

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Defection, Territoriality, and the
Evolution of National Security Discourse

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Geography

by

Carol Ann Medicott

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
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PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

- Medlicott, Carol. (2003). "Re-Thinking Geographical Exploration as Intelligence Collection: The Shared Epistemology of Reconnaissance and Lewis and Clark's 'Corps of Discovery' as Exemplar." *Terrae Incognitae* 35 (2003).
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Defection, Territoriality, and the
Evolution of National Security Discourse

by

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Professor John Agnew, Co-chair

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By examining the concept of defection and how it interconnects with territoriality, this dissertation seeks to add to geographers' understanding of territoriality as well as to reveal how national security discourse has evolved alongside both. Defection is closely linked to national security discourse. Though essentially a type of migration from one place to another, defection is distinct because it requires a context of binary conflict, and it assumes that the defector, by breaching a secured boundary, participates in the conflict and might affect its outcome. Although defection is conceptually connected to treason and loyalty, it is the element of territoriality that distinguishes defection from these related ideas. Defection is territorialized treason.

The dissertation examines defection's entry into the Anglo-American geopolitical lexicon during the Protestant Reformation, a pervasive binary

conflict with strong territorial implications, and against the backdrop of global geographical exploration and the formalization of intelligence functions within state governments. This points to an intrinsic interrelationship of geography and intelligence; and it suggests defection, a term most common to the intelligence profession, and territoriality, a prominent theme in geographic discourse, are deeply interconnected concepts.

The dissertation follows treason within contexts of territoriality from an early modern English to a modern American setting. American territorial imagination was most challenged during two periods: the generation following the American Revolution and the generation following the closure of the frontier. Americans' understanding of what a defector is and what the act of defection means for the security of American territory is best considered in light of the cultural imagination of American landscape as territory.

Examination of Cold War defection scenarios and security rhetoric reveals real and imagined implications for territoriality. With Korea as one site of the Cold War's founding, considering the integration of defection and territoriality in the inter-Korean context will be especially instructive. Defection reinforces a binary approach to political ideology, so it carries important implications for how the superpowers have imagined territorial security and security weaknesses, as well as the ways they have imposed and maintained their territorial schemes on the globe.

Triple Bronze

The Infinite's being so wide
Is the reason the Powers provide
For inner defense my hide.
For next defense outside

I make myself this time
Of wood or granite or lime
A wall too hard for crime
Either to breach or climb.

Then a number of us agree
On a national boundary
And that defense makes three
Between too much and me.

Robert Frost
(*A Witness Tree*, New York: Henry Holt, 1942)

Preface: Security and the Breaching of Boundaries

In the poem above, Robert Frost articulated a simple yet powerful explanation of the nested scales of human territoriality, from the scale of the individual human body to the scale of the nation state. Much of human interaction involves the erection and negotiation of boundaries, which are essential to define territories. The presence and fortification of boundaries contributes to conceptions of national security, so that when a boundary is breached national security is necessarily threatened. Boundaries are key features in geopolitical conflict, and attempts to penetrate boundaries through practices we define as intelligence gathering become central to the management of conflict between states. When boundaries are deliberately breached by individuals, who are

regarded as participants in conflict or who by their movement across a boundary affect the conflict's outcome, such an action can be called defection.

This dissertation will provide an integrative analysis of three concepts - defection, territoriality, and national security - as they have come to inform US foreign policy. I intend to explore how three complex sets of ideas never before, to my knowledge, studied alongside one another - defection, territoriality, and national security - have in fact, informed one another profoundly. At the same time, I intend to show how all three concepts have informed the evolution of geopolitical discourse in the United States. There will be a strong historical component: the foundation of my argument involves locating the basis to our contemporary understandings of defection, of political territoriality, and of national security in England's early modern period, from the late Tudor/Elizabethan period through the English Civil War. I contend that two other critical periods also inform present understanding of the three central concepts: the first generation following the American Revolution, roughly 1780-1830; and the period of America's shift from global periphery to global dominance, 1900-1930. I then turn to the Cold War period, following the development of the three interrelated concepts from the late 1940s to the present day.

Among geographers and historians of ideas there has been increased attention in recent years to the processes brought to bear in the construction of knowledge about distant places by the Western powers, particularly during the early modern period. Producers of geographic and cartographic knowledge - that is, authors and compilers of travel accounts, atlases, maps, and other geographic texts - were not always direct

participants in voyages of exploration. Consequently, the ways in which trust and credibility were established between those gathering geographic information and those consuming it have come under scrutiny.¹ Scholars have observed that the texts produced through geographical exploration amount to “power-knowledge,” after Foucault, who posits that bodies of knowledge are necessarily tied to systems of social control.² Common themes in the recent work on the construction of geographical knowledge in the early modern period, “when much of the world was made visible for the first time to educated Europeans,”³ have been the related concepts of vision and observation and an epistemology of trust and witness. Dorinda Outram states this succinctly by noting that, “The essence of the explorer’s claim was to be trusted as an eyewitness to a world that few or no others had seen.”⁴ It seems fairly obvious that information developed through the intelligence profession and its various methodologies, including the collection of knowledge from defectors, accords closely

¹ See Daniel Carey, “Compiling Nature’s History: Travellers and Travel Narratives in the Early Royal Society,” *Annals of Science* 54 (1997): 269-292; Dorinda Outram, “On Being Perseus: New Knowledge, Dislocation, and Enlightenment Exploration,” in *Geography and Enlightenment*, ed. David J. Livingstone and Charles Withers (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 281-294; and Charles Withers, “Reporting, Mapping, Trusting: Making Geographical Knowledge in the Late Seventeenth Century,” *Isis* 90 (1999): 497-521.

² The concept of knowledge as power is explored in Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, edited by Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books), 1977. Maps and other geographical works as “power-knowledge” is a theme in both J.B. Harley, “Silences and Secrecy: The Hidden Agenda of Cartography in Early Modern Europe,” *Imago Mundi* 40 (1988): 57-76; and James R. Akerman and David Buisseret, *Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps: A cartographic exhibit at the Newberry Library* (Chicago: Newberry Library, 1985).

³ Michael Heffernan, “‘A Dream as Frail as Those of Ancient Time’: The In-credible Geographies of Timbuctoo,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 19 (2001): 203-225, p. 203.

⁴ Outram, 283.

with Foucauldian power-knowledge. After all, “intelligence” is simply another word for information, and is employed almost entirely in reference to information that is collected and employed for tactical or strategic purposes in the negotiation of power relationships, including all-out conflict.

The transparency and legibility of places – how transparency and legibility are achieved and what these conditions enable, especially in terms of managing geopolitical relationships - is a theme that will recur throughout the dissertation. With the emphasis - beginning in the early modern period and continuing through the Enlightenment - upon visual practices to produce knowledge, we inhabit a modern world system that continues to be informed by similar assumptions. Our contemporary international setting still largely rests on the presumption that practices of observation, classification, and quantification make places transparent and legible to those in authority internally in those places, as well as to those who may aspire to power over them.⁵ A state’s transparency, at least in many respects, is virtually a prerequisite to enable its full participation in the global community. To achieve a normative condition of sovereignty, a state must permit the gaze of the international community to penetrate its territory, illuminating the ways in which the territory is organized politically, people are regulated and governed, and authority is discharged and reproduced. In theory at least,

⁵ For an influential account of how state authorities make the contents and inhabitants within a state’s own territory legible, to more effectively regulate and control social processes and outcomes, see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Additionally, the history of the mastering gaze in the Western intellectual tradition, especially insofar as it reduces and objectifies the globe, is explored in Denis Cosgrove, *Apollo’s Eye: A Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the Western Imagination* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

external recognition results from states' making themselves transparent; and recognition, which can only be bestowed from the international community external to a state, is ironically a necessary component of sovereignty, the condition that ensures states' immunity from uninvited external intervention.⁶ Of course, the practice of modern statecraft includes the idea that a primary way of managing and mitigating external threats to the state is to protect various elements that are considered vital to a state's security or to its national essence by altogether concealing them from the broader international gaze or by shielding them from full scrutiny. Thus, state's systems of security are, in general, organized upon foundations of secrecy, and include complex procedures of concealment, masking, and deception.⁷ Moreover, they necessarily include the efforts to penetrate the secrecy and detect the deceptions of adversaries. Particularly in conditions of binary conflict, security or "intelligence" services basically attempt to collect information that is being actively concealed, information that tends to be place-specific relative to the territories of adversaries. Defectors, with their place-specific information, represent one method that intelligence services exploit to gain strategic advantage over adversaries and rival intelligence services.

⁶ See Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (editors), *State Sovereignty as a Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). This volume of essays is organized around the notion that sovereignty is a normative condition that results when four constituent elements – territory, authority, population, and recognition – come together in the context of a particular place, namely, the state.

⁷ For a theoretical discussion of secrecy as it is integrated into various aspects of political and cultural life, see Sisela Bok, *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), especially Chapter 12 ("Secrets of State," 171-190), and Chapter 13 ("Military Secrecy") in which she notes the role of secrecy in "confounding one's enemies" (191-194).

By arguing for the recognition of the inherent geographic property of defection, and by accentuating the critical role of knowledge and its strategic use in the defection process, I hope to demonstrate the relevance of this project to the literature on the history of ideas and the historical spatiality of knowledge. Locating both the early understanding of defection, as well as England's first experience with professional intelligence to support the state, during the early modern period, when global exploration was at its height and a "Cold War" type rivalry between the newly Protestant England and Catholic Spain dominated the political climate of Europe, allows us to consider intelligence information - and defector information in particular - as knowledge with a strong spatial component. It also reminds us of the emphasis shared between geographic discourse and intelligence discourse of establishing credibility when knowledge is being collected and used for strategic aims.

I wish also to position my work with respect to similar conceptual terrain that has recently been covered or is just now being addressed by scholars of critical geopolitics. For example, my work might be seen as resembling that of David Campbell, whose book was aimed at scrutinizing some of the discursive origins of national security discourse.⁸ Campbell's objective is to elucidate how national security discourse both informs and produces foreign policy. I am proceeding largely from a position of agreement with Campbell, at least in terms of his overall theme if not all his specifics. But additionally, I am explicitly seeking to reveal the connections among

⁸David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

geography, intelligence, and foreign policy. This appears to overlap the latest work by Neil Smith, whose book *American Empire* explores the deep interconnections between the geographic profession and America's intricate foreign policy machinations of the early and mid-20th century.⁹ My work might be seen as sharing commonalities with both these themes, but I hope to add a further dimension to both. By exploring the ways in which territory and defection are integrated and in which they together inform national security discourse, I hope to help clarify a condition that heretofore has gone largely unnoticed – namely, the fundamental relationship between geography and intelligence.¹⁰

⁹ Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

¹⁰ One exception to this is found in an article by Michael Heffernan, "Geography, Cartography, and Military Intelligence: The Royal Geographical Society and the First World War," in *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 21:3 (1996), 504-553. Heffernan insightfully suggests that the collection of military intelligence and the collection of geographical knowledge are "closely interwoven" (505). He cites British intelligence historian Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London: Heinemann, 1985), as being aware of the interconnections in between intelligence and geography in the history of Britain's secret service (perhaps more aware than his professional counterparts who document American intelligence history); although Heffernan suggests that Andrew's argument is not "theoretically complex" (524, n13).

Chapter One

Navigating the Territory - Geography and National Security

Introduction: Why Defection?

It might appear as though defection is an odd topic for a dissertation in geography. Defection is a term that is encountered mostly in social and political settings in which a troubling shift of loyalty is taking place, usually on the part of an individual vis-à-vis a group, accompanied invariably by a spatial shift as the individual quits a group in one place and transfers his or her loyalty (and physical body) over to an alternate group elsewhere. However, it should be easy to discern that were it not for a set of assumptions that arise directly from geographic imaginations of how groups relate to and inhabit physical spaces, defection would not be particularly distinguishable from other types of human migrations over space. Central to this set of assumptions is the idea of space as territory: that groups transform their inhabited spaces into territories, in which they behave in territorial ways. And relatedly, this includes the idea that boundaries exist between territories; and territorial boundaries are normatively unbreachable, outside of the context of established rules and practices. This observation I believe to be a largely unacknowledged truism regarding the common understanding of the term “defector” – that it rests fundamentally on a geographic imagination of territories separated by fortified boundaries from other territories.

Defection is a type of human movement through space. Like other processes of human migration through space, defection impacts the spaces that are crossed, including

the defector's origin and destination, and often may impact these spaces dramatically. The defector is also personally affected by the spaces which the defection involves. Considering that geographers are vigorously engaged in the study of other kinds of human migration and the impacts of human migration on the landscape, it seems peculiar that defection has eluded attention. In the United States, during the second half of the twentieth century in particular, defectors to the United States were treated by the judicial system under the same body of law pertaining to the legal immigration process.¹ This reinforces the notion that defectors are simply a type of immigrant. Yet, while scholars have studied other kinds of immigrants, such as refugees and asylum seekers, defectors have largely remained unexamined.

There are certain key distinctions between defectors and other migrants. Perhaps the most significant distinction is that defectors possess particular types of information or knowledge that they intend to use, or are at least willing to use, to the detriment of the territory from which they are exiting. Another distinction is that defection is always associated with conditions of binary conflict, while other types of migration can occur irrespective of conflict. Granted, migrants such as refugees or asylum seekers may have experienced conflict, and the conditions that engender refugees or asylum seekers almost invariably involve some type of conflict. But unique to defection is the notion that a defector moves from one "side" to the opposing "side,"

¹In an unpublished report produced for the Jamestown Foundation, Etienne Huygens states, "The term 'defector' has no real legal existence as have other notions such as political refugee and asylee... The terms 'political refugee' and 'asylee', to the contrary, have both a very precise contents, defined on national and international levels." See Etienne Huygens, "The Notion of Defecting: Attempting to Define and Compare," Jamestown Foundation, 1986.

and that these two “sides” are engaged in conflict with one another. Moreover, a defector is an important component in the management of conflict between places, places that are fortified against one another and also perhaps hidden from one another. A defector’s knowledge is place-specific, and a defector can help to make a place legible by revealing what opponents strive to keep hidden from one another.

The Territorial Element - Territorialized Treason

The common understanding of defection rests upon assumptions of territorial spaces with fortified boundaries. Inherent in the idea of defection is the notion that the defector is a traitor to the group occupying the space that is left behind, and moreover that the act of exiting is itself an act of treason. One can be a traitor, though, without being a defector; and treason is understood primarily as a condition of profound and deliberate disloyalty. It is the element of a territorial shift, or at least of a territorial imagination, that transforms a traitor into a defector: defection is territorialized treason.

The idea of a the state as a territorial political unit with fixed boundaries, which is the container for a “nation,” a national culture, and a national ideology,² is fairly recent in the West. The shifts in English political thought that transformed the physical space of England into a territorial state began in the sixteenth century with the Protestant Reformation, continued into the seventeenth century and were affected by the

² See John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory,” *Review of International Political Economy* 1:1 (January 1994), 53-80. For the rise of the nation more generally, see J. Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982); E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); and Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

“discovery” of distant lands and advances in the navigational sciences. The transference to the American setting of a variety of English cultural and ideological forms and practices, including political culture, has been widely remarked upon, and the English assumption that ideology may be embedded in and contained by territory is among the ideas transferred to the American context. With America as the inheritor of formative notions about political territoriality, it is appropriate to follow the evolution of ideas about deflection and territoriality to the early American Republic.

It seems that territorial behavior in the early Republic was motivated by love and loyalty to place, but with greatest attention to the place of everyday experience. Absent the mechanics of nationalism, such as wide and simultaneous dissemination of print media to a literate populace, as well as the material and symbolic infrastructures of the state,³ the broader geographic scale, such as the federal state, was not the space of everyday experience nor of everyday imagination. So the spaces that engendered the loyalty tended to be the narrower spaces of everyday experience, such as locality or individual state. Not only does this seem to have been a dilemma of the early Republic, but this dilemma seems to have persisted until the Civil War, an event which jarringly brought to a head the fact that local places in the young United States tended to

³ Benedict Anderson’s account of the rise of nationalism, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), credits widely disseminated print media as essential to the nation, as it provides a mechanism through which citizens can imagine the nation as a far-flung community of individuals with a common identity, though they may remain strangers. This work has been enormously influential. Others, though, such as John Agnew, “Nationalism,” in *Companion to Cultural Geography*, J. Duncan et al, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, forthcoming 2003), caution that excessive emphasis upon print media diverts attention from material and symbolic infrastructural elements that have been equally important in establishing the concept of the nation, elements such as museums, currency, educational curricula, arts and pageantry, and management systems for public lands.

engender more loyalty than did abstract ideas like “nation.” Consequently, the later nineteenth century gave rise to many efforts to fuse an American national identity with a territorial imagination that extended beyond the local or regional scale. Critical to these efforts was the construction of national memory and the inscription of national memory onto the American landscape through memorial sites and structures. I will argue that ideas about defection, the role of defection in transforming land into national political territory, and the importance of treason and loyalty (the two sides of defection’s “coin”) in securing the nation, began to be communicated both subtly and not so subtly through memorial landscapes and iconographic displays.

National Security, Intelligence, and the Territorial State

Although it is common to speak of defection from any number of social and political affiliations – from religious cults, from political parties, from corporations, etc. – it is in the context of large-scale binary conflict between states that the term has had the most profound impact on popular consciousness in the 20th century. Defection and defectors have loomed large in the negotiation of security strategies between geopolitical rivals. Defectors have the capacity to inflict grave damage on the national security of the state they leave behind, even while they have the capacity to enhance the national security strategies of the state to which they are defecting. Considering that defection is by its nature a territorial act, one might presume that territorial security and national security are essentially synonymous, but this has not always been the case. I intend to explore how the emergence of the territorial state coincided with the

emergence of the idea of a security apparatus – what we would call today an intelligence service - that would ensure the perpetuation not of a particular monarch, but of the state itself. Defection entered the political lexicon at precisely the same time that the language of state-sponsored espionage and intelligence began to be directed at the idea of protecting a particular territory, as a container of the state, both in addition to and as opposed to a monarch. Thus, defection appears to be inherently connected to conditions of national security, and these may wax and wane according to the actions of defectors. Moreover, defection is most commonly understood in the context of intelligence discourse, and intelligence discourse is fundamental to the practices and assumptions of national security.

One shortcoming of the contemporary intelligence profession in the United States, with its short genealogy reaching back little more than 60 years, is that it has made little or no attempt to theorize itself and its discursive practices. This statement may seem provocative, since “intelligence studies” clearly exists as an academic field in both the United States and Great Britain, often connected organizationally to departments of political science, “government,” international relations, or public affairs. Moreover, several scholarly journals are devoted to intelligence (and its counterpart, counterintelligence), such as *Intelligence and National Security* (edited by Frank Cass), *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (edited by Taylor and Francis), *Studies in Intelligence* (edited by the CIA, but unclassified), and the electronic *International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Terrorism Studies* (edited by Knightsbridge University). However, overwhelmingly these journals cover various

tactical and methodological concerns in intelligence operations. They tend not to address the theoretical underpinnings of intelligence profession itself: the processes which intelligence profession purports to carry out, and the justification for the assumption that the intelligence process produces information that is credible and presumed “true.” By the late 1980s intelligence studies scholars were producing work examining and comparing procedural and ethical aspects of intelligence, as well as recommending how intelligence organizations could best serve national needs, and Roy Godson is a scholar whose work has dominated this segment of the intelligence studies literature.⁴ Additionally, there was a growing body of work examining how the intelligence profession was situated organizationally within a democratic political system involving checks and balances and legislative oversight, and the work of Loch Johnson is representative here.⁵ The primary “theoretical” issue to rise to the fore in intelligence studies has involved the reassessment of the intelligence process and how it should be reoriented since the end of the Cold War, which eliminated the overwhelmingly binary nature of conflicts faced in the national security arena; and this

⁴See Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Elements of Intelligence* (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1983); K.G. Robertson, ed., *British and American Approaches to Intelligence* (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, and London: MacMillan, 1987), especially Chapter One by Roy Godson, “Intelligence: An American View,” 2-36; Roy Godson, ed., *Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The US, the USSR, the UK, & the Third World* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988); Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1990's: Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989).

⁵Loch K. Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry: Congress and Intelligence* (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988); and Loch K. Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

exercise has engendered work by the same group of scholars.⁶ What theoretical content is present in this work, however, concerns more the changes in what constitutes national security threats than theory about how and why intelligence itself is conducted. Of course, there is also a burgeoning literature addressing the history of the intelligence profession, much of which is produced by intelligence “insiders,” who base their accounts on personal experience (these will be discussed further in Chapter Six), since the kind of documentation available to historians in other fields is often inaccessible to scholars because of classification restrictions. With the passage of time, many archival materials relating to the earliest years of the Anglo-American intelligence communities have been released, resulting in the production of some acclaimed historical accounts, especially those by Christopher Andrew and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones.⁷ One might venture to say, however, that the intelligence studies field has substituted history for theory. With the intelligence profession seeming on a certain level to be causally linked with

⁶ See for example Richard Schultz, Roy Godson, and Ted Greenwood, *Security Studies for the 1990s* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1993); Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt, eds., *U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agenda for Reform* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1995); Loch K. Johnson, *Secret Agencies: US Intelligence in a Hostile World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); and Loch K. Johnson, *Bombs, Bugs, Drugs, and Thugs: Intelligence and America's Quest For Security* (New York: New York University Press, 2000).

⁷In addition to Andrew's *Secret Service*, such works include Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); and David Stafford and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, eds., *American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations, 1939-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000). The ability of newly released archives to enable historians' accounts of intelligence history is not limited to Western intelligence, and works have likewise been recently produced on Soviet KGB history, such as Christopher M. Andrew (with Vasili Mitrokhin), *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

some of the most iconic events of the 20th century, intelligence studies seems to have conflated theory and history. It seems that intelligence scholars' ability to demonstrate the formal intelligence profession as a necessary outcome to a set of empirical threats is intended to suffice as a theoretical foundation.

Although I will consider particular aspects of intelligence history and intelligence studies, as well as the consequences of intelligence practice where defectors are concerned, I am less concerned in this dissertation about the tactical and historical aspects of the intelligence profession and more concerned about how professional intelligence, in the abstract sense, is a product of both territoriality and national security discourses, insofar as it is through these that the "threats" upon which the intelligence profession is focused are conceived of and produced through these discourses.

Concentrating upon intelligence in the abstract sense, I will argue that an epistemology of reconnaissance, by which I mean a reliance upon practices of observation and visual scrutiny of places that are distant, opaque, or partially concealed, sustains the modern intelligence profession. This argument is borne out in part by the fact that many of the terms used in the intelligence profession allude to vision; espionage and spy, of course, come from the archaic 'espie,' meaning to detect something visually. In fact, one of the earliest documented uses of the word intelligence in a context virtually identical to the present one is from the well-known 1614 geographical text by Samuel Purchas, the *Pilgrimage*, and refers to the need for credible human reporting to confirm a supposition

about a distant and invisible place: “I suspend [belief] till some eye-intelligence of some of our parts have testified the truth.”⁸

And the connection of professional intelligence with practices of vision is not confined only to the Anglo-American history of espionage. A September 2002 *New York Times* article detailing progress of American intelligence specialists in assessing Al Qaeda quoted an excerpt from an Al Qaeda manual on how to conduct espionage: “The spy is called an eye because his work is through his eyes, or because of his excessive preoccupation with observation... as if all his being is an eye.”⁹ Thus, in keeping with the intelligence profession’s emphasis upon the visual as the most authentic way of knowing, defectors’ value rests in part on their potential ability to make concealed, opaque, or invisible places more transparent and visible.

Having discussed the three concepts that are the basis of the dissertation, I will briefly discuss an additional premise that informs this research, namely, that one must give attention to the linguistic construction of particular “keywords” that structure ideas. Following that, I will continue to situate the concept of territoriality by reviewing some of the literature that examines the development of territoriality as an idea in human geography. I will then turn to a discussion of my research problem, sources, and research methodology. Finally, I will offer a brief summary of the overall structure of the remaining chapters.

⁸ Quoted in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, online version.

⁹ Dexter Filkins, “War of Secrets; Bin Laden’s Guys Have Cloaks and Daggers, Too,” *New York Times*, September 8, 2002.

Linguistic Approach to the History of Ideas

The three concepts that I will be considering are all linguistically complex.

Defection is a noun derived from the verb, “to defect.” But “defect” can of course also be a noun, part of a family of words – defect, defective - that appear to be very different in their meaning from defection, defect, and defector. Territory is no more straightforward in its meaning than defection. It has an “unsettled” etymology, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, and while it appears to be related to the Latin noun meaning “land,” it is derived – along with its apparent Latin root - from an older Latin verb meaning “to frighten,” from which we get “terror” and “terrify.” “National security” does not appear to be a particularly mystifying term, until one stops to think that the term is usually employed in reference to the territorial and infrastructural security of a state, and that a nation and a state are far from being the same thing. National security, conceptually and functionally, in the modern world is very much part of the bureaucratic apparatus of a territorial state. Nation groups with aspirations to statehood rarely if ever have national security apparatuses, because, a bit paradoxically, the territorial existence of a state with its material infrastructure seems to be the necessary framework for what we call a national (as opposed to state) security apparatus. One was more likely to hear the term “state security” in the context of the intelligence and security apparatuses of a totalitarian state such as the former Soviet Union or its satellites. This can perhaps be accounted for by the notion that the socialist totalitarian system presumed the collapse and dissolution of nations into a state of ever-

increasing scope. Relatedly, the term “national security,” far from lacking a material dimension and referring only to the imaginative and mythical construct of a nation, can be interpreted instead as referring to the security concerns of a national democracy, in which the people comprise the institutions that in turn comprise the state.

It is important, then, to examine the history and etymology of concepts if we wish to enhance our contemporary understandings of those concepts. After all, unless our contemporary understanding of words and concepts is indeed, as historians of ideas argue, the result of a progression of ideas about those words that have become sedimented over time in collective consciousness, words could in fact mean whatever we want them to mean at any given time. The best confirmation of the validity of this approach is found in the work of Raymond Williams, and it is from his work that I draw my basic theoretical framework not only for the analysis of the meaning of defection, but also for analysis of my other two concepts and of a few additional meaning-laden words that I shall address in forthcoming chapters. In *Keywords* Williams notes that people are typically not conscious of the problems raised in contradictory uses of the same word. His “keywords” are “significant binding words in certain activities and their interpretation; they are significant, indicative words in certain forms of thought.” He asserts that, “Certain uses (of such words) bound together certain ways of seeing culture and society. Certain other uses seemed...to open up issues and problems.” Surely the words *defect*, *defect*, *defective*, *defector*, and *defection* are nearly ideal examples of what Williams had in mind, especially when he notes that words critical to areas of thought or learning regarded as separate suggests that those areas of learning

may not in fact be so separate. Williams' recommendation that we must "be conscious of the words as elements of the problems" seems to validate the notion that the etymology and evolution of deflection, as well as other terms I shall consider, might offer clues to a better contemporary understanding.¹⁰ I do not mean, of course, to imply that etymology alone dictates the meanings of intellectually laden terms as they have evolved in social contexts. Words such as those I will be considering refer to practice and performance, which may well exist in other temporal or cultural settings apart from the existence of those words to describe them. I simply want to offer this line of analysis as a reminder that our understanding of certain heavily laden "keywords" may be substantially informed by nuances of meaning of which we are perhaps not consciously aware, nuances that have been embedded in the words because of their complex etymologies.

Background to Territoriality

The territorial state has become so commonplace as a normative construction for a political community that it is easy to forget that there are other ways to conceive of a national political community. Political geographers have observed that the primary mode of imagining one's own nation state is not necessarily a territorial one.¹¹ While some people may describe their nation-state as a territorial space, such as the

¹⁰Raymond Williams. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. Surrey: Croom Helm Ltd., 1976, 12-14.

¹¹ See in particular Gertjan Dijkink, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 16.

continental United States that stretches, thanks to “manifest destiny,” “from sea to shining sea,” others may be more apt to describe their nation, notwithstanding a real territorial existence, in terms of adherents to a particular cultural framework or a set of political ideals.

Analysis of the political ramifications of territoriality, such as the rise of the territorial state, is complicated by the fact that some scholarly discussions of territoriality tend to treat it as a natural consequence of animal behavior. Humans, as most animals, naturally demarcate for themselves the physical space necessary to provide their life necessities; and they are willing to defend this physical space against those who would invade it or claim its resources. With territorial behavior commonly observed to be “natural,” it is only a short leap to the assumption that territorial forms of governance are also natural. Robert Sack’s account of territoriality privileges its association with human behavior and its effects upon human organizations and upon behavioral dynamics and strategies both within and among organizations. Additionally, by showing how human behavior has been a consequence of spiritual orientation, Sack’s work on territoriality grounds it in Judeo-Christian spiritual assumptions. In Chapters Two and Three I will consider the strong religious and spiritual implications of defection. Indeed, among the early English uses of the word was its invocation in the context of committing spiritual treason by rejecting the Church and its teachings. Because the spiritual component of defection is so strong, it is particularly appropriate to relate it to accounts of territoriality that feature analyses of sacred space as well as

present Church territoriality as perhaps the most important manifestation of human territoriality in the West and assume it to be a kind of precursor to modern state territoriality, all of which Sack's account purports to do.

However, other analyses of territoriality besides Sack's must also be considered. In addition to attending to historical dimensions of territoriality as manifested in human organizational behavior and organizational strategies, I want to also incorporate brief observations about territoriality as a state's manner of visualizing, of territoriality as a manifestation for governmentality, and of territoriality as a foundation for geopolitical assumptions in international relations. These views are to be found in studies of territoriality by James C. Scott, Matthew Hannah, and John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, respectively.¹² Additionally, I will draw from two works of Kenneth Olwig, who resituates territoriality within the idea of landscape, by reminding that the meaning of a landscape as a restricted and bounded territory should not be lost in our overwhelming recourse to the aesthetic implications of the term landscape.¹³ Finally, I will note the observations by Anssi Paasi on how the need to maintain such an unnatural construct as territoriality gives rise to complex cultural practices and institutions.

¹² Scott, *Seeing Like a State*; Matthew Hannah, *Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory, and International Political Economy* (London: Routledge, 1995).

¹³ Kenneth R. Olwig, "Recovering the Substantive Nature of Landscape," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 86:4 (1996), 630-653; and Olwig, "Landscape, Place, and the State of Progress," in *Progress: Geographical Essays*, edited by Robert David Sack (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 22-60.

Turning first to Sack, he defines territoriality as a human strategy to affect, control, and influence people and resources through control of geographical area.¹⁴ Sack addresses the implications of territoriality for the rise of civilizations in a general sense and, secondly, for the rise of capitalist modernity in a somewhat more pointed sense. On the former, Sack suggests that territoriality was simply a mechanism to define and control people by encouraging people in a given area to identify with one another, and to posit themselves as potentially in conflict with those in another, perhaps neighboring, area. On the latter, Sack argues that territoriality is a device that creates the idea of emptyable and fillable spaces and obscures actual sources of power by creating the illusion that territorial scales are themselves the sources of power. Moreover, the idea of territory that has been at work under capitalist modernity is one in which territorial assumptions need not be resisted, because they are impersonal and natural (Sack, 125). In addition to treating at length how the Roman Church became an institution with a complex territoriality, Sack also investigates the more ancient sources of territoriality in pre-Christian Hebrew thought. These territorial assumptions arise in part from the nature of the Hebrew God, in contrast to the other deities that were assumed to exist by people in the ancient Near East. The Hebrew God was responsible for creating the whole world and was ubiquitous throughout the landscape, as opposed to enacting power over only a specific natural object or phenomenon. But, paradoxically, God was confined to a specific location – to a particular mountain, or

¹⁴ See Robert David Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

later, to a container in which the people transported him and a tent in which he was housed when the people encamped. Sack describes the logic whereby the territory of the Hebrews radiated outward from the sacred center where God was housed (Sack, 99-101). This Hebrew approach to territory is surprisingly similar to the spatial premise of Imperial China. Just as the Hebrew Ark represented the single point at which heaven and earth joined metaphysically, the throne of the Emperor in the Forbidden City was regarded as the point at which heaven and earth intersected. The spaces of the Chinese capitol were arrayed in concentric grids, with the closest space to the Emperor's person being the space where the Emperor's power and authority were most potent. Parallel to the Hebrew case, the Emperor was physically restricted to his sacred space and never left the confines of the Forbidden City, although his power was projected through proxy through the system of Confucian scholar-bureaucrats and other symbolic motifs.¹⁵ And in both cases, the idea of sacrality concentrated at a center point set up a tradition of pilgrimage, which in the Hebrew case took the form of pilgrimage to a temple to perform ritual sacrifices and in the Chinese case took the form of pilgrimage for performance of quasi-religious political rituals and presentation of political petitions.

¹⁵ For accounts of the symbolic spatiality of the traditional Chinese capitol and of the pre-modern Chinese world system generally, see C.P. Fitzgerald, *The Chinese View of Their Place in the World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Paul Wheatley, *The Pivot of the Four Quarters: A Preliminary Enquiry Into the Origins and Character of the Ancient Chinese City* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971); A.F. Wright, "The Cosmology of the Chinese City," in *The City in Late Imperial China*, edited by G. W. Skinner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977, 34-73); and Linda Hershkovitz, Linda, "Tiananmen Square and the Politics of Place," *Political Geography* 12:5 (September 1993), 395-420.

Another contextualization of the ancient Hebrew, as well as more recent Jewish, accounts of territoriality can be found in a 1975 analysis by Emanuel Maier of the Hebrew law or “Torah” as “movable territory.”¹⁶ Like Sack, Maier also suggests a parallel with Asian concepts of sacred spatiality, and he specifically compares the Torah, placed at the center of a worship site that is in turn at the center of a community of believers, with an eastern mandala, whose center is characterized by “high and intense value” (Maier, 20). He suggests that the Torah, with its spiritual and moral and legal content, provided a metaphorical terrain to which Jews of the diaspora, who were landless and persecuted, could repair for refuge. In short, Maier argues that the Torah offered metaphorical territory “as a substitute and in compensation for the loss of actual territory,” and at the same time functioned symbolically as an icon of territory (Maier 20, 22). Projecting this idea temporally forward into the modern world, Maier notes that the symbolic territory of the Torah “gave rise to the social and political structure of the ghetto, so typically internalized and isolated from the outside world” (Maier, 21-22). Maier argues that Zionism – that is, the compulsion to re-establish a Jewish territorial state – was born when the ghetto began to break down as a distinct and sequestered spot, a small substitute territory presided over by the iconic Torah; and Jewish intellectual life was encouraged to assimilate with the European mainstream. And he is mildly critical of the contemporary Israel for losing its metaphysical attachment to

¹⁶ See Emanuel Maier, “Torah As Movable Territory.” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 65:1 (March 1975), 18-23.

traditional Jewish law: “Apparently real territory is better suited to rally the people than the ‘movable territory’ which did well enough for two thousand years” (Maier, 23).

Returning to Sack, his work on territoriality deals at length with the Church as an institution whose power was organized and wielded territorially (Sack, 101-121). Sack draws from other work on sacred space, such as Robert Cohn, whose book treats the many strong geographical motifs in Judeo-Christian thinking, motifs such as wilderness, mountains, and rivers and their appearance as symbolic devices in narratives on exile, revealed wisdom, fertility, and reconciliation.¹⁷ Sack alludes to the early Christian belief in a spiritual realm existing alongside a material worldly realm and the possibility of simultaneous deference to the authority of each without irreconcilable conflict. One can conclude from his analysis that the Church becoming territorial – that is, using territoriality as a device to organize people at varying scales and impose authority hierarchically over space - presumed the collapsing of spiritual authority into political authority, a condition that more or less characterizes the Middle Ages. As an example of the territorial practice of the Church, Sack notes the common prohibition against clergy assigned at a particular territorial scale leaving their territory to travel elsewhere, without permission of a higher authority (111). And Sack diagnoses the territorial practice of the Church not in the context of the relatively simple civilizational territoriality, but rather in the context of the more complex and ominous modernist/capitalist territoriality, when he describes the process of reification and

¹⁷ See Robert L. Cohn, *The Shape of Sacred Space: Four Biblical Studies* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981).

displacement (Sack, 114). Reification, in his view, renders the controlling agent visible: i.e., the vast material infrastructure of the church, such as its imposing buildings and the sensory impact of its performance rituals. And displacement is the process by which we forget that territoriality is a device only; rather “we come to believe that the territory or place is itself the phenomenon that it represents, not a device of representation only.” In the case of the material infrastructure of the Church, the process of displacement is obvious, with the real authority and the representational trappings of authority merging into one another.

The Church’s territoriality was not seriously challenged until the Protestant Reformation swept Europe, accompanied not only by a gradual splitting of religious and secular authority, but also by a reorientation of ultimate spiritual interpretation – and the moral accountability that this imply - to the individual soul as opposed to the distant and external authority of the Church. Of course, the territorial state did not immediately replace the territorially structured Church, but rather came to exist alongside it, and could not have emerged without the erosion to the Church’s territorial authority that was a fundamental consequence of the Reformation. In any case, the question of divided loyalties that characterized much of the political and religious persecution of the Reformation – namely, whether loyalty to a state authority could exist alongside loyalty to Church or to one’s own private spiritual convictions – continues to plague the West right down to the present day.

Sack’s processes of reification and displacement apply just as easily to early modern and modern state territoriality as they do to the pre-modern territoriality of the

Church. The state's territoriality is reified, or made materially explicit, through a wide variety of representational devices – cartography, coins and currency, flags, structures where state practices and rituals are held, structures of memory, etc. – and all these collectively help to comprise a state's material infrastructure. The material representational framework itself comes to be seen as having authority, and, in displacement, people lose sight of the real source of power and the territory itself appears to be powerful. The role of cartography in disseminating a visceral conception of the territorial state cannot be underestimated here. Some theorists, notably Michael Biggs, argue that the modern territorial state depended upon cartographic representation.¹⁸ Granted, the feudal system of governance in medieval Europe gave greatest attention to accounting for land controlled by aristocrats with particular loyalties, but lands were seen as personal possessions of a monarch. They might fall in and out of the monarch's possession. They were not necessarily contiguous, nor were they seen as containers of any particular cultural or "national" consciousness. Lands were certainly not regarded as collectively constituting an entity that was transcendent over even the monarch. In short, they were not political territories. It required the various impulses we associate with the Reformation and with the early modern period in general, including the emergence of national consciousness and national cartographic enterprises, to lay the groundwork for the territorial state. Biggs discusses the importance of the cartographic image of the state in reinforcing the state's territory as a

¹⁸Michael Biggs, "Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and the European State Formation," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41:2 (April 1999), 374-405.

symbolic scale of membership to which people could identify. He reminds us that “while political theorists deduced Leviathan as a philosophical necessity, cartographers discovered it as a geographical reality” (Biggs, 376). Of course, one might observe that the Church had been doing precisely the same thing when it promoted the cartographic device of the “T-O” or orbis terrarum, a mapping approach that molded known land masses around a modified cross-shape, placing Jerusalem, the spiritual center of Christendom, at the center of a symbolic world geography.¹⁹ And, perhaps as a reinforcement to the symbolism of the T-O map of early medieval times, the Church concurrently evolved a sophisticated symbolic geography where its ecclesiastical architecture was concerned, so that even the church buildings themselves - with their nave, choir, high altar, and transepts arranged to form the shape of a cross, whose top end (the altar) was oriented towards the east and symbolic of resurrection - became maps of church territory. Both these devices functioned to reinforce Church territoriality and to reinforce popular consciousness of membership in that transcendent territory. In an even more explicit fashion, then, early modern cartography reinforced the rather novel notion of a territorial state that could function as a container for political authority, national culture, and national collective consciousness.

The assumption that the territorial state as a container for a national culture and a cohesive culture-bound society is a strong theme in Agnew and Corbridge’s account of territoriality. They note that as states have become territorially bounded entities,

¹⁹ See Norman J. W. Thrower, *Maps and Civilization: Cartography in Culture and Society* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972, revised edition 1996), especially 41-59.

cartographically engineered and reinforced through education, iconography, and myriad cultural practices, the field of international relations has come to rely upon the territorial fixity of states and the collapsing of national culture into state dimensions.²⁰ States are presumed to speak in the international community with a unified voice, representing a culturally coherent (if not completely homogeneous) citizenry. Social and political issues come to be rigidly categorized as domestic or international, and a continual appeal to states' territorial stability – conditions that may in many cases be problematic and highly fluid – dominates international relations discourse. This way of considering territoriality is important to the themes of this dissertation for several reasons. First, the existence of boundaries between territories and assumptions of territorial fixity and contribute to the understanding of defection, as I have indicated. Second, and relatedly, defection presumes a certain amount of political and social coherence within territorial boundaries, because it is against a coherent political or social construct within a bounded territory that defectors posit their action. And third, because defection is most familiar in the context of the intelligence profession, which itself only emerged historically as the modern state became territorial and began to conceive of threats to itself as originating from the world external to its borders and which throughout the latter half of the twentieth century was clearly implicated as a tool in the conduct of international relations, it is clearly relevant to take note of an account of territoriality that emphasizes territory's centrality to international relations theory.

²⁰ Agnew and Corbridge, especially 78-100.

Agnew and Corbridge, then, offer a strongly historical approach to territoriality as it emerged alongside the modern Western state. James Scott's analysis of territoriality is no less historically oriented, but it examines in detail the ways through which state authorities have transformed national and cultural spaces into political and social territories by imposing a scrutinizing gaze that demands systematization, conformity, accountability, replicability of a state's physiographic features, its built infrastructure, and its human inhabitants. For Scott, "seeing like a state" refers to the myriad ways that states maintain material cohesion as places where people can live in an orderly way, resources can be managed, goods can be produced, laws can be enforced, and a whole range of social outcomes can be predicted. Scott's approach focuses upon high modernism as the theoretical underpinning for state territoriality; and although it is easy to see how he can make his case by calling attention to some of the more infamous state-directed attempts at social engineering of the 20th century, his arguments are equally compelling when applied to any one of the many more innocuous case studies he presents of state-managed application of modernist expertise to everything from the building of road infrastructure to managed forestry. Because Scott conceives territoriality as resulting from states' efforts to account for their contents through techniques with a visual basis, it will be relevant to my later discussion of intelligence discourse, in which defection is situated, as also sharing assumptions that vision necessarily produces knowledge.

Matthew Hannah's work on governmentality and territoriality in 19th century America strongly echoing Scott's emphasis upon visual examination and surveillance as

a feature of the modern state which puts visually-based statistical techniques to work to create an orderly society through acts of normative description. While both Scott and Hannah proceed from an insight owed to Foucault that the disciplinary power of the state lies in its “minute regulation and ‘normalization’ of individual behavior through impartial observation,”²¹ Hannah’s work is theoretically explicitly dependent upon Foucault, in contrast to Scott who makes tactical use of Foucault alongside several other theoretical resources. Adopting Foucault’s term “governmentality,” which “constructs an object of knowledge, the social body, through discursive practices which, in giving it intelligible form, render this object at least partially susceptible to rational management,”²² Hannah performs a rigorous reading of the political-territorial management of America’s Gilded Age government bureaucrats and particularly upon the use of the census as a diagnostic tool for government management. For Hannah, as for Foucault, governmentality is intertwined with the visual tactics of surveillance that produce the disciplinary effects of modernity; but governmentality differs from discipline, in that in addition to regulating bodies, governmentality implies the discursive construction of a variety of social objects and formations for the purpose of managing them. Emerging from Hannah’s meticulous analysis of Gilded Age social management is a suggestion of the ways in which governmentality can be gendered, and he illustrates this theme with the example of US Census official Frank Walker who

²¹ Hannah, 18. Hannah is referring here to Foucault’s well-known analysis of Bentham’s “panopticon.” in *Discipline and Punish* (New York: Vintage, 1977).

²² Hannah, 24-25.

obsessively designed educational programs to instill and normalize in young men appropriately masculine characteristics. Hannah's approach to territoriality is useful to me for three reasons. First, like Scott, Hannah also privileges vision as an underlying component to territoriality, and this bolsters my argument that intelligence knowledge is essentially identical to geographic knowledge because of the "vision equals truth" quality of both. Second, Hannah notes that governmentality is inherently spatial, because, drawing from Michael Mann, the infrastructural power of the state which necessarily enables governmentality to occur is in large part a material infrastructure, existing in space, and subject to geographic interpretation.²³ This is a point to which I will return in Chapter Five, when I discuss the material establishment of roadside monuments as both tourist infrastructure and as texts for particular discourses of national identity and territoriality. Third, Hannah's discussion of the gendered qualities of Gilded Age governmentality may prove useful in my discussion of the national security discourse that began to emerge soon after in the era of progressivism. The concept of defection is part of a broader intelligence discourse that is overwhelmingly gendered, and the implications of this appear to warrant further study.

Consideration of Olwig's treatment of the "'territorial' meaning of landscape" is important for my present argument because of the way in which Olwig locates this territorial aspect through examination of landscape's linguistic history. He reminds us

²³ Hannah, 30-40. Hannah is drawing from Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol. II, *The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 59. Mann makes largely the same point about the infrastructural power of the state in his article, 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results,' *European Journal of Sociology* 25 (1984): 185-213.

that landscape is derived from *Landschaft*, a “Dutch form of a common Northern European term designating an area of territory – a province, district, or region,” and that the same term came to be applied to the distinctive genre of scenery painting that was emerging in Northern Europe of the sixteenth century. Olwig notes that “German language discussions of *Landschaft* are often obscured by the tendency to confuse and conflate older and newer meanings of the term... (I)t carried, and continues to carry, a range of meaning that goes far beyond natural scenery.”²⁴ Olwig continues by describing how landscape should be seen as more than an aesthetic construct, but rather as a domain presided over and even possessed, when considered from the point of view of the viewer. In a separate but related analysis, Olwig effectively presents the transformation of English scenery (both as aesthetic construct and as the possession of the monarch) into national territory. This happened, he argues, in the late sixteenth century, as monarch and the court inhabited the scenery in ritual and performative fashion both in the landscape itself and within enclosed court settings, as representations of the scenery are manipulated in dramatic performances and tableau.²⁵ Theoretically, Olwig’s work resonates with my argument, given his appeal to linguistic history and etymology as a source of insights on present use of the term landscape. And I will invoke his work later at specific junctures in Chapters Three, when I address the emergence of state territoriality and state-directed intelligence in the late Tudor period,

²⁴Olwig (1996), 631.

²⁵ Olwig (2002). Although the theme of this essay is to challenge the conventional understanding of progress, in doing so Olwig also highlights the shift in the relationship between landscape and territory in the late 16th and early 17th century English context.

and Chapter Five, when I note the emerging role of landscapes of memory in reinforcing territorial practice and a particular national security orientation in the early 20th century.

Finally, although state territoriality should rightly be evaluated, as Sack, Scott, Hannah, and Agnew and Corbridge all do in quite different ways, as closely implicated in the rise of capitalism and modernity, it cannot be “reductively explained in terms of their existence,” according to Anssi Paasi’s recent analysis of territoriality.²⁶ Synthesizing the history of the idea of territoriality, Paasi offers several important observations. First, he notes that unlike most other kinds of places, political territories “require perpetual public effort to maintain.” This makes political territories, ironically, among the most *unnatural* of places, when the reification-displacement power process of territoriality would have us accept territories as natural. Secondly, Paasi reminds us that state territoriality is “deeply seated in the (spatial) division of labor” within a state, and that a variety of actors within a state participate in the production and reproduction of territoriality, including not only politicians and government bureaucrats and military figures, but a host of other groups as well, such as cultural activists, journalists, and educators. For the purposes of my research, this is an important point. I shall later turn to not only the ways in which intelligence professionals reproduce territoriality, an obvious focus-area of this dissertation, but I shall also consider such cultural actors as producers of popular magazines and private culturally-oriented groups. In Chapter Five

²⁶ Anssi Paasi, “Territory,” in *Companion to Political Geography*, edited by J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 109-122.

I will pick up this theme with examinations of the arch-conservative women's group, the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR), with its determination to promote nationalist education and historic preservation; and two popular magazines of the 1910s and 1920s, the *DAR Magazine* and *Country Life In America*. Thirdly, Paasi makes an important observation about the role of boundaries as the "basic element in the construction of territories" when he notes that places can be classified or mapped apart that are not necessarily territories and "these become territories only when their boundaries are used to control people." The salience of this observation to my dissertation topic should be fairly obvious: the act of defection involves the breach of a territorial boundary, a boundary which not only is intended to control people but also the flow of information held by people. Finally, Paasi echoes the observations of Sack and others when he notes the fundamental shift in political territorial thinking that accompanied the Renaissance, when medieval ideas privileging a monarch's "control of people and cities" were set aside. Paasi cites recent scholarship that suggests the emergence of a "New Medievalism," namely, "a situation characterized by overlapping authorities and administrative structures." This is an interesting concept to consider in conjunction with my present topic, as the breakdown of the Cold War global order has produced an international setting in which traditional political boundaries have become increasingly porous and activities within territories increasingly difficult for state authorities to regulate and control.

Research Problem, Sources, and Methodology

Distilling this dissertation topic to a central research problem has been difficult. Rather than pose a single question, then collect data from which that question can be answered, I see my central research problem as consisting of how to integrate separate literatures, and indeed whole separate discourses that have long been regarded as quite unrelated, for the purpose of identifying and expressing new insights about each. Ultimately, the essence of my argument will be that, of these various literatures, “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts” type argument. Much of my “data,” therefore, consist largely of my ability to articulate a particular context in which I am analyzing an exceedingly wide range of source material.

The sources utilized in the preparation of this dissertation are wide-ranging, then, including both primary and secondary source materials. My primary sources include the following: period materials dating from the English Renaissance and pertaining to English state security; period publications from the early American republic, especially geography texts; published compilations of archival materials dating from the period of the Louisiana Purchase and pertaining to the shifts in American territorial imagination that accompanied the Louisiana Purchase; period magazines dating from 1910 to 1932, including multiple issues of *Daughters of the American Revolution Magazine* and multiple issues of *Country Life in America*; other period materials from the early 20th century relating to landscape, memory, and national identity; archival materials on early Cold War Soviet defectors (Stanford University collection) and on later Cold War Soviet and Bloc defectors (Jamestown Foundation);

Korean media accounts of inter-Korean defection events; personal interviews with individual defectors and with intelligence professionals (both Russian and American) who have worked with defectors. Another group of primary source materials that I will draw on for Chapter Seven and that are difficult to categorize includes books, pamphlets, and periodicals of North Korean origin.

The secondary sources I have consulted fall into a few broad categories: published literature on defection, treason, and related concepts; literature on the concept of territoriality; literature on the emergence of the territorial state in Europe; literature on the intelligence profession, including published analyses of England's early "secret service" during the Elizabethan period and beyond, as well as works on various aspects of the Cold War intelligence profession; literature exploring the transference of various aspects of English cultural and political assumptions to the American context; and literature on the inter-Korean political and territorial rivalry.

My methodology has varied slightly among various parts of the dissertation. As regards Chapters Two, Three, and Four, my approach has been to employ an analytical narrative to present my argument, validating my claims of interconnectedness among the concepts that I am exploring. In these chapters, I draw on archival and period material, and my methodology will include some analysis of content of letters and manuscripts, but I rely more substantially on secondary sources. In Chapter Five, I draw heavily on archival materials, and my methodology will include content analysis of magazines and other period publications. Chapter Six will be likewise mostly undergirded by content analysis of archival materials. Chapters Seven and Eight will

rely mostly on analysis of archival and/or Korean language sources, print media accounts, as well as use of personal interviews.

Organization of Chapters

In Chapter Two I will examine the concept of defection and its etymology in greater detail. I will discuss literature that is relevant to an understanding of defection, as well as to other related concepts such as treason and loyalty, as well as other associated types of migration, such as refuge and asylum seeking. My goal is to situate defection within a broader theoretical context, as well as within the contexts of both geographic discourse and intelligence discourse.

Chapter Three will examine the period of the English Renaissance because it is the setting in which three important themes arose simultaneously - defection as a term in the English political lexicon, the rise of state territoriality and privileging it as the political identity to which nations should aspire, and the rise of state-directed intelligence as a separate profession. In that chapter I will argue that our late 20th century concept of defection is derived from this period and linked to ideas associated with the Protestant Reformation. This early perception of defection was that it constituted the active and destructive betrayal of one set of beliefs in favor of its binary opposite. With the rise of the intelligence profession as part and parcel of a state apparatus also occurring during precisely the same period, it is no coincidence that defection has come to be most commonly associated with intelligence and security discourse. In the period of the English Renaissance, as political culture quickly evolved

so that ideologies came to be associated with specific bounded territories ruled by a state, the notion of defecting from a state came to require a territorial as well as a psychological shift. Thus, our contemporary imagination of the defection process necessarily exists alongside our imagination of places as bounded territories. Lesley Cormack and others have recently argued that the geographical imagination and the rise of academic geography in England during the Tudor period contributed to the sense of English national/territorial identity.²⁷ This work draws from earlier work by E.G.R Taylor on the role of the English in fueling the push towards exploration of the globe to advance English geopolitical and national security designs.²⁸ Scholarship on the Elizabethan political setting holds important insights on the internal and external conflicts and dangers faced by the regime, and how a semi-formalized and professionalized intelligence apparatus was formed as a result.²⁹ Additionally, several scholars from across a range of disciplines have noted the parallels between Elizabethan

²⁷ Lesley Cormack has addressed this theme repeatedly. See “‘Good Fences Make Good Neighbors’: Geography as Self-Definition in Early Modern England,” *Isis* (82), 1991, 639-661; “The Fashioning of an Empire: Geography and the State in Elizabethan England,” in *Geography and Empire*, Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith, eds. (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 15-30; and *Charting an Empire: Geography at the English Universities, 1580-1620* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997). See also John Scattergood, “*The Libelle of Englyshe Polyce: The Nation and Its Place*,” in *Nation, Court, and Culture: New Essays on Fifteenth-Century English Poetry*, edited by Helen Cooney (Dublin, Ireland: Four Courts Press, 2001), 28-49.

²⁸ Anyone addressing geography as a national undertaking in England during the early modern period must rely upon E.G.R. Taylor, including articles such as “The Missing Draft Project of Drake’s Voyage of 1577-80,” *Geographical Journal* (75:1, 1930), 46-47; and her two primary book-length accounts, *Tudor Geography, 1485-1583* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1930) and *Late Tudor and Early Stuart Geography, 1583-1650* (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.), 1934.

²⁹ This literature on the Elizabethan security climate is spread over both the areas of political history and of literary criticism.

England and “modern” American political culture.³⁰ It seems, then, that the territorial component of defection is a consequence of the shifts ongoing during the early modern period in political territorial imagination, and this has informed American attitudes about defection down to the present day.

Chapter Four will address how, because America inherited the mantle of English political-territorial thought, the process of following the conceptual evolution of defection, territoriality, and national security discourse in context of the early American Republic is justified. This chapter will explore the territorial assumptions and consciousness of the early Republic, as well as the nature of perceived threats to the American state. The period is critical, because it witnessed the first of a long series of territorial augmentations of the United States, a process we tend to explain by reference to the attitudes of “Manifest Destiny.” However, Manifest Destiny was not a term familiar to the early Republic, nor did it necessarily reflect attitudes held in the early Republic about America’s territorial future. Although the American government apparatus of that period is not normally regarded as having an intelligence capability or apparatus, I will argue that government-sponsored geographic explorations functioned as intelligence missions, and the native peoples and others enlisted to cooperate in reconnaissance and exploration can be seen as intelligence operatives and defectors.

³⁰ For a perspective from critical geopolitics, Campbell, *Writing Security*, especially Chapter Five; for a perspective from international relations, see Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), especially 122-134; for a perspective from literary criticism, see Curtis C. Breight, *Surveillance, Militarism and Drama in the Elizabethan Era* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996).

Chapter Five will confront the period of America's shift from global periphery to global center. This period is significant, because of the changes in how Americans were conceptualizing national territory and how they were conceptualizing threats to national territory. And, further, it is the period in which American identity was being challenged, because at the very time that American territory was fixed, American citizenship and the meaning of American political and social identity was placed in flux. I will identify three significant shifts relating to attitudes about America as a political space. First, the frontier was closed and manifest destiny was completed. Political strife in Europe engendered and accentuated American sense of its territory being sequestered, of its particular ideologies being associated with its national territory. Second, the increases in urbanization and increasing immigration, accentuated the attention of America's wealthy elite attention to non-urban spaces, including the rediscovery of nature and of the arcadian myths about "country." This engendered complex ideas about rural and "country" spaces as being the source of American identity and American values. Third, the period witnessed efforts to inscribe upon America's natural landscape a mythical and monumental national past. And, relatedly, there was a push to inscribe memory on the landscape through constructing monuments, as well as the promotion of natural landscape tourism and heritage tourism as enactments of territorial consciousness. Prominent within the efforts to make the landscape reflect national narratives were projects involving the Revolutionary period and the frontier, twin "cradles" of American civilization.

In Chapter Six I will address how the Cold War took shape and was treated discursively in a fashion that is striking in its similarities both to the Elizabethan Cold War as well as to the threat climate that evolved during the early American Republic. As the Cold War emerged as a binary conflict with clear territorial referents, it is easy to detect parallels to these earlier settings of binary conflict with their clear territorial referents, and to analyze defectors and their role in the intelligence profession using the analysis laid out in earlier chapters. I will also address the rise of the intelligence profession during this time, and its interconnections with academic geography.

In Chapter Seven I will examine the three themes of this dissertation with respect to a particular setting of binary conflict – the Korean peninsula. This setting was produced by, and continues to be heavily informed by, Cold War threat discourses. Although up to this point I will have concentrated upon developing the idea of defection and territoriality and national security within the English and Anglo-American contexts, examining defection in the Korean context should be useful. A Cold War style confrontation persists in Korea, where American political and ideological influence date back more than a century. Korea is one site of the original descent of the “Iron Curtain” in the late 1940s. And Korea is by many accounts an ontologically unified territory that is artificially divided by political circumstance and superpower intervention. So the idea of defection will necessarily be problematized there. I will consider the application of territorial discourses to early modern and divided Korea and attempt to suggest a more theoretically constituted explanation for how alternate discourses of territoriality have been implicated in the production of national security frameworks among the two

Koreas. Obviously, just as the Cold War has persisted in many ways in Korea, so too Korea is the site of the continuation of defectors and defection. This chapter will discuss how defection, as a particular type of movement between the two Koreas, is produced from and problematized by inter-Korean national security discourse

In Chapter Eight, I will resume looking at defection between the primary Cold War adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition to drawing upon information from archival collections of defector interview accounts and interviews of defectors themselves and of intelligence professionals (both American and Soviet) who dealt with defectors, I will also examine an organization established specifically to help defectors integrate into their new territorial setting, the Jamestown Foundation. This should help to illuminate how defectors themselves perceive their relationship to territory.

In conclusion, I hope to offer some theoretical insights into the integration among territoriality, national security discourse, and the act of defection, suggesting in particular that an integrative analysis of the three can reveal fresh avenues to understanding each one. Despite globalization and, by some accounts, the erosion of both real and conceptual boundaries between and among territories, a continuation of seeing the world in terms of reduction to binary conflicts seems to persist. Also, the institutional biases in the United States tend to perpetuate the espionage game and our belief that defectors can help to illuminate hidden places.

Chapter Two

Defection and Its Components

Introduction

The intent of this chapter is to review the existing literature on defection, which is scant, and to analyze defection alongside the concepts to which it is very closely attached, in terms of moral content – treason and loyalty – and also alongside other related terms that also connote conditions of migration – refuge, asylum, and sanctuary. These other related terms – both those that share defection’s moral and ethical qualities, and also those that share its suggestion of geographical displacement – all have a fairly substantial literature, at least relative to the literature on defection.

Why, if our present understanding of ideas is necessarily informed by the evolution of ideas and word-families over time, is defection viewed relatively unambiguously with little meaning outside of the late 20th century Cold War context? In beginning to examine an idea like defection, one cannot help but be struck by the fact that people seem to have very clear ideas about what a defector is and evince total confidence in identifying a defector relative to other migrant types. Yet, the most common definitions of defector could also be applied to migrating types who are clearly not defectors. For example, one common definition of a defector is simply someone who migrates illegally, clearly a condition also true of many migrants quite apart than defectors. Other common terms used to define defectors could just as easily be applied to people who commit a breach of loyalty or trust with no accompanying geographic displacement whatsoever; or, conversely, they could be applied to people who have

undertaken a geographic displacement, but have not necessarily committed a breach of loyalty or of trust.

Why do words or phrases such as “abandonment” or “to desert a country” seem to suffice as common definitions of defection, yet there are many instances in which no one would think of using “defection” in place of one of these terms? For example, one might say, “abandoning his hectic life as a New York City stockbroker, Tom deserted his job and disappeared into the Canadian wilderness,” but this statement of Tom’s situation hardly brands him as a defector to Canada. Yet, one might reasonably say, “Mr. Hwang abandoned his responsibilities in the foreign ministry and deserted his country,” in recounting the actual event in February 1996 of the elite North Korean defector Hwang Chang-yop. Common to both Hwang and the imaginary “Tom” are elements of abandonment and desertion. So why is “defection” applicable to certain transitions of political and social membership, but not to others, particularly when terms like “abandonment” or “desertion” might apply to both?

In short, it seems peculiar that a phenomenon such as defection, which appears to be easily and instantly recognizable and which has gained a prominent place in the American political and security vernacular over the past half-century, could engender such diverging accounts when people attempt to describe or define it. In formulating this topic, I initially confronted the question of whether the term defection has much meaning outside of the literatures of espionage and of international conflict.¹ But since

¹ Espionage itself is an adjunct of international conflict, not only conflict that is openly and actively expressed, but also conflict that is implicit and underlying. Espionage is implicated in conflict as the carrying on of a rivalry through clandestine, mutually invasive operations.

one can speak of defection in wildly varying contexts quite apart from espionage and international intrigue – from a religious cult, a baseball team, a corporation, or “across the aisle” from one political party to another – it seemed clear that simply studying how the term has become endowed with meaning in the fields of espionage and international security could only lead to a superficial understanding of defection and its territorial implications. Defection, then, is not a concept whose examination can be restricted to the vacuum of the espionage literature. As the introductory chapter asserts, the intelligence profession and those that write about it, at least in the United States, produce endless and largely sensationalized descriptive accounts, but little in the way of theoretical accounts. Thus, an understanding of how defection functions theoretically in the intelligence and security arenas is not likely to be found within the intelligence and security literatures.

In this chapter, I will discuss my attempt to arrive at a more satisfactory meaning of defection, to include locating the sources of the nuances of meaning that are seemingly taken for granted in the term’s popular usage. Part of this effort will include a look at why “defection” is related to its linguistic cousin, “defective,” in a way that is critical to a full understanding of defection. I will also explore how the term defection interrelates with a broader family of terms, which includes sanctuary and asylum, loyalty and betrayal, and treason. I hope to show why all of these terms are so important to theoretical discussions of territory, because they relate to fundamental issues of wholeness, otherness, and separation – all issues that are implicated in territoriality.

Etymology of Defection

As the introductory chapter mentions, examining the etymology of words offers one path to a better understanding of how words function in different contexts. So one reasonable place to begin my analysis of defection and its nuances is with the etymology of the family of words to which defection belongs. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary (OED)*, “defect” derives from the Latin verb “deficere.” A standard Latin dictionary defines “deficere” as, “to fail, desert, abandon...to defect, to secede.” Basically, this Latin definition matches a common English definition of defect. Going further into the etymology, the *OED* notes that the Latin “deficere” is derived from the root verb “facere,” meaning “to make, to do,” preceded by the affix “de-” that generally implies negation or moving away from. Literally, then, defection would seem to be the undoing or the unmaking of something, or the “making away” of something.

Relatedly, the primary meaning of the noun *defect*, according to the *OED*, is “the lack of essential component or element, without which a thing is incomplete.” Its secondary meaning is “a flaw.” But this secondary meaning is the one that happens to be the more frequently encountered in daily vernacular and from which the most commonplace understanding of *defect*. It is not difficult to connect these two nuances of the noun *defect*; after all, any adulterating factor that detracts from the intended condition of a thing can be understood as a flaw. But how then does the meaning of the noun *defect* intersect with that of the verb *defect*? One can easily see that a *defect* un-makes or un-does something, removing its essence and rendering it incomplete. Therefore, a defector is that essence which, if removed from the thing with which it

originates, leaves that thing flawed and incomplete. And unlike others who may leave their place of origin without their act of departure posing any particular danger to it, a defector uniquely may indeed be the “undoing” of the system that he or she leaves behind.

In light of these aspects of the origins of these words, the reasons for the common yet elusive usage of defection and defector become much more clear. The ideas of wholeness versus lack and completion versus incompleteness, seem central to both defectiveness and defection. Moreover, the idea of a thing and its opposite, which together make up a whole, emerges as an important image to convey the meaning of defection. Defection only seems to apply to a transition of identity between two adversaries. It takes place within a binary paradigm. When a thing is “defective,” when it has lost an essential component, - it is transformed from one thing into another thing. It does not oscillate among several possible new identities, but rather had left one behind and assumes another.

Adversariality within a binary paradigm, then, is the first central component of defection. In the political and social sense, to defect is to “cross over” to the adversary. Understanding this tells us why no one would speak of defecting from the United States to Canada or from Iceland to Spain, although one might readily speak of migrating illegally between these places or of abandoning one for the other. Also, it tells us why calling a particular transition a defection can be provocative in itself, because it reaffirms the fundamental condition of adversariality between the defector’s place of origin and the place of destination. This explains why use of the term “defection” can

be problematic in the Korean context since the two Korea's signed a mutual declaration of nonaggression in the early 1990's. Korean officials on both sides of the DMZ have declared the use of the term "defector" inappropriate because it reaffirms underlying adversariality in apparent contradiction of the nonaggression pact.

A second central component of defection would seem to lie in the Latin root verb, to un-make or un-do. For most political defectors, simply abandoning the system of origin is not enough. The goal seems often to be to provide information to the political system of destination. Indeed, this information is the "price of admission" for some defectors. An article describing the South Korean policies for "resettling" North Korean "escapees" and defectors says that the information which the escapee could provide to the government would be assessed and given a monetary value. This value was then incorporated into the lump sum of defection "reward money" and other non-monetary compensation such as housing and vocational training that former North Koreans would be allocated.² The Korean case is just one example of something that seems clear enough in the customary usage of "defector." Defectors must be of "value" in order to be called defectors, and the determination of their value becomes a determination of what level of knowledge they possess and are able to reveal about their system of origin. In the Cold War context, the most valuable defectors for each side would have been those who were members of military services and intelligence services - the state components which most directly administered the adversarial relationship

² Yoo Young Ock, "Problems and Policies Regarding Escapees From North Korea," *East Asian Review* 9:2 (Summer 1997), Seoul: Institute for East Asian Studies, 1998, 34-53.

between the two superpowers. These would have been the people who would most likely have possessed the knowledge which could “undo” their former system or government. The “defector,” then, represented that essence which, if removed from something, would leave it incomplete and literally “undone.”

In another example from the Korean context, some two hundred North Korean loggers assigned to work sites in Siberia as “guestworkers” declared en masse that they wished to seek asylum in South Korea. Although these loggers were embarking on an illegal migration and although they were abandoning their jobs and their country and perhaps even betraying their government, it was rare to hear this group described as defectors. Presumably their knowledge of the North Korean regime was not so great as to contribute to that regime’s “undoing.” This is not to suggest, however, that only people with singular military, intelligence, or political access might be termed defectors. The Cold War espionage genre literature is filled with references to defectors who were athletes or dancers. The term defector would be applicable to them, because their training by the state made them state property and an important cultural “essence” of the state, without which the state was incomplete.

Figures 2.1 and 2.2 attempt to illustrate the image of binary halves together making a whole, with the act of defection fundamentally “undoing” one half, while it also challenges the other half. This, I argue, is at the core of the defection concept. The wedge-shaped portions at the edges of the two halves are meant to represent potential defectors. In Figure 2.1, a loss has occurred, and one side of the binary image is fundamentally transformed by the loss of a key component. That component has moved

towards the other side, Figure 2.2, “un-making” the paradigm from which it came (2.1), making its essence available to the other side. These two figures should help to both spatialize and objectify defection. The related concept of membership is also clearly spatial, in that it suggests the common experience of some kind of bounded territory - cultural, social, political, or otherwise – that is, again, represented by the bounded circles in the two figures. Defection, the repudiation of one membership and the transition from one paradigm to an opposing one, is a spatial shift from one paradigm to another; it is clearly a spatial shift and may in many cases be accompanied by a literal shift in territorial space.

Visualizing the binary image in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 should also help to remind us that defection occurs in a truly binary setting and need not be unidirectional. If the spaces negotiated by defectors are two halves engaged in a “whole” confrontation, surely the act of defection can in theory occur relative to either half. Viewing defection objectively, it can only be thus; there can be no value judgement ascribed to one half of a binary confrontation or another, no assertion that a deliberate departure from one side is a defection while a departure from the other side cannot be a defection but is merely an exit. In theory, at least, defection would seem to be an equal-opportunity concept: one could have defectors from either side, although one would hope that one’s own side - the “good” side - would not engender defections.

Drawing from defection’s etymology a third key component that is critical to understanding defection, the term’s relationship to the noun and adjective “*defect*” and “*defective*” helps to clarify how we understand defection in a very visceral sense.

Defectors are flawed. They are “defective.” Particularly if they are deliberately departing from “our” side to go over to the enemy and threaten our own undoing, they must be defective, otherwise they could not commit such a heinous act. And defectors from the enemy are perhaps never quite trusted, even though they may be regarded on one level as heroes, because who but a flawed person could carry out such a betrayal?

However, despite the seeming condition of reciprocity among the two sides in defection, it is a common view in the intelligence and security communities in the United States that defection occurs in one direction only. The Washington, D.C.-based Jamestown Foundation, an organization established in the early 1980s to assist Soviet and Soviet Bloc defectors with a variety of resettlement issues, takes the position that defection could only occur “from East to West,” and that someone who chose to depart the West for the Soviet Bloc could not be described as a defector. By way of explanation, the Jamestown founder, a former official of the U.S. Department of State, noted that “anyone could go to the Soviet Union...all they had to do was buy a plane ticket,” and therefore they were not defectors but “only emigres.”³ This approach to defining defection would seem to count territorial boundaries and their breachability - and, implicitly, the capacity of a state authority to restrict movement - as the most important aspect, more important than a defector’s capacity to “undo” the place from which he comes. For a defection to occur, according to this approach, not only must there be binary conflict, but there must also be a secured and defended border between

³ Personal interview with Bill Geimer, President, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C., December 1999.

the two participants in the conflict and an effort by authorities on only one side to block movement across the border. If the border is easily and legally breached, no defection can be construed to have occurred; but if the border is breached with great difficulty and in the face of obstacles, this helps to define the act as a defection. In light of the defection's etymology, the addition of a condition about the particular form and character of boundaries dividing the spaces negotiated by defectors would seem to be entirely arbitrary.

Indeed, the approach to defining and categorizing defection taken by US intelligence "insiders" can be not only theoretically suspect, but wildly diverging from the straightforward understanding of a cross-boundary betrayal from one side of a conflict to another. An account in an intelligence studies professional journal, the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, of problems faced by US intelligence handlers relative to Soviet defectors explains defection in strongly Eurocentric imperialist terms, not as a phenomenon that has any particular bearing upon binary conflict or any inherent connection to a destructive betrayal, but rather as yet another iteration of a fundamental human yearning to "go West."⁴ In a discussion which smugly generalizes and essentializes a noble Anglo-American "West" versus a depraved Russian "East," the author makes a rather bizarre claim that Russia has long been an inherently undesirable place to be, and that the Russian system of governance has long implemented administrative procedures restricting people's movements,

⁴ Tom Polgar, "Defection and Redefection," *The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 1:2 (1986), 29-42.

without which, he argues, the population hemorrhage to Western Europe would be unstoppable. He infers that conditions under the Soviet regime were simply a continuation of a long-established trend.⁵ This account of defection is not only arbitrary, it traps defection in an overarching meta-trajectory of development that is both modernist and Orientalist, while it makes no attempt to address how defection differs from other acts of migration or to account for defection in other cultural settings or conflict scenarios.

I have identified three key aspects of defection that arise from the term's etymology: first, the accompanying context of binary conflict and the theoretical reciprocity of the action; second, the defector's active "undoing" of the paradigm from which he departs, by virtue of his departure; and third, the visceral understanding of defectors as flawed or defective. Although I have tried to point to how defection can be understood as a spatial concept and can easily be related to territoriality, since membership is often territorial, I am not arguing that territoriality is a fourth fundamental aspect of defection, by definition. Rather, I am arguing that the ways in which defect, defection, and defector have come to be used as a set of terms in political and social vernacular rest upon assumptions and imaginations of territoriality. And my mention of the Jamestown Foundation's arbitrary addition of secured boundaries breached only with difficulty for defection to occur should underscore the notion that territoriality has become implicit in the common understanding of what constitutes

⁵ In a particular context of Russian social history it is possible that such a point might be arguable. It will not be debated here, however.

defection. Whether or not one accepts that defection can occur in either “direction,” one assumes the existence of a boundary that the defector must breach – a boundary dividing one real or imagined territory from another one.⁶ Conditions of binary conflict can produce other kinds of migrating types, such as refugees and asylum seekers. And an individual can be the “undoing” of his group through acts of treason or betrayal that are not necessarily recognized as defection.⁷ Again, we return to assumptions and imagination of territoriality: territoriality seems to unfailingly inform defection and is implied by defection.

Analyzing Definitions and Uses of “Defection”

Even in today’s geopolitical climate well over a decade beyond the binary Cold War setting one is reminded that defection remains an ambiguous term. A July 2002 headline in a Canadian newswire read, “What is a Defector,” and the accompanying article about 23 Cubans who refused to return to Cuba after traveling to Toronto for World Youth Day began with an attempt to situate a discussion of these individuals’

⁶ The notion that a defector must have committed a physical transition from one territory to an enemy territory is reiterated in Vernon Hinchley, *The Defectors* (London and Toronto: Harrap, 1967), 10, who says that the defector “must have travelled to the country of his choice.”

⁷ Indeed, the approach taken in Chapman Pincher, *Traitors: The Labyrinths of Treason* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1987), is to review treason and acts of treason firmly from the standpoint of the Anglo-American intelligence services during the Cold War. Pincher categorizes different types of traitors, to include spies, terrorists, and defectors. He also devotes chapters to exploring deviance as an explanatory factor in treason – “The Homo-Sex Factor” (103-114), “Defects of Character” (166-174), and “Drink and Drugs,” (175-180) are examples. Although written for a popular audience and clearly categorized within the “spy” genre of popular literature, Pincher nevertheless gives at least passing recognition of the complex territorial component of loyalty (3), when he notes that people can be loyal to territorial spaces at different scales, and that loyalties to territory can easily be conflated with loyalties to the people and the systems of thought and culture that inhabit those territorial spaces.

immigration status in the context of dictionary definitions of defector. "It's the image... of a particular country that makes you say he's a defector," a Canadian immigration official was quoted as saying.⁸ It is useful to examine various published definitions of defection and defector; and placing definitions from the intelligence and security professions alongside more scholarly definitions, such as those from the Oxford English Dictionary, is especially instructive. A working definition of defector included in a US Army document providing regulations for the handling of "walk-ins" (an intelligence term referring to foreign individuals who, quite literally, approach or "walk into" a US military or diplomatic facility and offer to become clandestine informants) reads, "A person who unlawfully and voluntarily leaves control of a country that has views contrary to those of the United States, and allows him- or herself to come under control of U.S. authorities."⁹ The *Encyclopedia of Espionage*, a reference book compiled by US intelligence community retirees, defines a defector as:

A person who repudiates his or her country and may be in possession of information of value to another country. A person who has intelligence value who volunteers to work for another intelligence service. He may be requesting asylum or can remain in place.¹⁰

Since both of these definitions come from a late 20th century American context that was informed strongly by Cold War assumptions of conflict and national territoriality, it is

⁸ "What is a Defector?", Linda Ward and Adam Segal, CBC News Online, July 30, 2002.

⁹ United States Army in Europe (USAREUR) Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, HQ USAREUR/7A Regulation 381-22, "Processing Walk-Ins." May 17, 1999. Accessed via Federation of American Scientists (FAS) website, www.fas.org/irp/docdir/army/381-22.htm.

¹⁰ Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, *The Encyclopedia of Espionage* (New York: Gramercy Books, 1997), p. 158.

not surprising that they are similar in several respects. Both speak of leaving and rejecting a country, which is assumed to be a territorial entity. By using words such as “contrary” and “repudiate,” both suggest that defection occurs in a setting of binary conflict. And the second key element of defection is also present in both definitions – the defection as an “undoing.” Both definitions suggest that the defector willingly allows himself to be used and manipulated, with the implied end being detrimental to his country of origin. These definitions would suggest that what distinguishes a defector from other migrants in a conflict setting is their willful departure from one side and their willful submission to the other. And implicit in both definitions is an assumption that the entities in conflict are territories divided by fortified boundaries.

The Craft of Intelligence, written by Allen Dulles after resigning from his eight-year stint as autocratic head of the CIA, is intended as a comprehensive handbook of espionage methodologies within the context of Cold War binary conflict between Soviet communism and Anglo-American democracy. Dulles situates his brief discussion of defection within his chapter on “volunteers,” as a broad category of willing individuals who might contribute to an intelligence service’s goals by offering useful information.¹¹ Dulles’ account of defection seems to reflect both of the key elements that arise from the term’s etymology. According to Dulles, “the piercing of secrets behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains is made easier for the West” because of defectors, and a defector “can

¹¹ Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1963), 134-144.

literally paralyze the service he left behind.”¹² Clearly, Dulles is alluding both to binary conflict between the West and communism (in both its Russian and Asian variants, as evidenced by his evocative metaphor) and to the capacity of a defector to undo the system he leaves behind. However, Dulles also lapses into the meta-narrative of the West as being the place for which all human beings naturally yearn when he ends his discussion of defectors by stating, “the United States in particular has always been a haven for those seeking to leave tyranny and espouse freedom.”¹³

Turning to definitions of defector that appear in a scholarly resource outside of the intelligence profession - the *OED* - one is struck by how dissimilar the definitions are. In fact, one might suspect that the “intelligence insider’s” understanding and use of the term defection is of defection is ad hoc and based less upon systematic attention to the word itself than it is upon an insider culture within the intelligence profession. A review of the *OED* entries for defector, defect, and defection reveals the notion of “falling away” as a common element among the definitions for all three terms. A defection is described as the “action of falling away from allegiance or adherence to a leader, party, or cause...a falling away from faith, religion, duty, or virtue.” “Backsliding” and “apostasy” are offered as synonyms for defection, and “seceder or deserter” as synonyms for defector. “Falling away” and “backsliding” are not among the terms used in the intelligence and security literature to describe defection; these are passive terms and do not convey the notion of defection as an active and deliberate

¹² Dulles, 134 and 140.

¹³ Dulles, 144.

betrayal, which is how defection is more popularly understood. As another striking difference, missing from the *OED* entries is an explicit allusion to treason; but the connection is perhaps implicit in the use of terms such as apostasy, deserter, and seceder, all of which seem to contribute to a suggestion of a binary context and of betrayal. “Deserter,” moreover, has a distinct geographic connotation; it implies betrayal through abandonment of a particular place and the betrayal of a spatialized loyalty. For a variation of meaning that is geared to the 20th century Cold War context, the *OED* describes “defect” as, “to desert to a Communist country from a non-Communist country, or vice-versa.” This echoes my earlier assertion that the act of defection cannot be uni-directional, notwithstanding how some in the US intelligence profession have used it. Absent from the *OED* entries is any suggestion of the defector being distinct from other types of migrants across boundaries because of value and his potential for manipulation by authorities. Although that element of the definition can be deduced from the etymology, as I have tried to do, and is also a major component of the conventional Cold War understanding, the *OED* definitions do not convey that aspect. In short, the fact that the *OED* descriptions of these terms vary so much from definitions found in other contexts, such as the intelligence context and other popular understandings, would seem in and of itself to validate the need for closer examination of the terms as they have come to be used in different discursive settings.

The *OED* entries for defect, defector, and defection offer one other validation of the particular approach that this study will take – namely, taking early modern English political thought as a point of departure for my analysis of defection, territoriality, and

national security discourse. The *OED* “timelines” that are included as an online resource clearly show that earliest documented uses of the terms *defect* and *defection* are in the mid 16th century, and the earliest *OED* examples date from the 1540s. As the introductory chapter indicated, the century or so from the English Reformation to the English Civil War was a period of time during which intellectual shifts occurred that were critical to the development of the concepts of political territoriality and national security, shifts influenced primarily by the Protestant Reformation and by the acceleration of global exploration. It seems significant that the use of the term “defection” is documented as appearing precisely within this timeframe.

In the Church-oriented paradigm of thinking about the world, which had dominated European political philosophy until the 17th century, the complete whole of human society is bifurcated into good and evil. God, Christ, and the Church have represented the side of the good, and false gods and the anti-Christ represent the opposing side of evil. The good and the evil are perpetually engaged in a struggle for dominance, one over the other. “Apostasy” or rejecting God is the ultimate unforgivable sin, because it implies a willful and deliberate turning to the other side. In Western medieval times, of course, the earthly political realm was persistently conceived using religious metaphors; and treason, or betrayal of the monarch, became the worst crime and the traitor subject to the harshest punishment. The conceptual bifurcation of human society into good and evil was complicated in the early modern period with the Protestant Reformation. The Reformation materialized and territorialized an overarching binary conflict in Europe, with the Protestant powers of

England and the Netherlands locked in varying degrees of dispute with the Catholic powers of Spain and France. Perhaps the term defection arose in the increasingly complex setting of early modernity - in which personal conscience and objective law replaced political and spiritual tyranny as the ultimate authority over individuals - as a way to reflect the modern individual's layered engagement with the spiritual, political, and territorial dimensions as loyalty was expressed and territorially manifested.

One early modern example of the term "defection" comes from a sermon by English Protestant reformist leader Hugh Latimer, delivered before Protestant king Edward VI. Latimer stated that, "Also the defection has come and swerving from the faith."¹⁴ Influential Protestants such as Latimer (who was later condemned as a traitor and burned at the stake under the Catholic queen Mary I as an attempt to hasten the restoration of Catholic practice to the English public) spoke of defection as occurring among Protestant clergy who bowed to Catholic pressure to recant. Other uses of defection in the early modern context allude to those who are persuaded to abandon Catholicism or "the true Church" as defectors. For example, John Leslie's 1578 *History of Scotland* declared of Scottish Protestant reformers John Knox and John Willock, "They had defected frome the Christiane Religioune."¹⁵ Clearly, defection was conceived of as a theoretically reciprocal act, with as much applicability to one side of the Protestant-Catholic conflict as to the other. The orientation of which side

¹⁴ Arthur Pollard, *Sermons: Hugh Latimer* (Manchester: Fyfield, 2000), 52.

¹⁵ John Leslie, *History of Scotland* (1578), Vol. 4, Section 53, p. 241. According to the 1910 Catholic Encyclopedia (accessed online at www.newadvent.org), John Leslie was a Catholic bishop in Scotland, opponent of John Knox and lifelong champion of the Catholic, Mary Queen of Scots.

represented the “true Church” and which represented the anti-Christ against which the forces of truth were constantly embattled was a matter of perspective. In any case, the idea of passing over to join an adversary is the first component of defection. That not all people who rejected their “true” beliefs were called defectors, but rather a smaller subset of people with a type of official status in the Church, seems to accord with the second component of defection – the active un-making. One could construe that the loss of priests or other holders of religious vocations would pose a greater threat to the wholeness of the Church – Protestant or Catholic – because it is through such individuals that the essence of the Church within human society is manifested, and their loss could be the Church's undoing.

The use of the term defector in political and social parlance is somewhat spotty in both the English and American contexts from the English early modern period all the way through to the beginning of the Cold War some 400 years later. At that point the words defector and defection re-entered both the popular lexicon and the lexicon of the nascent intelligence profession, along with the idea that defectors might multiply in a setting of large-scale binary conflict affecting that conflict by virtue of their choices and their sharing of information. Having been first used in reference to the ideological meta-conflict that pervaded late Tudor England of the early modern period, the re-emergence of defection just as the conflict between the United States and Soviet-style Communism began to consolidate (a process well on its way long before the formal beginning of the Cold War, as Chapter Six will discuss) is particularly significant, in light of scholars' arguments that the Cold War of the 20th century holds parallels to an

earlier Elizabethan “Cold War” between England and Spain,¹⁶ as well as a broader claim advanced by Samuel Huntington that the U.S. polity of the early 20th century shares many characteristics of a Tudor polity.¹⁷

Recognizing that there are routine usages of the term defection in discussions of membership transition apart from the all-encompassing ideological orientations that have been discussed so far, it is useful to acknowledge some of these other categories because the literature on other types of transitions that are termed defections may well be illustrative of important dimensions of the term overall. One of these usages occurs in discussions of bipartisan parliamentary political systems, when elected legislators are said to defect to the opposing party - literally to “cross the aisle.” The clear implication is that legislative defections give strength to the opposing side and allow it to gain dominance more readily in a bipartisan struggle. On a more subtle level, defectors in this context may be more useful to the party to which they are defecting than the original members of that party, because the defectors bring with them an “insider” knowledge of the opposing party’s strategies. In one discussion of the impact of legislative defections upon Indian internal politics, Subhash Kashayap notes that his usage of the term defection accords with the conventional political and military definition of desertion and abandonment. However, Kashayap also introduces the

¹⁶ This argument is advanced strongly by Curtis C. Breight, *Surveillance, Militarism and Drama in the Elizabethan Era* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996), and is present to a lesser extent in Alison Plowden, *The Elizabethan Secret Service* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).

¹⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 108, 124-26.

notion of betrayal of a loyalty as an inseparable component of defection, because unlike many other membership transitions, defection “presupposes an oath of allegiance or duty or an obligation to guard, protect, or support.”¹⁸ This is certainly salient to a discussion of defections within a bipartisan political system, in which an elected official in part owes his status to the support he has received from his party, and he is dutybound to reciprocate through loyalty to the party.

Another area in which disassociations of membership and identity might be termed defections is in discussions of religious cults. In a monograph which explores the sociological process by which individuals voluntarily abandon cult membership, Stuart Wright notes that there is a shortage of scholarly investigation into the acts of “defection, deconversion, and disaffiliation,”¹⁹ relative to the fairly abundant literature on acts of joining or conversion. Many of his observations speak to defection in general, not just to defection from cults. Wright calls attention to the spatiality of cults and cult membership, and he reminds us that similarity between a cult defection and a geopolitical one owes much to the self-imposed isolation of the cult from the world outside, and the sense of adversariality towards the outside world that is inculcated in cultists. Wright notes that any defection involves “detachment and repudiation, but

¹⁸Subhash C. Kashayap, *The Politics of Defection: A Study of State Politics in India* (Delhi: National Publishing House, 1969), 12.

¹⁹Stuart A. Wright, *Leaving Cults: The Dynamics of Defection*. (Society for the Scientific Study of Religion Monograph Series, Number 7. Washington, D.C.: Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1987, p. 4.

also reformulation and selection of an alternate identity and worldview.”²⁰ Accenting one geographical element of defection, Wright says that such a transition “necessarily implies a destination.” In addition to reminding readers of the overall lack of scholarship on defection as a concept, Wright’s work suggests that studying defections of various sorts must include attention to the defector’s experience of both the space of his origin and the space of his destination.

I will now consider some of the various ideas that are inherent in defection and must be brought to bear upon an analysis of defection. First, I will turn to the related ideas of betrayal and treason and their opposite, loyalty. Second, I will consider other migration acts, over which an understanding of defection often seems to overlap. Third, I will further consider the interrelationship of *defect* and *defect*, suggesting that defectors are usually regarded to be flawed or deviant.

Defection, Betrayal, and Treason

George Fletcher’s series of essays on loyalty is salient to an analysis of defection, although he never identifies defection specifically as a relevant concept. Fletcher notes, however, that a definition of “treason” should require enmity between two opposing parties, a quality that is certainly central to defection.²¹ According to Fletcher, the betrayal of loyalty is the worst sin of all. At many levels of human society,

²⁰Wright, p. 76.

²¹George P. Fletcher, *Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 44. Fletcher muses that Jonathan Pollard was branded a “traitor,” even though the state to which he “betrayed” US secrets is the closest ally to the United States (Israel), and he wonders how betrayal can occur apart from an adversarial relationship.

the worst punishments and most vitriolic hatreds are reserved for the sins of betrayal - whether they are sexual betrayals (adultery), religious betrayals (apostasy), or political betrayals (treason). Using language that strongly suggests that the concept of defection must have been considered in his analysis, he says that the "spiritual event of adhering to the enemy" invites the greatest imaginable scorn from the betrayed party. Also, Fletcher reverts to the common phrase, "the bonds of loyalty," and refers to betrayal as a "fissure" in these binding ties within human society. This description resonates with the foregoing discussion of - and illustration of - a defection as the breaking off of an essential part, critical to a thing's wholeness.

Fletcher's analysis of loyalty also seems to accord with my argument that the related concept of defection contains at its core a fundamental presumption about the bifurcation of the world into opposing realms of good and evil. Fletcher points to the First Commandment of the Hebrew scripture, "Thou shalt have no other gods before Me," as validation of the notion that betrayal is the gravest sin of all.²² By prohibiting the worship of other gods, God was affirming the nature of the relationship demanded between the Hebrews and the deity: one of unconditional loyalty. Interestingly, the First Commandment implies that other "gods" do, in fact, exist in a state of perpetual conflict with God, but people are expected to reject them, to do nothing to aid them or give strength to them. Particularly when the scripture continues with God declaring Himself to be a "jealous god," completely intolerant of these other "gods," it is clear

²²Fletcher, 70.

that a permanent condition of enmity exists between the Hebrew God and the rest. Betrayal of God necessarily would mean assistance to the enemy. Depending upon the permanence of the shift in paradigm between the Hebrew God and the rest, the betrayal alluded to in the First Commandment could, in fact, be regarded as a defection. This analysis seems to accord with the earlier discussion of the emphasis in the *OED* definitions of defection as a religious “falling away,” or apostasy. The *OED* quotes a 1583 text that not only alludes to the betrayal of Jesus by Judas as a defection - “After the defection of Judas the traitour...” – but also equates defection with treason.

In a study of the concept of treason as it developed in medieval England, J.G. Bellamy alludes to both Germanic and Roman law as sources for different dimensions of the treason definition.²³ Both of these relate to themes in the discussion up to this point. The Germanic idea of treason was a breach of trust or the fracturing of a relationship based on trust. Contrastingly, the Roman idea of treason was an insult to public authority or a challenge of public authority in favor of an opposing view. The early medieval European concept of “perduellio” was also present within the “amalgam” of ideas on treason that are developed in Bellamy’s work. Perduellio denoted a quasi-military act of deserting the state while giving aid and comfort to the enemy.²⁴ Bellamy notes insightfully that, “Concepts of treason never flourish in a vacuum. They depend greatly on the prevailing thesis of government.” In other words,

²³J. G. Bellamy, *The Law of Treason in England in the Later Middle Ages* (Aberdeen: University Press, 1970), 1-9.

²⁴Bellamy (1970), 2.

the degree to which authoritarian rule is absolute, versus mediated through organized public opposition and dissent, determines what acts or behaviors are regarded as betrayals of the state, or treason. In perhaps his most suggestive statement of the conceptual interlinkages between treason and defection, Bellamy observes that “Treason was held to lie particularly in causing a division between the king and his people, thereby endangering the union which was the basis of the late medieval English state.”²⁵ Recognizing that the term “state” is used here as simply a synonym for “regime,” rather than as a way of denoting a state in the early modern sense, the theme of completion or wholeness being violated seems to be an important commonality between his account of treason and my account of defection. However, as I suggested in the introductory chapter, a betrayal in a non-territorialized regime setting can be understood as treason, while betrayal in the context of the territorial state can be understood as “territorialized treason,” or defection.

In a later volume that extends his study of English treason beyond the medieval period to the Tudor period, Bellamy explores how the definition of treason fluctuated under Tudor monarchs according to exigencies of each reign.²⁶ Under Henry VIII treason focused upon personal affronts to the king and to his authority and was highly arbitrary and broadly interpreted according to political convenience. Under the sickly Edward VI, who was not expected to have a long life or to produce heirs, treason was

²⁵ Bellamy (1970), 210.

²⁶ John Bellamy, *The Tudor Law of Treason: An Introduction* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 47-82.

focused upon challenges to the royal succession. Under Mary I, whose central challenge was the reimposition of Roman Catholicism, treason was equated with religious apostasy. And the most significant modifications to the definition of treason occurred under Elizabeth's rule, when it became a more complex layering of religious with political motives that came to threaten the queen in her physical person or in the security of her rule. Tellingly, the most "traitorous" plots against the queen were seen as having an origin outside of the queen's realm – from Scotland, from Spain, from the Roman Catholicism of continental Europe. Echoing this same progression of the Tudor approach to treason is another major work in the literature on English treason by noted Tudor scholar Lacey Baldwin Smith.²⁷ Collapsed into the idea of treason under Elizabeth was the concept of an external threat to England as a territorial state. This theme shall be expanded in Chapter Three.

James Hurst explicitly argues the importance of beginning an analysis of treason in the United States with the origins of the concept of treason in English law, and he analyzes the treason clause that exists in the US Constitution²⁸ – its historical precedents, its origins in English law, the debate over how it should be worded, and ongoing legal debates over precisely what it means.²⁹ The wording of the Constitution's treason clause

²⁷ Lacey Baldwin Smith, *Treason in Tudor England: Politics and Paranoia* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986).

²⁸ The US Constitution, Article III, Section 3, reads, "Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No persons shall be convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court..."

²⁹ James Willard Hurst, *The Law of Treason in the United States: Collected Essays* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1971).

is borrowed from medieval English law, specifically the “Statute of 25 Edward III,” which had defined treason using similar phrases such as “making war against the king, seeking his death, adhering to the king’s enemies, giving them aid and comfort.”³⁰ It is significant, given one underlying theme of dissertation that the English understanding of critical political and social concepts (such as defection, territoriality, and national security) was transferred to the American geographical setting, that Hurst chooses to highlight the debt owed to English law in the American legal approach to treason. He remarks, “There is historic logic in beginning with the English materials in a subject like ‘treason,’ because American policy was derived from American ideas concerning the meaning of English experience as well as American professional familiarity with English statutes and treatises.”³¹ Noting the concern of the Constitution’s framers to mitigate the potential for accusations of treason to become a tool for pursuing factional grievances, Hurst deals at length with the difference between treason as mere expression of beliefs or opinions and treason as a planned and accomplished act. Hurst’s definition of treason, and his reflections on treason of intent versus of action, are worth reviewing:

Treason is the betrayal of allegiance owed a political sovereign either because of citizenship or because of acceptance of the protection of laws. Obviously intention is at the heart of such a crime. Is an act a distinct element of the offense, in addition to the showing of the intent to betray?³²

³⁰ Hurst, 4.

³¹ Hurst, 7.

³² Hurst, 14-15.

In the context of Hurst's discussion of the Constitutional understanding of treason, clearly defection must be seen as an act of treason, insofar as it involves going over to the enemy, "adhering" to the enemy and giving the enemy "aid and comfort" in the form of sharing information with the enemy that will assist the enemy and give an advantage. Also, defection is a visible act – it is a completed act. But the geographical shift across a territorial boundary need not occur for defection to be a completed act, as long as the sharing of information with the enemy – the element of "undoing" – has occurred. Implicit in Hurst is the idea that the defector's sharing of information can alone connote treason.

Turning from treason in a legal sense to betrayal in a sociological sense, Albert Hirschman and Malin Akerstrom have each produced noteworthy volumes dealing with exit from a group as a manifestation of betrayal of loyalty. In *Betrayal and Betrayers: The Sociology of Treachery*,³³ Akerstrom notes that an individual's exit from a group is not necessarily enough to engender feelings of betrayal on the part of the group members left behind.³⁴ In contrast, however, people who leave a group and then begin associating with outsiders who have been in positions of authority over the group or in competition with the group are much more likely to be regarded as traitors than people

³³ Ironically, the book's subtitle suggests a linguistic connection between betrayal and treachery, while this is not the case. Traitor, treason, and betray all come from the Latin verb "tradere," meaning to hand over. By contrast, treachery comes from a different Latin verb meaning to cheat, or to physically shuffle, and this is also the linguistic origin of trickery. Certainly, betrayal *can be* treachery, but by definition it is not.

³⁴ Malin Akerstrom, *Betrayal and Betrayers: The Sociology of Treachery* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 11.

who simply reject the group and leave.³⁵ Hirschman's analysis of the relationship between exit and loyalty centers upon individual behavior within the context of business organizations, and he explores how individual choices to remain in an organization versus transferring to an alternate organization, perhaps one in competition with the original organization, affect the health of an organization.³⁶ While Hirschman never mentions defection explicitly, he does attempt to extend his analysis to nation-states, so the suggested implications of his analysis to individuals who undertake transfers of loyalty from one state to another is clear. The fact that he connects an individual's exit with the potential for an organization to decline accords perfectly with the notion of defection as an "undoing."

Defection, Refuge, and Asylum

There is a significant body of literature on traditions of asylum, sanctuary, and the providing of refuge to fugitives or escapees. To the extent that political defectors are regarded in the legal sense as another category of asylum-seekers, I believe that this literature is important to a fuller understanding of the defection concept. Also, like betrayal and treason, sanctuary is a term with a history reaching far back to ancient Hebraic and early Christian traditions.

³⁵ Akerstrom, 3.

³⁶ Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

In theory and according to its original connotation, sanctuary refers to the sheltering and protection of a person who has either inadvertently committed a crime or is thoroughly and unambiguously repentant of a crime that he has committed. In my brief review of the history of the concept of sanctuary, it was clear to me that sanctuary has a particular history as an idea, and it was never intended to refer to the sheltering of victims of crime or persecution.³⁷ This type of sheltering was subsumed in the somewhat related ideas of asylum or refuge. Slightly unrelated to the present discussion of defection, but evident from my research nonetheless and worthy of comment, is that contemporary use of the terms refuge and asylum have almost completely conflated their meanings with that of sanctuary, so that the three are now used more or less interchangeably. Today's discussions of political asylees or refugees or persons seeking sanctuary are virtually without exception discussions of victimhood. It would be "politically incorrect" to speak of "sanctuary seekers" as people who have wronged others.

Yet, that original meaning of sanctuary is precisely what ties the concept to that of defection. Because a defector is at the same time also a traitor to the system he is abandoning, he is implicitly seeking sanctuary for his crime within the system that he seeks to enter. Moreover, to seek "sanctuary" in the literal sense of the word was to

³⁷ See for example Arnaout, Ghassan Maarouf Arnaout, *Asylum in the Arab-Islamic Tradition* (Geneva : Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 1987); Rev. J. Charles Cox, *The Sanctuaries and Sanctuary Seekers of Medieval England* (London: G. Allen & Sons, 1911); and Ignatius Bau, *This Ground is Holy: Church Sanctuary and Central American Refugees* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985).

appeal to the protection of the altar of God, a place outside of the laws of man, where the seeker would remain untouched or “sacrosanct.” In a similar vein, political defectors, whose treason is clearly implied by their action of crossing over, are usually sequestered in a place apart for a considerable length of time before they are allowed to make the full transition to become members of a new paradigm. Often, a full transition never really happens at all, as the defectors might be given new identities for security reasons.

Similarities between defectors and refugees, who like defectors are also undertaking a process of asylum-seeking, can be seen in a collection of essays edited by Daniel and Knudsen on the implications of the refugee process for trust and mistrust.³⁸ One could substitute “defector” for “refugee” in the following passage from the introductory essay by Daniel and Knudsen: “The refugee mistrusts and is mistrusted. In a profound sense, one becomes a refugee even before fleeing the society in which one lives and continues to be a refugee even after one receives asylum in a new place among new people.”³⁹ Daniel and Knudsen allude to a fairly substantial literature on refugees in the fields of anthropology and sociology. One can sense that the “caseworker” who tries to assist the refugee’s transition is analogous to the intelligence specialist who tries to assist the defector’s transition. The defector faces similar dilemmas of trust and mistrust, which are further problematized in the physical settings of the intelligence

³⁸ E. Valentine Daniel and John Chr. Knudsen, *Mistrusting Refugees* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995). See especially the introductory chapter, 1-12.

³⁹ Daniel and Knudsen, 1.

profession in which issues of secrecy and access loom large. It is not common to think of defectors as posing the same challenges for US authorities as refugees do, in terms of resettlement. But in a sense defector resettlement is just as much or even more problematic, based in part upon the interest vested by the US government in defector information and its implications for national security, as well as the political sensation surrounding their act. A later essay in the Daniel and Knudsen volume takes up the issue of state legal infrastructures for resettling refugees,⁴⁰ and Chapter Eight will take up this theme of defector resettlement as a type of refugee resettlement during the later Cold War, especially as it was envisioned and coordinated by the Jamestown Foundation.

Defection and Deviance

Returning to the etymology of both the noun and the verb forms of defect, it is important to note that the common understanding of the noun *defect* - a flaw - frequently intrudes upon the usage of the terms defector and defection. In a fundamental sense, a defector is regarded as “defective.” Working from the common Cold War era usage of the term defector, a system which had experienced a defection attempted to explain it by reexamining records of the defector’s past behavior and locating deviant characteristics. The idea that defectors are flawed and despicable people is evident in Dulles’ handbook of intelligence methodologies, when he refers to

⁴⁰ Alexander T. Aleinikoff, “State-centered Refugee Law: From Resettlement to Containment,” in *Mistrusting Refugees* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995) 257-278.

the espionage activities of one American who was blackmailed into cooperating with foreign intelligence as “the sordid affair of a weakling.”⁴¹

The US Government directed that a study be carried out by the Brookings Institution in 1945 defining “un-American activities.” As a binary struggle between two opposing ideologies had come to dominate the global community, it seemed important to systematize the definition of what was un-American, so one could deduce who might be acting instead on behalf of the enemy. Any strengthening of “America’s adversaries,” especially during a time of threatened war - which the Cold War certainly was - was regarded as an un-American act. Moreover, the study defined American identity as a social one, derived publicly through public participation in civil society. So un-American activities could be certain things that were carried out in secret, outside of the public eye. From this position, it is a very short leap to the consideration of any deviant behavior - to the extent that people usually carry out “deviant” acts in their private space rather than in the public space of civil society - as somehow un-American. The undercurrent to this line of thought seems to be that personal deviancy in one’s private space predisposes the deviant, defective, flawed person to other clandestine acts which would be unambiguously “un-American.”⁴²

Related to the attitude towards sexual deviancy and potential for treason that prevailed during the early days of the Cold War, a 1949 book entitled *Treason Complex*

⁴¹ Dulles, 250.

⁴² The Brookings Institution. *Suggested Standards for Determining Un-American Activities: Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution: 1945.

attempts to deconstruct the personal life of Aristotle, explaining his inability to maintain loyalties throughout his lifetime by pointing to his erratic and irrational behavior that was the necessary consequence of his homosexuality. The author alleges that Aristotle committed several fundamental betrayals of loyalties to strong personal associations throughout his life. The author's basic position seems to be that homosexuality is so dysfunctional that people who engage in it are more likely to commit treason against institutions to which they are ostensibly loyal.⁴³

Another excellent example of the prevalent assumptions about deviancy and defection is found in a 1962 report prepared by the Committee for Un-American Activities which analyzed the 1960 defection to the Soviet Union of two National Security Agency cryptologists. Cryptology, the science of code-breaking, was of critical importance to the Intelligence Community at the time, so the defection of two promising NSA cryptologists who had had full access to some of that agency's most sensitive sources and methods was regarded as nothing short of a disaster for the United States in its rivalry with the Soviet Union. The defectors were Bernon Mitchell and William Martin, friends in their early thirties with military service prior to their NSA employment. They had taken a personal vacation together to the Caribbean, routinely advising NSA of their plans and their itinerary. They failed to return as scheduled and soon were determined to have defected to the Soviet Union through Cuba. The report recapitulated the personality profiles of Mitchell and Martin, which had been compiled

⁴³Rene Allendy, *Treason Complex* (New York: Social Sciences Publishers, 1949); see especially, "Homosexuality and Treason," 85-103.

through interviews when the two were being considered for security clearances, as well as later investigation conducted after their defection, which uncovered previously confidential medical records. The report asserted that in both cases tendencies towards deviant sexual behavior had been clearly present in the men's backgrounds, and that neither should have ever been considered for employment. In the case of Mitchell, the report discussed records of psychiatric counseling that Mitchell had sought during his NSA employment. During the counseling sessions, he had admitted to participating in perverted sex acts when he was between 13 and 19 years old. When questioned more closely on what this behavior entailed, Mitchell would only describe it as "experimentations involving dogs and chickens."⁴⁴ Review of Martin's background showed that descriptions of Martin obtained from his friends and associates during his background check prior to employment with NSA included assertions that he was "effeminate" and "not entirely normal." The report seemed to believe that the deviancy in both men was so egregious that their employment at NSA must not have occurred simply through the agency's oversight, but rather due to a Communist conspiracy. In effort to validate this aspect, the report devoted several pages to a character assassination of one of NSA's personnel managers who had participated in the hiring of both men; he was accused of having Communist associations during his college days, as well as of effeminacy.

⁴⁴ Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives. *Security Practices in the National Security Agency: Defection of Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, 2-8.

Allen Dulles' book strongly concurs in the evaluation of Martin and Mitchell as deviant, and he asserts that it is the duty of government agencies to scrutinize the personal lives of people whose potential betrayal would be particularly destructive and ensure they are not deviant:

In the case of Martin and Mitchell, I am convinced that if anyone had reported on the manner of their lives, an investigation would have resulted. Their living quarters were a shambles of disorderliness and slovenliness. Something must be wrong with people who lived as they did... I see no reason why anyone should be employed or retained in a sensitive government position when there is credible evidence that the person has a serious character weakness or aberrations of conduct...⁴⁵

Deviancy and defectiveness as core elements of defection and treason are not modern additions to the usage of defection as a term. An account of the trial of Benedict Arnold notes that long before he betrayed the American cause he was known as a flamboyant and intemperate person, given to excesses in his personal life. He tried to maintain an ostentatious house, well beyond his means, and he entertained lavishly and drove a fancy carriage.⁴⁶ The unarticulated implication was that this behavior should have indicated that he could not be entirely trusted, because "proper" American colonists did not comport themselves as the deviant Arnold did.

Finally, referring to surely one of the earliest discussions of treasonous behavior in the Western intellectual tradition, George Fletcher assesses the First Commandment in Hebrew scripture as essentially forbidding the Hebrews to commit treason against

⁴⁵ Dulles, 250-51.

⁴⁶ *Proceedings of a General Court Martial for the Trial of Major General Arnold*. New York: J. Munsell, 1865.

God by committing idolatry. In Fletcher's analysis, one theological interpretation of idolatry is "weird worship," and can connote not only worshipping other gods, but worshipping in a strange and deviant way.⁴⁷ Thus, it seems clear that deviancy has been a core element of the concepts of treason and apostasy, so it must also be regarded as deeply implicated in any study of defection.

Conclusion

My objective in this chapter has been to examine defection's etymology and varying definitions in order to produce approach a more nuanced understanding of defection, to highlight an absence of literature specifically addressing defection, and to provide a survey of some of the key ideas that are implicated in an analysis of defection.

Defection is a very perplexing kind of transition, in that discussions of it usually seem unambiguous in their assigning of the term defector to some people who are undertaking membership transitions, but not to others. Upon closer examination, the etymology of the word provides critical clues to understanding what I have identified as three key elements of the concept. First, defection must exist within a paradigm of binary adversariality between two opposing camps. Second, defection represents an innate threat of one opponent to the other, in the sense that the defector possesses the potential to "undo" or weaken the system from which he defects. And third, reflecting the contempt reserved for that most heinous of acts – betrayal of loyalty – defectors are viscerally regarded as flawed or "defective," by both participant sides in a conflict.

⁴⁷ Fletcher, 70.

Defection is an important manifestation of a condition of conflict between adversaries. It is refreshing to realize that a seemingly ordinary concept such as defection, which permeated the Cold War era worldview and which seems to present itself in routine conversations in a very unproblematic way, could still have so many secrets to give up.

Defection = Loss of Essence




Figure 2.1

Figure 2.2

Chapter Three

Expanding Globe and Enclosing Nation: Defection, Territoriality, and National Security in Early Modern England

Introduction

The time was right in the mid 16th century for defection, as understood according to Chapter Two's etymology, to enter the English political and social lexicon. The variable progress of the Protestant Reformation in England had produced social havoc between the death of Henry VIII and the ascension of Elizabeth, with the intermingled question of politics and religion increasingly seen in binary terms, putting English (and Scottish) Protestants fundamentally at odds with Catholic Europe. This all-encompassing confrontation did not distinguish between the spiritual and the political; what we would now regard as separate elements were one and the same. The stakes were high between the two adversaries that largely occupied separate spaces in Europe, and the idea of a territorialized betrayal - an exit with a moral dimension, committed by a person who could willfully impact the nature of the struggle - seemed to be an idea whose time had come. Defection, and the related act of recantation, became an important feature of managing political relations between states.

The use of the term defection emerged at a time when both territory and national security were undergoing important transformations in English political culture. Perhaps partly due to England's insular separation from the rest of Europe, its sovereign space came to be seen as essentially Protestant space, with non-Protestant elements

viewed as suspected of foreign collusion and subversion and even a threat to the security of England. The stability of Elizabeth's reign, to include the question of her personal safety, was collapsed into the stability of England itself, producing an early discourse of national security, which is distinct from earlier medieval security orientations in which the bodily security of a sovereign was any regime's primary concern. The various iconographic devices through which Elizabeth's sovereignty was inscribed upon landscape are relatively well known,¹ and the only one that will be mentioned here at length will be her practice of annual perambulations of the court throughout the countryside, better known as "progresses." What is perhaps less explicitly presented in existing scholarship of this period than Elizabethan manipulation of iconography and performance to reinforce the Queen's power over her domain is the notion that these practices helped to transform a kingdom into a national territory, and the spaces external to England into other respective national territories.

This chapter contends that the term, understanding, and practice of defection emerged over the century spanning the Elizabethan period and a bit beyond, and this occurred against a backdrop distinguished by the following three developments: first, the rise of state territoriality as an underlying political and social assumption, replacing earlier medieval assumptions of a political realm as simply a possession of a despot;

¹ Analysis of how Elizabeth's political power was expressed through portraiture commands a small literature. The "Ditchley Portrait," depicting Elizabeth standing atop a map of England (with one foot resting on a town called Ditchley) is a famous example of Elizabeth's political authority and legitimacy being physically infused with the territory of England. Similarly, the "Rainbow Portrait," showing Elizabeth's dress festooned with embroidered eyes and ears, suggests the surveilling power of the state extended through political space. See Roy Strong, *Gloriana: The Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1987); and Elizabeth W. Pomeroy, *Reading the Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1989).

second, the rise of an intelligence profession in England, as assumptions of state territoriality gave rise to a realization that external threats to the state could be detected, monitored, and mitigated through the use of intelligence methods; and third, the escalation of global exploration and the participation of England in an increasingly complex and competitive drive to learn about distant lands, so that they could be exploited for commerce, colonization, and resource-extraction. My argument has two emphases. First, it asserts that the emergence of these three themes in the same period is no coincidence; rather, the three are deeply interconnected and interdependent. Second, it suggests that the contemporary prominence of the term defection in the context of the intelligence profession (as opposed to other social contexts) derives from the term's emergence while professional intelligence as a tool of statecraft was increasingly manifesting itself. Given that second dimension to my argument, examining how the intelligence profession came to be established in a climate of nascent state territoriality becomes not ancillary to more effectively understanding defection, but in fact becomes central to it.

Following a brief recapitulation of the Elizabethan "world picture,"² I will note shifts in conceptions of territoriality and attempt to demonstrate how the Elizabethan practice of "progress" suggests that a transformation was underway in the conception of the English "country" as a national cultural space or territory, including new understandings of the monarch's bodily relationship with landscape. Proceeding to a

² The most concise account of this is found in E.M.W. Tillyard, *The Elizabethan World Picture* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1970).

discussion of the accelerating interest in global exploration, I will argue that the same epistemology that undergirded England's (and indeed Europe's) "age of reconnaissance" also pervaded the nascent intelligence profession, namely, that knowledge is gained through the credible visual observations of the dispatched traveler. Recognizing this should not only bolster my assertion of the interdependence of early modern territorializing trends, intelligence, and geographic exploration, but it should also serve as a reminder of an essential similarity shared by intelligence and geography discourses in a much broader sense. Just as it is no coincidence that defection emerged in the particular political and social landscape of late Reformation England, neither is it a coincidence that the intelligence profession was increasingly formalized in a geopolitical climate of intense and competitive global exploration. Turning to that nascent profession, I will describe the Elizabethan secret service, drawing from the limited literature on the subject, as well as from primary sources. This discussion will incorporate observations of the similarities between the Elizabethan "Cold War" and its 20th century counterpart, and will note what some have claimed the significance of these similarities to be. Finally, I will apply the idea of national security discourse to the Elizabethan and immediate post-Elizabethan settings, noting especially how discourses of fear came to be interpreted as national threat and incorporated into intelligence practice. The discourses of threat and of fear as they were confronted in the 16th and early 17th centuries provide a template for how Anglo-America confronted and interpreted threats in the 20th century and beyond.

Background to Elizabethan Worldview

The Elizabethan “world picture” inherited many of its features from medievalist thought, and perhaps most notable of these is the assumption that the threatening and harsh aspect of the natural world should be understood as the manifestation of the effect of sin upon the physical world. For the medieval mind, as well as for the Elizabethan, “wilderness” as fallen nature parallels sinful man as fallen from his created state. As Tillyard points out, the “double vision” of this insight was a consequence of the bringing together of Plato’s *Timaeus* with the creation accounts in *Genesis*, and should be counted as “the great medieval achievement.”³ Tillyard’s presents the natural world as understood by the Elizabethans through analogy, and he identifies three major systems of analogy – the Great Chain of Being, the Corresponding Planes, and the Cosmic Dance – which each informed various aspects of the Elizabethan understanding of both the natural and human-inhabited realms and their inter-connections. Tillyard’s explanations of these three distinct teleologies is concise and appealing, because he draws liberally from the literature of the period for illustrative examples. Although each of these three constructs has been written about separately,⁴ Tillyard usefully situates the three together in the same cultural framework to allow the reader to understand how the three teleologies could co-exist and could each inform the cultural products and attitudes of the period in different ways. Rather than recounting these

³ Tillyard, 33.

⁴ A good example is Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936)

three teleologies exhaustively, it should be sufficient to simply highlight a few of the important details of each.

The Great Chain of Being provided a roughly linear metaphor for the connection of all parts of the created world, from the meanest category of objects at the one extreme to God at the opposite extreme. Each link of the chain represented a group of objects, rather than individual objects. Among the groups of objects along the chain, each has its own superior characteristics, within the groups qualitative primacies exist. Thus characteristics are not morally determined, but are part of the natural order. Rock is durable, oxen are patient, horses are swift, and so on, not because of moral superiority but because each is being true to its nature. The idea of plenitude, both in number and in variety, was implied in the Great Chain of Being, and this had consequence for geographical discovery and its accompanying attitude of acquisition.

Of the Elizabethan conception of “correspondences,” Tillyard notes that contemporary people notice correspondences, too, but merely as passing curiosities rather than as portentous phenomena: “What to us is merely silly might for an Elizabethan be a solemn or joyful piece of evidence that he lived in an ordered universe where there was no waste and where every detail was a part of nature’s plan.”⁵ Correspondences generally involved vastly different scales, such as a conception of the “body politic” corresponding to the human body, with the same need for functional diversity of parts. The human body also could correspond to the world itself, and this is well illustrated in the verse of late Elizabethan poet John Donne, who wrote, “... my

⁵ Tillyard, 105.

physicians by their love are grown Cosmographers, and I their map, who lie flat on this bed...”⁶ In general, Shakespeare offers the clearest examples of the Elizabethan belief that events at the scale of individual human interaction could affect and be affected by events observed in nature, and one can readily call to mind how turbulent or bizarre natural events reflecting discord in human affairs is a motif in several plays, such as *Julius Caesar* and *King Lear*. Tillyard notes that correspondences between man’s affairs and the macrocosm have palpable moral implication, and nothing in nature or the heavens can go awry without impacting something else. Therefore, man “must feel shameful to allow the workings of his own little world to degenerate,” because the effect will be broader than he realizes or bargains for.⁷ Relatedly, the idea that degeneration within human affairs was not part of the natural order undergirds the teleology of “Cosmic Dance,” in which the workings of human society were conceived of as a perpetual motion, analogous to the motion of the heavens.

Tillyard’s work on the Elizabethan world picture is representative of a huge body of literature on the period, spanning both history and literary criticism, and this dominant approach to summing up the “Elizabethan mind” has been effectively critiqued recently by those who point to considerably more heterogeneity in thought and outlook than the earlier generation of Elizabethan experts would allow. Deborah Kuller Shuger argues that since the overwhelming impulse of the English Renaissance was the

⁶ Denis Cosgrove, in *Apollo’s Eye: A Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the Western Imagination* (153), notes that the “(g)lobe and map were insistent Elizabethan and Jacobean allegories and literary conceits,” and he also names poet John Donne, as well as Milton, for employing “constant global and cartographic metaphors for the human body.”

pursuit of a personal connection with the divine, rather than of an abstract group-oriented aspiration, one must be cautious about attributing Elizabethan habits of thought to an overarching collective ethos, however compelling and seemingly coherent.⁸ She points out that social class and literacy would have provided bases for slightly different “world views.” Shuger notes that of the systems of analogy discussed by Tillyard and others, the coherence of the overarching teleologies themselves raise suspicion, because they presume to provide so seamless a symbolic backdrop for a period that was in fact more deeply fractured than any other. Nevertheless, Shuger finally concedes that although the Elizabethan world was one of individual impulses rather than those of “classes, camps, or parties,” there appeared to be a “deep structure or inner logic” that seemed to gather in the whole; and she grants that Tillyard was “perhaps on the right track in emphasizing the centrality of analogy to the Elizabethan world-picture.”⁹

Whether one wholly accepts that systems of analogy rigidly and meticulously governed the ways in which people of the Elizabethan period understood the natural world and human and social relations, or whether one opts for a more critical view that suggests that personal characteristics such as class and gender and literacy intervened in how the broad teleological systems of the time functioned, it seems beyond dispute that analogy was a strong feature. This is evident both in what is often called the “cult” of

⁷ Tillyard, 114.

⁸ Debora Kuller Shuger, *Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance: Religion, Politics, and the Dominant Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

⁹ Shuger, 255-256.

Elizabeth,¹⁰ as well as in the material culture of the upper class more generally; and in both instances the copious use of illustrative metaphors and motifs in paintings, embroideries, tapestries, illuminations, and garden design seem to attest to a worldview dependent upon analogy. The beehive (and relatedly the single bee), for example, symbolized the ordered life of the court, or of England more generally, presided over by a queen towards whom the busy workers directed their productive efforts.¹¹ The pelican was a symbol of maternal sacrifice, drawing from a legend in which a mother pelican pricked its breast and fed its young with its own blood,¹² and its use represented the “virgin” Queen whose children were the people of England for whom she sacrificed. A rainbow suggested the mercy and beneficence of a presiding sun, Elizabeth.¹³

Changes in Territoriality

It is a commonplace that the sovereign territorial state (meaning the normatively homogenous extension of political authority within fixed boundaries and no attempt by that political authority to project its power beyond those fixed boundaries into

¹⁰See, for example, Roy Strong, *The Cult of Elizabeth: Elizabethan Portraiture and Pageantry* (London: Pimlico, 1999).

¹¹ Already an evocative motif, the beehive was further popularized by Shakespeare in *Henry V*, and this is pointed out by David J. Baker, *Between Nations: Shakespeare, Spenser, Marvell, and the Question of Britain* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 17.

¹² The pelican symbol also illustrates the concept of primacy in the *Great Chain of Being*, wherein the pelican would be deemed first among birds in its possession of the positive characteristic of maternal devotion, overshadowing its other features of ugliness and ungainliness.

¹³ The more common symbols in Elizabethan material culture are discussed in Roy Strong (1999), *The Cult of Elizabeth*; and also in Roy Strong, *The Tudor and Stuart Monarchy: Pageantry, Painting, and Iconography* (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1995-1998).

neighboring territories) was the accepted ideal throughout much of Europe by the mid 17th century. For England, most of the factors at work bringing about the rise of the understanding of political space as territorial space are so widely recognized that they hardly need repeating. The Protestant Reformation and the establishment of a separate national church was the single most important factor contributing to a rising sense of national territory, as Catholic influence and power was increasingly defined as fundamentally foreign to England. Conceiving of the Church, and places where the Church presided, as adversarial helped to solidify England's own real and symbolic borders. The rising sense of English territoriality, then, should perhaps be included in any formulation of the Elizabethan worldview.¹⁴ One can hardly consider the Elizabethan worldview without taking into account the profound disruption and dislocation that the "Tudor revolution," which both preceded and ushered in Elizabeth's reign, had entailed,¹⁵ or without recalling that the disruption was manifested in many ways – both legally and socially at broader scales of analysis, and spiritually and

¹⁴ This seems to be the position taken in the work of John Scattergood (*The Libelle of Englyshe Polyce: The Nation and Its Place*) and of David J. Baker (*Between Nations...*, especially "Imagining Britain," 17-65) each of whom point to different literary examples from the late 15th to the early 17th centuries, respectively, to demonstrate the rise of national territorial consciousness. Taking a cue from Tillyard on the technique of looking to literature for clues to support particular world views, it would be easy to find numerous additional passages in Shakespeare (beyond Baker's use of, primarily, Henry V) that would seem to suggest a popular awareness of the territorial distinctiveness of England as a national space, and the famous soliloquy delivered by the John of Gaunt character in Richard II is but one example ("...This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England...").

¹⁵ That the Reformation period in England, a full circle spanning the divorce of Henry VIII with it the split from Rome in 1529 to the death of Mary and the reassertion of that split in 1558, constituted a "Tudor Revolution" is a fairly common view in the historiography of the period. A good recapitulation of this is in Alan G.R. Smith, *The Emergence of a Nation State: The Commonwealth of England, 1529-1660* (London and New York: Longman, 1984), particularly Chapter 11, "The early Tudor revolution: The significance of the Reformation era, 1529-1558," 88-97.

physically at the more narrow scale of the individual English subject. Susan Brigden describes the “New World” that was the destructive reform of the Tudor revolution:

Reform brought physical destruction: the altars and shrines, dooms and roods of the parish churches were torn down; religious houses lay in ruins or were converted into gentry mansions. More traumatic than the desecration of treasures was the loss of the beliefs which they had symbolized... At the Reformation, the Christian was forced to choose between two Churches, each claiming to be the true Church, and sometimes to choose between private faith and public conformity... [N]o one was left untouched by the great transformations which the Reformation brought.¹⁶

Even within the small island of Britain, of course, the territorial articulation of political power was hardly settled at the beginning of the Tudor period, and the reigns of most Tudor monarchs were dominated by concern over popular obedience to central authority in the “marches,” or peripheral frontier areas. Steven G. Ellis considers the early Tudor suppression of opposition and alternate political identities in the distant “marches” in his study of the frontiers within the British Isles and their role in the rise of the English territorial state.¹⁷ Another important feature of the Tudor revolution that seems to figure into an explanation of changes in territorial thinking is the diversification of the system of justice and the imposition of social order through increasingly complex and multi-scalar regulatory systems. Steve Hindle’s account of the rise of the early modern territorial English state gives greatest attention to the state made manifest at the local scale through the myriad regulatory frameworks

¹⁶ Susan Brigden, *New Worlds, Lost Worlds: The Rule of the Tudors, 1485-1603* (London: The Penguin Press, 2000), 361-362.

¹⁷ Steven G. Ellis, *Tudor Frontiers and Noble Power: The Making of the British State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

administered by and through local people.¹⁸ His work highlights the territorial qualities of the state and reminds us that the geographical distance between distant authority and local practice was resolved through the diffusion of the state's authority into people at lower geographic scales.

The rise of geographical exploration in Europe and England's achievement of a prominent role in exploration as an enterprise is also credited as a source of the rising consciousness of political territoriality. Along with the ability to explore and describe distant lands came an increasingly systematic approach to the descriptive geography of England itself. The work of Leslie Cormack tends to support the view that the geographic exploration and description that flourished in the sixteenth century provided a foundation for England's emerging sense of itself as a distinct and cohesive territory, although the theme running through her work is that descriptive and exploratory geography helped to establish for England a sense of its potential as an empire: "Descriptive geography helped the English to identify themselves as separate from the Continental unrest they saw before them... it set in place a mentality of separateness and exploitation that would encourage the growth of English empire."¹⁹ However, Cormack implies that the sense of a domestic national territory, whose separateness was accentuated by the Reformation, arose *alongside* an awareness of imperial potential, when she says, "The Elizabethan world view encompassed an expanding globe and an

¹⁸ Steve Hindle, *The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1640* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000).

¹⁹ Lesley B. Cormack, "'Good Fences Make Good Neighbors': Geography as Self-Definition in Early Modern England," 655.

enclosing nation.”²⁰ Cormack argues, too, that knowledge of the world, as it was being developed through the enterprise of geographic exploration, was sought and manipulated by the English elite for political advantage (and similarly by the Spanish) so that it should be regarded as a fundamental feature of early modern geopolitics.²¹ My own view is that there is perhaps danger in taking too literally the language of empire as it was used in the geographic and political texts of the period, and that Cormack risks this throughout her work; as one example, she gives surprising emphasis to the metaphorical inscriptions and iconography in John Dee’s early Elizabethan text on navigation.²² If one bears in mind the Elizabethan tendency to understand the world through analogy, it becomes clearer that texts attempting to assert the sovereignty and authority of the English monarch relative to the “empire” of Catholic Europe might simply have resorted to the language of empire by way of analogy, when it was really the territorial insularity of England itself that they were affirming, rather than the near-term expectation of a far-flung empire.

Of course, one rather obvious way in which the concept of English political territory shifted during the Tudor period has to do with the dissolution of the monasteries and religious communities, with their expansive land holdings, following Henry VIII’s break with Rome. Not that Henry had not profited in some way from the monasteries before – in fact, he habitually took advantage of the “hospitality” of

²⁰ Ibid, 640.

²¹ Cormack, “The Fashioning of an Empire: Geography and the State in Elizabethan England.”

²² Cormack, *Charting an Empire*, 1-4.

monasteries, relying upon them for accommodations during his frequent trips to the countryside for hunting or for participation in various civic ceremonies.²³ But once the monasteries were dissolved at Henry's direction, revenues from the agricultural productivity of the vast tracts of land that had formerly belonged to various Catholic monastic orders in England and had been administered by individual monasteries now went to the English Crown, as well as to powerful aristocrats whose loyalty Henry secured by giving or allowing them to purchase the land. Moreover, the land itself came under English legal and cartographic administration, and Cormack alludes to the "race to survey and claim various unidentified and neglected plots of land formerly belonging to the religious foundations"²⁴ as contributing to the emergence of an English practice of chorography that helped to establish a sense of national territoriality distinct from the predominantly Catholic continent of Europe. After Henry abolished the monasteries and redistributed the land to aristocrats whose loyalty he was ensuring in the process, not only was productive land within the confines of England no longer economically and legally controlled by essentially a foreign power – the Roman Church, but the presence of monarchical authority was reinforced through a new cadre of loyal "landed" gentry whose physical presence replaced that of the monasteries.

Related to the real territorial significance of the monasteries, there had also been a spiritual and symbolic aspect to their presence. The putative purpose of the monastic

²³ This is pointed out in Mary Hill Cole, *The Portable Queen: Elizabeth I and the Politics of Ceremony* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 14.

²⁴ Cormack, "'Good Fences Make Good Neighbors,'" 658 and n54.

communities in England had been to symbolically administer the doctrine of purgatory, as the ostensible social value of monks and nuns lay in their occupation of tending to the souls in purgatory and mediating on their behalf. The monasteries and the monastic life symbolized the existence of an intermediate ground between the binary extremes of the living and the dead, between heaven and hell. Doing away with the monasteries in England not only abolished the territorial presence and power of the Church - it also abolished that intermediate symbolic space itself, so that one was left with no recourse but a binary confrontation between two polar opposites. As Susan Brigden explains it, with regard to the Reformation in general, as well as with the dissolution of the monasteries in England in particular:

The community of the dead and of the living had been parted as the doctrine of purgatory was undermined. And if there was no intermediary world in the hereafter, no way of propitiation after death, then a starker judgment awaited Christians; of election or retrobation, heaven or hell. The world of shared faith was broken, and the Christian community divided. At the Reformation, the Christian was forced to choose between two Churches, each claiming to be the true Church, and sometimes to choose between private faith and public conformity.²⁵

It is little wonder, then, that a term such as defection, which conceives of spatialities that are polar opposites with no intermediary space possible, should enter the political lexicon against the backdrop of social upheaval in which both the symbolic intermediate space of purgatory, as well as the territorial space that represented the imposition within England of the distant and foreign authority of the Church and its doctrines, was being violently abolished.

²⁵ Brigden, 361-362.

Earlier in this chapter, I noted the presiding tendency in the late Tudor period to understand the world through analogy and to express this understanding through metaphor. By having done so, I want to propose an interpretation of one well-known Elizabethan practice, the “progress,” which suggests that the progress helped bring about a real transformation in the understanding of national territory because it functioned as an effective metaphor for the Queen’s relationship to the space that she governed. Of the approaches to territoriality that I reviewed in Chapter One, that of Kenneth Olwig seems relevant here, as he hints that a landscape conceived visually as a political domain is perhaps synonymous with territory. Olwig’s recent work highlights the Elizabethan progress as evidence for how political authority inhabiting the landscape in a performative circuit helped define territory as power-in-landscape. Olwig proffers not an analysis of the Elizabethan progress per se (because he cites no literature whatsoever on the phenomenon of the progress), but rather an observation that the Elizabethan progress, as a historical practice, is suggestive of the ambiguities that persist in our present understanding of the spatialities inherent in the word “progress,” with linear movement implying a circuit at the same time that it implies an origin and a destination.²⁶ The literature on the progress is divided between literary studies and Elizabethan history. Literary scholars study the progresses because such a major aspect of them was the staging of entertainments for the queen, plays and masques, mostly with allegorical themes. Elizabethan historians study them, especially the particularly lavish ones, as exemplars of the cult of Elizabeth and of different aspects of court life.

²⁶ Olwig, “Landscape, Place, and the State of Progress,” 24-25.

In a recent attempt to address the spatiality of the progresses, Mary Hill Cole notes that insights from cultural studies have forced historians to consider the importance of ritual, pageantry, and processions in constructing expressions of power.²⁷ This is the context in which not only the Elizabethan progress, but also the elaborate Tudor practices of pageantry and spectacle in general, have been studied.²⁸

While other English monarchs had traveled through their domains, Elizabeth's Tudor predecessors "had not made the idea of travel central to their government in the way that Elizabeth had."²⁹ Obviously, there were practical aspects to a monarchical travel, such as vacating the city during hot summer months, during epidemics, and to allow residential palaces a chance to be "aired" – a euphemism for the clearing away of garbage and human waste that accumulated so rapidly in settings where sanitation systems were limited. For Henry VIII, travel either supported his consolidation of authority where it was contested in peripheral areas (early in his reign) or it was simply recreational, mostly for hunting game. Queen Mary's travels were kept deliberately inconspicuous because of her Spanish husband's unpopularity and the generally contentious nature of her reign. In contrast, Elizabeth's travels, as a collective institution, can be seen collectively as an important instrument in her approach to

²⁷ Cole, 6.

²⁸ An account of early Tudor power as expressed through pageantry is found in Sydney Anglo, *Spectacle, Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). An account of a prototypical Elizabethan progress from the standpoint of the literary texts that supported the various performances and pageants that occurred is found in Zillah Dovey, *An Elizabethan Progress: The Queen's Journey into East Anglia, 1578* (United Kingdom: Allan Sutton Publishing Limited, 1996).

²⁹ Cole, 12.

governance. Elizabethan historian Anne Somerset remarks intuitively that the progresses were undertaken by Queen Elizabeth “with the deliberate intention of transforming the monarchy from a remote and faceless entity to a living presence.”³⁰ While the literature on the progresses tends to focus upon the performances and ceremonies staged by various hosts at the specific destinations, the display of the Queen’s retinue in transit was itself equally important. Somerset notes that between the queen, the courtiers, and the “baggage train,” a typical procession would consist of between 400 and 600 animal-drawn carts, whose “passage through the countryside made an impressive spectacle.” Moreover, the pace of travel was “excruciatingly slow,” and the queen would direct the retinue to where the crowds were thickest, so as to engineer the most profound effect on the people.³¹

It is interesting that the spatiality of the progresses has been overlooked, for all intents and purposes, for so long. Spectacle happens in particular places, and the phenomenon of spectacle concentrated in the particular space of a capital city is far different than the imposition and diffusion of spectacle through space and across distance. Mary Cole’s work seems to be aimed at describing the progresses as a spatial institution. If one is to define the Elizabethan “progress” as involving a circuit of overnight stays as a guest in a succession of houses, none of which were owned by the Queen, the progresses numbered twenty-three and spanned her reign literally from Elizabeth’s first summer as Queen (1559) to her last (1602), with the years of hiatus

³⁰ Anne Somerset, *Elizabeth I* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 372.

³¹ Somerset, 371-383.

mainly clustered in the 1580s.³² Her travel was concentrated over the central third of her kingdom (see Figure 3.1), and it is significant that she seemed to avoid the far north and the far west and southwest, areas where dissent was most prevalent. In contrast to Henry VIII who traveled to peripheral areas episodically to demonstrate his authority there, Elizabeth rather chose to repeatedly project her presence throughout a central English “heartland.” The fact that she never traveled out of England during her entire life and that her compulsion was to travel incessantly throughout the mid-section of the country allowed Elizabeth to represent herself as a truly “homegrown” ruler. It seems very reasonable that the idea of England as a political territory should emerge, then, under Elizabeth, whose physical body came to be a metaphor for the geographic insularity and cultural coherence that state territoriality is meant to express.³³ The progresses suggest that the state was made visible on the landscape as the queen and her court became mobile and moved through countryside. It was a spectacle of power, and the queen and her entourage was more of a mobile symbol made palpable and tangible to citizens watching her pass than it was a set of real people. In contrast to the medieval idea of the state simply being the royal court (supported by the revenues of surrounding environs), the early modern English state became that territory through which the person of the queen might move. The queen’s court was enlarged to become the entire

³² Cole, 19-23 and appendices. These twenty-three progresses included hosted stays at scores of houses, with repeat visits to the houses of particular friends or court favorites. Cole explores the ambivalence with which the Queen’s visits were viewed by courtiers, who were genuinely honored to be chosen for a visit, but whose household finances could be decimated by the demands and expectations involved in hosting the Queen.

³³ The “Ditchley portrait,” showing Elizabeth standing on a map of England (with one foot resting on the town of Ditchley), is the iconic expression of this.

area of the English countryside, so that the territorial state might become the court – the part that is in her physical presence - writ large. The fact, then, that the more distant reaches of the kingdom remained generally in opposition to the Queen becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: the Queen was less likely to make progresses to areas where the resident nobles were not completely unambiguous in their loyalty to her (and where nobles had the economic resources to host her in the fashion that was expected), and their loyalty remained ambiguous at least in part because she did not travel there.³⁴

Territoriality and the Epistemology of Reconnaissance

The irony that England, through royal and courtly sponsorship of its mariners and geographers, rose to become a major participant in the enterprise of global exploration and mapping under a monarch who, through her annual practice of the progress, so tenaciously cultivated an English heartland as a newly conceived national territory, seems somewhat lost upon historians, though perhaps not upon historical geographers. Cormack expresses this dualism nicely when she comments that the Elizabethans cultivated a “seemingly contradictory view of their world - at once expansive and exclusive.” Having earlier considered the impact of this duality upon the shifting sense of national territoriality, I wish now to investigate each side of this duality – expansiveness in geographical exploration and accumulation of knowledge

³⁴ Cole mentions that Elizabeth seemed to go out of her way on occasion to stay with Catholic aristocrats, specifically to demonstrate her lack of personal animus to Catholics and her belief in the potential of Catholics to be loyal subjects. However, she also used progresses as opportunities to confront “prominent local recusants” (Somerset, 387), some of whom ended up in prison after her visit.

about the world beyond the state, on one hand, and exclusivity in protection of the territorial state against threats with external origins, on the other hand - in terms of how each interrelates with my two remaining themes – defection and national security. The massive literature on global exploration during this “age of reconnaissance” highlights the centrality of exploration and cartography, as important national enterprises, to England’s domestic political and geopolitical strategies.³⁵ Moreover, the literature (significantly less massive!) on the Elizabethan intelligence apparatus or “secret service” suggests that it took on a character fundamentally different from the long-standing and universal practice of court intrigue through “spials and intelligencers”³⁶ due to the heightened sense of the ideal cultural coherence of England as a normatively Protestant territory, which was threatened by Catholic incursions and Catholic-instigated plots of all kinds, all of which had the perceived common denominator of a foreign origin from beyond England’s borders. To this, I would add also that Elizabeth’s success in achieving an analogous link between the body of the monarch and the territorial body of the state, an achievement arising in no small part from the practice of annual progresses, was a factor in producing a domestic political situation in which security of the state meant security of the territory, beyond and in addition to the bodily security of the monarch. This also goes far towards explaining the rise of the

³⁵ J. H. Parry, *The Age of Reconnaissance* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1963). This work is a fixture in the descriptive literature of the process of global exploration and mapping by European powers during the 15th through the mid 18th centuries.

³⁶ These were common terms in the vernacular of the 16th century Elizabethan court, and they have no doubt been combined in many texts of the period. The phrase appears in Francis Bacon’s *Discourse in Praise of Knowledge*, written to be performed as a recitation in a 1592 court entertainment staged for Queen Elizabeth.

professional intelligence apparatus at that particular juncture in English history. What becomes clear upon investigation is the extent to which the same individuals who were sponsors and promoters of geographic exploration were also conceptualizing, directing, and participating in intelligence operations; however, this is rarely commented upon in either literature. This is hardly surprising when one considers that the two endeavors – one expansive in its orientation, the other inward looking – shared similar aims of enhancing national power and perpetuating the security and prosperity of the state. The descriptive histories of global exploration presume this overarching aim without commenting upon it theoretically. More recent theoretically-informed critical examinations of different aspects of Renaissance and Enlightenment exploration have emphasized the centrality of expansive trade networks and patterns to state power and security,³⁷ while other accounts emphasize that visual processes of surveillance and reconnaissance have profoundly informed the construction of geographical knowledge.³⁸ For the “age of reconnaissance,” the direct visual observation and description by the eyewitness was assumed to produce credible knowledge. Visual reconnaissance became an instrument of power, and I wish to argue that its

³⁷ See Lisa Jardine, *Worldly Goods: A New History of the Renaissance* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996); and Jeremy Brotton, *Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

³⁸ Many who are participating in this burgeoning literature are cited in the Preface, n1. See also David Livingstone, *The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), especially 52-101; Steven Shapin, *A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), especially “Epistemological Decorum,” 193-242, in which he addresses visual observation and direct witness as reliable testimony to truth; and John Michael Archer, “Surveillance and Enlightenment in Bacon’s New Atlantis” (*Assays* 6: 111-127, 1991), which argues that Bacon’s New Atlantis reinforced the assumption that direct observation of distant lands and peoples could produce knowledge that would lead to a variety of social improvements.

manifestation within the practice of geographical exploration was functionally identical to its manifestation in the nascent intelligence profession of Renaissance England.

By now, the relationship of geographic exploration, as instrument of state knowledge and power, to the practice of intelligence or espionage, another instrument of state knowledge and power, should begin to emerge. Geographic exploration, through observation and description, reveals distant places and territorial settings and makes them legible. Intelligence does precisely the same thing, revealing and rendering legible the places that are potentially adversarial - the territories and territorial settings associated with adversaries and with adversarial actions. Both discourses – the discourse of geographic exploration and the discourse of intelligence practice – are informed by the same epistemology of reconnaissance, namely that observation makes truth and enables power. Although Western specialists during the Cold War assigned intelligence a variety of definitions that are both broad and vague, the contemporary understanding seems uniformly to involve information sought by a state and used to advance some state objective.³⁹ Themes emerge from these definitions that are similar to those that undergird the production of knowledge through geographical exploration: vision, witness, and observation. Frequently described as the “second oldest

³⁹ An array of definitions spanning legislative documents as well as the writings of former Intelligence Community figures includes the following: National Security Act of 1947, in *Compilation of Intelligence Laws and Related Laws and Executive Orders of Interest to the National Intelligence Community* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998) 3-45; Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, 9; Roy Godson, “Intelligence: An American View,” in *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*, ed. K.G. Robertson (London: MacMillan Press, 1987) 3-36; and John Bruce Lockhart, “Intelligence: A British View,” in *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*, 37-52.

profession,”⁴⁰ intelligence-collection in its most basic form is reconnaissance of territory, especially of territory associated with an enemy. Ancient examples of reconnaissance are appealed to in twentieth century writing about the intelligence profession.⁴¹ Examples of this include *The Art of War*, a text credited to ancient Chinese military theorist Sun-Tzu, which describes how informants should be dispatched to unknown territories to collect and report firsthand descriptions of enemies; Old Testament accounts of Moses, who, according to Numbers 13, sent men to explore the land of Canaan and return to give an eye-witness description of the territory and its people and what sort of adversaries they might be; or accounts in Joshua 2 of men, sent secretly by Joshua into the city of Jericho, who were to observe and bring back firsthand reports, so that battle against the city could be conducted more effectively. Examples of battlefield reconnaissance in various early American settings are also commonly used to “set the stage” in the late 20th century descriptive literature on the US intelligence profession.⁴² That the modern intelligence profession resorts to illustrations from a range of various ancient, more recent, and even mythical settings of military conflict (ancient Greek and Roman conquests also offer many vignettes used by Dulles) to present its historical antecedents shows that it rests upon an epistemology of

⁴⁰ Among the many who employ this evocative description are Godson, 3; and Polmar and Allen, *The Encyclopedia of Espionage*, ix.

⁴¹ See especially Dulles, 9-28.

⁴² An example of this is in Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), 6-29, in which the author claims to account for all American intelligence from the Revolution up until America's entry into WWI.

reconnaissance, the assumption that truth can be ascertained through the direct observation and description of the witness or dispatched informant.⁴³ The logic of this epistemology is understood to speak for itself, and nowhere does the literature of the contemporary intelligence profession contain any critical examination of these epistemological assumptions. In contrast, of course, the practices of Renaissance and Enlightenment geographers, cartographers, and global explorers have increasingly come under the critical scrutiny of a new generation of geographers and historians.

One need only look at dictionary definitions to see the language of intelligence as generally understood in its Cold War context brought together with the language of geographical discovery. *Webster's* defines intelligence as "information concerning an enemy, a possible enemy, or an area" (emphasis added). The *OED* meaning that accords with the Cold War understanding of intelligence is "knowledge as to events, communicated by or obtained from another... information of military value, especially applied to the communication of spies, secret or private agents, etc." Significantly, the *OED's* literary example of this particular context of intelligence is taken from the 1613 text, *Pilgrimage*, by popular English travel-writer Samuel Purchas, who wrote, "I suspend [belief] till some eye-intelligence of some of our parts have testified the

⁴³ That the history of intelligence is completely synonymous with the history of military intelligence is the theme running throughout all the chapters of a fairly recent volume of essays on intelligence history, Keith Neilson and B.J.C. McKercher, eds., *Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992).

truth.”⁴⁴ Here the linkage between intelligence and visual observation is clearly conveyed.

Purchas’ *Pilgrimage*, is discussed at length by E.G.R. Taylor, whose *Late Stuart and Early Tudor Geography* devotes a full chapter to Samuel Purchas.⁴⁵ Taylor argues that *Pilgrimage* was underestimated in its lasting importance relative to other geographical texts of the period, (such as Hakluyt’s *Principal Navigations*). The fact that Purchas himself never traveled more than 200 miles from his place of birth, but constructed this influential text relying entirely upon the compiled, firsthand accounts of more than 700 people, demonstrates that methods recognized today as those associated with the intelligence profession – that is, assessing the credibility of firsthand informants’ reports – were vitally important in the construction of geographical knowledge. Purchas’ work was deemed credible, and, owing to the uniqueness of the firsthand accounts he used, it was especially useful in constructing early English impressions of Japan.⁴⁶

The Elizabethan intelligence network emerged to address a newly heightened sense of foreign threat to the security of both Elizabeth’s regime and to the state as a territory. Likewise, geographical exploration was promoted by the European state elites (including England, of course) of that period, or by governments themselves; and clearly any government that promoted exploration did so because it perceived that state

⁴⁴See OED online, <http://dictionary.oed.com>.

⁴⁵ E.G.R. Taylor, *Late Tudor and Early Stuart Geography, 1583-1650*, 53-66.

interests – commercial, military, and political – were at stake. Trade networks, and maps of those networks, were central to state power and security, and states' desire for their actors to extend and control commercial networks across new territory was as much an impetus for exploration as simple acquisition of wealth.⁴⁷ Literary theorist John Scattergood recently argued that as early as the fifteenth century, English voices were expressing a sophisticated geopolitics. A popular mid-fifteenth century poem, “The Libelle of Englyshe Polyce” (cited in a slightly different context in Chapter 1, n27) discerns that national power depended upon the state's strategic ability to connect with transportation networks and trade routes, and this poem has been cited as perhaps the earliest written assertion of an English “sea power” strategy, wherein global navigation as directed by a merchant class becomes the source of state power.⁴⁸ The poem's impact on public perception is indicated by the fact that it was reprinted often during the succeeding two centuries, most notably by Richard Hakluyt in his second edition of *Principal Navigations*. For Hakluyt, the poem was useful in bolstering the notion that geographic exploration with an eye towards developing colonial sources of commodities was preferable to state dependence for commodity trade upon rival foreign powers. But it would be difficult to separate commercial from state security concerns, recognizing that the age of reconaissance “regarded foreign trade as another form of

⁴⁶ Michael J. Huissen, “England Encounters Japan: English Knowledge of Japan in the Seventeenth Century,” *Terrae Incognitae* 5 (1973): 43-59 (see especially 49-55).

⁴⁷ In addition to Jardine and Brotton, see also Nicholas Crane, *Mercator: The Man Who Mapped the Planet* (Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 2003).

⁴⁸ John Scattergood, “‘The Libelle of Englyshe Polyce’: The Nation and Its Place,” 49.

war,” with religious motives fading in importance relative to economic ones.⁴⁹ Thus, geographical exploration was deeply integrated with states’ senses of vulnerability, and the information developed through the exploration process was key to state prestige and security.

Another reason to regard the information developed through geographical exploration as intelligence information lies in the notion that, as I have already suggested, one can read the political situation in Europe as a kind of Cold War, with the same powers engaged in intense political-religious rivalry – the Protestant powers of England and the Netherlands against the Catholic powers of Spain and France – also engaged in rivalry over distant territories for colonization and resource extraction.⁵⁰ Of course, just as the twentieth century Cold War “heated up” from time to time, so did the rivalry in between Protestant and Catholic powers, with Spanish Armada’s attempted English invasion of 1588 being the best example. But the rivalry was manifested at different scales and in different settings, including between Spanish and English explorers and adventurers who encountered one another in the New World. English merchant adventurer John Hawkins and his group of over 100 men and boys were captured in New Spain (Mexico) and subjected to the local version of the Inquisition, which was standard treatment for any captured European adventurers, especially English, and this amounted to being accused of heresy as well as of spying on behalf of

⁴⁹ Parry, *Age of Reconnaissance*, 324-325.

⁵⁰ Breight, *Surveillance, Militarism and Drama in the Elizabethan Era*, 100.

England.⁵¹ The Inquisition seemed to be the instrument through which Spain conducted its “Cold War” against England, as well as the instrument through which it asserted its claim to distant territories. Hawkins and barely a dozen of his men survived their ordeal to eventually report on their travels to Hakluyt, who incorporated their horrific account of Catholic New Spain into his *Principal Navigations*.⁵²

It is impossible to ignore that Francis Walsingham, who directed the collection of military and political intelligence in support of Queen Elizabeth’s government, also was a key patron of various exploration ventures.⁵³ Indeed, Walsingham’s patronage of geographical exploration ranged from overt to covert. On the overt side, one sees Walsingham’s interest in the elder Richard Hakluyt’s manuscript *Discourse of Western Planting*, as well as the younger Hakluyt’s dedication to Walsingham of his 1589 *Principal Voyages and Navigations of the English Nation*, as evidence of the latter’s interest in exploration.⁵⁴ Hakluyt produced his work during a sojourn of several years as assistant to the English Ambassador to France, a diplomatic post that Walsingham himself had held during the previous decade. In fact, one view of the relationship

⁵¹ Somerset, 322-323; and Lourdes de Ita, “The Perception of Mexico in Elizabethan England,” paper presented at the Society for the History of Discoveries Annual Conference, Guadalajara, Mexico, October 2002.

⁵² de Ita.

⁵³ E.G.R. Taylor’s work bears this out again and again, in Taylor “The Missing Draft Project of Drake’s Voyage of 1577-80,” 46-47; and at numerous points in her *Tudor Geography* (such as 113, where she names the promoters of Drake’s voyage of circumnavigation) and her *Late Tudor and Stuart Geography*. See also Michael Burn, *The Debatable Land: A Study of the Motives of Spies in Two Ages* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), 197.

⁵⁴ Taylor, *Late Tudor and Early Stuart Geography*, 6, 15-16.

between Hakluyt and Walsingham is that Walsingham was not only Hakluyt's mentor, but that Hakluyt was an important agent in Walsingham's network of informants.⁵⁵ And Walsingham's view of the importance of exploration to political strategy is suggested by his direction of a censorship of the younger Hakluyt's work, to ensure that no "state secrets" relative to geographic knowledge were compromised. Covertly, Walsingham's spy network and his penetration of diplomatic correspondence ensured that he kept abreast of the exploration ventures of foreign rivals, and one example of this is Walsingham's interest in the reports of a spy (possibly a double agent) who accompanied the Martin Frobisher expedition to North America and was charged with reporting on the explorations of Spain in the same area.⁵⁶ Though the literature on Walsingham as a central figure in Elizabethan intelligence ignores the ways in which his interests in geographical exploration and intelligence intersect, one cannot help but notice that a recent description of Walsingham's intelligence network as "a small army of free-lance news-gatherers scattered all over Europe," which "included merchants, traders, businessmen, commercial agents, licensed travelers, and petty functionaries" is

⁵⁵ This is the conclusion of Hakluyt's early 20th century biographer G.B.Parks, *Richard Hakluyt and the English Voyages*, (New York, 1928), as well as of renowned historical geographer of the period, E.G.R. Taylor, who suggested this conclusion in her "Introduction" to *The Original Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1935) 76-77. However, neither author comments upon the implications of this relationship for the interrelationship of Walsingham's vocation, England's domestic security, with Hakluyt's vocation, describing England's expansionist aspirations.

⁵⁶ Bernard Allaire and Donald Hogarth, "Martin Frobisher, the Spaniards, and a Sixteenth-Century Northern Spy," *Terrae Incognitae* (1996) 28: 46-57.

also an apt description of the type of people who were sought out by Walsingham and by his protégé Hakluyt as sources of geographical and cartographic knowledge.⁵⁷

In addition to Walsingham, Francis Drake is another Elizabethan figure whose reputation as a military and political figure overlapped his renown for geographical exploration. Geographic writers who were his contemporaries noted his shortcomings in not providing detailed reports on his circumnavigation of the globe (reports which would be readily recognized as intelligence reports according to contemporary intelligence vernacular), arguing that such a written account would serve the interests of the state as well as of the general public:

But if it please Sir Francis to write a perfect Diary of his whole voyage, showing... what Ports and Havens he found,... what manner of people, what trade of living, what kind of building and government..., whether the ground were fertile or barren... In thus doing, the said Sir Francis, I say, should greatly profit his countrymen and thereby deserve immortal fame.⁵⁸

However, Drake's case points to the double-edged sword of geographic information as intelligence. Drake's prestige was already assured, through his circumnavigational feat as well as his successful confrontation with the Armada. As his behavior during his explorations amounted to piracy, he was hardly motivated to provide a detailed written account for the monarch or the public to scrutinize, and rather he "rested on his laurels."

Following close upon the heels of Drake's victory over the Armada, the return of Thomas Cavendish from a global circumnavigation that was intended as an emulation of Drake's earlier voyage reminded English statesmen of the potential for

⁵⁷ Alison Plowden, Alison, *The Elizabethan Secret Service* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 54.

⁵⁸ Taylor *Late Tudor and Early Stuart Geography*, 26.

exploration to develop “material suitable for denigrating Spanish achievements and revealing the vulnerability of Spain’s empire.”⁵⁹ Exploration could produce “state secrets,” such as we see with Walsingham’s effort to censor Hakluyt’s work or in early Portuguese attitudes of secrecy relative to voyages of exploration.⁶⁰ Alternately, it could be used as “disinformation,” to employ a term from twentieth century intelligence vernacular: propaganda that is intended to mislead, as seen in the case of the Dutch, who “became expert in the issue of propaganda relating to overseas and other ventures.”⁶¹ And Cavendish’s return also highlighted the value of native people as informants, or, to use more recent intelligence vernacular, sources of “human intelligence.” In addition to returning with captured Spanish booty, Cavendish also brought back to England two Asian men, who were “borne naturalles of Japan and the Philippinaes” and were capable of “speaking our language and informing us of the state of their Easterne habitations.”⁶² Richard Hakluyt “debriefed” these men personally, and used information from their “interrogations” in preparation of his *Principal Navigations*.⁶³ Moreover, Cavendish’s letter to the English Lord Chamberlain detailing the geopolitical significance not only of his completed voyage, but also of his capturing

⁵⁹ David B. Quinn and David R. Ransome, “Economic and Political Profit-taking in the Aftermath of Thomas Cavendish’s Circumnavigation of the Globe, 1588-1589,” *Terrae Incognitae* 29 (1997): 22-34.

⁶⁰ Bailey W. Diffie, “Foreigners in Portugal and the ‘Policy of Silence,’” *Terrae Incognitae* 1 (1969): 23-34; Quinn and Ransome, 22.

⁶¹ Quinn and Ransome, 22.

⁶² Taylor *Late Tudor and Early Stuart Geography*, 17.

⁶³ Taylor *Late Tudor and Early Stuart Geography*, Huissen, 43-44.

of Spanish riches and foreign “eye-witnesses” alike, was reprinted by Hakluyt and elsewhere, in pamphlets and pedagogical materials in no fewer than six other European languages.⁶⁴

The notion of secrecy, which is a commonplace feature of the twentieth century intelligence profession, was likewise present to varying degrees in many accounts and texts of geographical exploration in the Age of Reconnaissance. Bailey W. Diffie explores the controversial theme that from the early fifteenth century Portugal suppressed news of its own navigational achievements so as to prevent rival powers from learning about them. That Diffie questions the practicality of maintaining secrecy about navigational practices and intentions in a Portuguese setting that was so cosmopolitan, filled with foreigners all participating in various aspects of navigation and trade, simply points to the assumption that foreigners would have been viewed as potential conduits of information among rival state elements. Likewise in intelligence discourse, such assumptions are always present. We see a similar example in the Enlightenment-era explorations of Siberia by Sir Samuel Bentham, an Englishman employed by the court of Catherine the Great to explore and map the territory, as well as to gather intelligence on Russia’s Chinese frontier.⁶⁵ Harley notes a growing role for secrecy and censorship in the production of maps “as the emergent nations struggled as

⁶⁴ Quinn and Ransome, 27.

⁶⁵ Dennis Reinhartz, “In the Service of Catherine the Great: The Siberian Explorations and Map of Sir Samuel Bentham,” *Terrae Incognitae* 26 (1994): 49-60 (see especially 53).

much for self-definition as for physical territory,” and he states that “by the early modern period, cartographic secrecy was clearly widespread.”⁶⁶

One variation on secrecy relative to geographical exploration is the tendency to contain reports of voyages in closely-guarded correspondences, including diplomatic dispatches, often using code or cipher. Taylor cites the “discovery” of key facts about Drake’s circumnavigation, located in obscure and damaged fragments of letters, including one sent by a member of Drake’s crew to powerful relatives who were among the voyage’s sponsors.⁶⁷ And Allaire and Hogarth argue that the Spanish court was able to keep track of the progress of Martin Frobisher’s expedition to North America through the reports of a spy who was secretly operating as a member of Frobisher’s crew and corresponding with a diplomat, who in turn communicated the information to other state elites using cipher. Observing that dissemination of information about voyages commonly involved coded dispatches from diplomats, especially for states whose geographical explorations touched upon sensitive aspects of foreign or military policy, Allaire and Hogarth suggest that full details of many explorers’ voyages remain obscure, due to modern inability to translate the codes and ciphers of the period. In the case of the Frobisher expedition, during which a spy relayed to the Spanish ambassador to England reports of Frobisher’s attempts to locate valuable mineral deposits, Allaire and Hogarth not only speculate on the identity of the spy, but also hypothesize that he may have actually been a “double agent,” feeding the Spanish ambassador with

⁶⁶ Harley, “Silences and Secrecy,” 59.

⁶⁷ Taylor, “The Missing Draft Project of Drake’s Voyage of 1577-80.”

sufficient information to satisfy him without endangering Frobisher's mission. The same ambassador kept well abreast of the movements and progress of Sir Walter Raleigh in the New World.⁶⁸ Haynes notes relatedly that Elizabethan diplomatic dispatches were never entirely secure, as Walsingham's network of agents included individuals who intercepted diplomatic correspondence.⁶⁹ Thus, the use of codes and ciphers by diplomats was imperative and was of course practiced by Walsingham himself in most of his correspondence, including that which concerned his promotional interests in New World exploration. (See Figure 3.2)

The Sixteenth Century Cold War

The idea of the Elizabethan setting as one that mirrors the Cold War, in terms of aggressive intelligence practiced between adversaries in response to broadly conceived and unrelenting threats, is one which has been picked up in most of the literature on the Elizabethan "secret service." Moreover, some observers note that the Elizabethan practice of espionage, to which Walsingham's name is most commonly linked but with which William Cecil and Robert Dudley were also indelibly associated, mirrored the Spanish Inquisition in general; and Walsingham mirrored his Spanish nemesis, Mendoza, the Spain's ambassador to the English court.⁷⁰ For one thing, the two

⁶⁸ David Quinn, "Preparations for the 1585 Virginia Voyage," *William and Mary Quarterly* 6/2 (1949): 208-236.

⁶⁹ Alan Haynes, *Invisible Power: The Elizabethan Secret Services, 1570-1603* (Wolfboro Falls, NH: Alan Sutton Publishing Inc., 1992), 11-35.

⁷⁰ Burn, 196-199; Haynes, 157. That Mendoza, an ambassador, is portrayed in the literature as the principal intelligence rival of Walsingham (who himself began his service to Queen Elizabeth with a

represented extreme ends of the religious spectrum. Walsingham was a Puritan, then a radical and purist faction within the English Protestant church and one that within a generation would provoke further political and social strife. At the opposite extreme, Mendoza was so devout a Catholic that he insisted upon receiving absolution prior to each audience with the excommunicated Queen Elizabeth.⁷¹ In fact, the similarity between these two is heightened further by Burn's comment that, like Walsingham, Mendoza also relentlessly sought information on exploration ventures and counted merchants and sailors and ship captains among his informants; indeed, the similarity between these two as intelligence rivals seems to parallel the similarity between geographic knowledge and intelligence knowledge.⁷² However, the literature on Elizabethan intelligence practice varies in its estimation of which individual courtiers wielded the most power,⁷³ whether the phenomenon even deserves the designation of "secret service," and the extent to which the intelligence practices should be construed as instrumental to Elizabeth's personal needs versus the needs of the territorial state. None of these points are particularly crucial to my argument. On the first, though one

diplomatic assignment to France) helps to remind us that diplomacy tended to be intertwined with espionage and with routine intelligence reporting beginning in the early modern period and continuing through to the 20th century when professional intelligence services were established separately within government bureaucracies. This was in contrast to the late medieval period in Europe when, in general terms, ambassadors were largely symbolic and intended to communicate a visual impression rather than actively participate in policy or political dialogue. See "Sent Abroad to Lie," *The Economist*, 21 December 2002, 78-82.

⁷¹ Burn, 197.

⁷² Burn, 199.

⁷³ Walsingham and William Cecil are the main contenders, and Curtis Breight argues strenuously in favor of Cecil, suggesting that Walsingham was nothing but Cecil's protégé.

might argue that William Cecil rather than Walsingham was the “mastermind” of Elizabethan intelligence, no one seems to argue that Walsingham did not devote his life to intelligence as an undertaking. On the second, whether or not the term “secret service” is invoked to describe the informant networks and normalized procedures of coded communication seems to be a matter of semantics. Those who make this point often invoke the views of Walsingham’s principal 20th century biographer, Conyers Read. Read produced his three-volume study in the 1920s, long before either the onset of the Cold War or the resumption of elaborate state-directed overseas intelligence networks could explain why his work is interpreted as downplaying Walsingham as a spymaster and his network as an intelligence service.⁷⁴ On the third point, the failure of some scholars to invest the Elizabethan intelligence network with importance extending beyond simply the protection of the Queen herself and the furtherance of her marriage schemes seems to reflect a shortcoming in the understanding of the profoundly transformative quality of the early modern period from medieval regime to territorial

⁷⁴ This is the claim of Haynes, 12-13. However implicit throughout the three volumes of Conyers Read, *Mr Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925) is the notion that intelligence was Walsingham’s primary means of developing information, and therefore the foundational instrument of his service to the Queen. Perhaps because Read did not have a contemporary Cold War or a contemporary spy industry to serve as a point of comparison, his work does not reflect a separate lengthy treatment of Walsingham as a spymaster. Nevertheless, Read addresses the animus that Walsingham’s intelligence activities and intrigues has provoked in later critics and detractors: “Inevitably a man who has to do with ciphers and spies and who undertakes to meet plot by counterplot acquires a sinister reputation for himself... The greater his skill in such matters the more certain his condemnation... It must be confessed that there was much about him which lends colour to this charge. His sharp, swarthy countenance, his pointed Italian beard, his habitually sombre garments in themselves furnish damaging testimony... no man ever looked more satanic than he.” See Read, Volume II, 340-341.

state.⁷⁵ With a more geographically informed interpretation comes the realization that that threats to the English queen became synonymous with threats to English territory, and this is a feature of the early modern period that I have already discussed at length.

My own view, and one borne out by most scholars of Elizabethan intelligence, is that intelligence extended Elizabeth's gaze beyond her territorial dominion. Elizabeth's domain was a normatively Protestant one, so that threats to both the symbolic and territorial state were not only Catholic in origin, but Catholic threats were also necessarily foreign in origin. Nowhere is this more clear than in the accounts of fugitive English Catholics who "defected" to seminaries in Europe, institutions such as the well-known seminary at Douai in the Netherlands, as well as a Jesuit-run seminary in Rome catering to the training of English Catholics. Catholicism's continuation in England, after the early Elizabethan "Act of Uniformity" (which demanded the conversion of all Catholic clergy and the weekly attendance of citizens at Protestant services where Protestant clergy affiliated), was only possible if there were Catholic clergy who could circulate privately among Catholic households and administer the sacraments. By demanding early in her reign that all recusant clergy convert or go to prison as a consequence, Elizabeth's strategy was to cripple Catholicism in England by eliminating its priestly infrastructure. The threat to Elizabeth's reign that was posed by the Catholic Mary Queen of Scots, whose claim to the throne was fairly legitimate and who (unlike Elizabeth) did not present the dilemma of a reign unsecured by an heir, is

⁷⁵ Alison Plowden's work falls into this category. The foreign intrigue that she describes is remarkably devoid of "place," and the focus of foreign (Catholic) threats is invariably the Queen herself, rather than England as a territory.

well known and need not be repeated here; suffice it to say that the Scottish queen's supporters in England all happened to be Catholic, as well as associated with France or with the distant northern counties adjoining Scotland, and this provided yet other reasons to presume that Catholicism was a foreign-originating threat to England's stability. The idea of Catholicism as fundamentally inimical to England – and, relatedly, of all Catholics as potential traitors – was the natural consequence of the Papal excommunication of Elizabeth in 1570. Not only did the Pope declare Elizabeth and all who were loyal to her government to be eternally damned, he also declared as part of the excommunication that it was the duty of Catholics to seek her overthrow and that any person who committed violent acts in furtherance of her overthrow would be automatically absolved of any sin. For a period in which the condition of one's eternal soul was a very real concern for people of conscience, the implications of this policy was shattering at the level of the private individual, as well as being politically volatile.

One outcome of the excommunication was that English Catholics paid more attention to the need for clergy who could not only serve the spiritual demands of recusant Catholics, but who could also serve as focal points for plots to weaken and possibly overthrow Elizabeth. One exiled Catholic clergyman and former Oxford professor, William Allen, established the seminary at Douai in the Netherlands, and seminaries were established by Jesuits in Italy, all for the express purpose of preparing English priests to infiltrate back into England and move secretly through the countryside, not only undermining Protestant England by sustaining lapsed Catholics, but also fomenting plots to overthrow Elizabeth. The “secular priests” (called this

because they were not adherents to a particular monastic order) trained at the Douai seminary insisted they were politically neutral and wished only to minister to people's private spiritual needs; however, there is plenty of evidence to the contrary, and William Allen (named "Cardinal" in recognition of his tenacious efforts to win England back for the Church) is known to have plotted endlessly about Elizabeth's overthrow and proposed several schemes in which his priests might take part.⁷⁶ There was a method to the spatial distribution of the missionary priests who were infiltrated back into England, and they were sent more to the south and east of England, within easy reach of the ports where they arrived by ship, usually in disguise or as stowaways. Rather than send the missionary priests to areas that remained Catholic strongholds, the idea was to have them work within the heart of Elizabeth's domain, where support for her was strongest. Of course, this placed priests at greater risk of being apprehended and accused of fomenting treason. Ironically, the unintended consequence of this spatial strategy was that areas of the north and the northwest "which early in the reign were regarded as hotbeds of popery, were left bereft of priests, and by the end of the reign Catholicism there was on the wane."⁷⁷

Feared even more than the Douai priests were the Jesuit missionary priests who set their sights on England. The Jesuits were a young order, but an explicitly militant one, and one which had already achieved a reputation of facilitating the aggressive

⁷⁶ Somerset, *Elizabeth I*, 391. Somerset's general account of the impact of the Douai seminary on Elizabethan foreign policy is on 386-393. See also Warren, *Elizabeth I: Religion and Foreign Affairs*, 70-79.

⁷⁷ Somerset, 388.

spread of Spanish territorial conquest by accompanying Spanish explorers and “conquistadores” and setting up the infrastructure of the Inquisition in the distant reaches of the New World. As mentioned earlier, English mariners were not beyond the reach of the fanatic Jesuit priests of the Inquisition even across the Atlantic. Jesuits were not only known for their ability to withstand rigorous living conditions and face the risk of torture and death with equanimity, they were also equally renown for their success in converting “the heathen” of distant lands as for their ability to woo Protestants back into the faith. One of Elizabeth’s courtiers, Sir Francis Knollys, said of Jesuits:

Those Jesuits, in going from house to house to withdraw men from the obedience of her majesty unto the obedience of the false Catholic Church of Rome, hath and will endanger her Majesty’s person and state more than all the sects of the world, if no execution shall follow upon the traitorous practisers that are for the same apprehended.⁷⁸

Thus, the Jesuit threat was a particularly dangerous one. In both the New World and in the Protestant areas of the Old World alike, Jesuits were perceived as a vanguard, which would precede later secular political conquest. Not only were the Jesuits foreign in origin (even if Englishmen as individuals, the Jesuits as an order were foreign) and associated with both Spain and the Roman Church simultaneously, but the Jesuit threat was also insidious and invisible, lurking within individual houses throughout the English countryside, demanding that the prying eyes of intelligencers route it out. Moreover, the Jesuits were effective teachers who could subvert the English youth by

⁷⁸ Ibid.

inculcating them with foreign ideas.⁷⁹ The isolation and provincialism of the English countryside, even in traditionally Catholic areas, worked against any missionary priest, however, and the risk of apprehension was always high:

Wandering individuals without clear destinations in mind were likely to be detected quickly. After all, wandering about was not an acceptable practice in Elizabethan England. Vagrancy laws, deep-set localism, and suspicion of foreigners made a stranger without a discernible purpose vulnerable in the extreme. A network of safehouses meant, of course, that the priests had to rely on the gentry class for protection.⁸⁰

Accounts of the Elizabethan intelligence climate do not fail to mention the tendency for Walsingham and other courtiers who were running intelligence operations to seek informants within the households of gentry who were known or believed to be Catholic and who might harbor treasonous priests. The concept of defectors is especially relevant here, because the greatest danger to Catholics who plotted to conceal priests came from individuals who were known and trusted as Catholics within Catholic circles, but who had in reality switched sides and become informants for Walsingham and his circle. These sorts of individuals could penetrate Catholic households with relative ease, learn of the movements of infiltrated Douai or Jesuit priests, and even learn of Catholic plots against Elizabeth.

According to the more recent additions to the literature, the Protestant practitioners of early modern intelligence tend to be critically assessed as sadistic, manipulative, corrupt, and wantonly cruel, while their Catholic adversaries are, for the

⁷⁹ Plowden discusses the English intelligence and counterintelligence response to the threat of subversion and infiltration by Jesuits, 61-75.

⁸⁰ Warren, 75.

most part, innocent and victimized.⁸¹ Perhaps this is a corrective tactic intended to redress a traditional tendency towards hagiography in the literature of Elizabethan history. Additionally, it could represent a conscious or unconscious effort to balance past analogies of the Elizabethan and 20th century Cold Wars; just as the “West” (usually a stand-in for Anglo-America) is rightfully the focus of post-imperialist and post-Cold War critiques, so the English side in the Elizabethan Cold War might be seen as due for a trenchant critique. Balance is perhaps difficult to achieve, when one considers the availability of primary source accounts of atrocities visited by the English on their victims against the relative absence of Spanish threats and plots that actually came to fruition, but perhaps some measure of balance can be realized by keeping in perspective the role of fear in constructing threats. Just as in the Cold War, threats had a material referent and were not entirely discursive, although discourse played an undeniably important role in the construction of threats and of policies in response to threats,⁸² during the Elizabethan period threats also had a material dimension and

⁸¹ Haynes and Breight are particularly scathing in their treatment of Elizabethan intelligence practitioners, and Haynes condemns 20th century Western practitioners of intelligence as much as he does their Elizabethan counterparts when he says of Elizabethan espionage that it “grew parasitically on the body politic of the nation, flourishing as it is like to do when a certain godlessness takes hold, earthly authority massing to fill the space evacuated” (xi). Breight declares his intent to challenge what he terms the prevailing “Protestant nationalist historiography” that has been responsible for perpetuating the image of a Renaissance England flourishing under the shrewd yet benevolent “Good Queen Bess,” with the mild and wise William Cecil ever at her side; and this myth has persisted at the expense of “Catholic oppositional discourse,” which Breight claims has long been ruthlessly suppressed. Breight’s expressed intent is to give voice to this oppositional discourse and present an alternate interpretation of Cecil as a ruthless and tyrannical mastermind, whose cunning and cruelty overshadowed all his famed contemporaries - Walsingham, Leicester, even Elizabeth herself. For Breight, the period of his study ceases to be Elizabethan and becomes instead “Cecilian.” Plowden’s account is balanced, relative to the other two.

⁸² The theme of David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, is that the establishment of a dominant discourse of ideal American identity has given

cannot be assessed as entirely the result of discourse that emerged from the English Protestant power elite and their frantic desire to craft a national policy and a geopolitics independent of Catholic European superpowers. I would argue that a contributing factor to the ways in which national threats were perceived and responded to had to do with fear suffered on a personal level, and I would point to some key experiences of Francis Walsingham as an example. It is useful to recall that he was forced out of England as a young man during the violent reign of Queen Mary, both because he and his family were radical Protestant Puritans and perhaps also because he had distant relatives involved in plots to subvert Mary's ascension to the throne and he feared he might be drawn into a wide circle of royal retribution.⁸³ And early in his service to Queen Elizabeth he was dispatched to France as ambassador, a position he held for more than two years. During his service in France, in addition to developing an flourishing network of clandestine informants and adopting the practice of incorporating codes and ciphers into his correspondence, he also experienced firsthand the abrupt and bloody outbreak of Catholic-instigated mob violence in Paris in August 1572 that came to be called the St. Bartholemew's Day Massacre.⁸⁴ The victims of the massacre, which

policymakers a benchmark against which to posit threats to that identity, and this discursive process largely determines foreign policy. Campbell argues that far from being a pluralistic polity, the dominant identity that dictates policy direction is an Anglo one; and he maintains that along with inheriting an Anglo identity heavily informed by the late Tudor and Stuart periods, the United States also inherited the tendency prevalent in that period of English history to also construct threats from identity discourse.

⁸³ Read, *Volume I*, 17 and 22, speculates that Walsingham's reasons for exile may have extended beyond the obvious religious explanation, and probably included his discomfiture over his relatives' affiliations.

⁸⁴ The best account of Walsingham's work and experiences during this period was compiled in 1655 from the original correspondence and published by Sir Dudley Digges, *The Compleat Ambassador*.

was carried out by mobs in and around Paris over a period of two days, included perhaps several thousand people, with French Huguenots the primary target along with other Protestants and foreigners. English visitors to Paris, as well as many other Protestants, flocked to Walsingham's ambassadorial residence and were taken in and given protection. The distance of Walsingham's residence from the thickest mob violence probably accounts for the survival of most of the people who took refuge there, but documents cited by Conyers Read indicate that the mob broke into his house and dragged a few Huguenots out to be killed in the street. Moreover, letters contained in Dudley Digges' *Compleat Ambassador* (compiled early in the 17th century) report that Walsingham himself had to physically fend off the French Catholics who had invaded his residence seeking to kill him.⁸⁵ When news of the massacre reached the English court (as is well-recounted in the descriptive histories of the period) the shock of such unrestrained carnage visited upon Protestants by Catholics of the same nationality and in the capital city, with no apparent attempt at intervention by the state, and even threatening the English ambassador himself, filled English observers with very genuine fear that uncontrollable Catholic bloodlust could sweep across the English Channel from Europe. The accounts of Walsingham's personal witness of (and endangerment during) the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre should help to contextualize how one person could have sustained such profound hatred and distrust towards Catholics over an entire career and how his animus could have colored his interpretation of threats to England. As Haynes points out, the nature of the threat to English security posed by

⁸⁵ See Read, *Volume I*, 220-222; and Digges, 240.

Catholics fluctuated, at best: “This was the climate in which Catholic activities were converted into conspiracy at a time when the nature of the Catholic mission to England was entirely debatable, creating a discourse of treason, regardless of whether a given ‘treasonous’ plot was real, imagined, or contrived by the government.”⁸⁶ But for Walsingham, his personal experience had been enough to confirm that there was no debate over the authenticity of the Catholic threat to English territory.

It is also interesting to speculate on the possibility that Walsingham’s Puritan religious beliefs affected the way in which he interpreted threats to English national security. The fact that he identified as a Puritan throughout his career despite the open knowledge of the Queen’s own discomfiture with Puritanism and with any kind of religious radicalism suggests that Puritanism provided a set of beliefs from which he drew genuine spiritual sustenance and ethical guidance. And from Walsingham’s Puritanism we are reminded that 20th (and 21st) century intelligence practitioners also have the reputation of being ideologues, using their fervent beliefs to undergird their professional commitments. In any case, Walsingham devoted the remainder of his life to countering the Catholic threat by combining intelligence informants throughout Europe with patronage of exploration to lands beyond Europe, all aimed at the single coherent purpose of enhancing the security of the English state. His success lay in his ability to use his network as a geographic tool to overcome the limitations of territory, and Haynes expresses this well:

⁸⁶ Haynes, 35.

Walsingham was the greatest (just ahead of the Cecils) of the Elizabethan spy masters. His flair was to make a tiny, multi-national, shifting cluster of informers and intelligencers seem to be everywhere. Yet, they were only spasmodically anywhere, unlike the Spanish Inquisition which flourished in secret as another early modern bureaucracy.⁸⁷

One level at which the Elizabethan Cold War was played out was in the calculated exchange of printed propaganda materials. This not only highlights another point of similarity to the 20th century Cold War, it also suggests a feature of my present discussion of the interrelationship of geographical and intelligence discourse that is reminiscent of observations made of the geographic implications of modernity – namely, the tendency to conceive of knowledge as both objectifiable and spatial, able to be contained in a book and distributed through space. Accounts of various aspects of Elizabethan intelligence activity specifically mention that printed materials were sent into England with the intent of spreading a Catholic message, and that Protestant books and pamphlets were exported from England to contribute to the various Protestant movements that were ongoing in various parts of Europe.⁸⁸ One apparent social development of the early modern period, and one that perhaps was a consequence of the printing press and increased private ownership of books, was that literate people transitioned from reading aloud, even when alone, to silent reading. As Haynes points out, silent reading can be construed as secret reading and can produce secret impulses, unknown to any but the reader. Printed materials were a threat, inasmuch as they

⁸⁷ Haynes, 157.

⁸⁸ See Haynes, xvi.; also Ronald Pollitt, “The Abduction of Doctor John Story and the Evolution of Elizabethan Intelligence Operations,” *Sixteenth Century Journal* 14:2 (Summer 1983), 131-156, especially 135.

contained ideas that could be communicated secretly, that were themselves powerful, and that could produce material effects. Through the printed word, a subversive message could secretly be communicated, whose impact was not visible but was nevertheless diffusing spatially.

Attempts to control the distribution of subversive books led to the dramatic downfall of one Elizabethan “defector,” Dr. John Story. A non-converting Catholic, Story had been a key figure in the Marian persecutions of Protestants that led to the burning of over 200 Protestant “martyrs.” He was especially notorious for having led the trial of Archbishop Cranmer (the author of Henry VIII’s “Great Divorce”) and securing Cranmer’s admission that his life’s work had in fact amounted to treason and heresy (which Cranmer famously revoked during his own execution – holding into the flames his hand which had signed the recantation – with dramatic effect upon the public). Story was elected to a seat in the House of Commons early in Elizabeth’s reign, and his deportment can only be construed as foolhardy, because he openly derided her and questioned her suitability to rule. He was put into jail, but he escaped and left England altogether to take up residence in the Netherlands, where he immediately began working closely with the Spanish governor there to organize the English Catholic dissidents who were gravitating to the Netherlands.⁸⁹ Pollitt’s account claims that Story’s downfall began when he agreed to assist the Spanish governor, the

⁸⁹ The story of Story makes for dramatic reading. Because he was one of the first Catholics to suffer the gruesome traitor’s death and because details of his execution are relatively well documented, it is often treated by Elizabethan historians. Both Haynes and Pollitt expand on it as the first elaborate intelligence operation of the period, and Haynes devotes a full chapter to it.

Duke of Alva, to “either conceive or abet plots against the government of Elizabeth.”⁹⁰

Story was under obligation to the King of Spain, and his livelihood in the Netherlands was dependent upon Spanish patronage. Haynes claims that Story had taken Spanish citizenship, but he does not cite this point to any source, so his basis for asserting that is not at all clear. The English perception of Story was that he was a defector, an English dissident who fled to the enemy. The Spanish officials in the Netherlands gave Story a job as a customs inspector in the Dutch harbors, and his primary function was to search English ships for contraband Protestant literature that English Protestants were wont to smuggle into the Low Countries to succor Protestants there. He quickly gained a reputation for not only harassing English ships and merchants and conducting thorough and damaging searches and seizures of property, but also for threatening English security by serving as a rallying point for English dissidents who wanted to work for Elizabeth’s overthrow. One of William Cecil’s spies in the Netherlands reported: “Story remains at Brussels still a preferrer of all the English traitors’ business and causes, and has continual access to the Duke of Alva, and lately was rewarded with 250 crowns.”⁹¹ Eventually, Story was seen as more than simply an irritant; he was a threat that demanded elimination. A group of English agents posing as Catholics who had heard of the pending arrival of a particularly large and valuable stash of contraband Protestant books insinuated themselves into Story’s circle over a period of a few weeks,

⁹⁰ Pollitt, 136.

⁹¹ *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the Reign of Elizabeth* (London, 1874), IX, no. 803.

with the result being that he was kidnapped on board a ship at anchor, which he had boarded along with the agents for the ostensible purpose of searching the hold for smuggled books. Soon he was back in England to stand trial for treason. Interestingly, his defense focused upon his citizenship status; he claimed that he had renounced his English citizenship when he fled to Spanish protection in the Netherlands, so by definition he could not be held accountable for treason against England.⁹² The prosecution, however, argued that when Story initially fled England to escape jail and when he offered himself up for Spanish protection, this amounted to defection and treason of the worst kind and could hardly be construed as a legal migration. In any case, Story's abduction from abroad, his conviction, and his dramatic public execution was a chilling demonstration to other English exiles that the growing intelligence apparatus ensured they could not flee beyond the reach of the state.

The ability of the English state to penetrate its gaze beyond its territory, whether for the purpose of global exploration or for the purpose of detecting threats against the state, is one way to define the epistemology of reconnaissance that I argue characterized the production of both geographic and intelligence knowledge in the English early modern period. One text in which these two dimensions are effectively united is Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis*. Bacon himself represents a bridge between the two discourses of intelligence and geographical exploration. Both he and his younger brother Anthony worked with key figures in later Elizabethan intelligence operations,

⁹² Pollitt, 151.

particularly in the development of cipher codes.⁹³ Though Bacon was not an explorer himself, his writing notes the importance of exploration to the construction of “natural knowledge,” and scholars today tend to attribute the origins of the penetrating imperial gaze to Bacon.⁹⁴ In his *New Atlantis*, Bacon suggests that political discovery exists alongside scientific discovery and both can be accomplished through the same process of relying upon first-hand accounts from eyewitnesses. Upon arriving in the “New Atlantis” society of Bensalem, Bacon’s fictional voyagers learn that its inhabitants are fully aware of Europe, its various cultures, politics, religion, and languages, because they have sent explorers as intelligence agents to reside among Europeans “undercover” for regular intervals. Bacon’s characters validate the epistemology of reconnaissance for gaining knowledge about remote parts of the world:

This we found wonderful strange; for that all nations have interknowledge one of another, either by voyage into foreign parts, or by strangers that come to them; and though the traveller into a foreign country doth commonly know more by the eye than he that stayeth at home can by relation of the traveller; yet both ways suffice to make a mutual knowledge, in some degree, on both parts.⁹⁵

Additionally, just as Bacon’s earlier “Discourse in Praise of Knowledge” had suggested that the state’s process of constructing knowledge was a visual one but paradoxically required secrecy (“intelligencers and spials”), the inhabitants of Bacon’s Bensalem have

⁹³ See Burn, 149 and 232; John Michael Archer, *Sovereignty and Intelligence: Spying and Court Culture in the English Renaissance* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993), 121; and Gerhard F. Strasser, “Diplomatic Cryptology and Universal Languages in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in *Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History*, Keith Neilson and B.J.C. McKercher, eds., (Westport, CT: Praeger), 73-97.

⁹⁴ See Livingstone, 59-60.

⁹⁵ Bacon, *New Atlantis*.

formed such an ideal society precisely because their gaze penetrates to the world beyond their territory – in the form of their explorers who go into foreign territories to spy and observe undetected - but they themselves remain hidden.⁹⁶ The ability to surveill from a concealed position, then, is the source of the Bensalem's power.

Conclusion:

Defection is a term whose meaning has long been embedded in a context of intelligence discourse. Likewise, it is a term that presumes a territorial imagination. Just as it is no coincidence that defection emerged in the particular political and social landscape of late Reformation England, neither is it a coincidence that the intelligence profession was increasingly formalized in this same geopolitical climate of intense and competitive global exploration

Looking to the English early modern period in which the use of the term defection noticeably emerged, one finds not surprisingly that the period was characterized by three notable shifts: first, a shift in the understanding of territory as the manifestation and practice of political power within the landscape-as-countryside; second, the rise of professional intelligence as an instrument of the territorial state; and third, the flourishing of global exploration as a state-sponsored enterprise and one fundamental to the security of a state and to its geopolitical maneuverings. By proffering this third element as important to my overall argument, and by suggesting the

⁹⁶ See the analysis of Bacon's *New Atlantis* in John Michael Archer, "Surveillance and Enlightenment in Bacon's *New Atlantis*," *Assays* 6 (1990), 111-27.

relationship of the second shift – the rise of a professional intelligence service – to the third, I contend that it is to geographical exploration, rather than to the more traditionally-cited field of battlefield reconnaissance, to which the intelligence profession ought to look for its historical antecedents. This theme is important to articulate here, as it helps to justify my analytical focus upon the early modern period as the foundation for our contemporary understanding of defection and territoriality.

The English Renaissance gave rise to a new regard for the state as a territory, that is, a bounded space through which the physical presence and spectacle of the monarch could be extended. In essence, the state became a stage,⁹⁷ and seeing it in this way is not only in keeping with the Elizabethan understanding of knowledge as a visual process, but also in keeping with the Elizabethan penchant for understanding the world through analogy. The world and human society as a stage is of course a well-known analogy, and the most famous expressions of that date from this very period. The term “country” as applied in contrast to the city became common during the 16th century in England, and the fact that Elizabethan progresses were expressly aimed at the country

⁹⁷ Olwig (2002) asserts that the idea of the state as a symbolic stage is the source of our common understanding of “landscape” as mere scenery. He traces this idea from the Elizabethan progress which moved through the landscape to the subsequent Stuart practice of the ceremonial masque, a kind of inverted progress in which the monarch and the court were stationary fixtures in the performance against a backdrop of moving scenery of the national countryside. See Olwig (2002), especially 26-39. Clifford Geertz presents similar themes from a decidedly non-European context in his analysis of state ceremonies in 19th century Bali staged as public spectacles and as “metaphysical theater. See Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980) especially 104 and 113.

and at country houses demonstrates a conscious effort to craft a state in which city and country coexisted in a territorial unity, albeit in imaginary opposition.⁹⁸

But the dominant oppositional discourse of the early modern period involved the Protestant Reformation, which divided England from the Catholic powers of Europe both spiritually and territorially. This amounted to a “Cold War,” which observers have noted receives surprisingly little attention, considering its similarities to its 20th century counterpart and the possibility of enhancing the understanding of both through the exercise of comparison.⁹⁹ And a feature of the early modern Cold War that has only recently begun to receive attention is the Elizabethan intelligence apparatus. However, scholars have not yet commented upon the overlap between England’s intelligence apparatus and its enterprise of geographical exploration. In particular, both phenomena can be seen as outcomes of the evolution of a more modern conception of state territoriality during this period.

The next chapter will examine the transfer of English ideas of territoriality and national security to the space of the North American continent in the early colonial period and the early American Republic. In Enlightenment America, the ideological conflict that produced the heightened sense of English state territoriality also was a

⁹⁸ Williams places the first use of “city and country,” in the context of spatial opposition, with the Tyndale Bible, an English translation circulated early in the Reformation and recognized as one of the first Bibles to which lay people potentially had direct and personal access. See Williams *Keywords*, 81.

⁹⁹Of the Elizabethan Cold War, Bright (100) states: “The conflict demanded complex activities: espionage, research, writing – in brief, as massive organization of propaganda against an enemy equally well organized and resourced. Given the intensity of the propaganda struggle and the fact that inestimable global profits were at stake in this conflict for European dominance, it is surprising that the Elizabethan Cold War receives little attention in literary scholarship.”

backdrop for the twin impulses of reconnaissance – geographic exploration and intelligence collection. It was within this setting that the idea of defection emerged as treason with a territorial dimension. In the American context, the English immigrants' fusing of political ideologies with territory was problematized by the fact that they recognized no existing discourses of territoriality in the New World – the land was, to them, tabula rasa. And the formation of a political territorial discourse was accompanied by not a single overarching ideological conflict, as in early modern England, but by several conflicts – some ideological, some political, and some seemingly with nature itself. It is the conflict with nature that seemed to inform the discourse of territoriality most profoundly, and I will argue that it was in reference to the conflict with nature – broadly determined – that phenomena emerged which, upon scrutiny and analysis, can be recognized as intelligence collection, defections, and a conception of national security.



Figure 3.1. The shaded portion of this map of England depicts the geographic extent of Queen Elizabeth's annual "progresses."

Touching the state of this Countrey, there is nothing meant but extremity towards those of the Religion. On Sunday last, which was the fourteenth of this moneth, the young Princess of *Condé* was constrained to go to Mass, being threatned otherwise to go to prison, and so consequently to be made away. The Prince of *Condé* hath also yielded to hear Mass upon Sunday next, being otherwise threatned to go to the Bastile, where he is not like long to serve. The Friday before Queen Mother told me, that no bodies conscience — for (saith she) here is the King of *Navarre*, the Prince of *Condé*, and divers others in this Court, that live with liberty of conscience; and so shall continue; notwithstanding (saith she) that the King could be content, and could wish that they were all converted and become Catholiques. And I do perceive that
 112 6 0 6 7 0 0 4 0 0 6 4 1 3 3 * T 6 3 H 2 6 0
 3 0 0 0 3 m H 4 3 m 6 0 0 6 0 0 and therefore I hope her
 Majestie will stand upon her guard, and strengthen her self with the Amity of the Protestant Princes of *Germany*, who (as I hear) are awake, and marvellously stomach this late cruelty, and do think that the danger thereof will reach to themselves, if they do not seek to prevent it. I hope also her Majestie will establish things in such
 F 4 3 7 0 0 4 6 v r 3 m 6 5 c 6 0 d m
 6 5 0 6 0 d m 6 2 n a H H m 0 3 6 3 s H 3 6 3 m 6 0 6 and will not suffer her to be abused with her fair speech; having had so late experience of her faithless dealing, when the King is once possessed of *Rochel*, which he hopeth to have shortly. *Stratons* voyage is then directly to *Scotland*. All the Hugonote lands, which will amount to many millions, shall be sold and employed in the Conquest of Countreys, which I hope in God will prove an account without the host, if God do not blinde the eyes of the Princes of the Religion, who joyning together, shall be able to make their parts good against any
 of

Figure 3.2. Example of coded writing developed and used by Sir Francis Walsingham in his professional correspondence. (Source: Digges, ed., *The Compleat Ambassador*, Charles E. Young Research Library, Department of Special Collections).

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Chapter Four

From Terrain to Territory in the Early American Republic

Introduction

It is commonplace to observe that, because the first groups of immigrants who arrived in great numbers to settle in North America were English, many aspects of American culture have been derived from English antecedents. In fact, this is an axiom that is so ordinary and so self-evident that we rarely probe the massive evidence of cultural transference to search out fresh understandings of the English legacy upon specific American attitudes. It is my contention that the English understanding of territory as political power resident in the landscape-as-countryside passed to the American setting along with the myriad other cultural patterns and practices, and from this followed similar assumptions about national security and about the practice of defection in negotiating opposing sides in a conflict. While the English challenge in the 16th and early 17th centuries had been to redefine its space from an extension of Catholic Christendom to uniquely English national territory, the American challenge was to carve out national territory from a massive space whose patterns of human habitation were foreign, illegible, and seemingly minimal and whose physical environment was inhospitable and alien.

It is also commonplace to observe that the American Revolution was the inevitable consequence of the emergence of a new collectively imagined nationality on the North American continent, distinct from an English nationality. With the American

nationality having been invented, the period of the early American Republic is a crucial one for examining how territoriality came to be an intrinsic part of that national identity. Threats to the security of the new nation also provided the necessary conflictual space against which the national identity could be fashioned; as Robert Lawson-Peebles aptly expresses, “Nothing promotes cultural identity so much as a threat.”¹

It was during the first generation after American independence that the physical territory of the United States was most dramatically augmented, forcing American political theorists to construct innovative approaches to administratively assimilate vast stretches of land. Space itself was a threat to national security, as the prospect of maintaining political loyalties and national cultural cohesion across far-flung terrain appeared bleak. Nature, too, was a source of conflict faced by the early republic in trying to transform continental space into American national territory. Finally, other political powers were sources of conflict, as America negotiated its own role in the formation of the political landscape of the continent, vis-à-vis the roles of other states.

This chapter will first address the transference of English ideas about territoriality and national security to American setting and their continuation as a part of an overall “pattern of cultural persistence”² through which English antecedents continue to inform American culture through to the present day. It will then consider several aspects of American territorial expansion, such as the scalar orientation of loyalties, the

¹Robert Lawson-Peebles, *Landscape and Written Expression in Revolutionary America: The World Turned Upside Down* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 46.

²David Hackett Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 765.

methods of expressing political authority over landscape, and the transformative role of material infrastructure. It will argue that the American state's reconnaissance of new lands for territorial expansion functionally resembled later state functions that are commonly labeled as intelligence undertakings. Just as organized intelligence functioned in early modern England to help the state negotiate conflict and identify threats to its security, and just as it would later serve the same function in 20th century America, organized geographical reconnaissance was tantamount to intelligence, being the primary medium through which the early American state addressed the threat to national security that was posed by the unknown condition of the continent itself. The "defectors" that emerged from this setting were largely those indigenous people who have been valorized as the "good Indian" for switching sides in the conflict and assisting the American expansionist project. Later generations would construct the memory of those individuals and their acts in ways that elevated particular native people for their ability to recognize the superiority of the American civilizational enterprise and decision to support it, albeit at the expense of their own group's interests.

English Cultural Transference

As the previous chapter discussed, the Protestant Reformation had helped to nourish in England a political identity whose distinctiveness from Catholic Europe was reinforced by the insular separateness of English territory itself. Nevertheless, differing interpretations of Protestantism had been present almost instantly in the English church, and "conformity" to the English state-sanctioned liturgical forms continued to be an

area of debate. Puritans, whose zeal to carry church reform to an even greater extreme arose originally in response to Calvinist influences on English Protestant refugees who fled to the Continent during the reign of Catholic Queen Mary, objected to the continued formal resemblance between the English liturgy and the old Catholic mass (that the clergy continued to wear richly embellished vestments was one point of contention). Aided by the fact that many influential noble families and court figures (such as Walsingham) were sympathetic, Puritans cultivated a separate identity; and this grew to include both “conformist” Puritans, who abided by the laws demanding attendance at services of the state church, and “separatist” Puritans, who boycotted state church attendance in favor of privately formed congregations. All Puritans tended to form small voluntary “covenant” groups, and the sharing of a covenant fostered the belief that the members were “God’s elect,” destined to move the ongoing social and political changes in England in a very particular direction. Pressure on Puritans to conform to state worship was mounting early in the reign of James I, successor to Elizabeth, and the first waves of English Puritan migration to North America began as a result. Virtually alongside the Puritan migration pattern to New England, of course, was a separate settlement pattern to the growing plantation landscape of coastal Virginia, undertaken as a purely economic enterprise by a different segment of the English population, though hardly less a rigidly religious one. The history of these migrations is beyond the scope of my argument, except to simply mention that not only did cultural transference from England to the American setting occur, but that it began to occur precisely in the midst of and causally connected to the events I have been

discussing – religious dissent, changes in territorial conceptions, and awareness of geographical exploration and its potential social consequences. It is self-evident that these population outflows to North America were the reasonable outcome of a long engagement by Elizabethans with exploration and navigation, as well as the evolution within Elizabethan society of the idea of America as an exotic imaginative construct.³

Much has been made of the alleged imprint of Puritanism on a spectrum of American cultural forms and practices, American politics, American foreign policy, and the American “mind” in general. Perry Miller and Sacvan Bercovitch are among the scholars best known for analysis of the Puritan legacy in American intellectual history. Miller’s work offers many valuable insights about the Puritans’ “errand into the wilderness,”⁴ while Bercovitch analyzes the archetypal Puritan sermon form, the “jeremiad,” and suggests that it prefigured an American political culture in which anxiety and crisis were the norm.⁵ Broadly speaking, the project of looking to a century or so of early colonial Puritan life and locating antecedents for contemporary American social identity, has been a popular one among social, cultural, political, and intellectual historians. In addition to his study of jeremiads as a literary form, Bercovitch also examines the Puritan “legacy” and its implications for 19th century American

³ For the engagement of the Elizabethan mind with the idea of America, from thinking of it as a site for myth to a site of exploration to a site for commercial engagement and settlement, see A.L. Rowse, *The Elizabethans and America* (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1959).

⁴ Perry Miller, *Errand Into the Wilderness* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1956), offers a series of probing essays addressing various aspects of the first several generations of Puritan life in New England.

⁵ Sacvan Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

romanticism and American rhetoric.⁶ Richard Mosier's ambitious treatment of American intellectual history devotes well over one-fourth of its text to analysis of the Puritan way of life as the foundation from which the "American temper" evolved.⁷ The Puritan response and adaptation to the physical environment of the New World is an important theme explored by both Alan Heimert and Martyn Bowden, with the latter providing a provocative examination of the conventional notion that the dominant American triumphalist rhetoric of encounter with the "howling wilderness" evolved from the Puritan discursive construction of wilderness.⁸ David Campbell's critical analysis of the narrative construction of threat in American foreign policy is based upon an interpretation of historical discourses of fear that privileges the Puritan experience.⁹

Perry Miller's assessment of the Puritan migration reminds us of one very important, yet normally overlooked, factor relative to the experience of space and of territory – namely, that with only a very few exceptions, the Puritans who came to North America intended it as a sojourn only and fully expected to return to England later on. As Miller points out, "We realize the great migration was not sent upon its errand in order to found the United States of America." Rather, the various Puritan

⁶Sacvan Bercovitch, *The Puritan origins of the American Self* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).

⁷Richard D. Mosier, *The American Temper: Patterns of Our Intellectual Heritage* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1952), especially "Book I: The Puritan Mind," 3-81.

⁸See Alan Heimert, "Puritanism, Wilderness, and the Frontier," *New England Quarterly* 26:3 (September 1953), 361-382; and M. J. Bowden, "The Invention of American Tradition," *Journal of Historical Geography* 18:1 (1992), 3-26.

⁹See Campbell, *Writing Security*, especially 33-34 and 120-122. Campbell sees the Puritan jeremiad as foreshadowing Cold War era intelligence texts in the way that they express anxiety over looming threats, and he relies upon Bercovitch's 1978 analysis of the jeremiad while he inexplicably does not provide any examples of jeremiad texts directly.

migrations occurred in different temporal and social contexts, and the refugee groups who came in 1620 as a persecuted minority were somewhat different in their expectations from the “Great Migration” of Puritans to New England beginning in 1630. The groups who came after 1630 were not demoralized refugees, but rather they undertook their “errand into the wilderness,” as one later Puritan sermon described it,¹⁰ precisely because they aspired to social and political leadership in England. Miller states that the Massachusetts Bay Company set out to be a “city on a hill” to be an example for England and, indeed, all of Protestant Europe to emulate. But he dismisses the familiar stereotype of Puritans as proto-democratic but pious individualists, cherishing their freedom of conscience, when he points out that based on the Puritans own texts “they abhorred freedom of conscience” and “advertised again and again that their church polity was not democratic.”¹¹ Reformation notwithstanding, it was practically unthinkable in Europe that any government leave religion entirely up to individual conscience, and the Puritan motive was to establish a theocratic polity as a model for England to follow. As continued Reformation in England gave way to social revolution, “where else would the distracted country look for leadership except to those who in New England had perfected the ideal polity and who would know how to administer it?”¹² Keeping this zealous beginning in mind places the Puritan jeremiads,

¹⁰ Miller takes the title of his 1956 volume from the title of a sermon delivered in 1670 by Rev. Samuel Danforth that is considered to be one of the early archetypes for the jeremiad.

¹¹ Miller, 160.

¹² See Miller, 11-15. Miller (11) quotes Puritan leader Jonathan Winthrop who accentuated the importance to Europe of the Puritan experiment in Protestant theocracy when he wrote, “For we must consider that we shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eyes of all people are upon us.”

self-flagellating rhetorical forms that sought to frighten people back into conformity to the higher moral ideals of the preceding generation, into a slightly different context. Miller and Bercovitch both argue that the jeremiad form emerged precisely because the Puritan experience was in crisis; no appeal to the Massachusetts Bay Company had been forthcoming from England, and a new generation was coming to maturity in North America lacking the clear conviction of the original covenant groups. In fact, one Puritan writer presented in verse in 1662 a description of the horrible fate that awaited this doomed generation as God's punishment for "its innumerable defections" from the original "errand" that had been their divine charge.¹³

Campbell points to the jeremiad as the origin of the notion so persistent in 20th century national security discourse that America is in a perpetual state of crisis and that American culture is threatened by an onslaught from a looming foe. For the Puritans whose original "errand into the wilderness" had failed, the jeremiad developed as a way to inculcate that their ongoing "errand" would be perpetual. Quoting Bercovitch, Campbell asserts that the jeremiad "made anxiety its end as well as its means," and "set out to provide the sense of insecurity that would ensure the outcome."¹⁴ Campbell is correct to point to the role of fear in the evolution of one influential American literary genre – the jeremiad – and its connection to another textual form – national security discourse. As Chapter 3 argued, personal fear and the presence of palpable danger were crucial to the formation of England's security discourse in the late 16th century. It is

¹³ See Miller, 2 and 218-219, on Puritan poet Michael Wigglesworth.

¹⁴ See Campbell, 33; and Bercovitch (1978), *The American Jeremiad*, 23.

reasonable to consider the role of fear and perceived danger as English patterns of habitation were transferred to the geographical setting of North America.

The work of Alan Heimert is helpful here, as he considers the physical setting of “wilderness” in which the Puritans found themselves and the transformation of Puritan attitudes towards that wilderness. Heimert argues that for fully the first decade after the main migration of 1630 there was no aspiration to penetrate inland beyond the few seaboard communities. In fact, he maintains that efforts to do so were regarded as tantamount to defections from the main polity.¹⁵ After all, the destiny of the group was to perfect its theocratic system and be prepared to return to England, so the prospect of any members relinquishing this collective aspiration to move to other spots perhaps more agreeable or promising for long term habitation was not only a betrayal of the group and its covenant, but also threatened to weaken the main group’s likelihood of success. Additionally, the Puritans initially found it difficult to view the deliberate seeking out of habitation on the physical fringes of a settlement area as anything but suspect. Heimert points out that although it was common enough to talk about religious dissenters occupying the actual (as well as metaphorical) “borders” of society, meaning spatial peripheries, the Puritan mind did not conceive of liberty outside of society.¹⁶ Thus, wild nature would not have been an apt Puritan metaphor for social liberty; and Puritans would not have yearned – nor did they - for wilderness as an ideal locale for free political and social expression. However, this did not mean that some did not

¹⁵ Heimert, 363.

¹⁶ Heimert, 368-369, n42.

readily justify establishing communities farther inland on ostensibly more practical grounds. Heimert asserts that many were uneasy with the thickly wooded and flat area around Salem and eagerly reflected on rumors of alternate settlement sites with hills and promontories that might afford more expansive views both for overall orientation and (although Heimert does not mention it) probably for defensive purposes.¹⁷ But echoing other writers who suggest that the act of migrating to less settled areas was seen as a kind of betrayal or even defection, Heimert indicates that the uprisings and violence in the Puritan towns on the peripheries not only reinforced the idea of wilderness as an evil place, but also that the people who migrated there got what they deserved.¹⁸ Moreover, there was invariably innuendo about the contaminating effects of living too close to Indians. These attitudes are not surprising from a social system that dealt with dissenters by banishment.

But Heimert's main purpose seems to be to divest the reader of the notion that the later romantic ideal of wild nature as a garden conforms in any way to Puritan views. To the contrary, he argues convincingly that the wilderness was an utterly immoral landscape for the Puritans, just as it was utterly uninhabited, for all that it contained "wild Beasts and Wilder Men."¹⁹ Habitation meant Christian habitation, and the only recognizable cultural landscape was the one they were attempting to create.

¹⁷ Heimert, 365. It is worth mentioning that Bowden's account would seem to contest this point. Bowden, 11 and n43, draws from Puritan sources of the period to assert that the area around Salem consisted of "open plains, sandy ground, woods and bushes, and marshes," but without granting that period writers could have been guided by many ulterior motives in how they characterized the landscape.

¹⁸ Heimert, 373.

¹⁹ Heimert, 371, quoting a jeremiad by Cotton Mather titled, "The Deplorable State of New England."

With an increasing awareness of Catholic colonial projects elsewhere in the New World, such as the French in nearby Quebec and the Spanish far off in the south, the wilderness also loomed as the intertwined “habitat of pagan and papist.”²⁰ It was only through the Puritans themselves who were the “seeds” sown in this wilderness that a place was produced that Cotton Mather could describe as “The Almost only Garden, which our Lord Jesus Christ has in the vast continent of America,” indicating, as Heimert says, “how persistently the Puritans refused to identify the garden which they sought or attained with a mere unchurched paradise, however lush, fertile, or rolling its acres might be.” However, Heimert also suggests that the wilderness which the Puritans confronted was transformed to caricature in the jeremiads, as people faced the practical implications of permanent residence in the New World, as the moral downfall of the succeeding generations was juxtaposed against the fortitude of the first generation, and as material conditions produced resistance to the spread of Puritan communities. Heimert would seem to find at least some common ground with the much more recent conclusion of Martyn Bowden that the Puritans discursively constructed the threatening wilderness to elevate their own survival to the status of a superior moral achievement when he says:

Perhaps later incidents convinced these writers that their ancestors’ wilderness was this frightening, but it is also possible that a belief in the terror of their fathers’ predicament colored their perception of the contemporary wilderness.²¹

²⁰ Heimert, 370.

²¹ Heimert, 371.

Putting aside the vexing question of just how *threatening* was the wilderness to the Puritans in reality, the more enduring conclusion one can draw has to do with the eventual Puritan engagement with the metaphorical wilderness. As the Puritan experience in North America was prolonged clearly beyond a brief sojourn, the wilderness came to function symbolically as the appropriate setting for the settlement experience itself, which was refigured as a series of trials and temptations to be overcome enroute to the achievement of a future goal of redemption. The wilderness setting of the New World became the material proof of the virtue of the Puritans. And instead of denying it discursively by reasserting its transformation into a garden, the tactic instead was to parade the high merit of simple cultural forms – whether in speech, clothing, housing style, or food - as being intrinsically natural to the wilderness setting of New England.²²

Looking beyond the rather vast literature that focuses on the Puritan legacy in American life, the work of David Hackett Fischer represents a comprehensive attempt to account for the specific mechanisms through which a broader array of English cultural forms were transferred to the American setting overall, as opposed to specifically in New England. In *Albion's Seed* Fischer identifies four distinct “folkways,” and he examines the historical and spatial contexts that informed the introduction of each of these to early America. New England Puritanism is, to be sure, one of these folkways; but Fischer also addresses how different aspects of English

²² Heimert, 381. Heimert specifically connects this point to the “apotheosis of homespun,” and the emergence of sumptuary laws that restricted colors and styles solely on the basis of appearing too jarring and inconsistent with a wilderness setting.

culture were diffused to America through the migration patterns of English Quakers to Pennsylvania, the Anglican-establishment “cavaliers” in their plantation economy enterprise in tidewater Virginia and the Chesapeake Bay, and political dissidents from the English “borderlands” adjoining Scotland and Wales who maintained their peripheral social identity from the margins of the Carolina and Tennessee interior. His theme is that English regional patterns of cultural practice have long informed American regional patterns. However, Fischer seeks as much to redress what he asserts is a lack of attention in English cultural history to the region, as an intervening scale between national and local, as he does to provide historical explanations for manifestly apparent spatial differences in a wide range of American cultural practices. He accomplishes both, and his meticulous use of maps of English counties and regions to support his arguments remind us, again, that England was not a monolith but a heterogeneous cultural terrain in which the assertion of national territorial identity was precarious rather than self-evident in the early modern period out of which sustained migrations to North America emerged. Fischer argues that close study of the folkways of what he claims are the four main categories of English cultural transference reveals the people themselves to more closely resemble their some of their stereotypes than revisionist re-interpretations. For instance, he suggests that the “primitive Christian roots” of Pennsylvania’s Quaker founders have been overlooked in favor of branding them proto-contemporary multiculturalists; and he argues that the class bias of early Virginia “cavalier” gentlemen propelled them towards contempt for all people in indentured servitude, race notwithstanding, and the idea of rising above one’s station in

life was unthinkable to them.²³ In his interpretation of Puritanism, Fischer would seem to hark back to Perry Miller when he asserts that the Puritan identity and strong spiritual sense of purpose “has been lost beneath many layers of revisionist scholarship.”²⁴

But it is relative to his fourth category of English cultural transference, the migrations from the English “borderlands” to the mid-Atlantic and Southern interior, that Fischer’s work is most relevant to my research objective of justifying an Anglocentric analysis of American concepts of territoriality, defection, and national security by appealing to the “fact” of the spatial transference of political and cultural ideas and attitudes from the English to the American context. One can hardly address the evolution of the United States as a political territory without attempting to account for the transformation of “wilderness” to territory, a phenomenon we generally attempt to explain by way of recourse to idea of the “frontier” as a setting for a particular set of transformative social and political processes. But Fischer’s work points out that some of what later historians (most prominently F.J. Turner with his famous “frontier thesis”)²⁵ termed the “frontier” was regarded by earlier generations that were witness to

²³Fischer, 786. It is also worth noting that Perry Miller points to many similarities between Puritans and the English high-church Virginia settlers who were their contemporaries. He notes that both New England and Virginia were “legatees of the Reformation” and that “much we consider distinctly Puritan was really the spirit of the times” (*Errand Into the Wilderness*, 105). By this he is referring to the consensus that the state was responsible for enforcing both a civil and a moral code and the church was the indispensable tool for enforcement of the moral dimension.

²⁴ Fischer, 786.

²⁵F.J. Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in R. A. Billington, ed., *Frontier and Section: Selected Essays of Frederick Jackson Turner* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1961), 37-62.

American territorial expansion as “backcountry.”²⁶ This simple but startling insight reveals much about the Janus-faced attitude of the early American state relative to the broader space of the American continent and its potential for transformation from unsecured nature into territory. In fact, one could argue that the mere presence of “backcountry” as an imaginative construct argues against the myth that American territorial aspirations always were continental in scope. Fischer highlights the ease with which imagination of backcountry could mutate into imagination of frontier, and he traces how many of the characteristics typically associated with the frontier – such as personal independence, resistance of authority, social volatility and use of violence to settle disputes, and fluid attitudes towards morality and social propriety – were in fact characteristics once pervasive in the English borderlands that were transferred to the American “backcountry.” Fischer offers as one interesting example the militant support of the Revolutionary cause by Patrick Henry, whom he cites as hailing from Virginia’s western “backcountry” interior as opposed to the tidewater region, who detected within the New England cause a validation of “natural liberty” that was essentially consistent with backcountry sentiments. In fact, Fischer cites Henry’s written assertion that the Massachusetts-based “Friends of Liberty” would receive the support of “the back people.”²⁷

²⁶ Fischer, 642, 765.

²⁷ Fischer, 778-781.

American Expansion and Territorial Consciousness

The process of American territorial expansion in the first generation after the American Revolution is the subject of such a vast literature that saying anything even vaguely original about it might appear unrealistic. The mechanics of territorial expansion here concern me less than the implications for Americans' territorial imagination and the relationship among territorial imagination, national identity, and national security discourse. Still, one cannot easily consider the challenges to American territorial imagination in the early Republic without reflecting briefly on the logistics of how territorial expansion was accomplished, including the material and discursive processes by which political authority was imposed over the landscape so as to transform contested terrain into a coherent territorial nation. As is familiar to any student of American history, the early colonial land charters had granted land "from sea to sea" along particular parallels,²⁸ although this practice certainly cannot be taken as a realistic assertion of the colonies' earliest territorial pretensions. The Appalachian Mountains represented both a physical and an imaginative western boundary in the collective consciousness of the thirteen colonies, and the land area that came to be known as the Northwest Territory²⁹ was transferred from an English claim to an American one in the surrender terms at the close of the war of Independence. Clearly

²⁸ Hildegard Binder Johnson, "Towards a National Landscape," in *The Making of the American Landscape*, Michael Conzen, ed. (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), 127-145, p. 132.

²⁹ It should be acknowledged that there is discursive space between "territory" as a legal and administrative designation and the idea of territory more generally as an imagined construct to contain a set of political ideas. Most political geographers would argue that the two rarely go hand in hand. For the Northwest, it was named a "territory" in the administrative sense probably well before it was transformed into territory in the imaginative sense.

both a major territorial augmentation and the accompanying question of how best to administer it immediately faced the new country, which it dealt with alongside the equally pressing issue of determining what sort of polity the new collection of states would be. Returning to Robert Sack's volume on territoriality, in which his overarching theme is that organization of territory produces particular human social and political outcomes, we are reminded that the political map of the 1780s in general only had two kinds of states – unitary and territorially subdivided states with central hierarchical authority imposed down the subdivisions, and confederations of small autonomous states whose center, if any, was symbolic only with no real authority yielded to it.³⁰ The United States initially was organized as the second type of state, but it sought to discover a third approach – a representative democracy of individual states yielding power to a federal center. As Sack reminds us, it was the sheer size and far-flung nature of the purported national territory to be encompassed by this system that produced dissension over whether it could be expected to work. The naysayers warned that political unity could not be maintained across such distances, especially in light of the profound differences in terrain, climate, and lifestyle that the expansive distances produced; and the consequence of these differences was bound to be insurmountable factionalism. James Madison's contribution was to cut through this fallacy and observe that factionalism was no more likely in a large territory than in a small one; indeed, geographic size could actually help protect against political corruption by ensuring that

³⁰ Sack, *Human Territoriality*, 146.

relations between representatives and constituents remained somewhat impersonal.³¹ Steering both the US Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Madison was convinced that if it remained a weak confederation of states, any one of the United States could easily be the target of intrigue by one of the other foreign powers with interests in North America. Moreover, if the new United States played “the same stepmother’s role” to the far-off Northwest Territory as England had played to its colonies the “West was as good as gone.”³²

Indeed, the threat to political unity from local isolation and locally-perceived interests even within the thirteen existing states came to the fore with the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania, which necessitated the sending of nearly 15,000 Federal soldiers to suppress the uprising.³³ But the display of brute Federal force was by itself not enough to sustain the transformation of far-flung regions and localities into national territory. For the Northwest Territory, it is not surprising that the American framers of the land ordinances, who were wholly influenced by the rational and scientific ethos of the Enlightenment, looked to the grid-based land surveying to organize the land and incorporate it into an American territorial system.³⁴ This grid-

³¹ Sack, 147-148.

³² Theodore C. Pease, “The Ordinance of 1787,” *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 25:2 (September 1938), 167-180. p. 176.

³³ Thomas P. Slaughter, *The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

³⁴ There is a substantial literature on the Jeffersonian grid-based land survey first adopted by the US government through the Land Ordinance of 1785. See Norman J.W. Thrower, *Original Survey and Land Subdivision; a Comparative Study of the Form and Effect of Contrasting Cadastral Surveys* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Hildegard B. Johnson, *The Orderly Landscape: Landscape Tastes and the United*

based territorial system would also provide for social organization within a moral landscape. Several scholars point out that not only had the grid been favored as a tool for town planning in the colonial American east (William Penn's grid plan for Philadelphia is also well known), but that in general it has long been adopted more or less across cultures in the organization of towns and cities from ancient times.³⁵ Figure 4.1 not only depicts an early 18th century grid-like image of the town plan of Savannah, Georgia, but also starkly conveys the transformation of forested terrain into an orderly setting for civilized human habitation. It even suggests, by virtue of the town street that serves as a central axis to the image continuing into the forest and extending to an infinite vanishing point, the promise Enlightenment order projected over a gradually widening scope of the continent's terrain.³⁶ Commenting that "(t)here is little that is new about the grid," Lawson-Peebles tells us that John Locke, while working in 1669 with a patron who happened to be an investor in the Carolina colonies, proposed (unsuccessfully) to survey the Carolinas and mark the land into grid parcels prior to

States Survey (Minneapolis: James Ford Bell Library, 1977). A recent popular history of the land survey is Andro Linklater, *Measuring America: How an Untamed Wilderness Shaped the United States and Fulfilled the Promise of Democracy* (New York: Walker and Company, 2002). For shorter summary accounts see J.B. Jackson, "The Order of a Landscape: Reason and Religion in Newtonian America," in D.W. Meinig, ed., *The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 153-163; and Hildegard Binder Johnson, "Towards a National Landscape," in *The Making of the American Landscape*, Michael Conzen, ed. (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), 127-145.

³⁵See Pierce Lewis, "The Northeast and the Making of American Geographical Habits," in *The Making of the American Landscape*, Michael Conzen, ed. (New York and London: Routledge, 1990, 80-103), 96-97; Lawson-Peebles, 183-188; and Johnson (1990), 127.

³⁶ I am indebted to a Corcoran Gallery of Art exhibition volume for this image, Edward J. Nygren and Bruce Robinson, eds., *Views and Visions: American Landscape Before 1830* (Washington, DC: The Corcoran Gallery of Art, 1986), where it appears on p. 11. In his introductory essay, Nygren also remarks that the image "shows a world being destroyed and implies an underlying disregard for unimproved

allowing plantation settlement: "If America represented the world in its infancy, then the philosopher would try to ensure that it matured between rational lines."³⁷ Despite the regularity with which the grid surely appeared in town planning efforts, Lawson-Peebles seems to conflate Puritan moral rigidity with Enlightenment structured rationality when he suggests that the grid was a vestige of Puritan thought, as "Puritans tended to think in terms of enclosing frames, such as boundary walls;" and he pronounces Jefferson's metes and bounds surveying system "the Virginian's homage to the rigidities of Puritan thought without the benefit of pragmatic flexibility."³⁸

Jefferson's grid-based proposal for the organization of the land in the Northwest Territory was first adapted into the Land Ordinance of 1785, which required simply that land be surveyed according to cardinal compass directions prior to being sold.

Jefferson's vision for the incorporation of the Northwest Territory included, however, more than simply surveying. Surveying and grid-based organization, to be sure, eased the task of organizing and envisioning the nationalization of the land from the distance of the eastern cities. And as Peter Onuf observes, the transformative potential of the grid held important economic implications for the land as commodity, and the power of the grid lay paradoxically in its abstract quality: "artificiality was the key to the

nature." See Nygren, in *Views and Visions: American Landscape Before 1830*, "From View to Vision," 3-81, pp 10-12.

³⁷ Lawson-Peebles, 183-184.

³⁸ Lawson-Peebles, 186.

transformation of land into property.”³⁹ But to transform the Northwest Territory into a group of states entirely equal in status to the original states,⁴⁰ the native inhabitants had to be replaced with white people willing to inhabit an organized moral landscape. Jefferson’s plan included the proposal for such a moral landscape that itself would give form to the society that surely would emerge from it. Putting aside the ten bizarre state names that Jefferson suggested,⁴¹ the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 elaborated on the 1785 ordinance by not only stipulating the square as the ideal form for the surveyed land parcel, but it also provided the elaborate hierarchically scaled and uniform structure of counties, townships, and private land parcels, including regular allowance of parcels for schools at the rate of one per township. Its “most important feature... was the requirement of survey before settlement.”⁴² Thus, in a relatively short space of time, the Northwest Territory was transformed into a normative political territory, which, Turnerian myth notwithstanding, was only ever conceived by the early Republic as a coherent and legible national space rather than as a frontier, since it was theorized

³⁹ Peter S. Onuf, “Liberty, Development, and Union: Visions of the West in the 1780s,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 43:2 (April 1986), 179-213, 210 and n95.

⁴⁰For useful insights on the political and administrative aspects of that process see Robert F. Berkhofer, “The Northwest Ordinance and the Principle of Territorial Evolution,” in *The American Territorial System*, John Porter Bloom, ed. (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1969), 45-55; Arthur Bestor, “Constitutionalism and the Settlement of the West: Attainment of Consensus, 1754-1784,” in *The American Territorial System*, John Porter Bloom, ed. (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1969), 13-44; and Robert F. Berkhofer, “Jefferson, the Ordinance of 1784, and the Origins of the American Territorial System,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 29 (1972): 231-262.

⁴¹These included Polypotamia, Assenisipia, Saratoga, Metropotamia, Sylvania, Cherronesus, and Pelisipia. See *Daughters of the American Revolution Magazine* 42:6 (June 1918), 343-344, “The Jeffersonian States.”

⁴² Onuf, 210.

in the abstract before it was actively settled. Bearing in mind the challenges already being faced in the existing states in terms of achieving political unity and ensuring coherent loyalties across distant and ill-connected spaces, the Northwest Ordinance seemed to contain such specific instructions about spatial organization of settlements and their hierarchical administration as a purposeful attempt to prescriptively design nested identities that would lead logically from the local to the national. Peter Onuf suggests that the transformation of the Northwest to “territory” in the political sense of the word was undertaken with the awareness that the people who had already migrated there with the expectation of life in an unregulated frontier (or backcountry, depending on one’s perspective) were not the constituency most appropriate to long-term settlement. He notes that Congress, and especially Virginia representatives, accepted the notion that they “should not look to existing western settlements for settlers... (g)iven the chaotic history of their own backcountry.”⁴³ As ideal and ultimately impractical as we might interpret it, every effort seemed to be present to prevent this frontier from being a frontier, and, rather, to integrate into it from the outset a set of political and cultural identities that would be compatible with, not antithetical to, a national federal identity.⁴⁴ Cayton and Onuf argue that the success of this identity strategy is evident from the conflation of the (now) Midwest experience with the ideal

⁴³ Onuf, 210.

⁴⁴ Andrew R.L. Cayton, “‘Separate Interests’ and the Nation-State: The Washington Administration and the Origins of Regionalism in the Trans-Appalachian West,” *The Journal of American History* (June 1992), 39-65.

“American experience” and the assumption that the collection of states of the “old Northwest” represent an essential American “heartland.”⁴⁵

Territory and State Infrastructure

In addition to using the survey to transform land into property and provide an abstract expression of political authority over landscape, material infrastructure also played a role in transforming terrain into territory. As Cayton argues, the palpable presence of the military in the Northwest was a calculated strategy to remind settlers of federal authority and of the rule of law, and it served the twin purposes of easing settlers’ anxieties about the proximity of indigenous people and subtly reminding settlers that certain procedures for acquisition of Indian land should be followed (granted, the modern reader is bound to look at this second point with considerable cynicism). William Zelinsky advances a broad argument about the role of public architecture in imprinting political authority on the landscape. Although little of his work deals specifically with the early Republic, he does comment on the importance of erecting “courthouses” in newly settled towns, even before there were “courts” to meet in them, simply because of the potential for imposing public buildings to impart a moral quality to landscape.⁴⁶ It is recognized that the challenge for political order and authenticity in the early Republic was also an aesthetic challenge, and Pierce Lewis

⁴⁵ Peter S. Onuf and Andrew R.L. Cayton, *The Midwest and the Nation: Rethinking the History of an American Region* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

⁴⁶ Wilbur Zelinsky, “The Imprint of Central Authority,” in *The Making of the American Landscape*, Michael Conzen, ed. (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), 311-334, p. 314.

notes that Thomas Jefferson advocated a conscious turning away from Georgian architecture for public buildings in America, suggesting that it was inappropriate for a polity which had just broken away from a monarch's control to continue to favor an architectural style that bore that monarch's name. Instead, as is well known, he advocated the neo-classical aesthetic of Greco-Roman architecture, declaring it to be more naturally suited to the new republic.⁴⁷ Whether through the erection of buildings or not, the need to make the rule of law manifestly apparent in the landscape as a way to link localities to the central state also seems to come from the English context, and Olwig (2002) mentions the English origin of the circuit judge whose cyclical travel through the countryside was a physical representation of the state projected into localities.⁴⁸

In addition to public architecture and the presence of people or installations that symbolized law and order, material infrastructures of transportation were also brought to bear on the creation of territory from terrain. Indeed, transportation infrastructure was perceived by Washington, himself a surveyor and private promoter of roads and canals that would help link the areas of his own personal property holdings to the capital, as a crucial tool to enable political cohesion in the new Republic.

Accompanying plans for incorporation of the Northwest Territory was a proposal to build a "national road" that would extend from Washington, DC, westward into the Northwest Territories by way of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and (West) Virginia and all

⁴⁷ Lewis, 91-93.

⁴⁸ Olwig (2002), 24.

the way to the Mississippi River.⁴⁹ In fact, the ability of some of the separate territorial parcels within the Northwest to achieve statehood – specifically Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois) was partly contingent upon completion of the road.⁵⁰ Political unity could only be achieved and maintained through communication, and for the early Republic communication was a spatial concern, inseparable from geography. The Whiskey Rebellion was a reminder that the volatility of areas that were isolated through relative inaccessibility from the political power center posed a significant danger to political and social cohesion. Thus, transportation infrastructure was indispensable to the state's transformation of terrain into territory. In addition to the "National Road" or "Pike" (sometimes called the "king of roads"⁵¹), the Wilderness Road led from western Virginia through the Cumberland Gap, and the Great Philadelphia Wagon Road, was a roughly north-south trunk line connecting interior cities of the eastern seaboard states (see Figure 4.2).⁵² The enthusiasm for roads and other transportation infrastructure as the state's best instrument for promoting union among disparate interests across disparate regions continued into the early 19th century. Probably its most eloquent

⁴⁹ J.M. Lowe, *The National Old Trails Road: The Great Historic Highway of America* (Kansas City, Missouri: National Old Trails Road Association, 1925), is a collection of essays and historical documents about the National Road, compiled in the midst of the early 20th century "good roads movement" which sought to present the centrality of roads as an instrument of political union in the early Republic, as precedent to justify a national renaissance in roadbuilding.

⁵⁰ See Frederic Austin Ogg, *The Old Northwest: A Chronicle of the Ohio Valley and Beyond* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919).

⁵¹ Thomas B. Searight, *The Old Pike: A History of the National Road, With Incidents, Accidents, and Anecdotes Theron*, (Uniontown, PA: 'Published by the Author,' 1894), p. 14.

⁵² Parke Rouse, *The Great Wagon Road: From Philadelphia to the South* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973).

expression was through vice-presidential candidate John C. Calhoun who wrote in 1824, "Let us, then, bind the republic together with a perfect system of roads. Let us conquer space."⁵³

In general, political and historical geographers would seem to face a lot of open terrain for the analysis of the role of transportation infrastructures in fostering political identities in the early Republic. Interestingly, Zelinsky's work on material expression of political authority in the landscape displays a disjuncture when it comes to treating roads and road infrastructure. In commenting that antebellum America in general had little day-to-day awareness of the presence of the federal state at the local scale,⁵⁴ he seems to be overlooking the obvious federal presence in the material infrastructures of roads and turnpikes, as well as the related systems for the distribution of mail and currency. However, he also comments much later that the federal government stepped aside from roadbuilding to encourage (and subsidize) the completion of railroad infrastructure by the private sector, until the question of federal road management was revisited in the early 20th century.⁵⁵ One account that provides an imaginative corrective to Zelinsky is found in Ralph H. Brown's *Mirror For Americans: Likeness of the Eastern Seaboard, 1810*, which devotes a chapter to transportation infrastructure and is presented from the point of an early 19th century writer.⁵⁶

⁵³ Calhoun's speech is reprinted in Lowe, 142.

⁵⁴ Zelinsky, 312.

⁵⁵ Zelinsky, 325.

⁵⁶ Ralph H. Brown, *Mirror For Americans: Likeness of the Eastern Seaboard, 1810* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1968), "Ways of Travel," 43-64.

*Geography, Territorial Identity, and Implications for Intelligence
and National Security*

One other way in which the presence of the state could be expressed in the landscape so as to ease the transformation of American continental spaces from terrain to political and cultural territory was the geography text as a pedagogical tool. John Rennie Short has recently argued in two separate works that geography texts published in the United States in the early Republic were explicitly aimed at the “construction of a national identity” at a time “of great plasticity” in both the physical parameters of the new Republic and the definition of national citizenship.⁵⁷ Short traces the shift among the publication of English geographies in the United States (most popular was William Guthrie’s *Guthrie’s Geography*, produced in numerous editions between 1769 and 1842), the modification of English works to reflect American nationalist impulses, and the production of expressly American geographic texts. Short notes the geopolitical allusions in *Guthrie’s Geography* to illustrate why Americans realized the need for an American geographical perspective. Even in editions published well after American independence, the Guthrie maps of North America did not name the United States (it named the states individually, harking back to their colonial status), it exaggerated the size of Canada, and it portrayed western North America crowded with Spanish, English,

⁵⁷ John Rennie Short, “A New Mode of Thinking: Creating a National Geography in the Early Republic,” in *Surveying the Record: North American Scientific Exploration to 1930* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1999), 19-50, p. 20; and John Rennie Short, *Representing the Republic: Mapping the United States, 1600-1900* (London: Reaktion Books, 2001).

and Native American placenames - implying that the majority of the continent was not, in fact, empty space simply awaiting United States expansion.⁵⁸

The American geographer who worked hardest to redress what was perceived as Guthrie's misrepresentation of North American space was Jedidiah Morse. Not only was Morse called upon by the Philadelphia publisher of Guthrie's *Geography* to revise the section on North America,⁵⁹ but Morse also spent a solid portion of his career (between roughly the early 1780s through the end of that century divided) between his avocation - the production of explicitly nationalistic geographic texts - and his vocation - a rigidly conservative and orthodox Congregationalist minister and evangelist. As Martin Bruckner and others (such as Short and Brown) have pointed out, Morse, who had hit upon the notion of publishing a geography text as a way to supplement his income while a student at Yale, very nearly turned away from the ministry altogether when he recognized the lucrative potential of textbook publishing for schools in the new American republic.⁶⁰ Morse conceived of using geographical texts as instruments to produce an American nationality with an expressly Protestant Christian moral quality.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Short's discussions of Guthrie are in his 1999 work, 23-27 (see especially 26) and his 2001 work, 94-97.

⁵⁹ This is according to Short (1999), 27.

⁶⁰ Martin Bruckner, "Lessons in Geography: Maps, Spellers, and Other Grammars of Nationalism in the Early Republic," *American Quarterly* 51:2 (1999), 311-343, p. 319-320.

⁶¹ Assertions that Morse used narrative passages in his geographic texts to express his rigid and religiously-informed nationalism are found in Lawson-Peebles, 63-73; Short, 30-40; and in two recent biographies of Morse: Joseph W. Phillips, *Jedidiah Morse and New England Congregationalism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 183-185; and Richard J. Moss, *The Life of Jedidiah Morse: A Station of Peculiar Exposure* (Knoxville, The University of Tennessee Press, 1995), especially 35-53. For Moss, many of the narrative passages in Morse's geography texts amounted to jeremiads (see 44-45).

Geographical texts are no less important than other kinds of texts in the construction of nationalism, and Lawson-Peebles considers Morse's work in the same context as that of Noah Webster, his contemporary, when he states, "The hopes that Jedidiah Morse nursed for American geography were echoed by Webster in relation to American language."⁶² In considering the evolution of geographic education in America, Susan Schulten observes that relying upon contrast and difference to explain the unique character of places was Morse's strategy and has persisted in geographic pedagogy down to the present day.⁶³ Short notes the irony of this feature of Morse's style, in light of his intention to produce nationalist texts that would suggest unity, rather than perpetuate sectional divisiveness.⁶⁴ Schulten also credits the enduring popularity of Morse's *Geography Made Easy* and *American Universal Geography* with creating the impression that geography is a simplistic discipline that could be mastered at a young age through only the rote memorization of facts.⁶⁵

Others besides Morse were also involved in the construction of an American geographical and territorial consciousness, such as John Melish, a Scottish immigrant,

⁶² Lawson-Peebles, 74.

⁶³ Susan Schulten, *The Geographical Imagination in America, 1880-1950* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 116.

⁶⁴ Short (2001, 126) observes that Morse was "a nationalist who was unremitting in his distaste for the morals and manners of much of the country."

⁶⁵ Schulten, 71. The fact that Schulten, a historian, asserts this point in a book-length account tracing geography pedagogy and geographic imagination in America published out of a university press connected with a university that no longer even has a geography department suggests the sad truth of her observation. Sadder still is that many in the geographic profession do not seem concerned that the history of the discipline is being recounted by those outside of the discipline. Neither the *Annals of the AAG* nor *The Geographical Review* have yet even reviewed Schulten's book.

geographer, and enthusiastic travel writer. In addition to his descriptive accounts of travel through the growing United States and its adjoining territories, Melish's 1814 *Description of the Roads in the United States* was the first text to tabulate information on transportation conditions between and among specific cities.⁶⁶ The importance of roads to achieving and maintaining national political unity has already been discussed; this point does not seem to have escaped Short, who comments that John Melish's directory of roads (although it was a table and not a map) amounted to an important "statement on national coherence."⁶⁷ Short asserts that the work of both Morse and Melish was of considerable consequence in the creation of American nationalism in a period in which "national identity was not a given," for all that the two seemed to be promoting somewhat different nationalist discourses, one which sought to reproduce rigid New England Puritanism in the case of Morse and one which was more liberal and sought to encourage immigration and expansion of ideas along with territory in the case of Melish.⁶⁸

Considering the role of geographic texts in aiding the transformation of North American wilderness terrain into national territory and in constructing a national identity centered upon a particular territorial imagination points to yet another way that geographers and other collectors of geographic knowledge functioned during conditions of territorial expansion in the early Republic – namely, as collectors of intelligence.

⁶⁶ John Melish, *A Description of the Roads in the United States* (Philadelphia: G. Palmer, 1814).

⁶⁷ Short (1999), 42. For his discussion of Melish see Short (1999), 40-49, and (2001) "A Sensible Foreigner," 127-143.

The interconnection of geographic discourses and intelligence discourses – their sharing of a common epistemology of reconnaissance - has already been argued earlier in this dissertation. One way that this interconnection emerges is simply by considering the work of Morse and of Melish and noting the different techniques that they used to collect the information to support their geographic texts. As Lawson-Peebles tells us, Morse was commonly criticized for relying excessively upon secondhand information and accounts of distant places, rather than endeavoring to conduct research through direct observation and fieldwork. Morse was apparently sensitive to this, and wrote defensively of his “sources of intelligence.”⁶⁹ He borrowed from London’s Royal Society the idea of using questionnaires to elicit categories of information from informants, a technique promoted by Robert Boyle as the most efficient and standardized way to produce geographic accounts of various global regions. Lawson-Peebles contends that this reliance on others (to “see” on his behalf, as it were) caused Morse to produce texts that were themselves less visual and more dependent upon verbal descriptions. In a correspondence with Jeremy Belknap, Morse was reminded that, “To be a true geographer, it is necessary to be a traveler. To depend upon distant and accidental information is not safe, and there is a material difference between describing a place that we have seen and one that we have not seen.”⁷⁰ While Belknap’s assertions seem to have an idealistic ring that the Royal Society itself might

⁶⁸ Short (1999), 49.

⁶⁹ Lawson-Peebles, 66.

have questioned at that time (since it was obviously not possible for every geographer to also be an explorer), Short's comparison of Morse and Melish seems to find Melish's work superior primarily for this very reason: Melish was himself an avid traveler and relied less on informants and more on firsthand fieldwork. And American geographer Ralph H. Brown, who in 1941 chronicled Morse's career producing geographic texts sadly laments Morse's aversion to travel: "The annalist of Morse's activities as a geographer must express the regret that the one who has so often been called the 'father of American geography' was not an inveterate traveler or at least one who would occasionally strike out, possibly at all costs, for distant places."⁷¹

Some of the geographic publications of John Melish are direct reminders not only of the relationship of geographic information to intelligence information, but also of the indispensability of geography to inform military tactics and national security strategies alike. Melish's 1813 *Military and Topographical Atlas* targeted a readership that was once again concerned about the security of America's borders in its renewed confrontation with Great Britain. In introducing the work, Melish noted that he had personally traveled along much of America's northern border with British Canada, so that his firsthand knowledge of this strategic area was reliable. Moreover, he suggested that the American public could only hope to defeat Britain in a military confrontation if its citizens were at least as well-informed as the British took it upon themselves to be

⁷⁰ Quoted in Ralph H. Brown, "The American Geographies of Jedidiah Morse," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 31:3 (September 1941), 145-217, p. 157.

⁷¹ Brown (1941), 160.

about American geography: “Topographical delineation forms a very important part of the education of young men intended for the military profession in Britain... Wherever they carry the power of their arms, they endeavor to obtain correct information regarding the country.”⁷² A large part of Melish’s 1813 work, perhaps more than a third, is made up of British maps and British military descriptions of southern Canada that date from a much earlier period, roughly 1759-60. Initially, a modern reader might be mystified at why Melish would have believed that the inclusion of so much material more than 50 years old would have been acceptable to discriminating readers. Why would readers not have rejected the work as outdated? The answer lies in Melish’s narrative itself. Melish essentially declares in the work’s preface that this material, though old, was still treated by the British as valuable military intelligence and even guarded against unauthorized access. Of the maps and the supporting “Official Documents Relative to the Operations of the British Army” (Figures 4.3 and 4.4), Melish tantalizingly suggests that they were obtained in a covert operation worthy of a 20th century James Bond:

It is unnecessary to state particularly how they came into the hands of the publisher, but it may be observed that the British government in Canada set a very high value upon them and had them secured in a situation where it was not deemed possible that they could ever form part of a military atlas for the use of the inhabitants of the United States.⁷³

⁷² John Melish, *Military and Topographical Atlas; Including the British possessions & Florida*. (Philadelphia: G. Palmer, 1813), 4.

⁷³ John Melish, *Military and Topographical Atlas*, 5.

Apparently, then, Melish was literally banking on his readers to recognize his *Military and Topographical Atlas* as unique and singular intelligence information, an insider's look into what had been closely guarded secrets of an enemy power. The renewed confrontation with the British in 1812 would have accentuated the sense of the material's restricted nature, making it more attractive to readers, then, despite its age. Melish continued with his tendency to present his geographic publications as intelligence with direct bearing upon military conflict with his 1818 *Geographical Intelligence*, which was not itself an atlas or gazetteer, but rather was a descriptive pamphlet in which Melish provided narrative summaries of some forthcoming geographical publications, including his *Map of the Seat of War in North America* and its accompanying *Description of the Seat of War*.⁷⁴ As with his earlier *Military and Topographical Atlas*, Melish made it clear that recent hostilities with Great Britain had suggested to him that the public needed better geographical knowledge of the region of the confrontation, in order to better understand the confrontation itself:

This business took its rise at the commencement of the late war. At that period the geography of the United States was very imperfectly known; and few people had any document to guide them in tracing the military operations, particularly on the northern frontier. The author had travelled extensively through the country immediately previous to that event, and had not only collected a great mass of geographical knowledge relative to the country, but had brought with him all the best maps and surveys he could lay his hands on.⁷⁵

Melish's words clearly suggest that, in theory, the geographer and the collector of intelligence are ideally one and the same. However, the moral implications of what

⁷⁴ John Melish, *Geographical Intelligence* (Philadelphia: Melish, 1818).

⁷⁵ Melish, *Geographical Intelligence*, 3.

Morse increasingly understood as the fundamental dependence of war upon geographic knowledge were not lost on Melish. In *Geographical Intelligence*, he related the wry comment to him by a Quaker friend who said to him, "I wish, friend John, thee would make a Map of the Seat of Peace."⁷⁶ Melish continued by assuring his readers, "The hint was not lost."

Not only was firsthand visual information considered central to the geographic profession in this period, it was also recognized and termed "intelligence." Naturally, this is in one sense only a figure of speech, to be expected during a period when terms that have since become more heavily associated with the formal intelligence profession were instead popularly used to connote deliberate acquisition of information, and newspaper titles containing the words "spy" and "intelligencer" were common. But in another sense, of course, geographic information functioned precisely as intelligence for the young Republic. The continent of North America was shared by several powers other than the United States, and any territorial expansion had to take into account the possibility of provoking hostility on the part of European powers, European commercial concerns, and indigenous nations. This was made clear in an 1802 letter from George Rogers Clark to then President Jefferson, which recommended the establishment of a military fort at the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, a point which was for all intents and purposes a western gateway to the United States, west of which lay

⁷⁶ Ibid, 4.

foreign territory.⁷⁷ Additionally, it is clear that many of America's early attempts to mount organized explorations of other sections of North America were so met with suspicion and disapproval by European powers (Spain, in particular) that they either were quashed altogether or attempted in secret. Guarded diplomatic correspondence from the Spanish ambassador to the United States warned in December 1802 of American aspirations to explore western terrain as far as the Pacific Ocean, and the response from the King of Spain was decidedly negative.⁷⁸ And an early attempt by Jefferson to sponsor (through the American Philosophical Society) an exploration up the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean led by French botanist Andre Michaux had to be abandoned when it became clear that Michaux was an intelligence agent of France, which was at the time considering an attack on Spanish possessions in North America.⁷⁹ Even before he turned to the portrayal of American national coherence through his maps and tables of road interconnections, John Melish, who consulted with Jefferson on the cartographic depiction of American territorial claims as well as those of other

⁷⁷ Letter from George Rogers Clark to Thomas Jefferson, December 12, 1802; reprinted in Donald Jackson, ed., *Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, with Related Documents, 1783-1854* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978), Volume 1, 7-8.

⁷⁸ Letter from Carlos Martinez de Yrujo to Pedro Cevallos, December 21, 1802, and Spanish decree, February 19, 1803; reprinted in Jackson, ed., Volume 1, 4-6.

⁷⁹ See Stephen F. Knott, "Thomas Jefferson's Clandestine Foreign Policy," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 4:3 (1990, 325-355), 330-333; and Stephen E. Ambrose, *Undaunted Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening of the American West* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 71. It seems that the geographer Morse was susceptible to the rumors of foreign penetration and subversion of the young Republic, especially by France; and throughout the 1790s he not only was wildly suspicious of Jefferson of himself serving as an agent of France, but he also published a sermon wherein he warned of the "present danger" of European infiltration of the new Republic to erode its moral fabric and especially to attack what Morse saw as its religious foundation. See Lawson-Peebles, 69-70, for his analysis of this bizarre episode in Morse's career. It is also mentioned in Short (1999), 38-39.

European and indigenous powers in North America, was sufficiently convinced of the importance of geography to national security to produce an 1813 military map of North America, showing the locations of military forts and administrative districts.⁸⁰

Lewis and Clark's 'Corps of Discovery' as Intelligence Mission

The discussion of the epistemology of reconnaissance in the previous chapter was offered in the context of global exploration by European powers that was gaining momentum in the 16th century. As global exploration continued during the Enlightenment, and as the aim of systematic advancement of scientific knowledge replaced religious aims to stand alongside economic and political motivations for exploration, the same epistemology of reconnaissance prevailed. As Chapter One mentioned, there has been renewed scholarly attention to the Enlightenment's emphasis upon trust and credibility embedded within a travel narrative to develop knowledge about the world. However, it is common to overlook America's late 18th and early 19th century aspirations to explore the western portion of the continent as a political and scientific enterprise informed by the Enlightenment. Surely the best known aspect of this enterprise Lewis and Clark's "Corps of Discovery," which set out in 1804 to explore the Louisiana Purchase in central and western North America, to describe and catalogue its natural features, to negotiate with its natives according to President Jefferson's geopolitical aspirations for the young United States, and to discover a

⁸⁰See John Melish, *A Military and Topographical Atlas of the United States, Including British Possessions and Florida* (Philadelphia: G. Palmer, 1813).

mostly water route to the Pacific Ocean.⁸¹ Indeed, the Corps of Discovery was intended as a culmination of Enlightenment science in America, and it was fully integrated with the aims of the American Philosophical Society. Founded in Philadelphia by Benjamin Franklin in 1743, that Society was explicitly modeled after London's Royal Society,⁸² and its members included David Rittenhouse, acclaimed internationally for his invention of a mechanical orrery, Joseph Priestly, who discovered oxygen, and Charles Wilson Peale, the founder of the first public museum in the United States.⁸³ Another famous member was Thomas Jefferson, who was elected president of the Society in 1796 and remained its president while simultaneously President of the United States. Jefferson's interest in exploring and charting routes across sparsely inhabited lands was developed largely within the intellectual context of the American Philosophical Society and discussions among its members.⁸⁴

The Louisiana Purchase followed close upon the heels of the process of incorporating the Northwest into American national territory, and it represented another

⁸¹ The official name of the expedition, also referred to in account titles as the "Expedition of Captains Lewis and Clark," offers a subtle reminder that it was a military venture, a corps of officers and enlisted men, in which goals of military and geopolitical reconnaissance were combined with aspirations for scientific "discovery."

⁸² Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1948 [1993 Edition]), 9-26.

⁸³ Peale's museum displayed natural specimens collected by explorers and naturalists from Europe and North America alike. Its original location within Independence Hall implied a connection between the new American republic and New World nature itself, and suggested that patriotism could be expressed through attention to American natural history.

⁸⁴ John Logan Allen, *Lewis and Clark and the Image of the American Northwest* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1975), 65; Albert Furtwangler, *Acts of Discovery: Visions of America in the Lewis and Clark Journals* (Urbana and Chicago: University Press, 1993), 79; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Undaunted*

land acquisition with profound implications for America's territorial future. Even more than the Northwest Territory, which unabashedly relied upon surveyors to be the "eyes and ears" of the federal government, the Louisiana Purchase also required reconnaissance. Moreover, part of the concern in both cases was that "European imperial powers... supposedly stood ready to exploit frontier disorder and Indian discontent,"⁸⁵ and although that phrase was directed at the challenges facing the Northwest Territory, it applies equally to US concerns over the North American lands farther west. The early Republic had not yet arrived at an assumption of "manifest destiny," but rather presumed that the space of the continent would be negotiated among several competing political powers.

Once the Louisiana Purchase was finalized in 1802, Jefferson saw it as a victory as much for the advancement of "philosophical" inquiry as for the territorial aggrandizement of the United States. As president of the American Philosophical Society, he noted the Purchase as the "enlarged field of unexplored country lately opened to free research."⁸⁶ And once Jefferson chose his young secretary Meriwether Lewis to lead the "Corps of Discovery," he personally supervised Lewis's scientific training for the expedition.⁸⁷ In addition requiring Lewis to study the maps and published narratives of James Cook, George Vancouver, Alexander Mackenzie, and

Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening of the American West (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 69.

⁸⁵ Onuf, 179.

⁸⁶ Boorstin, 24.

⁸⁷ Furtwangler, 75-87.

other European Explorers, Jefferson invited members of the Society to provide Lewis with background material to assist his preparation on everything from conducting celestial observations to confronting medical emergencies to identifying plants and animals.⁸⁸ Society members were also encouraged to see the coming expedition as an instrument for the collection of scientific knowledge, and several furnished Lewis with long lists of questions and topical areas to guide his observations of various phenomena.⁸⁹ It was hoped that the “Corps of Discovery” would go far in addressing the most pressing research questions of America’s Enlightenment community of scientists.

A reassessment of the entire Lewis and Clark Expedition as an intelligence mission on behalf of the United States government and pursuant to Jeffersonian geopolitics would be a considerable undertaking and is beyond the scope of my present topic. However, to simply make the argument that the Expedition was sustained by the general epistemology of reconnaissance that is shared by geographic and intelligence discourses one need look no farther than the following: Lewis’s instructions from Jefferson and other American political and scientific elites; Lewis’s initial response to

⁸⁸ Boorstin, 24; Allen, 74-76; Ambrose, 74-76. See also James P. Ronda, *Lewis and Clark Among the Indians* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 1-8, who discusses these and other aspects of Lewis’ preparation, emphasizing his preparations relative to native groups that the Expedition might encounter.

⁸⁹ Many of these instructions appear or are discussed in letters contained in Donald Jackson, ed., *Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, With Related Documents, 1783-1854, Volume 1* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978), especially Jefferson to Benjamin Smith Barton (16), Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (18), Jefferson to Robert Patterson (21), Andrew Ellicott to Jefferson (23), Robert Patterson to Jefferson (28), Albert Gallatin to Jefferson (32), Benjamin Rush’s Rules of Health (54), and Jefferson to Lewis 30 April 1803 and 16 May 1803 (44, 49).

those instructions; coordinated procedures regarding secrecy and security of certain communications; and a few key decisions made by Lewis during the first several months of the Expedition. All of these matters have been well documented through the vast Jeffersonian literature, as well as Lewis's journals. The Corps of Discovery bears one unmistakable footprint of an Enlightenment exploration project: the determination to record written narratives of eyewitness accounts as the journey progressed. Dorinda Outram points to the emphasis upon written narrative as one key distinction between early modern explorations and later Enlightenment era ones.⁹⁰ Jefferson's instructions to Lewis stressed the importance of daily journals, not only by the two Captains themselves, but also by several of the literate members of the party.

Immediately apparent when one looks at the political climate in the United States around the time of the Louisiana Purchase is the complexity of European political and commercial designs on various parcels of North American territory. As far as the powers of Britain, France, and Spain were concerned, Jefferson tried to minimize the importance of the Lewis and Clark mission, representing it as only a "literary" operation to satisfy the effete interests of a few intellectuals.⁹¹ In reality, Jefferson was immensely concerned about Britain's likely expansion of its fur trade in the Pacific Northwest, which he saw as provocative. But at the same time he also wished to avoid antagonizing Britain in the case an armed conflict with France over its strategic

⁹⁰ Outram, 282-283. Outram's discussion points to the journals of Cook and Humboldt as demonstrative of the Enlightenment's emphasis upon the written travel narrative, but overlooks the additional and contemporaneous example of Lewis and Clark.

possession of New Orleans required the United States to appeal to Britain as an ally. Moreover, as Knott has noted, Jefferson was concerned over conflict in North America between France and Spain, and he was aware that French fur traders in the area of St. Louis and the lower Missouri River might well be informants for France. However, French traders were a force to be reckoned with in the west, because of their relative familiarity with the native tribes and their skill in native languages. And the indigenous tribes inhabiting the Louisiana Purchase, as far as Jefferson was aware, were at odds with one another as well as with the various European groups and trading concerns. Finally, even Lewis's instructions to study the geography of the Missouri River drainage had geopolitical implications: Jefferson determined that if any of the Missouri tributaries flowed from above 50 degrees latitude, this would extend America's territorial claims into present-day western Canada.⁹²

Jefferson schooled Lewis on all these geopolitical concerns and more, so that Lewis was not only prepared to act as Jefferson's "agent," but was also prepared to develop his own informants during the course of the expedition to acquire intelligence that addressed Jefferson's national security concerns. During his stay in St. Louis over the winter of 1803-04, Lewis developed close relationships with several men who were in excellent positions to provide him with information about what the Expedition was likely to face in terms of the native groups and their attitudes towards the various

⁹¹ Arlen J. Large, "Lewis and Clark Under Cover (Secrecy involving the Expedition - a cipher-text letter)," *We Proceeded On 15/3* (1989): 12-21, p. 13.

⁹² Allen, 354-355, notes Lewis's disappointment when he failed to prove this.

nationalities of “white men.” Among these was a pair of French brothers who were prominent in the St. Louis fur trade, an American postmaster who spoke French, and a Scottish fur trader employed by a Spanish trading company.⁹³ And once the Expedition was well underway, the party added the now famous figures of Charbonneau and his “wife” Sacagawea, because of Charbonneau’s familiarity with the tribes and tribal languages of the upper Missouri, as well as Sacagawea’s alleged kinship (which turned out to be correct) with an Indian tribe about which the Captain’s knew nothing firsthand, but from whom they hoped to purchase horses.⁹⁴ In terms of a contemporary intelligence operation, Lewis developed a range of informants with firsthand knowledge to address various aspects of his mission.

Additionally, Lewis used his St. Louis area informants during the winter of 1803-04 to begin to fulfill some of the topical information requirements conveyed to him by Jefferson, Treasury Secretary (and map enthusiast) Albert Gallatin, and American Philosophical Society members. He posed masses of questions to his acquaintances, and through them to a wider circle of less lettered individuals. But Lewis wrote to Jefferson of the limitations of his informants in providing succinct information, and he described a questionnaire he had designed with a grid for tabulating informants’ responses.⁹⁵ Clearly, the use of specially designed formats for the

⁹³ Ronda, 10-11.

⁹⁴ Native American historians maintain that Native American attitudes towards Sacagawea remain ambivalent today, due to impressions that she was a “defector,” in the sense of spying to the detriment of her own people. See Irving W. Anderson, “Myths Cloud True Role of ‘Sacagawea’ in White Conquest of the West,” *We Proceeded On 19/4* (1993): 28-29.

⁹⁵ Lewis to Jefferson, Dec. 28, 1803, in Jackson, ed. See also Ronda, 11.

organization of intelligence information, as well as questionnaires for informant debriefing, are practices widespread in the twentieth century intelligence profession. Ronda reports that none of these questionnaires, either blank or completed, seem to have survived.⁹⁶

The concern for strategic secrecy that is a persistent feature of geographic exploration, in addition to being normal procedure in the intelligence profession, can be observed in correspondence between Jefferson and Lewis during 1803. Large and Jackson have noted that the two men agreed on a particular cipher system (Figure 4.5) to be used to encode any communications “that might do injury if betrayed.”⁹⁷ Jefferson had designed the system, modifying a mechanical cipher machine that he had invented and used during his diplomatic service in France. No actual examples of ciphered communications remain, however.

Two things should emerge clearly from this discussion of Lewis and Clark’s Corps of Discovery. First, it counts among the most complex manifestations of American Enlightenment thought, although it is generally not understood as such. Second, just as earlier European explorations had served multiple purposes of scientific discovery, establishing access to natural resources, and advancing geopolitical goals, exploration of the uncharted land of western North America likewise had multiple implications for America’s geopolitics, her territorial security, and her intellectual community. Other European powers were competing with the United States for access

⁹⁶ Ronda, 11.

⁹⁷ Large, 18, quoting a letter from Jefferson to Lewis.

to the vast western portion of the continent. Rivalries over access to New World lands could invite more conflicts among European powers. Moreover, the indigenous “nations” of the western regions were an unknown quantity, and had to figure into the geopolitical equations of Jefferson and his contemporaries, just as the Iroquois Confederation had been an important consideration for the British and French in their earliest colonial designs on the American and Canadian northeast. All these factors suggest that Lewis and Clark’s mission clearly rested on an epistemology of reconnaissance: as trusted agents of the state, they were sent into potentially hostile territory to observe according to proscribed instructions and to collect information necessary to ensuring territorial security and negotiating North American geopolitics.

Ironically, the one feature of the Corps of Discovery that I earlier called the “footprint” of an Enlightenment geographical venture – namely, the expedition journals – is also responsible for the Corps of Discovery being generally overlooked in recent geographical scholarship and in literature on geographical discovery more generally.⁹⁸ I am referring to Lewis’s personal failure to prepare the journals for publication and the long delay before they were finally published in 1814, eight years after the Expedition’s return and five years after Lewis’s suicide. Although Lewis’s, and indeed Jefferson’s, intent was to publish a multi-volume account of the journey,⁹⁹ as was the style of Europe’s Enlightenment expeditions, which Jefferson was still consciously trying to

⁹⁸ The landmark work J.N.L. Baker, *A History of Geographical Discovery and Exploration* (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1931 [1945 edition]), gives a scant two pages to Lewis and Clark, 376-378.

⁹⁹ Allen, 373-375, notes that three volumes were intended: narrative, western geography, and scientific data on natural specimens and natives.

emulate, instead Lewis deteriorated into a series of delays and procrastinations, which Stephen Ambrose insightfully calls “the great mystery of Lewis’s life.”¹⁰⁰ Meanwhile, one of Corps’ enlisted members, Patrick Gass, published his diary, which was eagerly devoured by the public, reprinted at least four times, including one London edition, and was inexpensive to purchase. Additionally, other sensationalized counterfeit accounts appeared, which were eagerly read by Americans who may not have realized they were forgeries. All the while Jefferson kept assuring his scientific and intellectual acquaintances, both in America and abroad, that the full and genuine account would be published soon. When the Nicholas Biddle edition finally appeared in 1814, not only had the public largely forgotten that it was overdue, but its limited printing and high cost (some 1400 copies at six dollars apiece) ensured limited readership. Consequently, many of Lewis’s “discoveries” went unrecognized and were re-discovered by other western explorers, cartographers, and naturalists. Additionally, many of the names that Lewis and Clark gave to natural features were unknown until long after other western adventurers had given new names to the same locations.

Territory, Conflict, and Defectors

The standard historiography of the significance of the Louisiana Purchase seems to focus on its virtually instantaneous augmentation of American political territory and the promise of American trans-continental political presence – soon to be articulated in the 1840s as “manifest destiny” – that this represented. But it should not be overlooked

¹⁰⁰ Ambrose, 468.

that the Louisiana Purchase was seen by Jefferson and others as expanding not only actual territory, but, perhaps more importantly, as expanding options for the organization of American territory. Considering the problems that had been endemic in American territorial expansion from the very beginning and in all areas of the Republic, from New England to the southeast to the Northwest Territory – problems of supplanting existing cultural landscapes with new ones – the Louisiana Purchase captured the imagination of Jefferson precisely for its promise of ample space for the sequestering of certain functions and certain social elements. Jefferson explicitly envisioned sending to the western lands of the Louisiana Purchase native peoples who either could not or would not assimilate. Jefferson hoped that the west could become a “giant camp” where the arts of civilization could be learned and practiced by native peoples in preparation for their assimilation into the agrarian-based economy of the American mainstream, which Jefferson firmly believed would remain east of the Mississippi River.¹⁰¹ Moreover, he envisioned siphoning off numerous of resource production and other economic functions to the far West. Jefferson believed in an American future in which certain economic and manufacturing functions would be better removed to a separate area, so that the American landscape could remain the yeoman agrarian landscape that his personal aesthetic idealized so famously. Clearly, Jefferson was turning the Louisiana Purchase into an imagined territory long before it

¹⁰¹One key justification of the Louisiana Purchase was the idea that it could provide land to offer to the Indians of the Northwest Territories and the southeast, to mollify them for the loss of their lands to white encroachment. Jefferson articulated this in his “Message to Congress,” January 18, 1803, reprinted in Jackson, ed. See also Donald Jackson, *Thomas Jefferson and the Rocky Mountains: Exploring the West from Monticello* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

became the terrain of scientific and political reconnaissance, insofar as making a territory involves the pronouncement of a set of particular functions and expectation of what will happen there.

The early American Republic, guided as it was by Enlightenment thinking, faced an underlying conflict between its political identity articulated and imposed upon territory and the “wilderness” of the American continent. American territoriality was not born out of simply a military conflict with an Old World colonial power, but rather it was born out of a more intractable, and in the end a more challenging conflict, with nature itself. In this narrative, in which wild nature is engaged in adversarial conflict with American political-territorial aspirations, the individuals cast as defectors are those native people who assisted the American enterprise of exploration and conquest. Sacagawea is just the most common example among indigenous people that have been valorized for what could easily be seen as an act of treason against their own peoples and ways of life, as the discussion by Irving Anderson shows. Additionally and from a much earlier period, the accounts of Pocahontas, mythologized though they are, show, fundamentally, an act of intervention by an Indian to enable the white expansionist project. Within obscure local histories are located numerous accounts of Indian figures whose acts on behalf of whites, ranging from kindness to heroism, were proffered at the expense of their own peoples’ interests and essentially represented betrayals of their own peoples’ ways of life.¹⁰² Indeed, upon investigation of the origins of Indian

¹⁰² Examples of this can be found in Lucian Lamar Knight, *Georgia's Landmarks, Memorials, and Legends* (Atlanta: The Byrd Printing Company, 1914) ; and Anne Hughes Porter, *The History of the*

placenames, particularly in the Midwest and the South, it is common to discover the memorializing of alleged Indian acts towards whites, ranging from small kindnesses to deliberate gestures of heroism. Thinking of such acts as defections helps to explain American discomfiture with the notion that the entire American expansionist enterprise has depended upon Indian acts that are gracious or treasonous (according to perspective), and the apparent conflict between that and the accompanying notion that Indians have been consistently and ultimately shunned from attempts at assimilation into the white American mainstream.

Conclusion

Terrain becomes territory as the state is manifested upon it. In this chapter I have tried to address the process in colonial America and the early Republic by which polities became territorialized. As I have argued elsewhere, the linking of territory with national political consciousness does not simply happen – rather it is the outcome of deliberate processes, and it involves the negotiation of conditions of conflict. In the American case, the conflict was only partly with Old World colonial powers; in the main, it was with the “wild nature” of the continent itself, and everything this implied – from savage Indians to vast distances and rugged terrain.

Mississippi State Society Daughters of the American Revolution, 1896-1996 (Kosciusko, MS: Professional Publishing, 1996).

Considering the Puritan experience in this chapter has been important because it reminds us that the transference of ideas from the English to the American context, which is one of the underlying justifications of my research approach, was directly an outcome of the political and religious currents that I addressed in the preceding chapter. As Pierce Lewis comments, the earliest New Englanders were a “little theocracy settled by post-Elizabethan Puritans, who had broken away from the Anglican church at precisely the time when Britain’s religious wars were raging hottest.”¹⁰³ Besides the uncertain beginning of what was to be an evolving engagement with North American wilderness, we also see in the Puritan experience at least two implications for the concept of defection, as it would evolve in the American social setting. First, the Puritan mission was initially to remain in a few isolated seaboard communities only as a sojourn while they awaited a return to England, and attempts to move inland and seek out more inviting areas for long term habitation were defections, insofar as they both betrayed the main group’s sacred covenant and weakened the main group by undermining its unanimity of resolve. Second, the later generation of Puritans who were forced to reckon with their own moral shortcomings once the original “errand into the wilderness” was realized to have been a failure were redefined in the fiery jeremiads as defectors from God’s will. This meant that their world was discursively presented to them as in a perpetual state of crisis, and sinful society was to constantly struggle for redemption amid fear that the struggle was insufficient. At the same time, Puritans began to recognize the wilderness and invest it with a moral dimension, which was to

indelibly color future American attitudes towards wilderness as it was confronted and transformed into national territory.

The grid system was pressed into service by the early American republic first with respect to the Northwest Territory as an attempt to project civilization into the wilderness without the moral burden and irrational uncertainty of a frontier. By preceding settlement, it sought to systematize the land into territory before there was a frontier. By the same token, the idea of the National Road, as conceived by Washington and his contemporaries, was to build the road to enable settlement, not to blaze a trail that would eventually evolve into a road as settlement occurred, in sharp contrast to the myth propagated by Turner and other early historians. This normative approach changed substantially with the Louisiana Purchase and with the exploration of the West in general. To be sure, the Jeffersonian metes and bounds system of surveying soon came to pervade it and to transform it into political territory as well as into the moral landscape awaiting homesteading and other cultural forms. But the rather profound challenges of western topography, climate, human habitation, and animal habitation meant that considerably more careful reconnaissance and study had to be undertaken before an abstract scheme could simply be flung out as a tool for social transformation through landscape transformation.

This chapter sought also to establish the idea that road infrastructure was regarded from the days of the early Republic as critical to the formation of a national identity. In a political territory whose physical size was potentially continental and

¹⁰³Lewis, 85.

which spanned a variety of rugged terrains, the risk of destabilizing local identities forming and flourishing in enforced isolation could best be alleviated by using transportation arteries to penetrate across distance, connecting far-flung places and enabling communication and exchange of information. First suggested as a broad policy expression in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and later articulated succinctly by Calhoun, roads surely did have the potential to “conquer space.” This conviction would re-emerge in the early 20th century with an even more explicit connection to national security, as the following chapter will show.

The Louisiana Purchase gave a dramatic twist to American notions of territoriality, not only by filling in a lot of blank space on the map, but also by helping to conjure a national territorial imagination that was truly transcontinental. This chapter used the Lewis and Clark “Corps of Discovery” to highlight the shared epistemologies of intelligence and geographical exploration. And Lewis and Clark were followed by a whole series of government sponsored military surveying expeditions, which collectively translated the “west” from a foreign place – pervaded by a mixture of European powers, trappers, Indians, and rude nature – to a place that was legible in a new American territorial lexicon. Perhaps one key to understanding the origin of the relationship between geographic discourse and intelligence discourse, as modes of knowledge, lies in the term, “intelligence collection,” a ubiquitous phrase in contemporary intelligence vernacular. “Collection” brings to mind an important ancillary function of early modern and Enlightenment exploration – the collection of artifacts and specimens that could be brought back, categorized, and displayed. An

excellent illustration of the collection impulse of the Enlightenment is found in Charles Wilson Peale's self-portrait set at the entrance to his American Museum, whose displays included, interestingly, artifacts brought back by Lewis and Clark (Figure 4.6). Like geographic knowledge, intelligence is objectified and systematized; it "stands for" some distant reality that we attempt to know through the representation or through the eyewitness. The geographic community is actively critiquing this mode of knowing, but the intelligence community is not.

By reframing the conflict faced by the early American Republic in its territorial undertakings as a conflict against nature, and by also highlighting the extent to which geographic exploration in the early Republic served a complex political function that we can easily recognize today as intelligence, the people participating in these processes begin to fit the descriptions of intelligence agents and defectors. Redefining these processes in this way helps to reveal that the American discourses of intelligence and of national security that pervaded the latter half of the 20th century are not of such recent origin at all. Rather, they are simply more recent iterations of discourses that emerged from America's earliest encounters with North American terrain and its earliest attempts to transform that terrain into territory. In the next chapter I will follow the formalization of national security discourse in the early 20th century during a critical period that not only witnessed the first major series of attempts to construct hegemonic narratives commemorating the Revolutionary and early frontier periods, but also witnessed America's assessment of its own national, international, and imperial mission.




Figure 4.1. Pierre Fourdrinier, engraver (after drawing by Peter Gordon), “A view of Savannah [sic] as it stood the 29th of March, 1734.” Source: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, [reproduction number, e.g., LC-USZ62-1912].




Figure 4.2. Map depicting National Road, Wilderness Road, and Great Philadelphia Wagon Road.




Figure 4.3. “Map of Detroit River and Adjacent Country.” Source: John Melish, *Military and Topographical Atlas; Including the British Possessions & Florida*. Philadelphia: G. Palmer, 1813. (Source: Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library.)




Figure 4.4. Title page to "Official Documents Relative to the Operations of the British Army" section of John Melish, *Military and Topographical Atlas; Including the British Possessions & Florida*. Philadelphia: G. Palmer, 1813. (Source: Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library.)

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v
b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w
c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x
d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y
e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z
f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a
g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b
h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c
i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d
j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e
k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f
l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g
m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i
o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j
p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m
s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n
t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o
u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p
v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r
x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s
y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t
z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v

*The heads of the mountains, hills, wells, and the plants of the
 rock, and the trees, are the keys to the cipher, and
 the words, and the letters, are the keys to the cipher.*

Figure 4.5. The cipher matrix designed by Jefferson for coded communication by Meriwether Lewis during the voyage of the Corps of Discovery. It has been called the “artichoke matrix,” due to the word “artichoke” providing a key to its deciphering. Source: Manuscript Division, Library of Congress [reproduction number LCMS-27748-203].




Figure 4.6. “The Artist and His Portrait,” by Charles Wilson Peale. Courtesy of the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts. Gift of Mrs. Sarah Harrison (The Joseph Harrison, Jr. Collection). This painting by Peale, a member of the American Philosophical society, depicts the entrance to Peale’s American Museum in Philadelphia, and effectively illustrates the collection and classification impulses that were so characteristic of the Enlightenment.

Chapter Five

From Global Periphery to Global Center: American Territoriality and National Security Discourse, 1914-1929

Introduction

The previous chapter examined the first of two periods in which, according to the broad argument that I revealed in my opening chapter, America's territorial identity was most challenged – namely, the period of the first generation following American independence. During that period the new Republic grappled with the myriad challenges associated with political expansion, the transformation of terrain into territory, and the construction of a coherent national identity across distances among which connections were at best tenuous. This chapter turns to the second of these two periods – the generation following soon after the closure of America's frontier.

It seems paradoxical that American territoriality and national identity should be called into question at such a time, with Manifest Destiny declared complete and the frontier closed. I will identify three significant shifts during this period. Each gave rise to distinct implications for American territoriality, and it is from these three shifts that a new hegemonic discourse of national security would emerge.¹ The first of these three shifts is the accentuation of an American sense of its territory being sequestered from

¹My claim echoes that of Cecilia O'Leary, *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), who states of the period around WWI, "It was during this period that the institutional and ideological basis for what later became the national-security state assumed its modern shape" (221). However, although O'Leary examines some of the same rhetorical and empirical phenomena that I will address here, she allows the idea of "national security" to remain implicit in her narrative and misses the opportunity to explicate the relationship between discourses of patriotism and those of national security.

the political strife that was increasingly raging in Europe and elsewhere. Compared to much of the 19th century, world politics was becoming increasingly unstable and competitive. As Robert Dallek argues, American foreign policy was shaped increasingly in response to domestic trends; and these trends included, ironically, social consequences such as immigration and labor anxieties that were themselves produced by global instabilities.² With perceived territorial insulation came the sense that only particular ideologies should be associated with American territory, and alternative ideologies were necessarily a threat. The second shift concerns the acceleration of both urbanization and immigration, both of which worked to focus the attention of America's elite upon non-urban spaces. This contributed to the rediscovery of an English-influenced Arcadian ideal of nature and of country and gave rise to a set of complex and somewhat ironic ideas about rural spaces as being the source of American national identity and of American moral values. The obverse was of course an alternate set of ideas of threats to American identity and national security being associated with things foreign and things urban, and a strong current of insidious nativism saw its resurgence in this period as a result. The third shift is the emergence of concerted efforts throughout both public and private strata to locate a mythical and monumental past for America in its natural landscape and, relatedly, to inscribe memory on the landscape through the construction of monuments and the nascent phenomenon of the historic preservation industry. Tourism of both natural landscapes and of heritage sites was

²See Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Knopf, 1983). Dallek's theme is the interrelationship of domestic cultural politics and the formation of US foreign policy.

promoted as an enactment of territorial consciousness. For this third shift, the contribution to national security discourse came as decisions over commemorated sites, events, and individuals were consciously engineered, again, through a combination of public and private elements, in order to impart deliberate messages to elevate a certain kind of American past, thereby promoting a specific vision of a present and a future.

Many of the specifics of these three shifts that I have defined have been grouped into the political analytic category of “progressivism,” which generally dominates discussions of American social and political change of the period from roughly 1890 to 1920. In his landmark analysis of progressivism, Robert Wiebe notes that in addition to comprising a broad-based search by Americans for a stable national identity in an era of rapid social, technological, and demographic change, progressivism was also characterized by a gradual encroachment of the presence of the Federal government into daily lives through spreading bureaucratization of many social and business functions that had theretofore been either private, relegated to local or regional scales, or non-existent.³ With bureaucratization came the wielding of well-intended “expertise” with respect to a host of social and cultural problems at a variety of geographic scales, producing another set of implications for American territorial assumptions.⁴ Related to bureaucratization is the idea of governmentality, as articulated

³ Robert Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967).

⁴ On federal bureaucratization and progressivism in general see John Whiteclay Chambers II, *The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); and Lewis L. Gould, *America in the Progressive Era, 1890-1914* (Harlow, England and New York: Longman, 2001).

by Matthew Hannah. Although Hannah is explicitly addressing the “gilded age,” which is generally seen to have partly preceded progressivism and to have arguably overlapped with it somewhat in the opening years of the 20th century, his explanation of governmentality nevertheless is relevant here, because of his contention that governmentality is inherently spatial, reflexively emanating from the state while it also produces material infrastructure bolsters the state, because, and that these material artifacts then are located in space and become open to geographic interpretation.⁵

As Chapter One mentioned, Anssi Paasi’s work on territoriality notes that “nationalism’s relationships to territory” have been ignored in research. This chapter will seek to redress that gap, by identifying the ways in which the explicitly nationalistic agenda of one influential private group, the Daughters of the American Revolution, also functioned to reproduce territoriality and inculcate Americans in territorial behaviors. Additionally, I wish to pick up on other themes in Paasi’s work: first, his notion that political territories, ironically, are among the most unnatural of spaces and require constant public effort to maintain; and second, that territoriality is deeply embedded in the division of labor within states, and a multitude of actors participate in the reproduction of territoriality. Again, drawing from research on the activities and the mission of the ultra-nationalist DAR, I hope to argue that the DAR was deeply involved during this period in the construction and reproduction of both nationalistic and territorial discourses, through its many programs promoting patriotism,

⁵ See Hannah, *Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth-Century America*, 30-40; see also Chapter 1, note 24.

immigrant education, and historic preservation. The DAR was at the forefront of maintaining spaces as national territories, and, as a private actor with considerable public influence, took a leading role in the reproduction of territoriality. At the same time, the DAR was a key private participant in the construction of a hegemonic discourse of “national defense” that led to changes in Federal laws addressing treason and espionage.

The territorial claims embedded in nationalism have long attracted the attention of geographers, but are just beginning to be noticed by other social scientists. Although written in the context of the historical geography of Korean nationalism and the ambiguity of boundaries in the imagination of Korean national territory (a point to which I shall return in Chapter Seven), historian Andre Schmid’s observations about the inherently spatial qualities of nationalism are relevant to any discussion of territory and nationalism. Schmid states, “Nationalism thrives on crisis. And crises of the nation are generally of a spatial order: where something happens determines its national significance. This explains the centrality of territorial sovereignty to nationalist discourse...”⁶ To alter his observation only slightly, I would suggest that where something is *believed* or is *remembered* to have happened determines its national significance, and inscribing these memories on the landscape is crucial to the process of

⁶ Andre Schmid, “Looking North Toward Manchuria,” *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 99:1 (Winter 2000), 219-240, p. 221. Agnew summarizes the relationship of nationalism to territorial claims, taking into account nationalist movements that thrive, paradoxically, in diaspora communities. On this point, Agnew challenges historian Robert Wiebe, who asserts that nationalism is “geographically indeterminate,” simply because it is often triggered by migration (54), but at the same time claims that it focuses on “land sacred to (the) history” of national groups (57). See Robert Wiebe, “Imagined Communities: Nationalist Experiences,” *Journal of the Historical Society* 1 (2000), 33-63.

transformation from terrain into territory.⁷ Part of the aim of this chapter is to examine the way in which monuments and markers of various kinds – ranging from simple boulders and statues to entire roads that themselves were conceived of as monuments – functioned on the landscape as nationalist texts demarcating territory and helping to inculcate national territorial behaviors. And the central role of women and women's groups, such as the DAR, in the material processes of nationalism and territoriality that I will discuss in this chapter points to an ongoing change in the ways that scholars are approaching the interrelationship of nationalism and gender. Instead of women functioning in nationalist discourses simply as symbols of the fertility and reproduction of the nation and its peoples, it is increasingly clear that women have functioned quite forcefully in the production of nationalist discourses.⁸ That is not to say that gender does *not* enter in to the construction of nationalism; rather what emerges from examining woman-led nationalist initiatives is the presence of a strong conviction that nationalist discourse must have qualities that are not only decidedly moral, but also

⁷ There is a burgeoning literature on memory, iconography, and nationalism, within which the work of David Lowenthal's contributions have been perhaps most frequent and influential. See David Lowenthal, "Past Time, Present Time: The Landscape of Memory," *Geographical Review* 65:1 (January 1975), 1-36; "Age and Artifact: Dilemmas of Appreciation," in *The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes*, D.W. Meinig, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 103-28; *The Past is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and "Identity, Heritage and History," in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, John R. Gillis, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 41-57. Significant contributions to this literature that focus on the American landscape include Hal Rothman, *Preserving Different Pasts: The American National Monuments* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989); and Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994).

⁸ See Carol Medlicott and Michael Heffernan, "'Autograph of a Nation': The Daughters of the American Revolution and the National Old Trails Road, 1910-1927," *National Identities* (forthcoming, 2003).

nurturing and sensitive to aesthetic concerns, all aspects that the women involved believed themselves better equipped to impart than their male counterparts.⁹

As this chapter proceeds, I will examine the purported notion of territorial sequestration in early 20th century America and the various social, ideological, and material outcomes that this produced. Noting the shifting imagination of American rural landscapes and the meaning of “country,” as well as the rising importance of automobile access by roads to rural spaces, I will explore the construction of nationalist and territorial texts in the form of monuments and other spaces of memory. I will also discuss the rising discourses of nativism and “national defense,” the articulation of which was strongly but ambiguously shouldered by the ultra-nationalist DAR, alongside some other more pernicious groups. From this I will move to consider some of the nationalist and nativist rhetoric, as well as material projects, aimed at defining US citizenship versus “the foreign” in a period of accelerated migration. This will reveal the extent to which US territory and national security were being reconceptualized, while American nationalists struggled with the challenges posed by “foreigners” in their midst. In the end I hope to demonstrate that, as O’Leary suggests but without sufficient context, that the production of the national security discourse which was to inform US foreign policy for most of the latter half of the 20th century, and which also has sustained US intelligence discourse so as to produce coherent discussions of defectors, was indeed an outcome of events and trends from this complex period.

⁹ Agnew (2003), “Nationalism.” (Need page numbers in Duncan et al!!!)

Daughters on the Landscape

Of the several tasks to be undertaken in this chapter, I will turn first to a set of issues impinging upon interpretation of the American landscape itself as nationalist territory. The period on which this chapter focuses so famously and energetically produced nationalist rhetoric, precisely because the territory of the nation itself no longer appeared to be in question. The official closure of the frontier had been declared after the tallying of the 1890 Census and again more memorably by Frederick Jackson Turner¹⁰ in 1893, and at roughly same time the US Government declared victory in its war against the American Indian with the 1890 massacre at Wounded Knee. Soon various aspects of Manifest Destiny were being celebrated in spectacular fashion at a succession of three world's fairs – the Great Columbian Exposition of 1893, the Louisiana Purchase Exposition of 1904, and the Panama-Pacific Exhibition of 1915. With America's apparent coming-of-age came the need to solidify a national narrative that would better enable America to appear as the cultural equivalent of the leading Western imperial states; and a compelling national narrative required that a series of founding myths, as well as the sense of a venerable and even an ancient past, be codified - rhetorically, materially, and through manipulation of nature.¹¹ On the rhetorical side, the inauguration of the prestigious *Journal of American History* in 1907

¹⁰Turner, a University of Wisconsin historian, delivered a paper titled, 'The Influence of the Frontier on American History' before a 1893 meeting of the American Historical Association held in Chicago in conjunction with the World's Columbian Exposition.

¹¹ For a discussion of how America's monumental past was manifested in nature as well as in American prehistory and colonial history see Rothman, *Preserving Different Pasts*.

implied that America's past was worthy of scholarly study while it also offered one important venue in which national narrative could be inscribed.

In short, the closure of the frontier and the completion of Manifest Destiny provided the needed impetus for Americans to construct history and myth, to create a noble past and make that past an artifact of the present through the complex process of commemoration. Nor can one overlook the suggestive ability of notable anniversary years of various events to shape public awareness of the past and to somehow evoke in people the notion that the past may indeed be relevant to the present. Certainly the sentiments raised throughout America surrounding the Columbian Quartercentenary were ideally compatible with the recent triumphalism of the closed frontier and the concluded Indian wars, and the various Lewis and Clark centennial events in 1904-06 directed still more rhetorical attention towards the need to both narrate and commemorate the processes that had been involved in territorial expansion and transformation. This period also marked fifty years since the height of overland migration west along the Oregon and California Trails, and the anniversary period generated public discussion of the pioneer experience and the pioneer legacy. An aging former pioneer from Washington State, Ezra Meeker, undertook to retrace the Oregon Trail by ox-drawn wagon traveling west to east, some 50 years after his original journey, for the express purpose of raising money for Oregon Trail monuments.¹² From

¹² See Michael Kammen, *Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 397-402. Kammen notes that Meeker's recreated journeys along the old Oregon Trail were foci for local events, pageantry, and "pioneer days," as Meeker passed through communities along his way.

1906 until his death in 1928 at the age of 98, Meeker became a minor celebrity, completing several overland journeys by wagon, automobile, and even an open-cockpit airplane.¹³

Even anniversaries associated with the Civil War achieved almost epic status around this time, generating opportunities to reassess the meaning and plausibility of America's political union across vast geographical distances and across diverse cultural regions. Particularly during the years 1912-1915, as major battles and events of the war marked their 50-year anniversaries, highly-publicized veterans' reunions, many on actual battlefield sites, were occasions to reinvent and mythologize the war for a new generation of 20th century Americans who faced a different set of foes than the United States had faced in 1861. Remarkably, with such events as the massive Gettysburg reunion in July 1913, the discourse of southern treason against the Union was completely erased, in favor of a new discourse of an honorable South whose aging defenders were rhetorically rehabilitated as patriotic Americans.¹⁴

¹³ The DAR was well aware of Meeker and celebrated him in numerous speeches and feature articles as an authentic pioneer. Meeker is pictured and discussed in "Conference of the National Society, Daughters of the American Revolution, August 15-21, 1916," *DAR Magazine* 44 (5): 296-307. Additionally, the DAR's National Old Trails Road Committee praised Meeker in 1915 for drawing public attention to the historic trails through his re-enactments. Later Meeker was the subject of a March 1927 feature article, "At the End of the Trail," *DAR Magazine* 61 (3): 192-197. Meeker was also mentioned in the June 1927 dedication by the DAR of a Nebraska statue of a pioneer man called "The Plainsman."

¹⁴For the astonishing transformation of the American South in public memory from its association with treason and the reprehensible practice of slavery to its association with "honor" and ideal American traditional values, see David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001). Among the many contributions of this volume, Blight asserts that although the South lost the war it essentially won the peace, because by the 50th anniversary of the end of the war many views traditionally associated with the South, such as unrelenting racism, had become mainstream. Moreover, he argues that the South may have been vanquished, but it was never repentant, as Americans have expected other former wartime enemies to be. Blight notes that the many black Union veterans were systematically excluded from

Only with the frontier closed, then, did the frontier past become subject to memory and monumentality. Likewise, particularly since the temporal milestone of the America's centennial in 1876, the Revolutionary period was also increasingly subject to commemoration and monumentality. The intensity of public sentiment regarding Civil War memory and the care undertaken throughout numerous states to mark and maintain battlefield sites and soldiers' graves was a reminder to some Americans that the American Revolution was perhaps being shortchanged, so to speak, as a focus of memorializing impulses. Several women's groups already existed, especially in the South, whose aim it was to maintain the graves of Confederate dead.¹⁵ Additionally, women had since the mid 19th century begun to form preservationist societies that stressed the upkeep of specific locations deemed to be of local or national significance, such as the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association, which intervened on behalf of the home of the "Father" of the United States, raising funds to prevent its falling into ruin.¹⁶

In general during this period, American women were less inclined to surrender the public sphere entirely to men, evidenced not only by the accelerating suffrage

veterans' reunion events in the early 'teens. And he reminds us just how profound are the sepia-toned images from the various reunion events - bearded elderly men in their respective Confederate and Union uniforms shaking hands or embracing in shady picnic basket-strewn former battlefields - by remarking that most Americans today would be truly shocked at the sight of aging American vets embracing aging German vets who were proudly decked out in full Nazi regalia.

¹⁵ See H.E. Gulley, "Women and the Lost Cause: Preserving a Confederate Identity in the American Deep South," *Journal of Historical Geography* 19:2 (Spring 1993), 125-141.

¹⁶ See Charles B. Hosmer, Jr., *Presence of the Past: A History of the Preservation Movement in the United States Before Williamsburg* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), for a discussion of the 19th century origins of the preservationist movement. See p. 132 for another example of a women's group formed around a preservationist cause is the Hermitage Ladies' Association, which sought the preservation of Andrew Jackson's home.

movement, but also by the growing number of women's organizations oriented to a full spectrum of public service objectives, from promoting alcohol abstinence to early childhood education to urban beautification. Certain causes both appealed to women and were acceptable within a male-dominated setting to be relegated to women because they seemed to connect logically with traditional women's spheres of home, education, and spirituality.¹⁷ With its obvious maternal connotations, the idea of the nation as a household writ large provided a reasonable direction for women's collective interests to take. One finds at least one women's organization – the DAR – that was insisting upon women's active and creative inclusion in the nation-building project.

Shortly after the national men's organization, Sons of the American Revolution was established in 1889 (emerging from an 1876 San Francisco-based men's group called Sons of Revolutionary Sires), a group of some dozen Washington, DC women met on the eve of Columbus Day, 1890, to launch a group intended to be a female counterpart. Their action had been in response to a letter to the editor of the Washington Post written by one of that dozen – local author and boarding house proprietor Mary Lockwood (described by her contemporaries as 'a staunch feminist... with advanced ideas')¹⁸ in which Lockwood denounced the public refusal of

¹⁷ Hosmer discusses women's centrality to early historic preservation initiatives; and Carolyn Merchant, *Earthcare: Women and the Environment*, (New York: Routledge, 1995), highlights the thematic connection between historic preservation and environmental conservation in her examination of early twentieth century conservation initiatives led by women's organizations, including, briefly, the DAR (pp. 122-123).

¹⁸ See Margaret Gibbs, *The DAR*, (San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969), 38. For DAR history see also Martha Strayer, *The D.A.R.: An Informal History*, (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1958); and Peggy Anderson, *The Daughters: An Unconventional Look at America's Fan Club – The DAR*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1974).

the Sons of the American Revolution to expand its membership to women or even to allow women to attend its functions. The women who responded to the letter agreed that the Revolutionary-inspired ideals of American patriotism lived on in women as surely as they did in men, and their aim was to establish an organization which would promote patriotism by reminding contemporary Americans of the legacy of their Revolutionary-era forebears. While these women saw patriotism as the duty of all Americans, they believed that women who were lineally descended from individuals who had contributed materially to the Revolutionary cause bore a particular responsibility to perpetuate the idea of patriotic living.

Two criteria for membership were: first, proving one's direct lineage (through either parent) to a man or woman whose Revolutionary-era activities conformed to one of several categories of service for the American cause; and second, securing the sponsorship of an existing member. Ironically, a few founding members were somewhat vague about their own family lineage. The fact that a potential member had to be sponsored by an existing member tended later to produce accusations of unfairness and elitism, which would eventually damage the reputation of the DAR.¹⁹ The group quickly began attracting American women from many social backgrounds

¹⁹ Exclusion of would-be members on the basis of race has been a chronic criticism directed at the DAR. In the absence of racial exclusionary membership criteria, persistent functional exclusion has two main components: first, acceptable documentation of ancestry; and second, sponsorship of new members by existing ones. On the first point, the Society professes no objection in theory to members of African-American descent; but it claims that the social demographics of blacks in colonial and Revolutionary America was such that documents of family history were seldom produced, have been unlikely to survive if produced, and their authenticity should be viewed with extreme scepticism if they are produced. On the second point, whatever elitism and bigotry does exist within DAR ranks may effectively bring pressure to bear upon any member who would presume to sponsor an African-American as a new member. See discussion in Anderson, 156-163.

and classes, ranging from society elites to working women to women who thought of themselves as politically progressive and of 'advanced thinking', a contemporary equivalent for pro-suffrage.²⁰ In an age when women's potential for significant political contribution was limited, the DAR may have also been appealing because its work was quickly recognized by the US Government as so important to the country as a whole that it was directed to submit annual reports to the United States Congress via the Smithsonian Institution (and it remains among the few private organizations to do so). Thus, in contrast to other women's clubs, the DAR was from its outset uniquely situated to contribute materially to political life, in an era when women's attempted contributions were ridiculed or ignored. Consequently, membership requests poured in, and chapters became established in most states.²¹ By 1911 the Daughters outnumbered their male rival group Sons of the Revolution, by 80,000 to 18,000.²²

Specific national committees have varied throughout the DAR's history, but for the period of roughly 1910 through the 1920s the national committees included the following: Historic Spots Committee, Ellis Island Committee, Patriotic Education Committee, Welfare of Women and Children Committee, Conservation Committee,

²⁰ In contrast to popular image, DAR membership has never consisted primarily of the pampered wives of upper-class men. At least three of the original members were single working women with business or clerical jobs (Gibbs 37, 39, 40).

²¹ Relatedly, the DAR provided a kind of blueprint for many other 'Daughters'-type groups that began to proliferate after 1890: Daughters of the Republic of Texas (1891), United Daughters of the Confederacy (1894), Colonial Dames of America (1915), Daughters of the American Colonies (1921), are examples. For a discussion of the rise of lineage-based groups see Kammen, 215-223.

²² Gibbs, p. 59. According to the respective websites of the two organizations, the DAR today claims 170,000 members, nearly seven times the membership of the SAR at 26,000.

Oratorical Committee, National Old Trails Road Committee. New national committees were occasionally formed, usually in recognition of projects undertaken by local chapters, broadening in scope and interest until local members carried a petition forward to establish a national-level committee.

As Chapter One noted, not all political systems are necessarily territorial ones, and “nation” does not always easily overlay the territory over which a particular political system prevails. The work of securing the territory of the nation through imposing systems of categorization and measurement and political representation upon it, as well as by augmenting it through exploration and through “treaty” claims, was discussed in Chapter Three. However, the imagination of the territorial nation in the abstract in an era when people continued to be confined to particular regions and localities, and the conjuring of loyalty to that nation, was a consequence of hegemonic myths of nationhood and the manifestation of these upon the landscape. Thus, achieving the *mechanics* of territoriality was only the first part of the process of American national identity becoming a territorial one. The second part is the *imagination* of territoriality, and this occurred precisely through act of mythologizing the first part. With the temporal milestones of the late 19th and early 20th century, and with the rise of private groups that served as vehicles for public interest in commemorating various aspects of America’s heroic past, the resulting array of monuments, markers, and pageants served as texts to school the public on the imagination of American territoriality. These objects and events functioned within the cultural landscape to remind and educate the public about the expectations, the

outcomes, and the ideal character types that secured American territory or aided in the process.

For a group such as the DAR, then, which was at the forefront of historic preservation and of inscribing particular events and individual achievements on the landscape through monuments, it is possible to interpret a far more profound dimension to its aims. As we shall see, the Daughters were busy defining particular narratives of heritage and patriotism and American identity, and inscribing those narratives on the landscape, but they were also producing instructional texts on how a territorial American state is supposed to work. Hegemonic discourses, such as assumptions of territoriality, do not depend upon the iron fist of an authoritarian state to impose them and cause them to become “true.” Indeed, hegemonic discourses *only* become truth when they are reinforced and sustained by civil society, which includes private organizations and “organic intellectuals.”²³ And territoriality, as Anssi Paasi points out, is imbedded in the division of labor within states, so that private groups acting according to privately-agreed and negotiated agendas are equally instrumental in territoriality’s articulation. In fact, it seems that it is through groups precisely like the DAR that territoriality was enabled as a hegemonic discourse in the American context.

With historic preservation as a key mission of the DAR and the American Revolution as its *raison d’être*, it is no surprise that DAR women quickly became consumed with efforts to locate and mark sites associated with Revolutionary-era

²³Antonio Gramsci presents the concept of “organic intellectuals” in his *Prison Notebooks*. Although he does not relate the notion to territoriality, per se, he does relate it to political space in the abstract sense. See Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).

events. However, as chapters multiplied in states throughout the country, members were not surprisingly faced with the dilemma of locating events and people to commemorate if their chapter's geography did not happen to coincide with that of the Revolution or of Revolutionary figures.²⁴ Having been handed a rather undefined meta-narrative of historic preservation from the DAR's national scale, in which Daughters set themselves up as the most appropriate custodians of America's meaning and memory, it was left to Daughters at the state and local scales fit that mission to tangible projects that would reflect not only local material concerns but national-scale concerns as well.²⁵

In short, it was up to local Daughters to look beyond the American Revolution as the only setting for America's national myth, or its "golden age."²⁶ In 1902 the problem had been expressed by Kansas Daughters thus:

No incident of the Revolution occurred on Kansas soil, and the Daughters here have puzzled over 'What can we do to show our patriotism?' The chapters had done some local work, and had helped...in the erection of a Zebulon Pike Monument in Republic County, but it was left for... (the) State Regent to suggest the marking of the Old Trail through Kansas, which, as she said, was fast becoming obliterated.²⁷

²⁴ Hosmer bears this out, quoting from a Michigan Daughter's letter of 1900 (p. 132): 'There are so few landmarks in this part of the country that it is difficult to find anything interesting.'

²⁵ Hosmer (p. 133) relates that at the DAR's 1898 Continental Congress, one of the group's founders, Mary Desha, pushed to fund a Georgia chapter's purchase of a deteriorating house that had belonged to a signer of the Declaration of Independence. She declared that without the DAR's intervention, the house would fall into 'improper hands,' implying that the Daughters' hands were 'proper.'

²⁶ For a summary of the importance of a past mythic "golden age" to the construction of a nationalist present, see Anthony Smith, 'The 'Golden Age' and National Renewal,' in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schopflin, eds., *Myths and Nationhood* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 36-59.

²⁷ Allie Peckham Cordry, *The Story of the Marking of the Santa Fe Trail By the Daughters of the American Revolution in Kansas and the State of Kansas*, (Topeka: Crane and Company, 1915), 15. In writing a 'history' of the trail-marking project, Cordry reveals how the Kansas Daughters relied upon local knowledge and firsthand accounts to re-establish the trail's course and to place each of the 96 markers on spots that had a particular significance in the 50-odd year history of the Trail.

Seeing that Revolutionary geography was not directly relevant to them, the DAR women in Kansas instead looked to a prominent feature of their own State's past – the Santa Fe Trail. As a result of local members combing the countryside for evidence of exactly where the old route had passed – railroad travel had long since discontinued use of the Trail – the Kansas DAR was able to announce within seven years that ninety-six small stone markers had been erected to trace the original route of the Santa Fe Trail across Kansas.

Defection and Monumentality

This Kansas DAR project suggests that Daughters were realizing that perhaps, as Frederick Jackson Turner had famously declared, the American frontier offered as much – and probably more - fertile ground on which to focus the organization's preservationist fervor as did the Revolutionary period. Indeed, accepting the image promoted by Turner of a steadily encroaching line of civilization from east to west across the continent, America's frontier past offered a convenient alternative focus for DAR chapters virtually anywhere. Not all chapters could erect a marker for Bunker Hill or Yorktown, but what DAR chapter anywhere in the United States could not claim a pioneer? Consequently, DAR commemoration projects in states beyond the Eastern Seaboard tended to focus upon people, events, and locales associated with the frontier,

with western expansion, and with regional and local conflicts associated with the consolidation of white control over particular chunks of terrain.²⁸

Although the meaning and intent of the DAR's various memorials scattered so liberally throughout the American landscape can scarcely be generalized, one can reasonably argue that they are nationalist texts, aimed at mobilizing nationalist sentiments. Discourses of treason and loyalty, the two sides of defection's coin, were commonly implicated in DAR commemorative projects in interesting ways. For example, DAR chapters in Georgia had by the early 'teens erected monuments and embarked in fairly substantial historic preservation projects to honor native Americans who had acted against the interests of their people to help the whites in the state's early period of unstable relations with the various southeastern Indian tribes. A 1914 volume of Georgia landmarks lists a DAR "boulder," a common monument style consisting of a large boulder with a engraved bronze plaque affixed to it, placed in honor of "Old Chief Herod," who aided and actually joined forces with Andrew Jackson who stopped in his tribe's vicinity en route to Florida to "quell" the Florida Seminoles.²⁹ And at about the same time in 1913 the Piedmont Continental Chapter of the DAR lobbied the State of

²⁸ Kammen (401) erroneously dates the beginning of the DAR's concerted efforts to place plaques and boulders commemorating events and individuals associated with the frontier at around 1920, despite the existence in DAR archival materials of ample evidence that these commemorative projects began perhaps as much as twenty years earlier.

²⁹ See Knight, *Georgia's Landmark's Memorials, and Legends*, 980-981. The interpretation of the action of "Old Chief Herod" – joining forces with Andrew Jackson - as a defection is made even more interesting when one considers Jackson's career-long record of all-out brutality against native Americans. Indeed, even today, according to my conversation with a Sioux leader from Pine Ridge, South Dakota (in November 2002, at a conference in State College PA), many Indians today refuse to handle twenty-dollar bills as gesture of denunciation of Jackson.

Georgia to commit funds to help it purchase a building known as Varner House, built in 1823 by a Creek Indian chief of that name who had operated the building as a hotel for visitors to an area known for its mineral springs. The DAR described Chief Varner as “loyal to the Indians as well as to the white man,” and alleged that he actively undertook to deed Indian territory under his control to the State of Georgia, as the result of which his own people murdered him. The account claims that the Creek territory handed over to the whites by Varner caused Georgia to double in size, and it shames the state leaders for failing to show sufficient appreciation of this Indian’s sacrifice: “Yet Georgia has never in any way shown her appreciation of this great chief, to whom she owes a debt of gratitude that can never be repaid.”³⁰

In Mississippi, a DAR chapter forming in 1907 took the name of a locally famous early 19th century Choctaw chief, Pushmataha, who, similar to “Old Chief Herod” in the Georgia example, had fought alongside Andrew Jackson (see Figure 5.1). Like Varner in Georgia, Pushmataha had worked towards the transfer of Indian land to whites, and in 1825 he was in Washington, DC to negotiate the sale of some Choctaw land when he died of an illness. The DAR account claims that Pushmataha, who was called “the Indian General” by white people, called Andrew Jackson to his bedside and uttered his dying words, “When I am dead, let the big guns be fired over me.”³¹ Two separate DAR accounts differ slightly on whether his wish was carried out, but he was interred beneath a large cenotaph in the Congressional cemetery on Capitol Hill, where

³⁰ Knight, 611-612.

³¹ Porter, *The History of the Mississippi State Society DAR*, 410.

he is among only a few native Americans buried.³² The DAR describes Pushmataha as worthy of white Americans' admiration: "Of all the Indian chiefs of pure blood who have a place in American history, Pushmataha had more admirable traits of character than any other. He was intelligent, affable, courageous, eloquent, and wise."³³ Moreover, the account also declares that both of his two daughters married white men. Interestingly, another DAR chapter in Mississippi named itself for the mixed-race great-nephew of Pushmataha, himself another Choctaw chief, who "spoke against Choctaw resistance to the Great White Father and proposed a compromise by which the Nation would cede its lands for others in the Indian Territory across the Mississippi."³⁴ This person, Greenwood Leflore, remained in Mississippi (as opposed to being forced west in the infamous "Trail of Tears") and eventually served in the Missouri State Legislature.

In short, there are a multitude of examples of DAR memorials of various kinds to native Americans, as well as of DAR chapters being named in honor of worthy native Americans. The "factuality" of what these individuals are purported to have done is quite irrelevant. What is significant, rather, is what they are *mythologized* to have done. The pattern seems to be that the DAR chose to ennoble particular Indians precisely because they were seen as having helped the whites. In other words, the DAR valorized

³² Pushmataha is discussed in a 1921 DAR magazine article, "Cenotaphs and Epitaphs in Congressional Cemetery," *DAR Magazine* 55:4 (April 1921), 192-202. This article contains a reproduction of a portrait of Pushmataha in an early 19th century American military uniform, as well as a photograph of his grave marker.

³³ Porter, 410.

³⁴ Porter, 300.

mythic Indian defections. The Indian defector is deserving of recognition for two reasons, the first of which involves advancing the white cause – fighting alongside white military heroes, ceding land to the whites, etc. But the second reason that the Indian defector is presented as deserving of honor is simply his superiority relative to others of his race precisely because he uniquely possesses the ability to recognize white civilizational superiority, and he responds appropriately. This makes the Indian defector an aberration, a deviant relative to most Indians.³⁵

Perhaps the most notable example of the DAR enobling a particular native American as a defector is Sacagawea. The DAR has taken part in innumerable projects honoring Sacagawea, starting with a 1915 bronze plaque in Bozeman, Montana (Figure 5.2) and a second plaque the following year, also in Montana.³⁶ Grace Hebard, a prominent Wyoming suffragist, geographer, and University of Wyoming professor, who also served as Wyoming state DAR Regent, published a scholarly account of Sacagawea in the 1907 inaugural volume of *Journal of American History*. After decades of research on Sacagawea, much of which was focused on building a credible

³⁵ Arguably, however, it is the belief in this hidden potential of native Americans to recognize and defer to white superiority, particularly if influenced by morally-upright white people, that led DAR feminist “progressives” to agitate for Indian schools as early as the ‘teens. The first DAR member to be elected to U.S. Congress, Alice M. Robertson, had begun a career as a missionary teacher to the Creek Indians and also served as Oklahoma’s Supervisor of Indian Schools. See “DAR Member Elected to U.S. Congress,” *DAR Magazine* 54:12 (December 1920), 707. The following year Robertson was instrumental in the establishment of Bacone College, originally a Northern Baptist-affiliated Indian-only school, and still drawing significant DAR funding today. See “Work of Chapters, Muskogee-Indian Territory Chapter,” *DAR Magazine* 55:9 (September 1921), 541.

³⁶ The account of the unveiling of the Bozeman, MT plaque appears in the *DAR Magazine* 45:6 (December 1915), 306.

theory of Sacagawea's survival to old age and death and burial in Wyoming, Hebard eventually would publish a full biography of Sacagawea in 1933 (Figure 5.3).³⁷ Moreover, in Olympia, Washington, the 'Sacagawea Chapter' was established in 1905, and today sports a colorful sampler as its chapter emblem incorporating Sacagawea as the central design feature. Precious little is known of the "factual" Sacagawea, but as a mythic character she is valorized by the DAR (as well as by American popular culture generally) for guiding Lewis and Clark, an ambiguous act that ushered in a period of unrelenting destruction and cultural devastation to the upper plains and eastern Rockies peoples of which she was a part.³⁸ Typical of the rhetoric from which the Sacagawea myths have been constructed, a 1905 speech delivered at the celebrated unveiling of a Portland, OR statue of Sacagawea (Susan B. Anthony was present for the occasion) declared that Sacagawea's greatness lay in her act of betrayal of her own culture and her recognition of white superiority, "unlocking the gates of the mountains, and giving up the key to her country." The speech continued, "But what Sacajawea did, many Indian women did, in succession becoming the wives of trappers and traders, revealing the

³⁷Grace Raymond Hebard, "Pilot of First White Men to Cross the American Continent: Identification of the Indian Girl who Led the Lewis and Clark Expedition over the Rocky Mountains in their Unparalleled Journey into the Mysteries of the Western World," *Journal of American History* 1/3 (July-September 1907): 465-484; and Hebard, *Sacagawea: A guide and interpreter of the Lewis and Clark expedition, with an account of the travels of Toussaint Charbonneau, and of Jean Baptiste, the expedition papoose* (Glendale, CA: The Arthur C. Clark Co., 1932). This volume, and Hebard's work more generally, continues to excite considerable controversy even today among Lewis and Clark scholars, and many are contemptuous of Hebard's inference that native American oral testimonies of Sacagawea's life story were in fact more reliable than the "documented" accounts by earlier white men. See Thomas Slaughter, *Exploring Lewis and Clark: Reflections on Men and Wilderness* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003), Chapter Five, "Porivo's Story," 86-113.

³⁸ As n94 of the previous chapter indicates, native American feeling remains unsettled regarding the commemorative flurry surrounding Sacagawea. See Anderson (1993).

secrets of their country and giving over its trade and resources to the whites, opening the way to a higher civilization.”³⁹ Like the Indians in the Georgia and Mississippi examples, Sacagawea is singled not only because there is a belief in her material contribution to the white territorial enterprise, but because she herself purportedly believed in the superiority of that enterprise.⁴⁰ In all of these commemoration projects involving “good” Indians, nobility accrues to the Indian because of his “defection” to the whites, and these defections invariably facilitate various episodes in America’s grand project of territorial expansion and acquisition. Clearly then, the presentations of Indian “defectors” in DAR monuments and memorials are connected to territorial outcomes for the United States. In DAR discourse, defection was most definitely related to territoriality.⁴¹

³⁹ “Statue of Bird Woman Unveiled - Bronze of Sacajawea Stands in Center of Plaza at Exposition - Ceremonies Impressive - Heroism of Indian Woman Who Guided Lewis and Clark Across Mountains and Down River is Commemorated.” *Morning Oregonian*, Friday July 7, 1905.

⁴⁰ While a 1942 DAR Magazine article perpetuates this aspect of the Sacagawea myth, describing her as standing “erect and dignified in the stern of the boat, knowing full well the importance of her mission with this party,” Sacagawea’s mythic identity vacillates considerably. See “Sacagawea,” *DAR Magazine* 76:3 (March 1942), 176-178. While earlier accounts suggest she is a noble savage who has defected, this 1942 account paints her as a Marian figure, an unworthy handmaiden chosen for a great destiny. For analysis of Sacagawea’s mythic status and commemorative iconography, see Michael Heffernan and Carol Medlicott, “A Feminine Atlas? Sacagawea, the Suffragettes and the Commemorative Landscape in the American West, 1904-1910,” *Gender, Place and Culture*, 9:2 (2002), 109-131.

⁴¹ In an interesting variation of this claim, the DAR has been ambivalent in its commemorative approach to the well-known traitor, Benedict Arnold. His treason should be unambiguous and should cause him to be eliminated from any DAR memorial displays. But his treason is all the worse seen in light of his equally unambiguous acts of valor in the American Revolution prior to his defection to the British. DAR magazines of this period contain a few references to commemoration activity related to Arnold’s life prior to his defection. For example, chapters in Maine and Vermont, in 1914 and 1915 respectively, both erected a monuments honoring Arnold’s passage through those areas in conjunction with a military mission to Quebec in 1775, which was later highly acclaimed both for its success and for its tactical brilliance. Another DAR chapter raised money to acquire an antique desk that had belonged to Arnold, and which was alleged to be the desk at which he wrote a letter to the British indicating his act of treason. See *DAR Magazine* issues 44:1 (January 1914), 17; and 47:5 (November 1915), 309.

National Security, Territory, and the Roadside Landscape

Another significant dimension of the DAR's historic preservation mission in the first decades of the 20th century, and one closely related to its countless efforts to place historic markers, was its work on behalf of improving America's road and highway infrastructure. The group of DAR committees that I named earlier as being active in the early 20th century included Good Roads and National Old Trails Roads committees. The DAR's interest in improving highway infrastructure was partly an outgrowth of the Kansas-based project mentioned earlier to mark the route of the old Santa Fe Trail, and partly related to similar DAR initiatives in the neighboring state of Missouri to mark sites associated with western pioneer trails in that state. At the same time, the "good roads movement" was emerging in an American social landscape that was witnessing automobiles and their use multiplying faster than roads suitable for driving them on.⁴² Archival DAR sources suggest that in several states Daughters were attempting to

⁴² There is a significant literature on the good roads movement. This is reviewed and summarized in Medlicott and Heffernan, "Autograph of a Nation..." It should be noted that the political ethos of the progressive era dramatically impacted the good roads movement, causing the gradual incorporation of greater and greater federal participation. This was consistent with one feature of progressivism, namely, that neutral public "experts" could under the auspices of government for greater public good. Historian of technology Bruce Seely argues that the history of federal highway engineering provides an almost "textbook" example of the development and institutionalization of the progressivist ideal of the benign and neutral expertise of the government technocrat. See Bruce E. Seely, *Building the American Highway System: Engineers as Policy Makers* (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, Pa., 1987); and "The Diffusion of Science into Engineering: Highway Research at the Bureau of Public Roads, 1900-40," in *The Transfer and Transformation of Material Culture*, edited by Peter J. Hugill and D. Bruce Dickson, 143-162 College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1988. Seely notes that President Herbert Hoover's professional background as a mining engineer contributed to the impression that scientific and technical "experts" could render detached and apolitical service to public projects. This idea, which began specifically in reference to "experts" designing public works infrastructure, has seeped into all aspects of public life, argues Seely.

involve themselves directly in the male-dominated good roads movement by attending conventions and public meetings.⁴³ A 1913 account of the DAR's good roads activities asserted that a Daughter spoke at an Indianapolis good roads convention, and that the inaugural meeting of the Kansas City based National Old Trails Road Association of Men was held in conjunction with a DAR National Old Trails Road Committee meeting.⁴⁴ But rather than simply echoing the prevailing rationale of the good roads movement – that improved road infrastructure was necessary to American commercial progress – the Daughters achieved a strong rhetorical connection among several themes that were then of looming importance in American cultural life: commemorating America's venerable past, alleviating the social problems associated with rural isolation, and finding solutions to national security challenges associated with the newly-articulated foreign threat to American territory. What began as a regional Good Roads Committee within the Missouri DAR Society, formed out of a recognition of the centrality of Missouri to overland travel historically and the desire of Missouri Daughters that their state remain at the forefront of American transportation discourse, was accepted as a national level DAR initiative in 1912.⁴⁵ The Daughters focused their

⁴³ On the men's "good roads" associations that had begun to form privately in several states to examine the commercial implications of road improvement, see J.M. Lowe, *The National Old Trails Road: The Great Historic Highway of America*. Lowe contains correspondence and reprinted speeches relative to the many "good roads" conventions that began taking place in cities such as Atlanta, Indianapolis, Chicago, and Kansas City from approximately 1896.

⁴⁴ *Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Continental Congress of the Daughters of the American Revolution*, April 14-19, 1913, Appendix O., "Report, National Old Trails Road Committee."

⁴⁵ The Missouri Good Roads Committee had focused its energies on mapping and marking a cross-state highway that roughly corresponded to at least two old trails, the Boonslick Trail and the Santa Fe Trail. See "The Boone's Lick Road and Santa Fe Trail," *DAR Magazine*, 39:4 (October 1911), 185-187; "National Old Trails Road Committee: An Open Letter to Every Daughter from Elizabeth Butler

efforts upon persuading the Federal government, which was already in the midst of considering various good roads advocates' proposals for transcontinental highway systems, that a highway route should be adopted that would retrace as closely as possible the collective routes of several historic overland pioneer trails. They observed that Americans were embracing auto travel for recreation as much as for commerce, and they argued that recreation ought to have a morally edifying and educational component. If roads were built to correspond to historic trails and if the public could be convinced that roads themselves were monuments to America's pioneering past, then simply the act of driving along roads would amount to a commemorative act in recognition of the expanding frontier as a second "golden age," another chapter of America's founding narrative. The Daughter who was the project's main visionary presented the DAR's lofty cultural aspiration for American highways, relative to the more tawdry commercial and self-interested aims of other good roads enthusiasts: "Every other route, proposed as a National Highway, is being urged by commercial bodies, either for the benefit of certain cities or for certain industries. Patriotism versus Commercialism is our slogan..."⁴⁶

Using a monthly column in the DAR national monthly magazine as their primary mouthpiece, the Daughters of the National Old Trails Road Committee urged Daughters in local chapters throughout the United States to recognize the salience of

Gentry, Chairman," *DAR Magazine*, 43:3 (September 1913), 530-532; and "Marking the Santa Fe Trail in Missouri," *DAR Magazine*, 43:5 (November 1913), 642-647.

⁴⁶ *Proceedings...*, 891.

good roads to issues of traditional concern to American women everywhere, such as spirituality, education, and family welfare. In an American society that was still largely agrarian, roads linked family farms and isolated rural settlements to larger communities with schools, churches, doctors, and markets both for buying household goods and for selling farm products. Believe it or not, the necessity of road improvements was not then universally accepted, particularly by rural Americans, who saw increased auto travel as the source of an unwelcome incursion of urban elites into the countryside and feared that fast-moving automobiles would strike and kill farm animals.⁴⁷ So the DAR's rhetoric at the national level seemed to be aimed in part at alleviating such concerns on the part of rural Daughters and their communities. Moreover, the Daughters aimed their appeal directly at isolated women by arguing that roads not only gave them a communications link with nearby towns, but also by extension to the entire nation and even beyond, allowing them to involve themselves in national and even world issues. Missouri Daughter Elizabeth Butler Gentry, founder of the DAR's National Old Trails Road Committee, wrote, "A good road is a civilizing influence. It knits the interests of town and country. It makes for better neighbors, better citizens, better human beings. It makes for mutual welfare and happiness; it helps to conserve our greatest institution and most precious possession - the American home."⁴⁸ Through

⁴⁷ The conflict between city and countryside and the extent to which auto-touring was seen as an unwelcome provocation to social order is explored in James J. Flink, "Three Stages of American Automobile Consciousness," *American Quarterly* 24:4 (October 1972), 451-473, p. 455; Michael L. Berger, *The Devil-Wagon in God's Country: The Automobile and Social Change in Rural America, 1893-1929* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979); and Warren James Belasco, *Americans on the Road: From Autocamp to Motel, 1910-45* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1979).

⁴⁸ "The Old Trails Road, by Elizabeth Butler Gentry," *DAR Magazine* 42:4 (April 1913), 162-165.

such rhetorical appeals, the DAR rallied rural women in general - not just Daughters - to participate in practical road-oriented tasks such as painting directional markers "with paint-pots and brushes" on telegraph poles or planting flowers and trees to beautify roadsides.⁴⁹ Women seemed to respond positively, and a DAR account quotes a rural woman remarking appreciatively, "My menfolk have left me stuck in the mud all my life, and I am mighty thankful the DAR are trying to pull me out!"⁵⁰

The ambitious Daughters involved in the National Old Trails Road Committee related their work to several pressing national issues: defense of American territory against military threats, conceptualization of America's imperial potential, the incursion of foreign ideas into American territory, and the articulation of national identity. They adopted several interesting material and rhetorical strategies. Working closely with a U.S. Congressman from Missouri, William Borland, they sought Federal legislation to fund the upkeep and marking of a DAR-charted coast-to-coast route as the official DAR National Old Trails Road. Borland's speeches to persuade Congress to support this appeal declared that America's historic overland routes indeed had a moral content and underscored America's superiority relative to other empires. In contrast to ancient empires, as well as ongoing European imperial projects, America's roads, Borland said, "were not built to bring in the revenue of distant and unwilling provinces. They were built in order that the torch of American civilization might be carried into the

⁴⁹ "Report of National Committee on National Old Trails Road," *Proceedings of the Thirty-eighth Continental Congress of the DAR, April 15-20, 1929* (175-210), p. 177.

⁵⁰ Gentry, "The Old Trails Road," 1913, 163.

wilderness... They are the autograph of a nation written across the face of a continent.”⁵¹ Continuing the theme of the roads’ relationship with imperialism, the Daughters also suggested that American heavy equipment used to build the Panama Canal be brought back to the United States and employed on various road-building projects.⁵² DAR magazine articles frequently featured appeals to quality education, especially in rural areas, to counter the “pernicious influences” of foreign origin that were encroaching upon America and threatened to subvert young people and even farmers. References to the “Farmer’s Union” and the “Young Pioneers” suggested that movements afoot in rural America were similar to or outright connected to socialist-inspired movements of foreign origin.⁵³ DAR appeals relating good roads to these causes invariably rested upon the notion that good roads would facilitate the dissemination of enlightened education to counteract these more insidious movements. And once war in Europe was underway after 1914, the Daughters were presented with an entirely new set of national defense-related justifications for road improvements in the United States:

⁵¹ DAR Office of the Historian General Archive; Folder 89-045 (e & g), *Highways and History: The National Old Trails Road*, “Speech of Honorable William P. Borland of Missouri, in the House of Representatives,” January 4, 1917.

⁵² *Proceedings...*, 1913.

⁵³ These were fairly common themes in DAR writings and in the speeches of DAR officers during the period of the ‘teens and 1920s. For example, the DAR President General related road improvements to countering the atheistic and communist influence of the Young Pioneers in her 1929 address to the annual Continental Congress, a draft copy of which was reviewed in the DAR Historian General archives. In 1913, Gentry wrote in her monthly column, “The Farmer’s Union has been a negative force; and the farmer’s wives are now organizing and demanding good roads as a means of protection against the wolves of isolation that devour both mind and body. The farmer’s crop is not paramount to the farmer’s soul.”

The dreadful wars of the Old World have forcibly brought to our knowledge the fact of our utter unpreparedness to protect or defend our nation, and in the preparation for our defense good roads are of inestimable value and have been so proven in the foreign war. The great battle of Marne that saved Paris from a siege and possible destruction, was won by the French by the rapid construction of troops made possible by the use of thousands of automobiles. All the foreign powers involved in this awful struggle have been greatly aided by transporting troops and munitions of war over good roads when railroad bridges were burned, tracks torn up, or trains loaded with the wounded. It is just as patriotic to defend your country and protect the living as to build monuments and commemorate the achievements of a past age.⁵⁴

World War I, then, seemed to mark a turning point for the DAR in terms of its asserting that patriotism involved actively promoting the defense of the nation - in both its abstract and its physical territorial sense - in the present, in addition to defending a particular set of myths about the nation in the past. Of course, not only roads themselves, but also roadside markers and monuments were employed to defensively articulate American patriotic ideals and patriotic identity and to clarify it in contrast to alternate suspect and un-American identities. Reiterating the importance of the roadside as a space for the articulation of patriotism, Gulley remarks that, "The main artifact of this period is the roadside historical marker, adorned with a likeness of the state's seal or flag," and he relates this to the emergence of tourism and the setting of travel as an alternate sphere in which patriotic discourses could be promoted and patriotism experienced.⁵⁵ Also, for an increasingly diverse and mobile American population, roadside markers and displays helped to inculcate overarching discourses of national

⁵⁴ *Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Continental Congress of the DAR, April 1916, Appendix B - Statement of Committee Chairman Mrs. Henry McCleary, "Committee on National Old Trails Roads Annual Report, 1915-1916."*

⁵⁵ Gulley, 128.

identity that both advertised regional identities and accomplishments to a wider audience and also cut across regional identities to articulate national commonalities. The DAR set out to transform, both rhetorically and materially, America's rural landscapes from settings of regional exceptionalism and isolation to sites of dynamic expression of a common discourse of patriotism, citizenship, and moral responsibility.

Territory and the American Countryside

Without question, one instrument that enabled the DAR to better communicate a national agenda and also to transform local initiatives into broader discourses with truly national appeal was its monthly magazine.⁵⁶ Begun in 1892 and published under a succession of different names,⁵⁷ the magazine seems to be an ideal example of the potential envisioned by Benedict Anderson for print media creating a sense of national kinship among far-flung readers, most but not all of whom were Daughters. Moreover, the magazine also permitted the Daughters collectively to function as their own nation in an interesting sense, with the promulgation of their own collective identities as conservative women citizen, their own invented traditions, their own myths, their own legendary figures and formative events. In the *DAR Magazine*, the terrain of rural and

⁵⁶ One account that notes the persuasive nature of pictorial magazines and their capacity, within the context of American social history, to significantly impact public perceptions and expectations, particularly as to the appearance of the landscape, is Debora Rindge, "Science and Art Meet in the Parlor: The Role of Popular Magazine Illustrations in the Pictorial Record of the 'Great Surveys,'" in *Surveying the Record: North American Scientific Exploration to 1930*, Edward C. Carter, II, ed. (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1999), 173-193.

⁵⁷ These have included its earliest name - *American Monthly Magazine*, the name used during most of the period on which this chapter focuses - *DAR Magazine*, its later use of the name *National Historical Magazine*, and its current title of *American Spirit*.

small-town America were readily transformed into nationalist territory through the commemoration of heroic events of the past, as well as through the patriotic re-enactment and re-embodiment of the virtues of past Americans. American territory was ideally a rural space filled with patriotic virtue and brimming with impulses for responsible moral citizenship.

During the same period that forms the backdrop of this chapter, another popular magazine constructed an image of America as a territory and an interpretation of elite life within the rural space of American territory that was distinct from the images and interpretations commonly found in the *DAR Magazine*. *Country Life in America*, a substantial and opulently illustrated magazine that was costly both to produce and to purchase, was published in New Jersey between 1901 and 1941.⁵⁸ Interestingly, its establishment was precisely contemporary with a British Magazine called *Country Life*. *Country Life in America (CLIA)* promotes an American “country” that is the domain *not* of the humble yet upright and virtuous rural farmer who is the idealized American citizen in the dominant conservative discourse on American identity, such as that promoted by the DAR. Rather, *CLIA* positions in the rural American landscape the ultra-wealthy American capitalists who reside in these spaces out of conscious choice rather than necessity and for whom agricultural pursuits are no more than expensive hobbies. *CLIA* depicts rural America as providing ample space for opulent estates, far removed from urban areas increasingly congested by automobiles and immigrant

⁵⁸ Archival sources on the origin of *Country Life in America* are a bit ambiguous and suggest that the magazine may date to 1897.

populations and well insulated from both rural and urban poverty. These estates are the locus of entirely self-indulgent activities ranging from exotic gardening to hunting to motoring in expensive artisan-built automobiles.

From the pages of *CLIA*, one infers nothing particularly exclusive about American citizenship or American national identity. On the contrary, American elite citizenship is practically indistinguishable from elite citizenship abroad in Protestant northern Europe in general and in Great Britain in particular. *CLIA* promotes the look of a British country estate as the ideal aesthetic for the American country landscape, and this is seen both in the articles and in the illustrated advertisements that depict home exteriors, gardens, grounds, and home interiors. More to the point, *CLIA* seems to bear out Samuel Huntington's suggestion that the American polity, as it entered the 20th century, replicated a Tudor polity, particularly in terms of its relatively egalitarian quality, and Huntington argues that this was reproduced in America partly because the rough environmental setting challenged all immigrants equally.⁵⁹ It is impossible to ignore the degree to which the aesthetic dominating the estates pictured in *CLIA*, from home interiors to exteriors to gardens, draws overwhelmingly from the Tudor and Jacobean period. On the one hand, it is plausible that a magazine such as *CLIA* would promote European aesthetic styles as part of a strategy to construct an American country-dwelling aristocracy. But on the other hand, it is remarkable that the dominant aesthetic in *CLIA* reflects precisely the period in which the state became a territorialized entity in English political history and secular state power began to manifest itself on the

⁵⁹ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 122-134.

landscape in the form of massive country houses built by the powerful few that the Crown favored. And the *CLIA* landscape and architectural aesthetic also reflects the period in which, according to Raymond Williams, the word “country” entered the English lexicon as a term for that area that lies in contrast to the city.⁶⁰ Also, the idea of a country estate groomed to appear as an idyllic park comes from the idealized setting of *Arcadia*, a dramatic allegorical poem written by Elizabethan poet Philip Sidney and first performed, according to Williams, amidst the setting of a tiny rural village on the Sidney estate in southern England, whose residents had been forcibly evacuated so that the village could be transformed into a theatrical setting for the event.⁶¹

But ironically, although Huntington’s assertion of similarity of the 20th century polity to a Tudor polity is based in large part on the relatively egalitarian nature of both, the American polity reflected in *CLIA* is heavily divided by class, and those who are among the country-dwelling elite wish to insulate themselves from the lower working classes, both the urban poor and the rural poor. This is evident in the advertisements featured in *CLIA*. These frequently promoted equipment and services associated with the physical security and durability of homes and estates – building materials (such as limestone and concrete), door locks, gates, fencing, in-home safes, etc. On a related

⁶⁰ See Chapter 3, n98. See also Raymond Williams, *The Country and the City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). Williams work is important in the literature on pastoralism, a literature that generally explores the romanticization of the rural in contrast to the increasingly unpleasant urbanscape of the industrial revolution. I see pastoralism as quite different from the notions of rurality that either the *DAR Magazine* or *CLIA* were trying to promote, although this is somewhat outside of the scope of this dissertation.

⁶¹ Williams, *The Country and the City*, 22. Williams cites no source on this point about the first performance of Sidney’s *Arcadia*, but it is possible that it was performed for Queen Elizabeth during one of her progresses, as she held the Sidney family in high esteem and often visited their estate.

note, other ads promoted plumbing and water filtration fixtures that were guaranteed to protect against the invasion of harmful germs and toxins that one might associate with the less healthful setting of the city. One series of ads for fencing depicted the risk to estate grounds posed by working-class pleasure seekers, out for country drives in cheap cars, who spread picnics on mansion lawns (Figure 5.4). And articles echo such sentiments, with a column on motoring suggesting that mass-produced autos that are affordable for city workers and rural farmers are in fact a public nuisance and a safety hazard. Articles assert that wealthy drivers in expensive artisanal built autos are likely to be pressed into service as “good samaritans,” rescuing ignorant and careless drivers of cheap autos who find themselves needing assistance.⁶² Of course, egalitarianism is still at least implied in the presence of a “country life” set, some being more successful than others in responding to the opportunities inherent in American capitalism.

CLIA offers a notable contrast to the *DAR Magazine* of the same period, in terms of citizenship and connection to territory.⁶³ While the *DAR* magazines, to be sure, reflected a strong affinity for English cultural heritage, they reiterate again and again that American virtue is to be found not in material consumption and in replicating a particular material environment, but it is rather to be found in connecting oneself either through ancestral lineage or through educational awareness to a particular - albeit, imagined - set of political and moral values. The *DAR* message (though admittedly

⁶² This theme is evident in the regular “Automobile” columns in *CLIA* issues for 1915.

⁶³ I employ an underlying argument that popular magazines both reflect dominant public discourse and are also persuasive in their ability to impel changes in public discourse. Rindge, “Science and Art Meet make similar claims in the Parlor.”

falling short in practice) was that any American has the capacity to ally him or herself to this moral political identity, and that neither class nor income nor national origin pose obstacles. Moreover, this moral political identity is both unique *to* and because of the uniqueness of American territory, and each reinforces the sacred and singular nature of the other. But the *CLIA* message is very different. The “country life” set in America appears most loyal not to any national territory, but rather to that piece of territory which they personally own in the form of a country estate, and they conceive of their citizenship as citizenship in a capitalist class that has definite counterparts in the European imperialist states.

Of course, the idea that *CLIA* would promote an English landscape aesthetic as ideal for adaptation to the American setting is consistent with the work of many American cultural geographers whose work points to the persistence of precisely this feature. Discussions of the transference of English patterns of material culture and of landscape practices to the American setting, such as those found in David Fischer, Pierce Lewis (Fischer and Lewis were discussed in Chapter Four), and Joseph Wood, invariably note the resemblance of American cultural landscapes to English landscapes, as well as the resemblance of American landscapes of the inland mid-Atlantic and the northern Midwest regions to New England, because of the imposition of the stylistic preferences of migrating groups.⁶⁴ Other geographers and cultural historians move beyond discussions of transference alone to address the tendency for American elite to

⁶⁴ Besides Fischer's *Albion's Seed* and Lewis's "The Northeast and the Making of American Geographical Habits," see Joseph S. Wood, *The New England Village* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

materialize their political and social power on the landscape through English-influenced styles and forms that suggest a subconscious appeal to Old World aristocratic authority. As William Wyckoff phrases it, the wealthy elite in America long “have aped the English with enthusiasm and abandon,” and he points to golf and race-horse breeding as two phenomena in which expensive pastimes combine with land use to produce recognizable elite landscape aesthetics.⁶⁵ Drawing from an existing literature on the English pastoral ideal and its articulation in the American setting, which includes older works by Leo Marx and Peter Schmitt,⁶⁶ a burgeoning wave of more recent writers have been critiquing the persistent popularity of the ideal rural landscape as a trope in both North American and British settings. This literature offers somewhat varying accounts of the adoption of English landscape tastes. James Duncan and David Lambert, for instance, diverge somewhat from Peter Hugill on the identification of Thomas Jefferson’s landscape tastes with the emerging English pastoral ideal, and the extent to which English landscape tastes were consistently popular from the late 18th century onwards (Duncan and Lambert), or the American landscape was rather “reanglicized” from the mid-19th century with the publication of a particular set of style books for the use of architects and other designers of interior and exterior domestic spaces (Hugill).⁶⁷

⁶⁵ William K. Wyckoff, “Landscapes of Private Wealth and Power,” in *The Making of the American Landscape*, Michael Conzen, ed. (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), 335-354, especially 336-338.

⁶⁶ See Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) and Peter J. Schmitt, *Back to Nature: The Arcadian Myth in Urban America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

⁶⁷ See Peter Hugill, “English Landscape Tastes in the United States,” *Geographical Review* 76 (1986): 408-423; and James S. Duncan and David R. Lambert, “Landscape, Aesthetics, and Power,” in *American*

Although the work of James Duncan, both in collaboration with Lambert as well as earlier work in collaboration with Nancy Duncan, has powerfully articulated the ways in which social power and prestige have been “concretized” in the American landscape through the replication of English style homes and “Capability Brown” style estate grounds,⁶⁸ and has pointed to the use of the Tudor aesthetic in particular to express nostalgia for an idealized past, this work has not attempted to critically examine why the Tudor style would have emerged in particular as emblematic of America’s anglophilic fixation, relative to other English styles. Nor does the literature of which Duncan, Duncan, and Lambert are a part search for any political or nationalistic implications of this landscape aesthetic, although Michael Bunce’s excellent and ambitious study of the “countryside ideal” affirms the strong presence of social, scientific, and economic dimensions.⁶⁹ What this work does do, however, is point to how the countryside ideal arose as a direct function of the urban political economy and that it ironically celebrated a lifestyle that was in opposition to what enabled it. Bunce

Space / American Place: Geographies of the Contemporary United States, John A. Agnew and Jonathan M. Smith, eds. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 264-291.

⁶⁸ Duncan and Lambert, 270, discuss how social class has been “concretized” on the American landscape, and this theme is echoed in James S. Duncan and Nancy G. Duncan, “A Cultural Analysis of Urban Residential Landscapes in North America: The Case of the Anglophile Elite,” in *The City in Cultural Context*, John Agnew, et al, eds. (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984), 255-276. Capability Brown was a famous English landscape architect of the late 17th century, who transformed many English rural estates into idyllic “Arcadian” settings, through quite dramatic alterations to the natural landscape, such as digging ponds and lakes and building hills where no hills had existed.

⁶⁹ Michael Bunce, *The Countryside Ideal: Anglo-American Images of Landscape* (London: Routledge, 1994). See also Virginia Scott Jenkins, *The Lawn: A History of an American Obsession* (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994), whose theme is that the English country estate myth has been obsessively reproduced and miniaturized to the individual middle-class house and lawn and clump of trees or shrubs.

is particularly successful in expressing the theme that the complexity and the durability of the countryside ideal cannot be dismissed as simply the “trivial nostalgia of urbanites,” and he effectively articulates the conflict produced through “gentrification” of the countryside, when a new set of ideals are imposed that generally have the effect of alienating “rural folk.”⁷⁰ I believe Bunce is mistaken, however, when he claims that, while the English countryside is a symbol of national identity for contemporary Britain, “it seems unlikely to achieve quite this status in North America.”⁷¹ It seems that the reclamation of rural America as spaces of memory, in which the heroic events and individuals of the past might be re-inscribed and re-embodied for the present through commemorative acts and pageantry, is a clear indication that the American countryside, too, has come to be symbolic of national identity.⁷²

Confronting and Transforming the “Foreign” in the Midst of National Territory

The foregoing sections of this chapter have addressed the construction of national narratives and their material expression on the American landscape, the national territorial condition of which was being reinforced in the process; and have

⁷⁰ Bunce, 206 and 209.

⁷¹ Ibid, 210.

⁷² The difference between the material articulation in the American context of rural “pastoral” and what Duncan and Duncan refer to as “elegant pastoral” (Duncan and Duncan, 259) would require analysis well beyond the scope of this dissertation topic. I have left aside many aspects of this complex issue, such as the American “lodge” aesthetic, which produced towards the end of the Gilded Age opulent “camp” and “cottage” mansions. The lodge aesthetic is indeed featured in the pages of *CLIA* for the period of the ‘teens and 1920s, and is distinct for being the most common alternative to the nearly relentless Tudor and Jacobean style.

also explored the contested nature of the rural landscape itself, examining how it was conceived alternately as a platform for the reproduction of national narrative and also as a setting for an elite consumption oriented lifestyle that transcended a particular national setting and appealed to a trans-national Anglo and northern European class configuration. For the “country set,” those elite Americans who fancied themselves distinct for living in the country out of choice rather than out of necessity, any national narrative that was being reproduced in the pages of *CLIA* has to be seen as one aimed at strengthening America’s prestige in the imperialist global community. Such a narrative was of course not unfriendly to the aims of the DAR publication initiatives, although it was perhaps not as openly patriotic as the Daughters would have liked; and it implied that wealth, not lineage, was the foundation of American identity. Turning again to the DAR and its reproduction of national narratives, one can of course recognize that in addition to strengthening American prestige, these were also aimed at reassuring citizens at precisely the time when social life was being destabilized by urbanization and immigration. The Daughters took up such tasks in a fascinating array of initiatives for patriotic education and immigrant outreach.⁷³

⁷³ When beginning to look at such initiatives, it is useful to consider them in the context of social reform efforts that were ongoing by a variety of “progressive” groups. In doing so, one must also consider the DAR’s own interesting transition in its first few decades from being politically progressive to being at the extreme conservative and even reactionary end of the spectrum. In its early decades, the DAR’s ambivalence towards suffrage and related feminist issues was striking. Although one DAR historian states that many early Daughters “found suffragettes almost as reprehensible as anarchists” (Gibbs, 51), a 1915 DAR magazine article confirms that Susan B. Anthony was herself a member (“The Silver Jubilee,” *DAR Magazine* 47:6, December 1915, 357-360), and today at least one chapter is named in her honor. Moreover, many early Daughters were activists in then-controversial feminist issues, such as lobbying for women’s legal and property rights in the home (Mrs. Louise Marsh, “Missouri’s New Guardianship Law,” *DAR Magazine*, 43:4, October 1913, 617-619). As feminism came increasingly to be associated with pacifism, which the DAR repudiated (this is regularly reiterated in the *DAR Magazine* throughout the 1920s, with 59:1, January 1925, 38, being one succinct example), the Daughters’ reputation for

Examining the emergence of ultra-nationalism in the early 20th century forces one to confront the phenomenon that is generally referred to as nativism. David Bennett's work reminds us that nativism as a reaction to increased immigration has been a cycle in American social history since the 1830s, and he terms the 1920s the period of "traditional nativism's last stand."⁷⁴ Nativism, the conviction that white Protestant native-born individuals were solely deserving of American citizenship, looked at immigrants in general -and Catholics in particular – with suspicion because of their perceived attachment to "foreign" ideologies and the perception that the incursion of foreign ideas would eventually subvert American culture.⁷⁵ A persistent feature of nativism was extreme patriotism and a rhetorical appeal to defending American territory from all foreign threats, and it is easy to recognize certain thematic consistencies between nativist groups in the early 20th century and patriotic groups more generally. One might suppose that lineage-based societies such as the DAR, which excluded solely on the basis of ancestry and which were so openly patriotic and nationalist were also, necessarily, nativist. For example, examining the DAR of this period alongside what we might regard as the "mother of all nativist groups," the Ku Klux Klan, one sees that

progressive attitudes became tarnished, as discussed by J. Stanley Lemons, *The Woman Citizen: Social Feminism in the 1920s* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973); and Cecilia O'Leary, *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999).

⁷⁴ David H. Bennett, *The Party of Fear: The American Far Right from Nativism to the Militia Movement* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988). For earlier cycles of nativism, see 48-182. On nativism in the 1920s, see 199-237.

⁷⁵ An important account of early nativism, especially as it relates to immigration, is found in John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925*. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1955).

there was most certainly a lot of rhetorical overlap between the two groups, as well as membership overlap – with wives of Klansmen being Daughters, and some Daughters documented as members of the Klan’s women’s auxiliary, or WKKK.⁷⁶ To be sure, both the Klan and the DAR formed strong visions in the early 20th century of how American territory itself should be defined and how it might be threatened both from within and without.

Examples of the overlap of the DAR’s message with nativist ideals can be seen in the stridently patriotic cartoons that came to be part of the DAR’s national magazine format. Figure 5.5 dates from June 1928 and suggests that Lady Liberty, atop the U.S. Capitol dome, symbolizes the DAR as well as “other patriotic societies and all true Americans” in standing stalwartly above dissenting voices that would presume to advocate pacifism, criticism of government policy, and acceptance of foreign ideas. Moreover, the DAR favored the liberal use of the term “pure American,” which is strikingly close to the Klan slogan of “one hundred percent American.” Literature on the Klan confirms that slogan as a recognizable Klan trademark as early as 1921, although it reflected broader nativist sentiments that had been gaining popularity since well before World War I, when accelerating immigration began producing concerns that cities were becoming crowded with “hyphenates” who were not authentic Americans.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ For a more complete discussion of the groups’ interrelationship, see Carol Medlicott, “One Social Milieu, Paradoxical Responses: A Geographical Re-Examination of the Ku Klux Klan and the Daughters of the American Revolution in the Early Twentieth Century,” in *Spaces of Hate: Geographies of Hate, Discrimination, and Intolerance in the United States*, Colin Flint, ed. (Routledge, forthcoming September 2003).

⁷⁷ Charlton Moseley, “Latent Klanism in Georgia, 1890-1915,” *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 56: 3 (Fall 1972, 365-386), 374; David M. Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism: The First Century of the Ku Klux*

At the Klan's zenith in the 1920s, the use of the term "one hundred percent American," was so pervasive in denoting the "invisible empire" that the mere presence of the phrase "one hundred percent" in newspaper advertising was usually sufficient to signal Klan sympathies on the part of businesses.⁷⁸ While this specific term appears to be absent from DAR archival literature, the term "pure American" was constantly employed by Daughters at all scales, at least as early as 1914 and continuing through the entire decade of the 1920s.

"Pure American" was invoked by the DAR almost exclusively to denote undiluted Anglo-Saxon racial heritage, as in a 1914 remark justifying the building of a school for girls in southern Appalachia: "These girls are pure Americans...of good Revolutionary ancestry... But lack of education and opportunity has naturally resulted in pitiable ignorance."⁷⁹ In several southern states, Daughters burdened with "the feeling of responsibility to those children of pure Anglo-Saxon blood,"⁸⁰ initiated schools such as the Kate Duncan Smith School in Grant, Alabama, which remains a dynamic and regionally popular K-12 school more than 75 years after its founding (Figure 5.6). Perhaps in an effort to match the attention given by social reformers both

Klan, 1865-1965 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 30 and 57; and O'Leary, 238 and 244.

⁷⁸ Kathleen M. Blee, *Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 151-152. Additionally, Blee's final chapter, "100% Cooperation," recounts the overall ease with which the Klan operated in small cities in middle America, primarily Indiana.

⁷⁹ Katherine Braddock Barrow, "The Helen Dunlap School for Mountain Girls at Winslow, Arkansas," *DAR Magazine* 45:2 (August/September 1914), 80-82.

⁸⁰ June Gayle Troup, *A Vision Come True: The Gem of Gunter Mountain* (Guntersville, Alabama: Hayes Printing Company, 1991), 24.

within the DAR and elsewhere to the educational needs of urban and especially immigrant Americans, the Daughters of the 1920s were tenacious in their assertions that children of Anglo-Saxon heritage were also equally, and perhaps uniquely, deserving of the opportunities that would come with education. A not-so-subtle reminder that the Daughters believed that charity begins at home may be found in this 1925 passage from a speech by the DAR President-General:

Far back in the Southern mountains there are six million souls of pure American stock, many of whom trace their ancestry back to the patriots of Revolutionary days. Separated by their mountain fastnesses from contact with the outside world, this pioneer strain was, until recently, left to a very large degree to live in illiteracy.⁸¹

The speech continued by noting that the DAR's educational initiatives are enabling "the children of these Simon-pure Americans to come into the possession of their too-long-deferred birthright of properly equipped citizenship."

Though "pure American" continued to be employed most often to refer to these impoverished, yet ennobled, Southerners, it was also occasionally invoked as a term for ideal patriotic citizenship more generally. Such was the context in which the term was used in a 1921 speech by the President-General to the annual national DAR "Continental Congress" when she admonished all chapters to "stand out openly for pure Americanism without hyphenated mixtures."⁸²

The DAR's racial exclusion undeniably represented an additional area of overlap with more pernicious nativist groups. To stop with only such examples of

⁸¹ *DAR Magazine* 59:5 (May 1925), 280.

⁸² *DAR Magazine* 55:5 (May 1921), 245-251.

rhetorical similarity, exclusionary habits, and membership interconnectedness among the DAR and other superpatriotic groups such as the Klan, however, obscures the little understood ways in which the DAR presented a paradox for groups dominant in a period characterized by nearly unrelenting nativism. The essence of this paradox lay in the DAR's multiple programs aimed at outreach to immigrants. And more broadly, looking at the DAR's material projects - as well as its rhetorical postures - aimed at immigrants perhaps throws most sharply into focus the DAR's capacity to shape attitudes on national identity, American territoriality, and national security.

Of course, one way to consider the DAR's immigrant outreach is as a logical urban-based counterpart to the vigorous rural-based educational initiatives aimed at southern whites, which were just discussed. It is true that the variety of projects encompassed by the national committee for "Patriotic Education" included rural schools for southern whites and comparable programs for urban immigrants, almost as two sides of the same coin.⁸³ Many of the DAR's national scale undertakings had their genesis in projects begun at the local or state scales - as was seen in the foregoing discussions of roads and commemoration initiatives - and then embraced at the national scale after positive exposure in DAR publications and at national conferences. The DAR's work with immigrants followed this pattern. The Connecticut Daughters as early as 1913 had

⁸³ This metaphor weakens when one considers that a third set of initiatives existed within the Patriotic Education Committee's work: educational outreach to Native Americans, with a primary focus being support to Bacone College in Oklahoma. Patriotic Education projects aimed at native Americans were numerous, as were rhetorical and commemorative gestures at state and local scales throughout the DAR aimed at ennobling native Americans and their past. See n35.

evidently recognized an opportunity to ensure that the changing ethnic demographics of their state not mean that the state's commitment to colonial American values should lapse in any way. Noting that fully one-third of the population of Connecticut was foreign-born in 1913, the DAR's chairman of its national Patriotic Education Committee praised the creative initiatives ongoing in the Connecticut Society, where the typical Connecticut Daughter:

... has seen the transformation of a population take place before her very eyes. The old farmhouses on the hill tops that used to be inhabited by Simpsons and Browns and Whitmans are now the homes of the Levinskys and Swansons and Riccios, tow-headed children of the northern races and dark-eyed babies of the southern type crawl over the doorsteps where our fathers and grandfathers used to play...⁸⁴

This DAR officer presented the "transformation" quite optimistically and with more than a hint of reproach to those who might see it otherwise:

They bring us many gifts, these strangers, that we are slow to see and feel. They are brave and strong and willing to give of their best to the new country which they have chosen for a home and with what spirit have we met them? Prejudice and suspicion has often been their portion from our hands and a hasty judgment, which is always unjust.

Within the Connecticut DAR, a project had been launched as early as 1912 to publish and distribute to foreign-born citizens and new immigrants a pamphlet containing a few general facts on American history and government, advice on how to become an American citizen, and suggestions intended to help the foreign-born negotiate the vicissitudes of life in the towns and cities of Connecticut. The Connecticut DAR's "Little Green Book" was given wider attention at the national scale

⁸⁴ Clara Lee Bowman, "A National Program for 'The Little Green Book,'" *DAR Magazine* 43:4 (October 1913), 614-617.

through two 1913 magazine articles, which emphasized its ideal format as a vehicle for patriotic education. However, the Patriotic Education chairman noted that the Little Green Book was as useful a guide for Americans to infer the needs of the foreign born as it was for immigrants to learn about the United States, emphasizing what she saw as the reflexivity of the assimilation process. The DAR was beginning to manifest a belief that the process of assimilation was not the burden of the immigrant only, but that the “old stock” bore an equal or even greater responsibility. By 1915 the Connecticut Society was pouring significant funds into reproducing the “Little Green Book,” and the national President-General in her speech to mark the DAR’s “Silver Jubilee” praised the Connecticut Daughters for raising five thousand dollars to translate and publish the pamphlet in five languages:

This work will prove to be the cornerstone of an intelligent understanding to multitudes of foreigners who are flocking to these shores totally ignorant of the fundamental principles of a free government and a worthy citizenship – which, hereafter, will be no hyphenated citizenship – it will be American or nothing.⁸⁵

Inspired by this Connecticut initiative, a similar undertaking was launched at the national scale in 1921, with the first publication of the national DAR’s *Manual of the United States: For the Information of Immigrants and Foreigners*. The overleaf left the reader no doubt about from whom this generous instruction about the American nationalism was forthcoming:

This book is given to you by the National Society, Daughters of the American Revolution, in the hope that you will find it of great practical use in learning about our country, the opportunities it offers you, its form of government, and

⁸⁵ “The Silver Jubilee,” *DAR Magazine* 47:6 (December 1915), 357.

how to become patriotic citizens. Helpful hints for your guidance will be found at the close of this volume.⁸⁶

The “helpful hints” included an assortment of tips for daily life, ranging from how to reclaim baggage when traveling by train, to recourse that a worker should undertake if injured on the job, to the reasons that garbage should not be allowed to pile up around one’s home, to the reminder that one should “stop, look, and listen” when crossing a railroad track.⁸⁷

After its initial publication in 1921, the Manual was so popular and so widely distributed that it was reprinted in subsequent years with slight revisions and updates. Additionally, the national DAR was persuaded that the Manual’s effectiveness would be enhanced if it were made available in the major languages represented among immigrants, and funds were allocated for translation and publication of foreign language editions. By 1928 the Manual was printed in Italian, Spanish, French, German, Yiddish, Polish, Hungarian, Armenian, Greek, Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish, Russian, Lithuanian, Bohemian, Portuguese, and Japanese (despite the much tighter restrictions on immigrants from Asia). Figure 5.7 shows the title page of the 1925 Yiddish edition, which was produced using Hebrew script probably only familiar to a scholarly few, in contrast to the far more common use of the Latin alphabet for Yiddish. This highlights the irony that in all probability many individuals to whom the Manual

⁸⁶ *Manual of the United States: For the Information of Immigrants and Foreigners*, compiled by Elizabeth C. Barney Buel (Washington, D.C.: National Society Daughters of the American Revolution, Fifth Edition, 1928).

⁸⁷ “Helpful Hints for Men and Women,” *Manual of the United States*. 85-95.

was given were not literate in any language at all. The DAR itself seemed to be aware of this limited literacy, and one magazine article, which named assimilation of foreigners as “America’s greatest problem,” asserted that of immigrant women, fewer than one in five could read or write any language.⁸⁸ Yet, mystifyingly, the Daughters continued to produce vast numbers of foreign language Manuals, even while they were also promoting the immediate and vigorous schooling of immigrants – adults and children alike – in English language literacy.⁸⁹

In stark contrast, then, to nativist groups such as the Klan that were its contemporaries, the DAR was formulating a comparatively optimistic posture towards immigration, and certainly one that was more nuanced and more constructive, albeit deeply paternalistic by later standards. This reflected the DAR’s expansive geopolitical vision of America’s Anglo-based political and social superiority and the imperative for immigrant assimilation. The logic at work had several elements. Alongside avowed notions of Anglo-Saxon cultural superiority, DAR literature also took every opportunity to remind readers that colonial America had also been a society of immigrants from many European countries and that the Revolution had benefited from the contributions

⁸⁸“America’s Greatest Problem,” *DAR Magazine* 54:1 (January 1920), 29-33.

⁸⁹ The aggressive push to promote literacy as part and parcel of “Americanization” programs must be seen also in light of the Federal immigration legislation of 1917 that included the Burnett Act, which sought to make literacy a requirement of citizenship. See “For a Constructive Law on Immigration,” *Survey* 39 (February 23, 1918), 575; Higham, 202-203 and 302-303; and Allen F. Davis, “Welfare, Reform, and World War I,” *American Quarterly* 19:3 (Autumn, 1967), 516-533, p. 527. This provides further context explaining how the southern Appalachian schools initiatives fit in with the DAR’s overall “Americanization” platform. Daughters were painfully aware that racially Anglo-Saxon impoverished whites throughout rural America would be unable to meet many of the standards of citizenship being imposed on non-Anglo immigrants.

of patriots whose cultural backgrounds were other than Anglo-Saxon. Magazine articles detailed Polish, French, and German participation in the American cause.⁹⁰ And in contrast to black Americans, who are nearly erased from existence in the pages of DAR magazines of this period, a number of articles focused on Jewish Americans of Revolutionary times, stressing their patriotic military service, their prominence as civic leaders in community life, their philanthropy, and especially their patronage of the arts. A series of articles in the 1920s examined early American portraits of prominent Jewish citizens by such artists as Gilbert Stuart and Thomas Sully, and it argued that these artists' careers were given needed boosts by the numerous commissions they received from wealthy Jewish patrons.⁹¹ Additionally, the articles commented that, as property owners, Jewish families had been responsible custodians of many homes that could be regarded as among America's architectural treasures. At the same time that the magazines were highlighting early American Jews, however, a new feature in the DAR Magazine in the 1920s was a repeating column titled, "A Page in Heraldry," which offered explanations of the origins of various Anglo-Saxon surnames. These columns reasserted not only a class emphasis, but also a connection between the DAR and a noble Anglo-Saxon past.

⁹⁰ "Foreigners Who Helped America During the Revolution," *DAR Magazine* 48:1 (January 1916), 24; Estelle Harris, "The Huguenot in America," *DAR Magazine* 64:9 (September 1930), 551-555.

⁹¹ Dolores Boisefeuille Coloquitt, "Distinguished Jews in the St. Menin Miniatures," *DAR Magazine* 59:2 (February 1925), 79-83; Hannah R. London, "Portraits of Jews by Thomas Sully," *DAR Magazine* 60:2 (February 1926), 85-89; London, "Portraits of Jews Painted by Gilbert Stuart," *DAR Magazine* 60:4 (April 1926), 212-216; "Some Pre-Revolutionary Portraits," *DAR Magazine* 60:12 (December 1926), 725-730.

But admittedly, assumptions that, during this period, the DAR joined like-minded patriotic and nativist groups to unfailingly promote Anglo-Saxon superiority are complicated somewhat by DAR's documented tendency to ennoble Jewish and other non-Anglo Americans and to point to the positive aspects of immigration. Daughters of the 1920s invariably justified their contemporary outreach to immigrants by comparing their potential contribution to those of colonial immigrants. Acknowledging the potential for abuse of the immigration process, one Daughter wrote defensively of immigrants and even suggested the potential of Daughters to learn something from immigrants' example:

Despite the riff-raff that at times has crept into our emigrant masses, a large percentage of them came to us, following the beacon light of Liberty. They came as our pilgrim and our covenanter and our cavalier forefathers came... It takes courage to uproot from one's native vale and journey half way across the world seeking to better one's self... So have sympathy with these people, look at the poetry of their adventure, remember they have not been born to American ways and that very, very often they may shame native Americans with their idealistic view of this nation.⁹²

Moreover, in contrast to DAR rhetoric of earlier years, which warned of racial miscegenation that would result if the darker races of Europe and elsewhere were allowed to enter freely and mix with the pure Anglo-Saxon stock, no less than the DAR President-General declared in 1926, even as the Daughters were favoring legislation to curb immigration through quotas, that immigration must not be shunned altogether because, "Variety of racial strain has developed in America a truly remarkable people –

⁹²*DAR Magazine* 54:1 (January 1920), 31.

strong, vigorous, and virtuous.”⁹³ Even as nativist groups - which rivaled the DAR in terms of rhetorical commitment to patriotism - were driven by a narrow and defensive and localized geopolitical vision to harass and even expel immigrants from many communities, the Daughters continued to affirm the value of immigration, and they staunchly defended their own protective and paternalistic attitude towards immigrants when one declared, “Who can tell what valuable citizens of the future may be among those we are caring for? Stop and consider those of foreign birth who have helped make America great. Your efforts surely will not be in vain.”⁹⁴

To be sure, the positive remarks about the potential value of immigrants were balanced by liberal doses of dire warnings of the various pernicious social and political influences that threatened America from abroad. In a 1921 speech, the DAR President-General cautioned that the “German-Sinn Fein-Socialist combination... are all apparently linked up together, and they mean, if they can, to conquer the world,” although she conceded that being foreign-born alone did not necessarily make a citizen susceptible to this sinister message, which “does not find sympathy with the better element among Irishmen.”⁹⁵ Continuing through the 1920s, DAR projects at all scales evinced a sense of urgency, that if the Daughters did not redouble their efforts to tutor new citizens in everything from homemaking to knowledge of American politics, these foreigners would be left open and susceptible to more insidious influences:

⁹³ *DAR Magazine* 60:5 (May 1926), 262-273.

⁹⁴ Blanche H. Perkins, “DAR Work On Ellis Island,” *DAR Magazine* 65:2 (February 1931), 73.

⁹⁵ *DAR Magazine* 55:5 (May 1921), 245-251.

When he arrives in this country the bewildered foreigner immediately seeks leadership... Therefore it all depends upon who gets hold of him first whether he is transformed into a good, law-abiding, home-building citizen or becomes a pawn in the hands of radical groups who openly defy law and order and deride our Government.⁹⁶

This sort of sentiment presaged the “hands-on” approach that would come to typify Daughters’ work with immigrants at the scale of local chapters. The national magazine offered suggestions of activities that chapters might undertake to counter the “influence of the mischiefmaker upon the uneducated alien that...threatens a danger which we cannot safely ignore,” and among these suggestions were the organizing of local classes to teach home-making skills to immigrant women, as well as the staging of community “Americanization” events and pageants.⁹⁷ The Washington, D.C. Daughters furnished “a model home in one of the foreign quarters to demonstrate our standards of housekeeping and living and to teach the ideals of this nation and also to form a meeting place and recreation center for the foreign mothers and children.”⁹⁸ A Georgia chapter celebrated the local Italian immigrant population by staging the first “Italy Day” in the history of Georgia.⁹⁹ In Oneonta, New York, the Daughters hosted a multi-national group of immigrant women for an “Immigration Party.” While guests hailed from several European countries and were encouraged to come wearing their

⁹⁶ “Keep America American,” *DAR Magazine* 62:2 (February 1928), 114-16.

⁹⁷ *DAR Magazine* 48:4 (April 1916), 269.

⁹⁸ “Activities of the Women’s Clubs,” *Washington Post*, Sunday April 10, 1927. This accords with the discussion in Sallie A. Marston, “The Social Construction of Scale,” *Progress in Human Geography* 24 (2): 219-242, of the household scale as the site of focused activism undertaken by middle-class American women aimed at social reform. See Marston, 235-238.

⁹⁹ *DAR Magazine* 55:2 (February 1921), 104.

native clothing, it is difficult to tell if the statement included in the account that, "Two women from China were, of course, promptly deported," was intended as a joke. The immigration experience was treated as a frolic by the Daughters, who less entertained the foreign guests than they were entertained by them. Refreshments were served "Ellis Island style," with boxed lunches and "coffee served from a pail."¹⁰⁰

But the most concerted programs of "Americanization," education, and humanitarian relief of immigrants were aimed directly at the Ellis Island processing center. In addition to staffing welcoming stations with Daughters who handed out multi-lingual copies of the Manual of the United States, beginning in 1923 the U.S. Government administrators of Ellis Island granted to the DAR permission to maintain a "workroom" for immigrant women and children. This was supplied with sewing machines and sewing materials donated from throughout the DAR and staffed with volunteer Daughters; and the aim was not only to assist women by giving them the opportunity to make or repair clothing for their families during their detention at Ellis Island, but also to give immigrant women something productive to do to pass the time while in detention status (Figure 5.8). This work was deemed so successful that the Ellis Island administrators asked the Daughters to extend the project to Ellis Island men, and to add a workroom where men could also be given "hand work" to occupy their time: "In the detention rooms, hand work was being given out to detained men and women, and the outstretched, supplicating hands and eager faces showed what it would

¹⁰⁰ *DAR Magazine* 59:10 (October 1925), 645-647.

mean to have occupation for the weary, idle hours of anxious uncertainty.”¹⁰¹ Small kits containing materials for sewing, knitting, and embroidery were made up by the Daughters, with attached labels (translated into German, Italian, and Chinese) reading, “This material is given with no expense to you by the National Society, D.A.R., to help pass the time pleasantly while you are detained on Ellis Island. The finished product is yours to do with as you wish.”¹⁰²

Conclusion

At the outset of this chapter, I described three noticeable shifts during the period of my focus, a period that is generally discussed within the context of progressivism, suggesting that not only did each of these contribute to modifications in the way that American territoriality was viewed but that they together facilitated the emergence of a new hegemonic discourse of national security. The first of these three shifts involved the accentuation of an America’s territorial sequestering from the political strife that was increasingly raging in Europe and elsewhere, a shift made all the more contradictory by America’s own quasi imperial forays in Hawaii, the Philippines, and elsewhere. The second shift concerned the interrelated trends of urbanization and immigration, which produced a variety of cultural stimuli, largely forthcoming from upper class Americans, directed at non-urban spaces. Out of this complex mix came the country life movement, pastoralism, and the intriguing “elegant pastoral” aesthetic;

¹⁰¹ “As Seen by an Airplane Mascot,” *DAR Magazine* 59:3 (March 1925), 151-154.

¹⁰² *DAR Magazine* 65:2 (February 1931), 69-73.

while the obverse consequences included the ready recognition of threats to national territory and national security resulting from the incursion of things either foreign, urban, or both. Third, one sees a clear shift in the many, varied, and persistent impulses aimed at inscribing memory onto the American landscape and claiming a mythical, heroic, and monumental past for the nation. Because they required deliberate choices by similarly motivated private and civic groups of what sites to mark and which individuals to honor, these processes were aimed in reality more at the security of the present and of the future than at the memory of the past. Collectively, looking at these three shifts brings one into an analytic encounter with most of the material and rhetorical features of the progressive era, including emphases on building public infrastructure and on rural and urban social reform.

I have used primarily a selection of DAR initiatives from the period of the 1910s through the 1920s, along with a set of material drawn from a contemporaneous magazine that contrasts DAR material in an especially interesting and instructive way, as a set of instruments through which to explicate these three shifts. The empirical details and episodes have been arrayed in attempt to fortify the arguments that have been advanced by other authors that it was out of the progressive era that the ultra-patriotic discourses emerged which would sustain the coming Cold War. Moreover, by choosing the DAR, I also hope to enrich somewhat the contention of Anssi Paasi that a multitude of actors within states participate in the construction and reproduction of

territoriality, as well as to suggest a colorful example of what Gramsci seems to have been suggesting in his discussion of “organic intellectuals.”

Reflecting on the symbolic dimensions and various aesthetic considerations of public infrastructure, including the ways in which it was embellished with iconography, gives evidence for expansion of Zelinsky’s theoretical work on the material presence of state authority.¹⁰³ The visibility of the state as a material presence on the landscape is one thing, and it is indeed important in effecting within public consciousness a sense of the dominant presence of the state in the material spaces of everyday life and at the scale of the personal and the local. However, state infrastructure also conveys the ideology of nationalism and discourses of patriotism at these everyday scales, and aesthetic design and iconography is one way in which this is accomplished. In his analysis of state structures Zelinsky describes looming structures that intimidate by their very presence, but he leaves aside questions of ideological message or national imagination. An imposing material presence, important as it is to the constituting of the nation, is not necessarily enough to fully impart beliefs and national narratives. The ideological components of the national narrative must also be made visible on the landscape, and this is done aesthetically, through public art and iconography, and often in conjunction with the structures and infrastructures that are the object of Zelinsky’s study. Moreover, a multitude of private actors – who might well be read as “organic intellectuals” – also participate in this process, as Paasi suggests.

¹⁰³ Zelinsky, “The Imprint of Central Authority.” See Chapter Four, p. 163 and n46.

From its founding, the DAR intended to become what has often been described as ‘America’s fan club.’¹⁰⁴ However, events and controversies in the DAR’s history have contributed to the group being so ridiculed and reviled by many Americans that it is seldom seriously studied. The irony of this was expressed eloquently by one historian of the DAR: “It is one of the curiosities of American history that this organization, which set itself up as a fan club for America, has become one of the most unpopular groups ever to take root on American soil.”¹⁰⁵ However, the work of the DAR in the early 20th century, when its multi-faceted projects were influential and in many political and cultural sectors, is instructive in revealing how discourses of American territoriality were being constructed and reproduced. The DAR’s monuments and commemorative markers, which documented a particular narrative about incorporating American territory on various frontiers, were in fact texts reminding citizens what territoriality was all about and how Americans were to be territorial. This suggests the extreme importance of not only the DAR, but of similar private groups – many of which were also women’s groups, and all of which were deeply conservative groups – in constructing the territorial discourse of the United States. Surveying the DAR’s work also reveals how definitions and assumptions about national security were beginning to infuse American social, cultural, and political discourse in the early 20th century. The number of early DAR markers that valorize Indians, who essentially betrayed their own people and assisted the white settlers, as well as the DAR’s broader

¹⁰⁴ Stated thus by Anderson, 15 and book title.

¹⁰⁵ Anderson, 5.

initiatives aimed at uplifting the “noble savage” collectively reminded Americans that the definition of a “good Indian” was an Indian that had defected to side of the whites. This then reinforced assumptions of the territorial ramifications of treason versus loyalty.

Thus, one can see that the DAR initiatives aimed at historic preservation were in fact not unrelated to its programs aimed at confronting the question of how best to address the acceleration of immigration. Alternately immigration was viewed as a positive continuation of a noble American tradition and also as a dangerous source of possible foreign incursion. By vigorously promoting a particular discourse of national identity and citizenship, the DAR was able to implicitly inculcate in Americans a set of assumptions about what a repudiation of that identity – a defection – would look like. Moreover, the conservative discourse of citizenship, as crafted by the DAR, came to be understood as essential to the continuation of America’s territorial security.

Drawing from archival DAR magazines of the period, I have attempted to demonstrate that the magazines give American citizenship a clear territorial reference. Also, it seems clear that a particular discourse of British pastoralism that finds beauty and dignity in rural simplicity (in all its variants, including people and architecture alike) was transported to the American setting and was drawn on heavily in the protracted construction of a discourse of American identity that defined virtue in rurality, in the tilling of the soil, and in the struggle against nature. Essential American virtue was inextricably linked to rurality and to an imagination of rural values. The

DAR and its magazine embraced this fully. Along with the idea that people could be elevated and improved through the proper education was the perhaps naïve idea that the unique and separate American environment, where all were equally disadvantaged against nature and all had to overcome the same obstacles, could truly produce a classless society, with all citizens united in their reverence to the America's founding moments, its two cradles – first the Revolution and second the frontier. But I have tried to show that in sharp contrast to this, *CLIA* promoted a markedly different conceptualization of “country,” where instead of being the place of the simple virtue of the honest farmer, “country” becomes a place where that honest farmer is something of a spectacle, a butt of jokes. Instead, the virtue lies in opulent conspicuous consumption. Instead of harking back to an early America where the simple and honest Puritans struggled in their rude but sturdy homes erected through honest toil and using materials from nature's bounty, the “country” of *CLIA* draws largely from the Old World for an aesthetic and a lifestyle to emulate.

Finally, in considering some of the DAR programs with subtle national defense and national security implications, I have explored its program to “Americanize” immigrants, to school them in American myths and in American national identity. For the DAR, defense of America's national security and benevolent outreach to immigrants were clearly one and the same, and looking at its work in this area provides a fascinating example of private actors leading the production of hegemonic discourses, in which the United States government most definitely had the strongest stake. The DAR's ambivalence towards race and immigration was a logical outgrowth of its

unique and complex geopolitical vision. In contrast to the DAR's geopolitical vision, which promised that the world could become a better place and "foreigners" could become better people if aided by the transformative power of American values, the geopolitical visions of then-contemporary nativist groups promised that America would become a worse place under the insidious transformative power of "foreigners" and foreign values. As American leadership in the world community accelerated in the years following the 1920s, it would become increasingly clear that the kind of geopolitical vision espoused by the DAR was the more constructive and realistic underpinning of American conservative geopolitical discourse. As I turn to the upcoming chapters, which will examine the dominant Cold War discourses of national security and territoriality, it should be easy to recognize the legacy of these powerful DAR narratives.



Figure 5.1. Pushmataha, as portrayed in American military officers' attire. Source: *DAR Magazine* 55:4 (April 1921), 193.




Figure 5.2. Bronze plaque near Bozeman, Montana commemorates Sacajawea's participation in the Lewis and Clark Expedition. (Source: DAR Magazine, 45/6, December 1914, p. 306)



Figure 5.3. Grace Hebard at Shoshone reservation in Wyoming, 1926, with native woman recounting experiences with Sacagawea. Source: Hebard, 1933, 251.

Do you entertain these uninvited guests

They invade your property at all hours, break in, steal, trample, and do all sorts of mischief. They are the cause of many a broken heart and a ruined home. They are the cause of many a broken home and a ruined life.

An Anchor Fence is the permanent and diplomatic solution to the uninvited guests. It is the same for all, but with the only way of preventing them.

It is the only fence that is made of galvanized iron and is the only fence that is made of galvanized iron.

A fence will be better than any other fence. It will be better than any other fence. It will be better than any other fence.

ANCHOR FENCE WORKS
 9 East 42nd Street, New York, N. Y.

Albany	Chicago	Miami
Boston	Cleveland	New York
Chicago	Detroit	Philadelphia
Cleveland	Kansas City	Pittsburgh
Detroit	Los Angeles	St. Louis
Kansas City	San Francisco	

See Agents in all cities.

ANCHOR Fences

Enduring Protection

Figure 5.4. Fencing ad in *Country Life in America* portrays working-class motorists as a threat to the security of country estates. Source: *CLIA*, June 1926, 119.



Figure 5.5. A patriotic cartoon asserts the superiority of the DAR's political ideology relative to alternative "foreign" voices. Source: *DAR Magazine* 62:6 (June 1928), 340.




Figure 5.6. Campus entry sign, Kate Duncan Smith DAR School, Grant, Alabama.
Photo by author.



Figure 5.8. An Ellis Island mother with her children, who have been clothed in matching dresses made from DAR-donated fabric in the DAR-sponsored Ellis Island workroom. *DAR Magazine* 65:2 (February 1931), 73.

Chapter Six

Red Scares and Present Dangers: National Security Discourse and Defection from the 1930s to the Early Cold War

Introduction

As the previous chapter described, a variety of initiatives were underway during the opening decades of the 20th century to ensure that American territory would be increasingly conceived as a container for a particular selection of ideologies, to include “values” and other hegemonic social and cultural assumptions. Correspondingly, then, other ideologies came to be regarded as not properly belonging to American territory. These ideologies were not only seen as foreign and “un-American,” but their “foreignness” – that is, their external origin - alone made them a threat to national territory. It is not at all surprising, then, that the concept of defection should reassert itself in such an atmosphere. As Chapter Two demonstrated, a *defect* is an adulterating quality that mars the essence of a thing. In a social and political climate in which so much morbid attention was being directed at such issues as purity of national essence and the threat of tainting from foreign sources, the emergence of a visceral awareness of defection as an act that not only impacted territory but also impacted the purity of national essence that is contained within territory is understandable.

Scholars have recently clarified the theoretical connections between movement (of people and goods alike) and national security.¹ The regulatory mechanisms

¹See Campbell, *Writing Security*, especially 168-179; and John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

developed and imposed soon after World War I that David Campbell alludes to in his work on the rise of the 20th century American security state were aimed at restricting individuals' movement as much as at curbing individuals' actions. Implicit in John Torpey's work is the assertion that the ability to regulate movement is one of the constituent qualities of the state, so that unrestricted movement – both within a state and across state borders – inherently undermines the security of the state. As I continue with my own effort to interrogate the interrelationship between national security, defection, and territoriality, it is important to note that not only have analytical connections recently been made between national security and movement into, out of, and within political territory, but these connections have been made relative to the construction of the particular security paradigm that dominated much of the 20th century. Bearing in mind that defection connotes movement from one territory into another, the capacity of defection to impact national security becomes even more transparent.

The previous chapter suggested that foreign threats to American stability appeared, to the average person, to be complex and even interrelated. DAR rhetoric that portrayed German, socialist, and even Irish revolutionary threats as somehow co-mingled bore this out. However, the success of socialist revolution in Europe, together with increases in the working class migration from Europe, were reminders that America was not immune from the very real impact of foreign ideologies. The insulation of American territory from European social unrest was perhaps more tenuous than geography alone would suggest. Not only had the interconnectedness of American

and European interests been demonstrated by World War I (notwithstanding American politicians' discomfiture with the League of Nations), the potential for American public opinion and cultural sensibilities to be affected by foreign events and movements was strongly suggested by the rising technologies of radio and cinema. American capitalists were not surprisingly concerned about American workers being influenced or infiltrated by socialist-leaning labor organizers; and the protection of the status quo of the waning Gilded Age, in which workers had been chronically disadvantaged vis-à-vis business owners and capitalists, was easily conflated with the protection of national security. Workers' organizations such as the International Workers of the World (IWW) or "Wobblies," were the focus of mounting fears that the American working class might be subverted by foreign, especially Russian, directed communist impulses. Of course, the sharply spiraling poverty produced by the Depression only accentuated those fears, even though the Wobblies had already been effectively suppressed in many cities by the actions associated with the "red scares" of the earlier 1920s.

Conservative voices also expressed concern over the possibility of America disadvantaging itself by softening its own domestic military preparedness in the face of increasingly strident rhetoric linking the interests of the American working class with its foreign counterparts. Such rhetoric claimed that steps taken in the years following World War I to bolster America's standing army and navy were bellicose by nature, and that backing away from an active national defense posture and instead promoting pacifism within the global community was in the interests of the working class internationally. By the late 1920s, then, "internationalism" and "pacifism" were the

antithesis of Americanism. Reflecting the rising discourse of national security, the DAR's national defense rhetoric grew even more intense and its initiatives drew greater resources, as evidenced by the frequency of DAR radio broadcasts and the content of monthly "National Defense Committee" magazine columns. These latter grew to be densely packed multi-page diatribes (which implicitly demanded of their readers that their intellectual focus and acumen be somewhat higher than one might expect from a typical women's magazine), and they were nearly frantic in their insistence that vigorous defense against assaults on national security by communists was an issue on which all American women should agree.

The conservative hegemonic assumption, formed largely in the inter-war period, that American territory should be free of foreign ideologies and that threats to domestic security from foreign – especially communist – subversion must be guarded against through a militant defensive posture would provide a strong foundation for distrust of Soviet motives and intentions following World War II. What distinguished early Cold War assumptions about the interrelationship of ideology and national security, however, was their clear territorial orientation. Whereas national security discourse of the interwar period conceived of America as geographically sequestered, but at risk of "internationalist" and "pacifist" influences seeping in through labor agitation and immigration, early Cold War discourse staked out two territorial camps, divided by an "Iron Curtain" (as famously expressed by Churchill in his address at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri in the spring of 1946). Churchill's term "Iron Curtain" soon came to stand for both the real and imagined boundary between territorial spaces

dominated by Soviet or capitalist ideologies, respectively. But the “Iron Curtain” rhetoric also functioned, perhaps unintentionally, to highlight the concealment capacity of the fortified boundary between the two opposing spaces and the inability of people on each side to clearly envision conditions in the opposing side. This would contribute to the development of elaborate intelligence apparatuses on each side, which presumed to pierce the barrier and examine the reality of conditions within that oppositional territory, and to justify this process as a strategy for safeguarding national security.

During World War II, both scientific research and academic scholarship (particularly in “area studies”) had been mobilized for the war effort. The circumstances surrounding the end of the war, with the race to develop atomic weapons capability that was seen as virtually unassailable, caused science and its erudite practitioners to be seen as simply instruments for strategic manipulation by national security planners. Much scholarly and scientific knowledge lost its neutrality and came to be inescapably situated within national security discourse, and the individuals producing knowledge with strategic security dimensions themselves came under scrutiny for their supposed ideological associations. And national security and intelligence planners on both sides of the “Iron Curtain” yearned for (and schemed for) the defection of individuals who possessed particularly valuable knowledge.

This chapter will explore how the Cold War emerged out of a discursive climate in which threats to the United States were broadly conceived as foreign and manifested invisibly through subversion. After considering the foundations of this discourse in the inter-war period, it will move to the period of the 1950s and show how national security

rhetoric was eerily consistent with much earlier episodes of hysteria over foreign threats. Using examples drawn from archival sources, as well as from literature addressing the foundations of the intelligence profession, I will address several phases of the evolution of America's national security discourse from the inter-war period to the early Cold War, paying particular attention to, first, implications for territoriality and, second, the role of defection as an instrument of national security strategy.

Early National Defense Hysterics and the "Red Scares"

The escalation of many Americans' belief that more attention to national defense was needed - ironically well after World War I, although set in motion by reaction to it - is effectively illustrated in monthly "National Defense Committee" columns and other defense-related articles in the *DAR Magazine*. The magazine devoted considerable space to the public and political debates following the war over whether to perpetuate a higher level of military preparedness than had been the American norm prior to its participation in the war (part of which included the advocacy of maintaining a particular proportion - termed "5-5-3" - of US naval vessels relative to those of the imperial naval powers of Great Britain and Japan), as well as the related debates over changing immigration policy and the danger of foreign ideologies - especially socialism - invading America through the immigration process.²

²See "The Alien Within Our Boundaries," *DAR Magazine* 59:8 (August 1925), 469-473; "The Woman's Patriotic Conference on National Defense," *DAR Magazine* 61:4 (April 1927), 270-273; "DAR Congressional Report of the National Defense Committee," *DAR Magazine* 61:8 (August 1927), 590-592; "Patriotic Women Take Stand for Adequate National Defense," *DAR Magazine* 62:3 (March 1928), 145-150; "National Defense Committee," *DAR Magazine* 62:5 (May 1928), 300-303; "Prospectus for Chapter

The Daughters freely expressed their conviction that dynamic levels of military preparedness should be maintained, and they also tended to support immigration legislation of 1921 and 1924 (although the vigor and scope of the DAR's immigration outreach programs made immigration the one issue on which DAR rhetoric was exceptionally heterogeneous and nuanced, as the previous chapter demonstrated).³ Some of these columns and articles attempted to provide a national defense related interpretation of a range of typical women's issues, such as matrimony, education, and even children's health. For example a 1920 article titled "International Marriages" claimed that Germany had infiltrated women spies into the United States through marriages of German women to upper class American men.⁴ It suggested that upper class Americans marrying foreigners was not only an outright security threat, but also an economic threat, because it could mean the siphoning away of American wealth through dowries or inheritances for foreign-born children of American heiresses. And in a bizarre attempt to connect national defense fervor to family health concerns, a 1929 article titled "A Dreaded National Foe," described the threat to children posed by poison oak and poison ivy, offering guidance in how to recognize the plants and treat its

Programs on National Defense, 1928-1929," *DAR Magazine* 62:9 (September 1928), 558-560; and "Sixth Women's Patriotic Conference on National Defense," *DAR Magazine* 65:3 (March 1931), 145-149.

³The immigration legislation of the earlier 1920s is explained and justified in "National Defense Committee: Immigration Restriction," *DAR Magazine* 63:1 (January 1929), 99-101.

⁴ See "International Marriages," *DAR Magazine* 64:2 (February 1920), 92-93. Seemingly concerned primarily with marriages between Germans and Americans, this article is openly derisive German "kulture," of Americans who go abroad to soak in German "kulture," and of those who have married Germans and whose children must therefore learn to love German "kulture."

effects, and describing steps underway by the Department of Agriculture to combat the problem.⁵

But for the most part, the DAR magazine's monthly "National Defense Committee" columns in the period 1927 to 1931 concentrated upon the pernicious dangers that foreign ideologies – particularly communism – posed to American spiritual and educational institutions and the subversive threat to American children and youth. Columns stressed that communist and socialist indoctrination was forthcoming from some public school teachers and principals. Some DAR chapters, in effort to obviate the possibility of communists lurking amidst school faculties, brought pressure upon state governments to require loyalty oaths to be sworn by public school teachers. In particular, the Indiana DAR successfully sponsored a bill that would pass a "Teachers' Oath of Office Law."⁶ Daughters warned that communism was also invading the school environment unnoticed through extra-curricular "Pioneer" groups, outwardly similar to the Boy Scout and Girl Scout movements. Typical of the warnings about such groups was the following, from a lengthy address by the DAR president to its annual national convention:

Are you sure that in the public schools of your community there is not a well organized and flourishing group known as 'The Young Pioneers?' And if so,

⁵ See "A Dreaded National Foe," *DAR Magazine* 63:8 (August 1929), 479-480.

⁶ "Indiana Teachers Oath of Office Law," *DAR Magazine* 63:5 (May 1929), 281-282. This article states that members worked for several years lobbying state lawmakers to pass this law. It is worth noting that for most of the 1920s, Indiana state politics was heavily influenced by the Ku Klux Klan, and that the Klan's strength was greater in Indiana than in most other states. Moreover, DAR membership and WKKK membership was known to overlap in Indiana in the 1920s. See M. William Lutholtz, *Grand Dragon: D.C. Stephenson and the Ku Klux Klan in Indiana* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1991); and Blee, *Women of the Klan*, 114-116.

are you aware that its object is to defeat the purposes of religion, of the Boy and Girl Scout movements...? That it preaches communism and the ultimate destruction of this Government?⁷

Strikingly, the Daughters stressed that not only did communist and socialist indoctrination undermine patriotism among youth, but it also eroded traditional moral values, such as respect for authority. Conflating the communist threat with “Internationalism,” one account relates the plight of a public school whose students come under “Young Pioneer” influence and begin to resist school authority:

Internationalism is out to get the children. Witness the text of a statement made by the Young Pioneers on the occasion of the refusal of a 13-year-old girl to salute the American Flag. The tirade against school authority reads as follows: ‘The children of Public School 188 protest vigorously against the action of Principal Leon S. Kaiser in forcing little Gertrude to salute the American flag... We children are human beings as well as the school authorities. We are not slaves and prisoners to be bullied... Gertrude said that this was not her flag because she was a working-class child... For this crime she was called to the principal’s office, lectured, threatened, bullied... We call upon all school children to protest against such action... We want to have something to say about how the schools are run!’⁸

Preceding this passage had been a long diatribe describing how the Communist Party, through the Young Pioneer movement, taunted the American flag and other patriotic symbols such as the Liberty Bell for being quasi-religious fetishes, which inspired ridiculous rituals that were tantamount to idol worship. Claiming to quote a communist

⁷“The Thirty-Eighth Continental Congress of the National Society of the DAR,” *DAR Magazine* 63:5 (May 1929), 261-271, p. 266. If the DAR was aware of the irony of its own bitter contempt for the “Young Pioneer” movement, given its own symbolic overuse of the word “pioneer” in so many other contexts, its rhetoric gives no indication of it.

⁸ “National Defense Committee: Americanism Versus Internationalism,” *DAR Magazine* 62:7 (July 1928), 433-437, p. 434.

leaflet, the DAR column related how the movement described the Liberty Bell in terms sure to raise the hackles of any Daughter:

Why, when it was taken across the continent by railroad, groups of old ladies flocked to the tracks to interrupt its progress. They kissed it; yes kissed the brass side of this relic.

The DAR columns invested patriotism with moral qualities of vigor, youthfulness, energy, masculinity, alacrity, courage, and the ironic juxtaposition of willing combativeness side-by-side with respect for authority. This last is especially evident in the push for citizens' military training camps and campus programs for student military training, in which participants' readiness to participate in sparring and fist fighting was commended.⁹ Figure 6.1 is a DAR magazine cartoon titled "Mothers of Main Street," depicts the contrast between the lazy, shiftless, and dissipated son of a wizened and crone-like pacifist mother and the handsome and energetic son of a comparatively youthful and attractive DAR mother who looks fondly on as he strides briskly off to the citizens' military training camp. And the idea the communism, internationalism, and pacifism were associated equally with laziness is evident in the use of the term "slacker" to refer to people who were persuaded by communist organizers to resist military training programs and patriotic rituals alike by signing a "Slackers' Oath."¹⁰ Evidence of the DAR's transition by the late 1920s from its earlier

⁹ 62:5 (302); 63:5 (266). The irony of the overwhelmingly masculine gendering of much of the DAR's rhetoric is worthy of analysis, but is largely outside the scope of this dissertation. Although the DAR figures minimally in Cecilia O'Leary's work, *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism*, in general she deals with the irony of conservative women's groups constructing and perpetuating such strongly masculinist rhetoric.

¹⁰ 61:4 (271)

position as markedly progressive, especially where issues concerning women, labor, and the family were concerned, can be seen in its 1927 outcry against “Feminine Slackers,” who irresponsibly waste their newly won political franchise supporting the wrong causes or the wrong candidates.¹¹ Worse yet, these reprehensible women were likely to influence their grown sons to either shirk their duty to vote altogether or to follow suit with poor judgment in voting.

Clearly the DAR was attempting to hold its own against a growing number of alternate politically oriented organizations for women that were far more progressive.¹² From the pages of the primary suffrage and pacifist-oriented political magazine *The Woman Citizen*, prominent suffragist Carrie Chapman Catt assailed the DAR, but the DAR Magazine returned a stinging rebuttal and denunciation of Catt soon afterwards.¹³ And, since it was typical of Daughters and of “club women” in general to be involved in a number of organizations simultaneously, the DAR found it necessary to crack down on members who began to publicly espouse positions that did not reflect the hegemonic themes of the organization. In 1928 the DAR made an example of one member, Helen Tufts Bailie, who had circulated a pamphlet titled “Our Threatened Heritage” criticizing a number of DAR platforms, holding a hearing to pronounce her official expulsion from the organization. Bailie had allegedly become allied with the “Women’s International

¹¹ “Feminine Slackers,” *DAR Magazine* 61:11 (November 1927), 846-848.

¹² As was mentioned in Chapter Five, n72, J. Stanley Lemons’ *The Woman Citizen: Social Feminism in the 1920s* summarizes the social circumstances contributing to the DAR’s transition from progressive to ultra-nationalist.

¹³ “National Defense Work of DAR Upheld,” *DAR Magazine* 61:8 (August 1927), 576.

League for Peace and Freedom,” and its president Jane Addams had written in Bailie’s defense, denouncing her treatment by the DAR.¹⁴

The DAR’s national defense rhetoric was not restricted to the monthly magazine; rather, it also was broadcast to a national audience on a major Chicago radio station, WBBM, which was heard at least as far away as Florida.¹⁵ “National Defense” magazine columns and broadcasts alike stressed the threat of communist-influenced organizations promoting atheism, claiming in particular that they encouraged youth to not only become atheists, but to flaunt their atheism by publicly burning effigies of Jesus and of angels and by forming groups with deliberately shocking names such as “Damned Soul Society,” “Sons of the Godless,” and “Hedonic Hosts of the Hell-Bent Heathens.”¹⁶ The American Association for the Advancement of Atheism was singled out repeatedly for denunciation, and National Defense columns furnished lengthy accounts of its activities. Daughters referred to that organization as the “4-A,” probably a deliberate play on the popular conservative 4-H Club for youth (usually known simply as “4-H”)¹⁷ and designed to accentuate the contrast between the wholesome and moral

¹⁴ “National Defense Committee,” *DAR Magazine* 62:8 (August 1928), 478-479.

¹⁵ “National Defense Committee: The DAR Radio Program,” *DAR Magazine* 62:10 (October 1928), 642-643.

¹⁶ “National Defense Committee,” *DAR Magazine* 61:9 (September 1927), 695-697; 62:7 (436); and “Why Patriotic Organizations Should Protect Our American Institutions from the Menace of Radicalism,” *DAR Magazine* 63:4 (April 1929), 238-239.

¹⁷ The 4-H Club was founded in 1902 as a club for rural boys and girls, and its motto was “Hands, Home, Heart, Health.” Its primary focus has been, and continues to be, coordinating children’s handiwork, raising of vegetables and stock animals, hobby displays, and other judged entries in county fair competitions. See Franklin Mering Reck, *The 4-H Story: A History of 4-H Club Work* (Chicago: National Committee on Boys and Girls Club Work, 1951), 3-47. For background on the segregated 4-H, primarily in the southern states, see “Club Work With Negroes Expands,” 133-140.

influence of 4-H and the unwholesome and “godless” influence of 4-A. Coinciding almost precisely with the Depression, the National Defense Committee columns grew even more pointed and detailed on the programs and meeting locations of various communist organizations and the individual activities of particular well-known communist Americans, such as presidential candidate William Z. Foster.¹⁸ Suggesting a morbidly obsessive desire for an “insider’s” view, these columns were densely packed with information such as upcoming communist meeting locations, locations of summer camps for Young Pioneers groups, descriptions of audience reactions and audience-speaker interactions at meetings, and lists of songs sung at meetings. Passages tantalized readers with their omission of the most juicy and lurid details:

In some cases the music of favorite old hymns is adapted to vicious words. This is the case in the song, ‘Onward Christian Soldier,’ which is revamped into communist language too vile and blasphemous for reprinting in a legitimate publication.¹⁹

However, in addition to simply contributing to mounting public hysteria over communism’s allegedly escalating influence in America, particularly upon youth and upon religious practice, some of the DAR columns contained suggestions of more substantive and thoughtful policy responses to the growing Soviet phenomenon. For example, columns advocated changes in US economic and commercial policy towards

¹⁸“The Collective Man,” *DAR Magazine* 63:8 (August 1929), 502-504; “Communists Exclaim ‘In United Ranks, Forward!’” *DAR Magazine* 64:9 (September 1930), 565-567; “Communism – Dead or Alive?” *DAR Magazine* 64:10 (October 1930), 633-635; “The Grip of Communism on Youth,” *DAR Magazine* 65:1 (January 1931), 54-55; “Communist Conferences and Correspondences,” *DAR Magazine* 65:2 (February 1931), 108-109; and “Address of the President General,” 65:2, 94-100.

¹⁹64:10 (634).

the Soviet Union based upon allegations of Soviet use of slave-like labor conditions particularly in the Soviet timber industry.²⁰ Discomfited by the unrestricted access of Soviet commercial visitors and engineers who “are roaming at will through the United States inspecting our factories, mills, and mines and gathering all kinds of information,” one DAR column declared that American commercial officials should make more strenuous efforts to demand similar access to Soviet production facilities and claimed that the few Americans who had done so were able to report firsthand the horrendous conditions of cruelty to workers.²¹ This particular theme in a DAR column is a revealing indication of the belief that Soviet access to US territory was innately threatening to national security, but at the same time that US access to Soviet territory would bolster American security interests and should be encouraged. The DAR columns advocated an embargo against “every slave-made and convict-made commodity,” and it singled out lumber products specifically as being produced under appalling conditions of forced labor and therefore suitable for US embargo.²²

The DAR's programs relative to the purported communist threat confronting American society were hardly unique relative to other conservative private organizations and government organs. Rather, they were consistent both rhetorically and materially with “Red Scare” discourse that was becoming prevalent, and for that reason they are instructive. Additionally, given the DAR's penchant for protracted and

²⁰“Comments on Communism,” *DAR Magazine* 65:4 (April 1931), 233-235.

²¹65:3 (147).

²²65:4(233-234).

text-oriented magazine articles on many of its topics, the National Defense Committee and related columns not only serve as an exemplar of “Red Scare” rhetoric, they also provide countless substantial allusions to the many facets of the Red Scare issue and its evolution, as well as rich context from the point of view of conservative, yet in many ways conflicted, women.

At the same time that the DAR was circulating its warnings of the many dangers of communist ideologies, American institutions were developing operational strategies to counter these perceived threats to national security. Organized labor provided a convenient target of institutional strategies, and law enforcement organizations at various jurisdictional levels were prominent players in attacking the so-called communist threat. Issues of scale seemingly evaporated, or at least became profoundly conflated, as local police forces confronted groups and individuals who, according to powerful conservative innuendo-laden rhetoric being circulated by respectable groups such as the DAR, were threats not to the locality alone, but rather to the nation as a whole. Local police forces, particularly in major cities, developed intelligence components to search out and penetrate “red” groups, and the operational model of such “red squads” would influence the domestic intelligence and counterintelligence functions later normalized by Federal law enforcement early in the Cold War.²³ Moreover, the key officers within these early police “red squads” became powerful,

²³ For thorough background on the “red squads” and their later development into the early Cold War period, see Frank Donner, *Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). For the interrelationship of police red squads and Federal law enforcement see Frank Donner, *The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980).

widely respected, and even nationally famous. One example of such an individual is William F. Hynes of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).

William Hynes had joined the LAPD in 1922 and took an undercover assignment in which he himself became a member of the IWW. During World War One he had served in military intelligence, suggesting a propensity for clandestine work.²⁴ He broke his cover in 1924 to testify in a trial involving criminal allegations against the IWW. Hynes also had worked as a “labor spy” hired privately by companies to penetrate union movements. In 1927 he was appointed captain of the LAPD’s Intelligence Bureau, and by 1930 “Red” Hynes was gaining national exposure as a hunter of communists, so much so that he was called to present a huge mass of testimony before the Fish Committee, precursor to the later House Committee on Un-American Activities, or “HUAC.”²⁵ Hynes set the tone for red squads nationally, and it seems reasonable to conclude that much of his credibility stemmed from the fact that he had penetrated labor organizations undercover.²⁶ The intermingling of police red squad activity with actions driven by personal vendetta and corruption is well illustrated by the fact that as the LAPD’s intelligence chief, Hynes played out his own marital crisis using red squad officers. In June 1931, Hynes and his wife were featured in an article in the *Los Angeles Herald*, which explained that Hynes and his unit had encountered

²⁴Donner (1980), 48.

²⁵For biographical information on Red Hynes, see H. Bloom, “The Passing of Red Hynes,” *The Nation*, August 2, 1952.

²⁶Donner (1990: 59) states that “(M)ore than any other single individual, Hynes was influential in shaping the agenda of the modern red squad and in exploiting the career opportunities of its chief.”

Mrs. Hynes and another man driving in the Hynes family car in the middle of the night and had arrested both of them. Hynes charged the man “on suspicion of drunken driving” (evidently, the man, not Mrs. Hynes, was driving the Hynes family car).²⁷ He charged his wife “on suspicion of insanity” and had her committed to the “psychopathic ward” of the county jail. Interestingly, the *Los Angeles Herald* account of this incident notes that both Mrs. Hynes and her unfortunate companion were treated for “contusions, lacerations, and bruises,” indicating that they were beaten up by red squad officers (if not by Hynes himself), since physical abuse of victims was normal procedure by the red squad. But in the days following the incident, Hynes publicly recanted his wife’s arrest as a mistake, saying she was not insane but “merely hysterical,” and claiming that the man had been a “boyfriend of a girlfriend of Mrs. Hynes,” and Mrs. Hynes was “innocently taking him home.” Mrs. Hynes was quoted as claiming she was grateful for the police bringing her to her senses, and she gave assurances that she would now put aside her hysterical tendencies and submit to her husband, an attitude borne out by the accompanying photo which shows the attractive blonde Mrs. Hynes dressed in a clinging gown and reclining on a couch with her husband looming over her in a black suit and tie (Figure 6.2). Their public reconciliation notwithstanding, later newspaper accounts indicate the Hynes’ marital strife persisted, and in January 1933 the *Los Angeles Herald* reported that Red Hynes’ wife had sued him for divorce and he had offered to resign from the LAPD out of fear that his personal disgrace would impact the

²⁷For an account of this incident see “All Quiet After Hynes, Wife Mixup,” *Los Angeles Herald*, June 18, 1931.

fine reputation of his communist-hunting Intelligence Bureau.²⁸ However, the “aghast” LAPD chief would not hear of him resigning and urged him simply to take several weeks off in order to put his personal life in order. Whether the downfall of Hynes’ marriage impacted his crusade against communists is uncertain, but within weeks after dealing with his divorce, Hynes was under criticism for brutally assaulting a civil liberties attorney, and by the middle of that year the LAPD red squad was featured in a national magazine and “branded as most brutal” of all police red squads in the United States.²⁹

By the late 1930s, Red Hynes was chairman of the California Peace Officers’ Association Subcommittee on Subversive Activities, an influential position which afforded him national exposure as a leading authority on the communist threat. In 1937 Hynes authored a lengthy report titled “The Communist Situation in California,” which was published by the California Peace Officers’ Association. States.³⁰ The language in this report not only epitomizes the hyperbole of anti-Communist discourse, it also marks a distinct shift away from the kind of language and imagery typical of DAR rhetoric that in the 1920s had contrasted the hearty, vigorous, and masculine qualities of American patriotism with the laziness and indolence of communist and communist

²⁸ “Hynes to Stay On Despite Family Troubles,” *Los Angeles Herald*, January 8, 1933.

²⁹ “Demands That Chief Steckel Investigate Gallagher Attack,” *Open Forum*, March 4, 1933; “L.A. Red Squad Branded as Most Brutal in U.S.; Abolition Urged,” *Open Forum*, July 7, 1933.

³⁰ William F. Hynes, *The Communist Situation in California: Report of the Subcommittee on Subversive Activities* (Sacramento: California Peace Officers’ Association, 1937). Hynes apparently presented this report at the annual convention of the California Peace Officers’ Association in September 1937.

sympathizing “slackers.” In a conspicuous break from such terminology, Hynes portrayed the American mainstream as imperiled by its own weakness and foolishness, while the “Communist horde grows daily, gloating over the fact that we are a spineless nation which submissively prostrates itself for the ravaging attack of the jackals.”³¹

Moreover, Hynes’ narrative clearly depicts the conviction that communism and democracy should each have their respective territorial orientation, that American territory should be essentially a container in which communism was completely out of place, just as Soviet territory was a container in which American patriotic discourse was out of place. The following passage reveals Hynes’ strong advocacy of a the idea that national territories should be containers of particular ideologies:

If we cared to be facetious, we might conjure up a fantasy in which we would see the Iron Men of Soviet Russia lending – without restriction – the great Red Square in Moscow, as a meeting place in which intrepid Americans would mount the rostrum and speak in glowing terms of ‘American Democracy;’ would tell of the joys and advantages and privileges enjoyed by the residents of the United States of America and would advocate that the Soviet Communist Government be overthrown and that a Democracy be established in Russia... If it appears insane to paint a picture of such proceedings in Moscow’s Red Square, why should it not also appear insane to draw a picture of Communists being given the privilege of using the Civic Centers of our American cities as broadcasting centers for their anti-American propaganda?³²

Ironically, it was during this same period in which police red squads were becoming frighteningly powerful and their views of the essence of communism were being incorporated into the political mainstream that alternate views of communism

³¹Hynes, *The Communist Situation in California*, 1. Ironically, the image Hynes conjures is similar to the *Los Angeles Herald* photo of the chastened Mrs. Hynes curled submissively before her husband!

³²Hynes, *The Communist Situation in California*, 6-7.

from the “inside” were increasingly forthcoming by American travelers to the Soviet Union, as a 1962 article by Louis Feuer in a prestigious journal *American Quarterly* shows.³³ Feuer, who wrote this article shortly before his own renunciation of communism (the result, reportedly of his 1963 academic exchange in Moscow, during which he witnessed many harsh restrictions on free expression, such as seeing dissident speech branded “ideological espionage”³⁴), discusses how the perceptions of 1920s and early 1930s American visitors to the Soviet Union were shaped by the impulses and expectations of American progressive politics, and particularly by the optimistic assumption that concentrated and rationally planned programs by the state to intervene into and improve peoples’ lives and economic production alike was not only possible but was manifestly present in multiple Soviet settings. Feuer observes that, “It is a well attested psychological truth that what people need shapes what they see,” and he concludes that the “travelers’ needs, in large part, conditioned their perception of Soviet reality.”³⁵ However, Feuer also admits that those who briefly (and through an interpreter) saw “Russia Through a Car Window,”³⁶ were in less of a position to offer

³³Lewis S. Feuer, “American Travelers to the Soviet Union 1917-32: The Formation of a Component of New Deal Ideology,” *American Quarterly* 14:2 (Summer 1962), 119-149.

³⁴Sidney Hook, William L. O’Neill, and Roger O’Toole, eds., *Philosophy, History, and Social Action: Essays in Honor of Lewis Feuer, With an Autobiographical Essay by Lewis Feuer* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publications, 1988), 42-53, especially 50.

³⁵Feuer, 121. It is interesting to consider Feuer’s account of visitors to the Soviet Union of this period alongside the call noted previously (281) by the DAR for Americans to insist upon unrestricted access to Soviet sites as a counterbalance to what the Daughters saw as excessively broad Soviet visitors’ access to American industrial sites.

³⁶Feuer (142) refers to Oswald Garrison Villard, “Russia Through a Car Window,” *The Nation* 129: 3357, (November 6, 1929), 515-517.

authoritative assessments of Soviet social and economic conditions than were the many engineering and technical advisors, who tended to live and work at particular job sites in the Soviet Union for periods ranging from several months to several years, and who, as a group tended to offer assessments that were less “rosy” and ranged instead from neutral to pessimistic.³⁷

Despite the efforts by American progressives to learn from the ongoing Soviet social and economic experiments, domestically any Soviet influence whatsoever was repudiated by American law enforcement authorities. Donner argues that Hynes’ combined influence in “union-busting and radical-hunting” caused southern California to perpetuate its “powerful alliance of businessmen, boosters, superpatriots, and right-wing evangelicals” into the most infamous of America’s “red scare” periods, the 1950s.³⁸ The LAPD’s chief through the 1950s was the legendary William H. Parker (Parker had ironically begun his career as an undercover agent assigned by Hynes’ red squad to penetrate radical groups), who according to Donner fancied himself a “Savior of Civilization” in the face of the looming communist threat to America.³⁹ Not only did Parker’s rhetorical style represent a continuation of Hynes’, where he “inveighed

³⁷ Feuer (137) relates that the insights of Herbert Hoover, who “knew more about Russian minerals than any man in the world” through his period spent as a mining engineer in Siberia, were “managerial, hierarchical, and paternalistic.” While Hoover was keenly aware that his work in Siberia could have netted him “the largest engineering fees ever known to man,” he was also horrified to witness many of his Soviet colleagues permanently disappear off of job sites due to political “purging.”

³⁸ Donner (1990), 63.

³⁹ Donner (1990), 246. See also Parker’s various speeches and addresses, collected by O. W. Wilson, ed., *Parker on Police* (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1957), especially “Invasion From Within,” 49-65.

against the flabbiness and permissiveness of American society contrasted with the discipline of the communist revolutionaries,” Parker also painted America’s conflict with Communism in starkly religious terms (Donner calls Parker’s diatribes “Jeremiads”), with America in need of salvation and “moving toward Armageddon,” which would be a final struggle with the ultimate force of evil which was the Soviet Union. Parker’s view that the moral deterioration of America would undermine its security and lead to its downfall is evident in a 1962 interview, in which Parker affirmed his pessimism when asked about America’s future: “... it is hard for me to believe that our society can continue to violate all the fundamental rules of human conduct and expect to survive. I think I have to conclude that this civilization will destroy itself.”⁴⁰

Past to Present: America’s Evolving “Present Dangers”

The use of the term “jeremiads” to describe the 1950s exhortations by LAPD Chief Parker with respect to the foreign threat to America and Americans’ need for self-examination and recantation of immorality and secularism is entirely appropriate, considering the rhetorical similarities to past discourses of threat. In Chapter Four I cited scholars who have advanced the claim that the Puritan jeremiad prefigured the threat discourse of the early Cold War, specifically that threat loomed ominously and

⁴⁰ Donald McDonald, “The Police: An Interview By Donald McDonald With William H. Parker, Chief of Police of Los Angeles” (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1962), 25.

continuously, and catastrophe could strike at any time.⁴¹ This is the conclusion of David Campbell, specifically where Cold War rhetoric is concerned, and his analysis partially reflects the conclusions of Sacvan Bercovitch (who, in turn, had drawn from and built upon the work of Perry Miller) about the influence of the jeremiad on American conservative rhetorical style more generally. While I agree with Campbell, I would caution that his focus on the jeremiad as a framework for recognizing threats runs the risk of obscuring the second and equally important feature of the jeremiad, namely, the call for self-examination and recognition of the need for repentance.⁴² In the jeremiad, danger looming larger is a direct corollary of worsening moral deterioration. Recognizing this distinct element of the jeremiad should bring into clearer focus the rapid evolution of national security discourse from the early “red scare,” during which the DAR’s triumphalist rhetoric projected a confident and robust image of American nationalism confronting a weak and dissipated grouping of alternate forces of communism and pacifism and internationalism, into the slightly later pattern articulated by individuals such as Red Hynes, which asserted that the communist threat was all the worse because of Americans’ moral deterioration. Combating the menace, then, required examining America’s own body politic and detecting and correcting its

⁴¹See the discussion of Puritan rhetoric in Chapter Four, 145-148.

⁴²While briefly acknowledging the “omnipresence of sin” in the jeremiad tradition (33), Campbell seems to have overlooked the pointed observation by Bercovitch that students of the Puritans tend to stress the jeremiads’ “sense of impending doom” more than their continuous reiteration of the iniquities of the very people to whom they were directed. In this sense, Campbell falls into a similar trap as other scholars of Puritan rhetoric who, according to Bercovitch, “have fostered a series of misrepresentations of both the jeremiad and of the Puritan concept of errand.” With this claim, Bercovitch is in part proffering a critique of Perry Miller’s principle theme in his *Errand Into the Wilderness*. See Campbell, 33; and Bercovitch (1978), 4-17 (especially 5-6).

shortcomings. Only after this process of purging and cleansing of America itself could the enemy – which was not weak and contemptible, but rather mighty and formidable – be overcome.

One need not reach as far back as the Puritan jeremiads of the late 17th century to find religiously charged narrative that associates external threats with internal moral deficiencies. More than a century after the first jeremiads, during the same period that the Congregationalist minister and part-time geographer Jedidiah Morse was producing the first American-authored geography texts, he and other orthodox New England theologians were railing against the sharp trend of religious backsliding among Americans that had climaxed since the end of the revolutionary period. In addition to his often controversial work as a geographer, Morse was one of many strict conservative clergymen in the “Edwardean” (called by some scholars “Edwardsian”) tradition, a group of primarily New Englanders who saw themselves as influenced by the Puritan revival theology of the fire-brand preacher of the circa 1740 Great Awakening, Jonathan Edwards.⁴³ Prominent among this group was the grandson of Edwards, Timothy Dwight, who was Yale president and a close friend of Morse.⁴⁴ As

⁴³Bercovitch (1978), 94, notes that 20th conservative millennialism and revivalism traces its origin to the Edwardsian revivals of the 1740s, during which Edwards most famous jeremiad, “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” was first delivered. See also Perry Miller’s chapter on Edwards, “Jonathan Edwards and the Great Awakening, 153-166.

⁴⁴The centrality of Dwight and his close friend Morse in the circles of orthodox New England Congregationalism is noted in James King Morse, *Jedidiah Morse: A Champion of New England Orthodoxy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939); Robert Edson Lee, “Timothy Dwight and the Boston Palladium,” *The New England Quarterly* 35:2 (June 1962), 229-239; Gary Nash, “The American Clergy and the French Revolution,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 22:3 (July 1965), 392-412; K. Alan Snyder, “Foundations of Liberty: The Christian Republicanism of Timothy Dwight and Jedidiah Morse,” *New England Quarterly* 56:3 (September 1983), 382-397; Jane Kamensky, ““In These Contrasted Climes,

Vernon Stauffer noted in his early 20th century analysis of New England orthodox clergymen's reaction to what they considered subversive movements in the early American republic, many a late 18th century "modern Jeremiah" was observing from the pulpit that dire threats to the moral, civil, and religious order were lurking within American communities. A complex interrelationship of Americans' own sins alongside foreign threats was producing a situation that was "desperate almost beyond remedy."⁴⁵ Lest his readers suspect that clergymen's voices were peripheral and unheard, Stauffer asserted that theirs were not mere "pulpit utterances of men... who stood apart from the main currents of thought and life in their day," and he demonstrated the prevalence of such threat discourse by noting proclamations by religious organizations about the moral deterioration in America producing a situation of vulnerability to external threats.⁴⁶ For example, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United

How Chang'd the Scene': Progress, Declension, and Balance in the Landscapes of Timothy Dwight," *The New England Quarterly* 63:1 (March 1990), 20-108. Ironically, Dwight's contributions as a travel writer, have come to the attention of landscape historians, as evidenced by Kamensky's work, as well as by numerous passages in Lawson-Peebles' *Landscape and Written Expression in Revolutionary America*, especially 143-151; and John R. Stilgoe, "Smiling Scenes," in *Views and Visions: American Landscape Before 1830*, edited by Edward J. Nygren (Washington, DC: The Corcoran Gallery of Art, 1986), 211-228. Stilgoe contrasts the Dwight's aesthetic appreciation of landscape with Morse's more utilitarian approach and distrust of beauty (226), but Kamensky claims that Stilgoe overstates this point and that many travel writers exhibited a mixture of appreciation and distrust (88). Fundamentally, it is interesting to see one orthodox New England clergyman - Dwight - depicted as an imaginative geographer in recent critically informed literature, for all that he was a "leisured traveller" (Lawson-Peebles, 215), alongside a second orthodox New England clergyman - Morse - who attempted to be a more systematic geographer.

⁴⁵ Vernon Stauffer, *New England and the Bavarian Illuminati* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1918), 97-98. Stauffer quotes a published sermon by Nathan Strong, "A Sermon, Preached on the State Fast, April 6, 1798" (Hartford, 1798). A contemporary sermon that highlighted the foreign origin of social threats is by David Osgood, "Some Facts Evincive of the Atheistical, Anarchical, and in Other Respects, Immoral Principles of the French Republicans, Stated in a Sermon Delivered on the 9th of May, 1798" (Boston, 1798).

⁴⁶ Stauffer, 99-100.

States of America officially bemoaned “a general defection from God and corruption of the public principles and morals.”⁴⁷

The use of the term “defection” in the context of an early American jeremiad aimed at describing mounting threats to public order and security carries several notable implications. First, it suggests that American security was being equated with its collective moral well-being; and *defects*, that is, impurities in the population, could help produce a climate of political and social insecurity. Second, it tends to reinforce, as was specified in many of the published sermons (including those of Morse) by the late 1790s, that a particular religious ideology was both appropriate and desirable for diffusion throughout America’s national space; and conversely, it implies that diffusion of alternate ideologies is evidence of the incursion of foreign influence, which by definition was threatening. And third, it casts the fundamental conflict that threatens America’s security as a meta-narrative of ever-present crisis in which a deep and unambiguous binary divide exists between what is good for America and what is not.

Chapter Four already presented Jedidiah Morse in conjunction with his central role, during the early American republic, of bringing geography pedagogy to bear upon the process of transforming North American terrain into national territory. While it alluded to Morse’s inclination by the late 1790s to believe that American social and moral order was threatened by belief systems of European and specifically French origin, I wish to return to that matter, because it has been cited by several of the authors

⁴⁷ *Acts and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, May 17, 1798* (Philadelphia, 1798), 11.

who treat Morse's career as eerily anticipating the "red scare" mood of the mid twentieth century.⁴⁸ More than just a coincidental similarity of rhetoric, the comparison is apt because of the conscious mobilization of the jeremiad rhetorical style in both cases and because of the implications of the jeremiad style for conjuring the imagination of a binary conflict. As Bercovitch expresses this quality of the jeremiad, "the sacred characteristically defines itself through antithesis. The significance of 'holy land' depends on other lands not being holy."⁴⁹

As I have already observed, Morse's time was divided between two quite distinct professions. Although the Morse literature addresses the interrelationship of his work in each area to some extent (in particular the most recent biography by Moss), the geographers who treat Morse (Brown and Short) do little more than repeat some of Morse's hysterical rantings in 1799 about what he believed to be a French-origin threat to American public order. They leave aside any attempt to critically question how Morse's "avocation and (his) vocation" were in fact quite complimentary.⁵⁰ In both

⁴⁸See Lawson-Peebles, 69-70; Moss, 68-81; Short (1999), 38-39; and Short (2001), 122-123. Indeed, Short implies that Morse's style is consistent with even more recent national security threat discourse when he comments of Morse's assessment of the threat climate in the 1790s, "To the nation that was the light of the world was contrasted an anti-nation of internal enemies and foreign evil-doers," (2001, 123).

⁴⁹Bercovitch (1978), 178.

⁵⁰I intentionally employ this phrase, which is calculated to be ambiguous, from Robert Frost's poem, "Two Tramps in Mud Time." The last stanza comes close to capturing the motivation that one might imagine was driving Morse in his dual career:

"But yield who will to their separation,
My object in living is to unite
My avocation and my vocation
As my two eyes make one in sight.
Only where love and need are one,
And the work is play for mortal stakes,
Is the deed ever really done

professions, Morse enjoyed renown and considerable public influence. The circle of conservative clergymen within which Morse operated in his ministry were prominent among those termed by historian Gary Nash as the “publishing clergy” of the early Republic. Nash tells us that the publishing clergy – that is, clergymen whose sermons were routinely published and widely distributed in cheap leaflet form - included mainly orthodox ministers of the New England and Middle Atlantic states, as opposed to southern clergymen who for whatever reason tended not to publish their sermons. Nash characterizes these men as “highly influential in informing public opinion in the 1790s,” and recent analysis by David Livingstone similarly stresses the prominence of Morse and his circle in shaping public discourse.⁵¹ This suggests that the critical scholars (Campbell, Short, and Lawson-Peebles) who have observed Morse’s outbursts about external threats confronting America are not only correct about noting the rhetorical similarity to jeremiads, but also would be justified in making an even stronger case about Morse’s capacity to shape public understanding of the threat climate. This would in turn allow one to draw even more constructive parallels between the formation and articulation of 1790s public discourse under the influence of the preacher and geographer-pedagogue Morse and the formation of mid 20th century public discourse under conservative spokespersons ranging across the professional spectrum from politicians to evangelists.

For Heaven and the future’s sake.”

⁵¹Nash, 393-394. David Livingstone has recently expounded on Morse, Dwight, and Stanhope Smith in affecting cultural and political discourse alike in “‘Risen Into Empire’: Moral Geographies of the American Republic,” Lecture, Queen’s University of Belfast, March 28, 2003.

As Nash usefully recounts, Morse's infamous denunciation of France in his 1799 pulpit diatribe titled, "Sermon Exhibiting the Present Dangers and Consequent Duties of the Citizens of the United States of America," was delivered at the culmination of several years of mounting discomfiture on the part of the American clergy with the intellectual outcomes of the French Revolution and what was believed to be the pernicious influence of French revolutionary-motivated cultural and intellectual shifts upon the American social climate.⁵² It is well worthwhile to look at some of Morse's zealously inflammatory rhetoric which, as I have indicated, several scholars have already pointed to as uncanny in its similarity to the 1950s ravings of Joseph McCarthy. In his "Present Dangers" sermon, Morse declared:

Yes, my brethren, it is a sacred truth, that our most precious religious and political interests are at this moment imminently endangered, by the hostile designs, the insidious arts and demoralizing principles of a Foreign Nation; and I plainly declare to you that I mean the French Nation."⁵³

After a lengthy description of reports of alleged French plots to invade the United States under the guise of a slave insurrection that was to be mounted on the island of St. Domingo and infiltrate through the southern states, Morse elaborated on the French threat as both overt through armed attack and covert through subversive secret societies:

This intelligence comes to us through a channel which entitles it to credit... That such arts are practicing upon us there is no room for doubt. It has long been

⁵²I will draw substantially upon Nash's analysis in "The American Clergy and the French Revolution," a work that is not considered by Short or Campbell in their brief discussions of Morse's sermons, although it is cited in several contexts by Lawson-Peebles.

⁵³Jedidiah Morse, "Sermon Exhibiting the Present Dangers and Consequent Duties of the Citizens of the United States of America, Delivered at Charlestown, April 25, 1799, The Day of the National Fast. Published at the Request of the Hearers" (Charlestown, MA: Samuel Etheridge, 1799), 12.

suspected that Secret Societies, under the influence and direction of France, holding principles subversive of our religion and government, existed somewhere in this country...Evidence of this suspicion was well founded, has since been accumulating, and I have now in my possession...an official, authenticated list of the names, ages, places of nativity, professions, etc., of the officers and members of a Society of Illuminati, consisting of one hundred members...⁵⁴

In order to appreciate Morse's narrative as providing a pattern for the articulation within American public discourse of national security threats, it is important to see his words not as indicative of a frenzied fixation on France that was his alone, but as consistent with a widespread conservative backlash against not France in particular, but rather against deism, which had been the guiding philosophy of the French Revolution and which had long been popular in American intellectual circles as well.⁵⁵ Although the French Revolution had been uniformly praised by American clergy through its most violent – and where religious institutions were concerned, most destructive – phases, the opinion of the clergy began to shift discernibly by the mid 1790s.⁵⁶ The reasons for the shift are complex and have more to do with domestic

⁵⁴ Ibid, 14-15. The infamous speech by Joseph McCarthy during which he brandished a paper inscribed with a list of names of supposedly bonafide communists employed within the Department of State was delivered some 150 years later, in Wheeling, WV, on February 9, 1950. See "Chronology," in Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, eds., *Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957* (Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, 1996), xxxvii-xliv.

⁵⁵ A widely cited text on American deism is Herbert M. Morais, *Deism in Eighteenth Century America* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1934); and see especially "Deism Militant: Early National Period (1789-1805)," 120-158. More recent work includes Kerry S. Walters, *The American Deists: Voices of Reason and Dissent in the Early Republic* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992).

⁵⁶ In the American South, though the mood is more difficult to gauge because clergy tended not to publish their sermons, Nash and other historians believe that the fear of slave uprisings in French-held areas of North America might spread to southern states kept the clergy firmly cautious of the French Revolution in general, in contrast to the diametrical shift in the northern states from favorable to disapproving. See Nash, 394.

conditions than with any change in the manifest intentions of the French revolutionaries. One clear intent of the French Revolution had been to abolish organized and “revealed” religion, particularly the “tyranny” of the Catholic Church, and replace it with more “rational” alternatives ranging from deism to atheism. The conservative Protestant American clergy were so thrilled to see the destruction of French “popery” that they long excused or ignored the unorthodox alternatives. Moreover, deism was a fashionable philosophy in America and its advocates included many of the country’s most influential and celebrated thinkers and public figures, making deism an imprudent target for the clergy to attack.⁵⁷ And, as Nash points out, deism in America lacked institutional trappings and its practitioners did not aspire to overthrow any American church or unseat any clergy.

However, indications that deism was becoming more of a threat to America began appearing in the early 1790s with the “flood of rationalist literature” into American cities from Europe, mostly in the form of cheap reprints of deistic tracts, such as Thomas Paine’s *Age of Reason*. According to Nash, by 1795 the orthodox clergy were lamenting France’s “vomiting” of such noxious literature upon the United States; and the effects were being observed in American universities, where the “growing addiction of the students, presumably the leaders of the next generation, to the

⁵⁷ Lest one assume that deism flourished primarily in the urbane and cosmopolitan circles of eastern seaboard cities, Morais and Walters both stress the strong following for deism in less settled areas of the New England interior (especially Vermont) and the then western frontier of Kentucky, Tennessee, and inland Pennsylvania. See Morais, 154-158; and Kerry S. Walters, *Rational Infidels: The American Deists* (Durango, CO: Longwood Academics, 1992), 192 and 84-114 (“The Frontier Deist Ethan Allen”). Morais observes that while the notorious “general indifference to religion” in frontier settlements tended to facilitate the inroads of deism, many of these same areas were also responsive to the backlash of evangelical revivalism that soon followed the spread of deism.

rationalist philosophers” was also alarming the clergy, many of whom were also university professors or administrators.⁵⁸ Another turning point identified by Nash involved the emergence of a move to institutionalize deism, through the establishment of organized societies with a regularized creed. Spearheading this effort was America’s most ardent disciple of Paine, Elihu Palmer, a Dartmouth-trained former Presbyterian minister who had publicly renounced the divinity of Christ and become an outspoken deist.⁵⁹ In 1794 Palmer “began trekking up and down the coast to deliver lectures and organize deistical societies,” which distressed the clergy because it suggested an institutional and material dimension to deism might be rapidly evolving, and they believed that this could seriously undermine public and even political order in America.⁶⁰ Kerry Walters underscores the threat that Palmer posed to the orthodox clergy, suggesting that his “insider” skills at persuasive preaching and evangelism made him appear to the conservative clergy to be something of a traitor or even a defector:

Had Palmer remained within the Presbyterian fold, he may well have become one of the early republic’s leading evangelists. He had all the requisite talents and energy for such a calling. As it was, however, he turned this zeal against

⁵⁸Nash, 401-404.

⁵⁹ Kerry S. Walters, *Elihu Palmer’s ‘Principles of Nature’: Text and Commentary* (Wolfebory, NH: Longwood Academics, 1990), 6-15; and Walters (1992), *Rational Infidels*, 192-200.

⁶⁰Nash, 401. What makes Elihu Palmer’s action even more interesting is that he is alleged by a few sources to have functioned as one of Morse’s collection agents of research material for his geography texts, during a one-year sojourn in Augusta, Georgia, around 1794, for the organizing of a deistic club there. G. Adolf Koch, *Religion of the American Enlightenment* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968), 60 and n21, points out that the 1838 *Appleton’s Cyclopaedia of American Biography* makes this claim about the connection between Palmer and Morse, but Koch says that “this has not been authenticated.” An updated online version of the 19th century Appleton’s entry on Palmer can be found at [Virtualology.com, http://famousamericans.net/elihupalmer/](http://famousamericans.net/elihupalmer/). It asserts the same connection between Palmer and Morse, but without any caveat about its authenticity.

orthodoxy and in support of deism, and came close to beating the Christian establishment at its own game. It is little wonder that no other deist – including even the brutally anti-Christian Tom Paine – inspired so much fright and outrage among the faithful.⁶¹

As Snyder echoes, Morse, his friend and colleague Timothy Dwight, and other New England clergy had by 1798 been completely taken in by the “conspiracy theory” that the French Revolution had been the result of the organized deistical subversion of social ideals, and that the widespread admiration in America of the French Revolution and all it represented was evidence that this same subversion was afoot and would soon bring ruin within American communities.⁶² The focus of many openly political sermons, including Morse’s celebrated “Present Dangers” sermon, was the European movement identified as a radical and blatantly anti-Christian form of Freemasonry called the “Illuminism.” A spate of such sermons in 1798 and 1799 was answered with lampooning pamphlet counterblows, such as one cleverly titled, “A View of the New England Illuminati,” in which the author John Ogden contended that the real subversive threat lay in “the Edwardean sect,” consisting of Dwight, Morse, and other New Englanders whose sudden change of heart on the French Revolution exposed deep hypocrisy.⁶³ Calling New England “that seat and centre of priestcraft and spiritual tyranny,” the author said of Morse, “Science he forsakes, and her institutions he prostrates, to promote party, bigotry, and error.” As a parody of the ministers’

⁶¹Walters (1992), 201.

⁶²Snyder, 396-397.

expressed concerns over deism spreading to frontier, Ogden satirically observed that a primary aim of the New England Illuminati was missionary work on the frontier, and that frontier Americans should be on the lookout for this looming peril.⁶⁴

In general, Morse exposed himself to bitter criticism and ridicule by relying overwhelmingly on a single unauthenticated source of information on the presence in America of the so-called "Illuminati" group, a volume called *Proofs of a Conspiracy Against All the Governments and Religions of Europe*, by Scottish scholar John Robison. Just as Morse's detractors relative to his geographic texts denounced his research methodology for being sloppy, derivative, and inattentive to factuality of many details, his detractors on the Illuminati controversy ridiculed his reliance upon a text that many claimed had long since been discounted in Europe where it had originally been published.⁶⁵ Particularly damaging to Morse was correspondence from German geographer Christoph Ebeling that both belittled the Robison book and also suggested to Morse ways that he might improve his geography texts.⁶⁶ As Morse's biographer Moss points out, critics collapsed Morse's twin concerns of geography and "Illuminati-

⁶³John Cosens Ogden, "A View of the New England Illuminati: Who Are Indefatigably Engaged in Destroying the Religion and Government of the United States Under a Feigned Regard For Their Safety, and Under an Impious Abuse of True Religion" (Philadelphia: James Carey, 1799), 17.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 19.

⁶⁵Lawson-Peebles, 68-70; and Moss, 68-69 and 76-78. Both these authors note their debt to Vernon Stauffer's work. See also Stauffer's chapter, "The Illuminati Agitation in New England," 229-360, especially the Section I, "Morse Precipitates the Controversy."

⁶⁶Lawson-Peebles, 68; and Short (1999), 36-37. Chapter Four, 169-172, related how Brown, Short, and Lawson-Peebles all allude to the sloppiness of Morse's geographic research methodologies and his gullibility in accepting material uncritically from distant contributors.

baiting” with biting observations that what should be Morse’s main concern – his congregation – might soon be exasperated over his inattentiveness. One newspaper editor wrote, “... while he is exploring the territory of the United States and hunting up Robison’s Stragglings Illuminati, he must not be surprised if some of his own sheep have strayed...(to) the care of a more attentive shepherd.”⁶⁷

As historian David Brion Davis observes, America’s conservative religious establishment has long been suspicious that ideological movements, religious and irreligious alike, pose threats to national security and social stability. Davis notes that the patterns of reaction in the 19th century against the Masonic movement, Catholicism, and Mormonism, all seen as types of subversion or threats from within, have been similar, and he gives an example of Samuel B. Morse describing the threat from Catholicism in terms strikingly similar to those used by his father to refer to the French Illuminati.⁶⁸ In the 20th century “conspiracy theories” based substantially on the same information that so alarmed Morse, have been present in some of the most extreme and radical national security threat literatures that began to circulate in America first in the early “red scare” following World War One and second from the 1950s red scares on into the later Cold War. Nesta Webster’s 1921 *World Revolution: The Plot Against Civilization* begins with chapters on the Illuminati and on the intellectual subversion of

⁶⁷Moss, 72, quoting the editor of Boston’s *Independent Chronicle* in 1798.

⁶⁸David Brion Davis, “Some Themes of Counter-Subversion: An Analysis of Anti-Masonic, Anti-Catholic, and Anti-Mormon Literature,” *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 47:2 (September 1960), 205-224, p. 207; and David Brion Davis, ed., *The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971).

the French Revolution before proceeding on to topics such as socialism and the Bolshevik Revolution.⁶⁹ Later examples of similarly bizarre conspiracy-oriented literature include William Carr's *Red Fog Over America*, first published in the 1950s with later editions in the 1960s, and Clarence Kelly's *Conspiracy Against God and Man*. These volumes not only provide long accounts of Illuminism and Freemasonry that draw on the exact same 18th century sources that informed Morse's diatribes, but they also manage to connect Illuminism with everything from communism to interracial relationships to "International Jewry" to flouridation of water.⁷⁰ One could easily discount such materials as marginal, if it were not for their resurgence of exposure and popularity through the Internet. Representative sites include the "Jeremiah Project" (www.jeremiahproject.com), which not only includes a lengthy passage on John Robison and his 18th century writing on the Illuminati, but also seems to be consciously modeled after the rhetorical style of the jeremiad.

Science, Security, and Intelligence

The foregoing review and analysis of the tenor of late 18th century national security discourse is a convenient prelude to a discussion of the early Cold War for reasons that go beyond simply the striking similarities in the patterns of threat characterization. More than recognizing the mounting deistic influence as a threat to

⁶⁹Nesta H. Webster, *World Revolution: The Plot Against Civilization* (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1921).

⁷⁰William Guy Carr, *The Red Fog Over America* ([s.l.]: [s.n.], 1968); and Reverend Clarence Kelly, *Conspiracy Against God and Man* (Belmont, MA: Western Islands, 1974).

American social and political stability (and expressing this hysterically through vocal attacks on the ephemeral Illuminati), Morse and the other rigidly orthodox clergy were also recoiling from many aspects of the post-Revolutionary American Enlightenment and its widening influence throughout American culture. As Moss points out, the real target of Morse's political sermons was far more than just the Illuminati; rather, it was the Enlightenment rationality that, all around him, had turned and was continuing to turn Americans of all social classes away from accepting religious explanations for natural and social conditions and looking instead increasingly to science.⁷¹ Morse doggedly clung to an idealized view of the simple faith of pious Americans (particularly the Puritans, of course) of the more distant (and mythic) past, who did not question Divine Providence and who interpreted all changes and events in society and nature alike as indicative of God's presence and intervention in the world of man. Morse construed the Enlightenment as the fundamental threat, because Enlightenment impulses led people, as they searched for explanations for events and outcomes in the world around them: "to ascribe these things to the uncontrollable operation of *natural* causes and to keep out of view the Divine agency."⁷² Yet, as Moss observes, Morse was "clearly... caught between two modes of explanation," as evidenced by his remarks about efforts to explain recent decimating epidemics in Philadelphia and Boston:

From the disagreement among physicians as to the origin, nature, and methods of preventing and healing this malignant disease, and from its remarkable progress and increase, it is very evident that it is brought upon us in

⁷¹Moss, 73-74.

⁷²Morse (1799), 28, emphasis as in original. Also quoted in Moss, 74.

judgement...to punish us for our sins. And however attentive we may be to remove *natural causes*, which ought by no means to be omitted, yet we can have no good reason to expect that this calamity will cease from among us, till the *moral causes* be removed, till we acknowledge the righteous hand of GOD in it, and are truly humble for our sins and reform our lives.⁷³

Thus, it is evident that spokespersons such as Morse, who were clearly mouthpieces for the Federalist faction in the deeply partisan political climate of the late 18th century, were not only vociferously contending that America was threatened by elaborate plots of foreign origin, but that it was also threatened from within by the inclination towards Enlightenment science.⁷⁴ And this provides a suggestive precedent for the pattern that developed early in the Cold War of an ambiguous relationship between science and national security. Just as 18th century “illuminati-baiters” were deeply suspicious of Enlightenment intellectuals and their impulses in the area of scientific explanation, the climate of 20th century “red-baiting” compelled national security experts to likewise be wary of science and of intellectual discourse more generally. This produced a relationship between the security community and the scientific community that was profoundly uneasy, to say the least.

⁷³Morse (1799), 28-29, emphases as in original. Morse then, with baffling logic, compared America with Rome, contending that as long as Rome upheld rigid state-endorsed worship of its panoply of gods, it flourished as a civilization, but once it embraced the atheism of Epicurus (and its emperors began to convert to Christianity, though he omits this point!) it declined and fell.

⁷⁴Reaction to the Enlightenment took many forms, and Morse’s call for a return to pious acceptance of the guiding hand of God in human affairs was just one iteration. The more dominant, of course, was Romanticism, which privileged emotion rather than rationality in interpretation of natural phenomena. For the backlash to the Enlightenment and its implications for geographic thought, see Max Oelschläger, *The Idea of Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), especially Chapter Four, “Wild Nature: Critical Responses to Modernism,” 97-132. Also, Clarence J. Glacken anticipates this backlash at the close of his expansive volume *Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought From Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

Two issues, then, arise from the recognition of the problematic relationship between science and security and must be considered in this section. First, against the backdrop of appraising a broader spectrum of Morse's career and ideological convictions, one might assess the relationship in America between academic geography and the security community as having come full circle by the early Cold War period. And second, as the Cold War hostilities sharpened, the state's capabilities for intelligence and surveillance mounted, and national security was increasingly understood in terms of scientific and technological superiority, the US government sought to impose ever more exacting paradigms of loyalty and trust over the scientists in their midst.

Turning first to the relationship between academic geography and national security discourse, one detects a paradox. Although the oft-described "Father of American geography" stood in many ways against the rational Enlightenment science and saw the ideologies of the Enlightenment as placing American culture and American political security in peril, there has been a recent resurgence of interest among critical historical geographers in revealing the very ways that the ideologies and rational methodologies of the Enlightenment have undergirded modern geography and have contributed to Western geography's high-modernist project of empire.⁷⁵ So in a sense

⁷⁵The work of David Livingstone (1992), *The Geographical Tradition*, and of Livingstone and Charles Withers is prominent on this point, especially as evidenced by the title of the recent Livingstone and Withers edited volume (1999), *Geography and Enlightenment*. All of the authors whose work is collected in that volume make significant contributions to the argument that the modern discipline of geography rests on a foundation of Enlightenment thought. See especially Livingstone's "Geographical Inquiry, Rational Religion, and Moral Philosophy," in which he situates the anthropological work of 1790s Presbyterian clergyman Samuel Stanhope Smith relative to the Enlightenment intellectual climate, and also discusses the contemporaneous work of Morse (109-112); Michael Heffernan's "Historical

one is left to wonder how the American geography could have been “fathered” by an individual who railed against what it was soon to become. However, one might imagine that Morse would have been pleased when - during the formation of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was the predecessor to the CIA - so many academic geographers were called upon to staff the burgeoning need for “area studies,” as well as technical and interpretive cartographic skills, to be brought to bear upon questions of safeguarding American security against foreign threats.⁷⁶ Thus, a discipline informed by the tenets of rational Enlightenment science was not only relied upon in the early

Geographies of the Future: Three Perspectives from France, 1750-1825,” 125-164, which follows the progress of geography through the Enlightenment impulses of the French Revolution; Anne Marie Claire Godlewska’s “From Enlightenment Vision to Modern Science? Humboldt’s Visual Thinking,” 236-275, which reveals how Alexander Von Humboldt’s innovations in observation and reporting of phenomenon anticipate the methodologies of modern geography; and Paul Carter’s “Gaps in Knowledge: The Geography of Human Reason,” 295-318, which observes that “geographical discourse subscribed to the *mythos* of Enlightenment reason” (296). Another interesting way to consider these intellectual shifts entails recognizing the Enlightenment as forcing intellectuals to reevaluate sources of authority undergirding human knowledge, and this is the angle taken by Michael Curry, *The Work in the World: Geographical Practice and the Written Word* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), “Authorship and the Construction of Authority,” 119-142. It is not difficult to discern that much of the objection of Morse and his ilk to the tenets of the Enlightenment centered around the threat to the authority of God, and, in turn, to their own authority within the religious-political establishment.

⁷⁶The OSS was signed into existence by Roosevelt in June 1942 with General William Donovan as its head, and was dissolved by January 1946. Its purpose was to coordinate clandestine intelligence and sabotage operations to support the war effort in its various theatres. See Polmar and Allen, *Encyclopedia of Espionage*, 408-410, for a summary description of the OSS; Robin W. Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), who touches on the OSS throughout his volume, arrayed as it is according to the intelligence associations of a succession individual scholars and groups of scholars, rather than chronologically; and David Rudgers, *Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943-1947* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), whose volume addresses the demise of the OSS and the negotiations over what sort of peacetime agency should succeed it. Operating both in the United States and abroad, the OSS constituted five divisions: Secret Intelligence, Secret Operations, Research and Analysis, Morale Operations (or “Black Propaganda”), and Counterintelligence (or “X-2”), according to Polmar and Allen. The OSS employed an eclectic array of professionals and social elites, including prominent scholars and intellectuals, attorneys, artists, economists, and financiers. The perception of the group as filled with “limousine liberals” (Winks, 58), as well as with a disproportionate number of heirs to great fortunes (according to Rudgers, 10), produced many popular jests that “OSS” actually “stood for ‘Oh So Social’...or ‘Oh So Socialist’” (Winks, 58).

20th century to advance the interests of “empire” (by the European colonial powers, as well as by America, according to Neil Smith’s new volume),⁷⁷ but it was also instrumental in providing the skills and expertise necessary to launch the formal US intelligence community soon after World War II. This aspect of American geography’s disciplinary history has not been exhaustively studied nor the theoretical implications analyzed, although Neil Smith’s concentration upon Isaiah Bowman’s work within the Roosevelt administration may stimulate such work. Scant mention was made in American geography journals during the war or the early Cold War about the emerging relationship between geography and intelligence, although Association of American Geographers (AAG) President Derwent Whittlesley penned a June 1941 *Annals* editorial in which he related ongoing efforts by the National Research Council to draw up a plan to systematize the participation of academic geographers in wartime projects.⁷⁸ At the close of the war, an *Annals* article by E. A. Ackerman contended that the participation of geographers in wartime intelligence had revealed inadequacies in human geography training and methodologies.⁷⁹ In 1949, two years after the CIA had been established, Leonard Wilson, who had participated in the OSS as a wartime map

⁷⁷For the deep complicity of geographers in the colonial projects of European powers, as well as in the war efforts of European Allied powers, see the essays contained in Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith, eds., *Geography and Empire* (Cambridge: Blackwell), especially Andrew Kirby, “What Did You Do In the War, Daddy?”, 300-315. For Smith’s recent argument of the centrality of geographer Isaiah Bowman to what he describes as an American imperialist project to dominate the globe with the forces of market capitalism, see Smith’s *American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization*.

⁷⁸Derwent Whittlesley, “War, Peace, and Geography: An Editorial Foreword,” *Annals of the AAG* 31:2 (June 1941), 77-82.

⁷⁹E. A. Ackerman, “Geographic Training, Wartime Research, and Immediate Professional Objectives,” *Annals of the AAG* 35:4 (December 1945), 121-143, pp. 128-129.

analyst, contributed an article to *Geographical Review* in which he implied that the discipline was benefiting from its association with professional intelligence, because wartime demands for specialized cartographic analyses were the catalyst to many needed innovations in technique.⁸⁰ Also, he indicated that the OSS director General Bill Donovan recognized the need to incorporate a wide range of maps, geographic texts, and first-hand travelers' accounts pertaining to the various locations of war activity into the wartime intelligence program when he issued a "nation-wide appeal" that "brought in a large number of maps and considerable travel information."⁸¹

From the wartime OSS to the post-1947 CIA, the role of professional scholars and scientists from a spectrum of academic disciplines has largely been de-emphasized within the vast and colorful literature on U.S. intelligence history. This literature is characterized correctly by Robin Winks as "riddled with sloppy, hasty, ill-formed, conclusions, with amateur research that ignores the scholar's rudimentary methodologies, with modes of inquiry that overlook virtually all peripheral or ancillary research channels...and by simple – and complex – falsehood and evasion."⁸² Thus,

⁸⁰ Leonard S. Wilson, "Lessons Learned from the Experience of the Map Information Section, OSS," *Geographical Review* 39:2 (April 1949), 298-310, p. 310. Wilson acknowledges on his opening page that he is "indebted to Major General William S. Donovan," surely the only time the flamboyant and controversial central intelligence visionary "Wild Bill Donovan" was ever the recipient of such a tribute in an American geography journal.

⁸¹ Wilson, 302. One engaging anecdote pertaining to the amassing of geographic information from unexpected sources by the OSS is related by Wilson, 302-303: "One of the largest collections of Japanese topographic maps...was uncovered in a Department of Agriculture vault, where the original procurer, an expert on chestnut blight, had carefully locked them on December 7, 1941, because he did not want the responsibility of caring for them!"

⁸² Winks, 476-477.

none of it need be recounted here at any great length. A majority of the histories of the CIA are first-person memoir style accounts by retired or aging former CIA “insiders,” which tend to be self-serving and journalistic, and they rarely include a scholarly approach to sources or citations. Rather, their putative authority derives from the prestige and former positions of the authors.⁸³ One exception is David Rudgers’ recent volume on the years leading up to the CIA’s formal establishment in 1947, which, although Rudgers was a CIA employee, sets out to present a much-needed corrective to the dominant “founding myth” of the CIA’s immaculate conception from “the unique genius of William J. Donovan in the face of unenlightened resistance from troglodytes” (2). Instead of being personality-driven, as so many accounts of intelligence community history tend to be, Rudgers’ work is an analysis of the early CIA as an institution, arising from a complex interplay of the interests and needs of other government institutions. He insightfully observes that because of the classification level and proprietary nature of government records that would support scholars’ efforts to take any approach to studying the intelligence community other than a personality-based one (that uses personal memoirs for documentation), such studies must wait decades for classification controls to lapse and materials to pass into public domain.⁸⁴

⁸³Two examples are a first-person account of the CIA’s early decades by former CIA employee Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA* (Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, Ltd., 1976); the memoir of long-time Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Colby (with Peter Forbath), *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978); and an account of a particularly problematic period of CIA history by Carter Administration DCI, Stansfield Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985).

⁸⁴Rudgers discusses his intent and methodologies in his introduction, 1-3. Winks deals with similar themes of the difficulties of writing and researching intelligence history in an essay that begins his “Notes” section, 470-483, and especially 476-480, where he observes that one difficulty in finding quality

Rudgers himself relies upon memoir accounts in certain areas, however, such as on the issue of scholars being integrated into the OSS and other government agencies such as Department of State and later the CIA, when he draws from the work of William Langer, eminent Harvard historian and head of the OSS Research and Analysis division.⁸⁵ Of particular interest is Rudgers description of the resentment within State of the addition of a new layer of area studies specialists with putatively superior abilities to analyze intelligence threats:

The new order of intelligence did not graft easily on to the traditional structure of the State Department. Primary opposition to the idea of a strong Office of Intelligence came from the department's regional geographic offices, led by traditional diplomats. These foreign service officers felt that the nature of their work made them 'intelligence officers' who were capable of evaluating foreign events themselves. They therefore saw no need for an officer that might second-guess their own judgement.⁸⁶

This passage is important for several reasons. First, it is a reminder that "intelligence" as a process and as a way of formulating and evaluating knowledge about the world has been present in the modern state bureaucracy irrespective of the presence of a formal agency through which those functions might be consolidated. Second, it is a reminder that those intelligence functions were logically accorded to people who considered the

analysis of the theoretical and historical implications of the intelligence community is that "academicians prefer to denounce the existence of intelligence agencies from a distance rather than come to terms with them," while many readers "thrive on revelations and sensation," a combination that practically assures that the field of "intelligence studies" will be devoid of serious work.

⁸⁵ Rudgers, 10; and William L. Langer, *In and Out of the Ivory Tower: The Autobiography of William L. Langer* (New York: Neale Watson Academic Publications, 1977).

⁸⁶ Rudgers, 53. Rudgers also observes that the interrelationships between OSS and many individual government agencies and academic institutions alike remain unexplored by contemporary scholars (190, n22).

world and production of knowledge about the world geographically.⁸⁷ And third, it suggests that the addition of a new cadre of professionals for the production of intelligence knowledge was essentially replicating many of the same procedures for collection and analysis of information that already existed – albeit, not designated “intelligence” - and that these procedures were also organized geographically. Having formed the OSS out of a need to accentuate intelligence as a wartime function (despite its formal presence in peacetime under quasi-diplomatic guises), once it became clear that the “peace” would have to be managed like a war and that the “peace” would in fact become a “Cold War,” these wartime intelligence structures were modified to become a permanent part of civilian executive branch government, following years of discussion and debate⁸⁸

One final thing to be noted from materials that recount the foundations and early years of the intelligence community, particularly the CIA, is the frequency of rhetorical or symbolic appeals to the American revolutionary period. Quotations from George Washington regarding the value of intelligence appear as dedicatory passages in literature on the Cold War intelligence community, and intelligence community “insider” publications make liberal reference to the American Revolution as having set

⁸⁷ William Appleton Williams, *America in a Changing World: The History of the United States in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978), alludes repeatedly to the tendency of policymakers to rely upon firsthand reports from Americans residing overseas, such as businessmen, industrialists, and missionaries, whose accounts were collected by diplomats abroad and conveyed to Washington through diplomatic pouches. As Williams suggests, such reports were generally taken as credible eyewitness accounts and suitably authoritative to serve as the basis for American policies and responses overseas.

⁸⁸ This debate is contained in the *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950*, “Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,” Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1996.

the pattern for the use of clandestine means to confront and defeat an enemy.⁸⁹ Additionally, the presence of a life-sized statue of American revolutionary hero and martyr Nathan Hale, who was intercepted by the British while on a spy mission and hanged, just outside the main entrance to the original CIA Headquarters building at Langley, VA attests to the CIA appealing directly to the American Revolution as a source of rhetoric and metaphor as to the nature of threats to the United States and how to use intelligence methodologies to alleviate threats.⁹⁰

As America continued to codify its “society of security” following the second World War,⁹¹ particularly with the formal establishment of the CIA, the already secretive approach to scientific scholarship -insofar as it was mobilized for government projects – was accentuated. Thanks to the HUAC, which since 1938 had been fingering and interrogating Americans for alleged subversive activities, the associations and personal leanings of a variety of American intellectuals were already suspect, and a perception that American universities were harboring communist sympathizers had

⁸⁹Rudgers’ overleaf quotes George Washington writing in 1777 that “(t)he necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and . . . you keep the whole matter as secret as possible.” An unclassified Counterintelligence Reader produced by the National Counterintelligence Center, edited by Frank J. Rafalko, clarifies the Revolutionary period as a precedent for modern intelligence in a lengthy chapter to “The American Revolution and the Post-Revolutionary Era: A Historical Legacy,” 1-38. Polmar and Allen’s *Encyclopedia of Espionage* includes many entries on American revolutionary period figures and events, including Washington, Nathan Hale, John Andre, and Benedict Arnold.

⁹⁰Winks describes the Nathan Hale statue and the process surrounding its placement at CIA Headquarters, 15-19. It is a cast of a Hale statue that stands on the Old Campus of Yale University, and its reproduction for the CIA was undertaken by CIA Assistant General Counsel and Yale alumnus Walter Pforzheimer. The statue depicts Hale about to be hanged, with the noose draped around his neck, and his apocryphal words, “I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country,” are carved on the pedestal.

⁹¹David Campbell uses this term, 255-256, attributing it to Michel Foucault.

become widely accepted by the conservative political mainstream.⁹² With the conclusion of the War believed as having been brought about through America's scientific prowess and the ability of American scientists (working under the umbrella of the Manhattan Project) to perfect a functional atomic bomb, the Cold War took shape precisely around the question of rivalry over scientific superiority. Obviously, the Soviet Union was the only state able to rival the United States in terms of overall scientific proficiency.⁹³ Thus, the conservative attitude over the personal ideological leanings of American scientists who were the custodians of the knowledge and expertise that ensured American supremacy in the Cold War rivalry – particularly in light of latent suspicions since at least the 1920s of Communist subversion of American intellectuals - grew beyond mere concern and approached hysteria.

Columbia University law professor William Gellhorn wrote in 1950 that, "It is not too much to say that the loyalty of scientists as a group has become a matter about which there is wide public concern," in a volume that examines the problematic

⁹²For background on the HUAC, which in 1947 turned its attention to figures from the entertainment industry before focusing on a succession of scientists involved in classified atomic weapons-related research in the later 1940s and early 1950s, see Frank Donner, *The Un-Americans* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1961); Walter Goodman, *The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1968); and Don Edwards, *Putting our House in Order: The Case Against HUAC* (Washington, DC: Americans for Democratic Action, 1969). For archival background on the HUAC from the perspective of public relations, see *This is YOUR House Committed on Un-American Activities* (Washington, DC: Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, September 19, 1954).

⁹³As Louis Feuer's work points out, Americans' sense of the great potential of Soviet technological and scientific proficiency had been revealed by American progressives in visits to the Soviet Union from the late 'teens through the early 1930s, and particularly during the Depression years.

interrelationship of science and security that began to evolve after World War II.⁹⁴ Written early in a period in which the safeguarding of America's national security became an obsession, Gellhorn addresses not only the physical barriers that came to be erected around the "knowledge and instruments that constitute military superiority" (2), but also figurative walls formed through procedures and regimes that attempted to police compliance as well as loyalty itself. The spatiality of this new security community presents itself in two distinct, yet interconnected, ways. First, sites become unmistakably linked to national security because of the physical attributes of the facilities – remote locations relative to nearby towns, the presence of walls, fortified fences, and barbed-wire, guards that outnumber scientists, military infrastructure located nearby, etc. And second, work settings become security settings due to the nature of the information that is circulated within them, with a discursively constructed "line" separating information that may circulate freely from information that is "secret." Of that imagined line, Gellhorn tells us:

Once it has been drawn, it momentarily determines the dimensions of the area of secrecy. And once that area has been defined by appropriate public authority, there immediately arises a proper interest in assuring that all who work within it will scrupulously observe its boundaries. So long as the boundaries exist, they must not be ignored. (76-77)

Thus, it is possible to understand the process by which people are "cleared" for inclusion into a space that can be both physical and material as well as discursive.

⁹⁴Walter Gellhorn, *Security, Loyalty, and Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1950), 120. While the discussion remains focused primarily on Gellhorn, I will indicate page numbers parenthetically in the main text.

People who are suitable to be cleared for access to specific facilities or more broadly constructed discursive spaces alike would be those most likely to observe and respect boundaries of various kinds and the rules through which boundaries are constructed. Logically, then, people who are considered deviant and “defective” are less likely to be cleared for access to physical and discursive spaces of security, because personal flaws and weaknesses suggest a lax attitude to the rules through which boundaries are constructed. As Gellhorn reminds us, the activities and associations for which people could be denied a “security clearance” included membership in or sympathy to subversive organizations, advocacy of violent revolution, and homosexuality (87-88), all of which seemed to suggest a willingness to breach conventional moral boundaries separating acceptable personal conduct from unacceptable personal conduct.

Gellhorn observes, that of course, “there is nothing entirely novel about censorship and security controls in research centers” (9), and he notes that the rationale and procedures for the classification of information by the US government date back to statutes from 1789, regarding justified “custody, use and preservation of the records, papers, and property” by respective government departments (27). Through Gellhorn’s discussion is revealed how the logic in the early Cold War towards classifying information rested upon the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which presumed that the capability to wage atomic warfare was the single dominating factor in determining superiority of a state; so protecting atomic secrets was virtually synonymous with protecting national security (19-27). Consequently, then, because communists “are linked ideologically and emotionally to the Soviet Union, the only nation remotely capable of forcefully

challenging the military dominance of the United States...it is natural that the scientist is an especial focus of the pervasive concern about Communists” (4-5). However, one purpose of Gellhorn’s work is to reveal the pitfalls in the logic of the new security paradigm: “It may be that the nation loses more than it gains when, in order to pass on a scientist’s eligibility to participate in research, it seeks to examine and confine his political attitudes, his personal associations, and his intellectual drifts” (5). While referring to Klaus Fuchs as a concession that deliberate acts of treason by scientists are theoretically possible (7-8),⁹⁵

Gellhorn’s theme is that the security community stands to lose needed expertise by eliminating scientists from important projects on the basis of perceived loyalties, and he quotes Truman (who himself was deeply ambivalent about the concept of loyalty oaths despite his signing an Executive Order that demanded a loyalty oath of Federal employees⁹⁶), who observed that in a democracy, “(w)e cannot drive scientists into our

⁹⁵Klaus Fuchs was cleared for atomic bomb research in England in 1940, and was assigned temporarily to the US atomic research laboratory in 1944. He confessed in 1950 to espionage and to being handled by the Soviet KGB in 1950. See Robert Chadwell Williams, *Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). It should be noted that at the time of Gellhorn’s writing, the still highly controversial case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and the compromise of atomic secrets for which they were convicted and executed, had not yet completely unfolded, as the two were arrested and charged in July of 1950. There is a significant literature on the Rosenbergs, most of it written in sensationalistic style for a popular audience, which includes such recent volumes as Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, *The Rosenberg File: A Search for the Truth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); and Sam Roberts, *The Brother: The Untold Story of Atomic Spy David Greenglass and How He Sent His Sister Ethel Rosenberg To the Electric Chair* (New York: Random House, 2001).

⁹⁶ According to Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1973) 78-79, Truman was predisposed to deep skepticism when it came to loyalty oaths due to the Civil War period experience of civilians, particularly women, from his home area of western Missouri. Many were forced at gunpoint into pledging loyalty to the Union, and expelled from their farms even if they did so. Truman’s own grandmother had suffered such treatment, and Truman often spoke of this as the source of his wariness regarding the government seeking to establish concrete definitions of loyalty. Truman’s ambivalent position on this point brings to mind one of the key

laboratories, but, if we tolerate reckless or unfair attacks, we can certainly drive them out” (6). And he notes that one failure of the regulations requiring loyalty oaths of scientists employed by the federal government is the inability of regulatory and compliance frameworks to distinguish between those scientists’ work assignments that are relevant to national security and those that are relevant only to the general public welfare: “The personal beliefs of the seismologist, the poultry disease specialist, and the oceanographer should cease being a matter of governmental concern except as they may be objectively reflected in their actions” (171). Gellhorn theorized that the idea of “loyalty” as an abstraction, rather than “security” as a more objectifiable condition, not only led to the overwhelming reliance upon insinuation and innuendo to ascertain “disloyalty” (Gellhorn tells us on page 152 that “Federal employees have even been interrogated about possessing Paul Robeson records or Howard Fast novels...”), but also caused American scientists to deliberately turn away from particular sources of information (Gellhorn gives the example on pages 161-162 of the once widely-read *American Review of Soviet Medicine*) for fear that the enforcers of loyalty oaths would misunderstand the intent behind obtaining and reading such materials.

But at the same time, scientists were locked into a problematic relationship with the security community because of the damage to national security that, according to the pervasive discourse, would ensue if they happened to be “compromised” by the Soviet

themes present in the recent work of David Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (see Chapter Five, 208 and n14), namely that the restoration of “Union” was in large part rhetorical, national “loyalty” remained deeply informed by territorial identities at regional and local scales, and the contested loyalties produced during the Civil War continued to affect the lived experiences of Americans virtually a century later.

Union. "Compromise" in this context might mean a variety of things, including the following: a pre-existing and undetected relationship with a communist or a communist organization which represented a conduit for the passage of information to the Soviet intelligence apparatus; a "recruitment" by a Soviet intelligence officer, that is, the instituting of a willing association, which would be concealed from the scientists' American associates, but under the auspices of which the scientist would pass information to the Soviet Union; and the defection of the scientist to the Soviet Union or to a Soviet-controlled country, either as the culmination of a previous recruitment or due to ideological leanings long held and nursed secretly by the scientist.⁹⁷ The defection was the worst kind of compromise, because the scientist's physical departure placed him entirely at the disposal of Soviet intelligence, which could then freely and leisurely avail itself of whatever knowledge the scientist possessed, as well as whatever documents or materials he may have brought with him. Additionally, a defected American scientist, by virtue of having physically inhabited various research spaces and facilities for long periods, could potentially provide valuable firsthand observation from a privileged vantage point to which the Soviets would otherwise not have access.

Naturally, when compromises of various types occurred, and if the worst happened – if an American scientist actually defected – the Intelligence Community rallied around to not only conduct "damage assessments" of the kinds of information

⁹⁷ As a foundation to my references to intelligence tradecraft terms such as "compromise" and "recruitment," I have drawn upon Allen Dulles, *Craft of Intelligence*; Polmar and Allen *Encyclopedia of Espionage*; the essays contained in Robertson, *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*; and discussions of intelligence community tradecraft in Mark Riebling, *Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and the CIA* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994).

that was likely to have been revealed to the enemy, but also to attempt retroactively to determine how the scientist could have been susceptible to the compromise. Such was the case, of course, with the two National Security Agency cryptographers (discussed in Chapter Two, 78-80) Bernon Mitchell and William Martin, who defected to the Soviet Union by way of Cuba in 1960. Their act of defection was studied exhaustively over the years that followed, and the internal security procedures of the NSA were closely scrutinized, including the screening criteria for prospective employees. The resulting report, which was submitted to the HUAC in 1962, insinuated that the pair of young men had exhibited homosexual tendencies and other “deviant” behavior, but that lack of clarity among personnel screeners over exclusion criteria resulted in their being hired despite those characteristics.⁹⁸

Security, Intelligence, and Movement – The “Fellow Traveler”

As we have just seen, Gellhorn has theorized opposing security climates, one characterized by secrecy and the other by freely circulating information, in terms of barricaded and bounded spaces – physical and discursive alike. This should resonate in a rather obvious way with previous discussions of what occurs in the process of intelligence gathering in general and of defection in particular. As Chapter Two presented in theoretical terms, the defector “un-does” the space from which he comes, but the most straightforward way of doing that in a setting of intelligence-gathering is to

⁹⁸HUAC report, 1962, *Security Practices in the National Security Agency: Defection of Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin*. (See Chapter Two, n44 for full citation.)

reveal the information that would otherwise remain restrained within that space from which the defector has just departed. Moreover, it is the general concept of movement that so threatens the security paradigms of which Gellhorn writes. Information essential to national security is restricted to certain physical and discursive spaces, as well as to certain people. The potential movement of guarded information outside of those spaces – through the outward movement of people, or through the breaching of the barriers that purport to safeguard the space, allowing inward movement of contaminating or compromising factors – is the fundamental security risk.

Of course, controlling the movement into and out of the state by people and material goods of all kinds, as well as controlling the circulation within the state by people and goods, have been pointed to recently by John Torpey as fundamental to the process by which the state consolidate's power.⁹⁹ In fact, Torpey suggests persuasively that the authority to regulate movement be placed alongside the authority to control the means of production and the authority to control violence, all with respect to the state's territorial borders, to form the basis of our codified understanding of the definition of the modern state. With the importance of movement demonstrated by the state's patently obvious efforts to regulate and control it, conceiving of threats to the security of the state in terms of things that move – people and information alike – becomes increasingly easy.

Harking back to the HUAC, an almost uncanny indication that communist subversion was indeed fundamentally associated with mobility is found in the term

“fellow traveler” that is revealed by the Committee in its 1954 public-relations booklet as a “code term” of sorts used by communists to designate one another.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, the solidly converse relationship between movement and security is even further clarified when one stops to reflect that punitive measures taken against people who are identified as threats to the security of the state include both the forcing and the sanctioning of movement.¹⁰¹ For example, as Eric Bentley’s edited account of HUAC hearings tells us, individuals about whom the Committee harbored particular suspicion and concern would commonly have their passports revoked as an effort to prevent their further travel to the Soviet Union.¹⁰² This occurred with playwright Arthur Miller; singer Paul Robeson, who had gained a reputation for abrasive exercise of his right to free expression while in the Soviet Union, as well as with Willard Uphaus, a pacifist religious figure from Connecticut who had sought travel to the Soviet Union to express ecumenical Christian views. In addition to basing passport withholding on attempts to prove that these individuals had previously misused their passports (by traveling to countries other than what they listed on their passport applications), the rationale for

⁹⁹See Torpey (2000), *The Invention of the Passport*.

¹⁰⁰See This is YOUR House Committee on Un-American Activities, 24. This section contains explanations under the headings, “What does the committee consider a ‘fellow traveler’ to be?” and “Is the ‘fellow traveler’ dangerous?”

¹⁰¹I am not primarily thinking of detention in a prison cell here, although imprisonment can certainly be understood as the ultimate sanction against movement.

¹⁰²Eric Bentley, ed., *Thirty Years of Treason: Excerpts from Hearings Before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1938-1968* (New York: Viking Press, 1971), “Unauthorized Use of United States Passports,” 727-844, a section which includes the transcripts of testimony before the Committee by Paul William Uphaus, Arthur Miller, and Paul Robeson.

denying further travel stemmed from an unspoken assumption that America's cultural prestige was a constituent part of its national security; and these men could damage America's cultural prestige by speaking out against America in public settings in communist countries (presumably, misrepresenting American cultural and social conditions), and this could indirectly contribute to the erosion of national security.

Conversely, deportation – that is, forced ejection from state territory - was likewise employed punitively on those who were seen as a threat to national security. An example that is surely the most relevant to the early Cold War period with its prevailing climate of “red scares” concerns the harassment, arrest, and deportation of Chinese-American rocket scientist Tsien Hsue-shen (generally referred to in American journalistic accounts as H.S. Tsien).¹⁰³ When Tsien emigrated to the United States from mainland China at the age of 24 in 1935, he was already a promising scientist in the emerging field of rocket propulsion. After completing a Ph.D at Caltech in Pasadena, California, he distinguished himself during the war for work highly classified defense projects at Pasadena's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), and he continued research at JPL and teaching at Caltech after the war. In 1950, when a former friend and Caltech intellectual Sidney Weinbaum was arrested for communist party membership, Tsien was implicated as having been associated in the late 1930s with the same social club at Caltech that Weinbaum had been in, which had organized membership for the

¹⁰³Two popular book-length accounts of Tsien's ordeal are William L. Ryan and Sam Summerlin, *The China Cloud: America's Tragic Blunder and China's Rise to Nuclear Power* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1967); and the more recent volume by Asian-American popular historian, Iris Chang, *Thread of the Silkworm* (New York: BasicBooks, 1995).

Communist Party. What turned out to be the federal government's doggedly discharged case against Tsien hinged flimsily on a communist party identity card from the 1930s that Tsien appeared to have filled out but never signed. Moreover, a primary government witness, who not only testified against Tsien but also provided "expert" testimony about communist cells in southern California turned out to be none other than the retired William "Red" Hynes, who "stepped out of the past and into the limelight" to bolster the government's efforts to characterize the mild and brilliant Tsien as a subversive communist and a threat to national security.¹⁰⁴ Figure 6.3 shows Hynes testifying against Tsien at his deportation hearing in November 1950. With mounting pressure on him, and facing an incarceration in an INS detention center, Tsien had shipped a large quantity of his professional papers to family members in Shanghai in August 1950, which were interdicted and inspected by the US Customs Service out of suspicion of being "secret data."¹⁰⁵ After several years of waiting while his case was adjudicated and appealed, Tsien was finally deported from the United States to the Communist China in August 1955, where he received, according to Iris Chang, "a hero's welcome."¹⁰⁶ It is the greatest irony that the remainder of Tsien's career was spent advancing rocketry and missile technology in China, seen by Cold War America

¹⁰⁴Ryan and Summerlin, 116; 116-130 relates in semi-fictional style the role of Hynes and other LAPD figures, including formerly clandestine police informants, in presenting testimony about Tsien's affiliation with the communist "cell" at Caltech in 1938 and 1939.

¹⁰⁵Journalistic coverage of the Tsien case was a regular feature of the *Los Angeles Times* in the latter half of 1950, especially from August through November.

¹⁰⁶Chang, Chapter 23, "A Hero's Welcome (1955)," 199-207.

as a hostile and potentially adversarial communist state, as well as giving direct “advice to Mao and Zhou Enlai.”¹⁰⁷

Conclusion

The intent of this chapter has been to follow the development of American national security discourse from the early 20th century into the early Cold War period and to illuminate the extent to which 20th century understandings of national security and articulation of national security threats have been informed by strong patterns and discursive responses from late 18th century American republic. Relatedly, I have tried to reveal how the concept of movement both throws into sharper relief the problematic relationship between loyalty and security and also points towards an explanation for how defection and other intelligence practices are implicated in national security discourse.

Looking at DAR’s rampant production of material relative to the “Red Scare” period in the decade or so following World War One is representative of the hegemonic conservative threat discourse that was emerging, and it effectively reveals the transition that occurred between threats being perceived as vaguely foreign to pointedly Communist and of Soviet origin. William “Red” Hynes is an example of a figure who was so influential as a hunter of communists precisely because he himself had successfully penetrated the imagined barrier separating the communist movement from

¹⁰⁷Chang, 209. On 209-214 Chang describes the initial tenor of Tsien’s “four general contributions” to China, in terms of its advanced missile technology programs.

mainstream America during the earliest red scares of the 1920s. Moreover, one could read the animus that leftist newspapers held for Hynes partly as an indication of the outrage that the movements might have felt over the idea of having a traitor in their midst. And Hynes' influence extended long after his retirement from the LAPD to the "red scares" of the early 1950s, when he was called upon to present expert testimony on many individuals who were experiencing harassment for their earlier communist associations.

Examining the "deist-baiting" of the late 18th century alongside the "red-baiting" of the early Cold War casts a slightly different light on the relationship between discourses of enlightened science and of national security. One possible deduction is that at times when America's territorial security and its national territorial imagination are most problematized the tension between science and security is more likely to surface. To be sure, the discomfiture between American conservative nationalist discourse and the intellectual discourse of science reached a climax during the early Cold War, when the importance of science to America's national mission confronted the latent distrust and suspicion of science and of intellectuals. But the presence of this conflict had already been manifested in the early republic, and had been expressed through conservative clergy hysteria over the risk posed to American stability by Enlightenment intellectuals and in particular, deism. Short's observation of Morse's divided professional energies, characterizing him as "a geography writer but also a

Congregational minister deeply involved in the religious debates of the day”¹⁰⁸ is correct, but it stops well short of conveying that these “debates” were not peripheral to the public’s political consciousness as religious debates of later periods might be. Rather, they were at the center of discourse over national security and national identity. Seen in that way, then, the coexistence of Morse’s two professions – and the implications of their interrelationship - takes on far more significance. Morse used the same methodologies for illuminati-hunting and geographic text-writing, and his reference to reliability of his “intelligence” to bolster credibility of the threat. It is highly ironic, considering the connections that have recently been explicated between “Geography and Enlightenment” - meaning the centrality of enlightenment scientific discourse to the construction of the modern and postmodern discipline of geography - that the putative “Father of American Geography” fumed hysterically against the central ideological components of the Enlightenment, and could easily be characterized as “anti-Enlightenment.” This tendency of strict conservative religious practitioners and organizations to remain skeptical of science is abundantly present in public discourse today. One example of this is the puzzling, yet by all accounts dynamic, movement in the mainstream religious right to eschew the teaching of evolutionary theory in favor of “creation science.” Such privileging of faith-based “science” over evidentiary-based science is hardly radical or marginal, but rather dominates seemingly moderate Protestant churches, Christian schools and colleges, and popular homeschooling curricula.

¹⁰⁸Short (2001), 127.

As this chapter has shown, against a backdrop of consistent antipathy by American conservatives to alternate narratives of communism and internationalism between the early 1920s and the early Cold War, a rhetorical shift was nevertheless underway between the smug triumphalist language of the DAR of the 1920s and early 1930s to the truly jeremiad-like tone of the early Cold War, which presented the threat as strong precisely because of America's collective cultural sins. Rather than to say, as some academics have done, that the jeremiad style has always been with us and has always informed American national political discourse and security discourse, it is perhaps more accurate to say that it informs American political discourse at times when the conflict in which America is engaged is portrayed in particularly binary and simplistic terms. The threats that the DAR railed against in the 1920s and 1930s were so multi-faceted that this perhaps explains why the rhetoric remained so triumphalist and confident, with an edge of triumphal contempt for the forces that threatened America. However, the threat of communism began to be conceived rhetorically as so singular and so unidimensional that it came to balance the religious-political nationalism as a polar opposite alternative, that would itself grab hold of America, both through outright war and open conflict as well as through the insidious invasion of the body politic. In terms of its stark bipolarity, then, the Cold War was also rhetorically similar to the Elizabethan Cold War, which, as Chapter Three presented, conceived of the international political stage as dominated by a single binary conflict. Just as the practitioners of statecraft in the Elizabethan Cold War had done on a fledgling scale, the

20th century Cold War institutionalized intelligence operations as one set of mechanisms through which the adversarial relations could be constituted.

The next chapter will turn to one geopolitical setting outside of the “West” in which the Cold War was materially and discursively constituted – namely, the Korean peninsula. It will consider the three broad themes of this dissertation – defection, territoriality, and national security discourse - within the context of divided Korea. National territory has been the focus of intense military and propaganda rivalry between the two Koreas, elaborate security devices exist to barricade the national and cultural territories of each from the other, and defectors and acts of defection have figured prominently in the two Koreas’ rivalry over cultural and political authenticity. Additionally, the division of Korea into rival territories recapitulated in microcosm the global territorial and ideological divisions, and it intensified in a single site the logic of national security and of defection. Thus, a brief review of the post-1945 Korean setting should suggest a more succinct approach to grasping the interrelationships among the three themes.




Figure 6.1. Cartoon titled "Mothers of Main Street" contrasts putative moral qualities of pacifism and patriotism. Source: *DAR Magazine* 62:6 (June 1928), 361.



Figure 6.2. “Red” Hynes with his young son and his repentant wife, pictured shortly after her release from the “psychopathic ward” of the county jail in 1931, where she had been placed under charges of “criminal hysteria.” (Source: USC Regional History Collection Photo Archive.)



Figure 6.3. “Red” Hynes testifies at the deportation hearing of Chinese-American scientist H.S. Tsien, November 1950. (Source: USC Regional History Collection, Photo Archive.)

Chapter Seven:

Divided Nation, Divided Territory: National Security and Defection in the Two Koreas

Thus far, I have presented a historically-grounded argument on how the concepts of territoriality and national security came to be integrated within Anglo-American geopolitical discourse and together have functioned as constitutive elements in a third concept – defection. And I have attempted to situate defection in the context of the particular process of constructing knowledge about distant or hidden places that, by the mid-20th century had begun to be codified – most notably by the United States, as it assumed leadership of one side of the Cold War binary construct - as the intelligence profession. Beginning with analysis of early modern English political discourse, I have proceeded under the well established theory that transference of cultural and political ideas from an early modern English to a colonial American setting was widespread and that the formation of a range of American social discourses owed rather more to English antecedents than to those from other European settings, despite the incursion of other Old World social and cultural forms as well. An abrupt shift, then, to a geopolitical setting that is not Anglo-American and not even “Western” might seem to serve no useful purpose, and indeed to be counterproductive to the dissertation’s theme of following the evolution of these discourses from an English to an American setting. However, I would argue that the reverse is in fact true. Although the discourses that I have been analyzing did not begin in the geopolitical setting in which Korea was traditionally situated, they were forcibly imposed upon that setting, along with the

binary geopolitical framework of the Cold War, making Korea in some ways the inheritor of many of the key features of these discourses. Because Korea was one of the sites where the Cold War was materially constituted, and because it is now one of the few sites where the various structures of the Cold War (rhetorical, military, political, etc.) remain in place, Korea continues to be highly vulnerable to the manifestation of these Anglo-American informed discourses of national security, territoriality, and defection. Considering how national security, territoriality, and intelligence methods such as defection have continue to play out within the inter-Korean rivalry – even as they are “naturalized” by being situated within indigenous Korean narratives and given Korean “dressing” - is instructive in demonstrating the enduring power of these discursive frameworks.

This chapter is not intended to provide a definitive account of inter-Korean defection. Although no such study exists, one undertaken from the standpoint of critical geopolitics – taking as a point of departure Korea’s putative territorial and cultural unity, which was strained by Japanese colonialism, shattered by the superpowers in Korea’s immediate post-colonial aftermath, and reinvented as rival political identities by dueling Korean regimes - would be a welcome addition to the literature. But such a project is well beyond the scope of a single chapter. My intent here, instead, is to simply to review how the western discourses of territoriality and national security came to be imposed upon Korea and, in so doing, to reveal the various implications for the conduct of intelligence (more broadly) and the act of defection (more specifically) between the two Koreas. I will situate the discussion with respect to contemporary

divided Korea by way of recourse to impressions of the security climate gained through fieldwork, as well as to review of inter-Korean defection issues in general and a specific defection scenario in particular. My hope is to calculate, or at least to enlighten, the role of defection in the ongoing struggle over territory and security between the two Koreas.

Background to Korean Territoriality

The point at which dynastic, pre-colonial Korea¹ achieved a cohesive national territorial consciousness has been contested by historians of Asia. One must of course put aside the propagandistic rhetoric advanced by both post-1945 Korean states of the “five thousand years of unified history and territory,”² and acknowledge the importance of avoiding “that trap of projecting a one Korea into the distant past.”³ Nevertheless,

¹One could readily say “pre-modern” here, but this term carries a great deal of baggage, and its use in reference to Asia prior to sustained contact with and integration with the West can be problematic. Imperialist discourses of high modernity necessarily implied that “pre-modern” meant “backward,” justifying imperialist aggression. The point I mean to raise has to do with whether Korea, prior to its exposure to Western discourses of territoriality (gained directly, as well as filtered through Japan, which was itself becoming rapidly steeped in Western discourses of industrial, military, and expansionist modernity), had its own sophisticated territorial discourse, over which Western discourses of territoriality were perhaps imposed. On the question of how “modernity” applies to such an exercise, Alexander Woodside, in “Territorial Order and Collective Identity Tensions in Confucian Asia: China, Vietnam, Korea; Early Modernities,” *Daedalus* 127:3 (Summer 1998), 191-220, insightfully suggests that “we need to construct a more historically ‘open’ language of social and political analysis than the one we have.”

² Typical passages include, from South Korea, “The Korean people existed as a homogeneous group...proud of 5000 years of their great history,” and from North Korea, “Our nation which for ages had lived in the same territory with one culture and one language found itself divided in two.” See, respectively, Young-soo Kim, et al, eds., *The Identity of the Korean People: A History of Legitimacy on the Korean Peninsula*, (Republic of Korea: National Unification Board, 1983), 12; and Kim Il Sung, *On the Work of the United Front* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978), 114.

³ Johannes Reckel, “Korea and Manchuria: The Historical Links Between Korea and the Ancestors of the Modern Manchus,” *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society-Korea Branch* 76 (2001), 1-12.

Alexander Woodside states that Korea was “precocious” relative to other Asian polities in settling its territorial question early: “The ‘territoriality’ of the modern peninsular Korean state, north to the Yalu River, was achieved by the medieval Koryo dynasty (spanning 918-1392) by the end of the tenth century. Among mainland Confucian polities, Korea’s precocious early ‘closure’ of the national political space was unique.”⁴ Gari Ledyard’s extensive work on Korean cartography would seem to back up this assumption. Ledyard discusses Koryo’s “respectable cartographic tradition,” that relied upon maps of the entire peninsula for administrative purposes, although none are known to survive.⁵ That the graphic impact of the visual outline of the nation has been instrumental in forming national territorial identities is the point proffered by Michael Biggs, and although Biggs addresses early modern Europe, his argument is no less applicable to the Korean context.⁶ As Ledyard effectively illustrates, the northernmost reach of Korea was well south of the modern boundary during early Koryo, but by early in the Choson dynasty, pre-colonial Korea’s final dynasty (1392-1910), it had extended to be virtually coterminous with the early 20th century boundary.⁷ Of course, it is doubtless more appropriate here to speak not of Korea’s conceptualization of its northern “boundary” as a rigidly demarcated line, but rather as a broader “frontier” zone

⁴Woodside, (get page #s from paper copy of Daedalus at YRL!).

⁵ Gari Ledyard, “Cartography in Korea, Japan, and Vietnam,” in *The History of Cartography: Volume II, Book 2, Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies*, edited by J.B. Harley and David Woodward, 235-344 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 240.

⁶ Michael Biggs, “Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and the European State Formation.” (See Chapter One, 23, n22.)

in which identities were blurred, and this is reflected in Ledyard's choice of such terms as "frontier" and "habitation limit." Still, even the earliest maps produced in Korea purporting to depict the entire "national" territory of Korea are easily recognizable to the contemporary eye. Yet, what is less understood is the process by which a map image of a Korean national territory produced a collective popular understanding of the peninsula as an expansive space that contained a unified national culture. Such a process would have depended upon the national maps being displayed and accessible to the population. German geographer Lautensach (writing in the 1940s in a work later translated and edited by Katherine and Eckart Dege) notes that Chinese scholars came to Korea in 1709 to study a map of the peninsula that hung in the palace of the Korean king, which was recognized as particularly authoritative.⁸ However, Ledyard alludes to considerable uncertainty over how and among whom the cartographic works of Korean geographers were disseminated, beyond the royal family residences, the royal library, and the "defense council" of the Choson state. Ledyard's description of the tendency to produce national maps in "album style," with bound pages that could be unbound and joined together to make a single map of the entire peninsula, suggests that the more common method of storage and study by "*sirhak* scholars and other map fanciers" was not as a single unified map image, but rather as fractured sections of the territory.⁹

⁷ Ledyard, 290.

⁸ Hermann Lautensach, *Korea: A Geography Based On the Author's Travels and Literature* (1945), translated and edited by Katherine and Eckart Dege (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1988), 38 and 43.

⁹ Ledyard, 305-311, and especially 307. "Sirhak" refers to the intellectual movement in eighteenth century Korea to embrace "practical learning," including western-informed techniques supporting study of the sciences, as well as adaptations of western methods to political and social administration. See

Another argument about Korean territorial consciousness is represented by the work of Andre Schmid, which explores the claims that through evidence of cultural practice and linguistic patterns, Korean “identity” extended well to the north of the roughly constituted “boundaries” of Korea along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, and that the prominent early modern Korean nationalist Sin Ch’ae-ho led the drive to project “an irredentist claim on all of Manchuria.”¹⁰ Relatedly, Chizuko Allen advances a similar discussion of another influential Korean nationalist intellectual, Ch’oe Namson, whose “view of history” likewise included Korean identity extending into Manchuria.¹¹ These scholars have helped to problematize the accepted parameters of Korean territory by pointing out that Korean popular “identity” extending into Manchuria was seen by Imperial Japan as one justification for its annexation of Manchuria, after it had already colonized Korea. Employing a rationale of “Korea is where Koreans are,” the Japanese imperialist machine sought Manchuria as a logical extension of the Korean territory already incorporated into the Japanese empire.

For over a half-century, assumptions of territoriality on the Korean peninsula have been simplistically straightforward, yet also, simultaneously and paradoxically, deeply conflicted. According to the Western conception of state sovereignty (that dates from Europe’s early modern period and that provided the organizing framework through which colonial empires were dismantled and transformed into a collection of

Peter H. Lee, et al, eds., *Sourcebook of Korean Civilization, Volume II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), Chapter 28, “Development of Enlightenment Thought,” 337-360.

¹⁰See Andre Schmid, “Looking North Toward Manchuria,” 220. See also my Chapter Five, 202 and n6.

states which, alongside states of the colonial powers, together constituted an international system of states), a bounded territory is a key constitutive component of the state.¹² This “world view in which discrete, quasi-independent territorial units were seen as the principal building blocks for social and political life” fostered the notion that territories could be the containers for that which they sought to build and organize, namely, social and political life; and studying the construction and imagination of these territorial units is key to understanding the modern state system, according to Alexander Murphy, who identifies this as the “concern” which lies “at the core of political geography.”¹³ For Korea, the post-colonial process of having territorial statehood conferred by the Western powers involved not only the imposition of the Western discourse of territorial sovereignty itself, but also the imposition of the Cold War binary territorial meta-narrative, which was “writ small” in Korea.

The process by which the Japanese surrender was managed on the Korean peninsula by the allied powers of the United States and the Soviet Union are a matter of historical record and need not be analyzed extensively here. Within the sizable

¹¹Chizuko T. Allen, “Northeast Asia Centered Around Korea: Ch’oe Namson’s View of History,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 49:4 (November 1990), 787-806.

¹²It is most common to credit the Europe’s Peace of Westphalia in 1648 as bringing the concept of territorial sovereignty into being, as well as to note the role of English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes, whose *Leviathan* (published in 1651) introduced the notion of the state being the sole source of order within a particular territory, outside of which, in the realm of disorderly nature, life will necessarily be “nasty, brutish, and short.” On the state as a “political-territorial ideal,” see Jean Gottman, *The Significance of Territory* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973); Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Alexander B. Murphy, “The Sovereign State as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations,” in *State Sovereignty as a Social Construct*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, 81-120 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

¹³Murphy, 82 and 113 (n6).

literature on this period, the work of historian Bruce Cumings is the most extensive and authoritative in revealing how the actions of these “allies”- who were already well on their way to becoming superpower rivals - caused their own emerging struggle over ideological domination of global territory to be replicated in microcosm on the Korean peninsula.¹⁴ While Robert Scalapino and Lee Chong-sik offer detailed analysis of the territorial division in conjunction with their survey of Korean communism, their suggestion that Soviet communism represented the imposition of an alien system tends to bolster the authenticity of the South Korean state at the expense of its rival in the North.¹⁵ Quite different analysis is found in the summary of “Liberation, Division, and War” by Carter Eckert, Lee Ki-baik, et al, who note that the transfer of power under Soviet guidance resulted in “the complete overturn within a few months of the colonial bureaucratic and social structure,” with a key positive feature being that imperial Japan’s “(c)ollaborators were thrown out of office;” while in contrast, the “American thrust... proceeded to resurrect much of the discredited colonial administration

¹⁴See Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume I: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); and Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997), Chapter Four, “The Passions, 1945-1948” (185-236), and Chapter Five, “Collision, 1948-1953” (237-298). Other useful perspectives on the American and Soviet roles in the emergence of the rival Korean states are found in Suh Dae-sook, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korea Leader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) ; and Erik van Rhee, *Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947* (Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989).

¹⁵ Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

throughout the country.”¹⁶ Moreover, their account emphasizes the early imprint of Cold War hostilities in Korea when it notes that American military authorities in liberated Korea were “inclined to regard the anti-colonial revolution taking place there as a Soviet-inspired communist conspiracy antithetical to American interests.”¹⁷

While the hurried and somewhat arbitrary selection of the 38th parallel as providing the locus for the eventual lowering of Korea’s own “iron curtain” is well-known,¹⁸ the mechanics of the transition in the immediate post-liberation years to a divided Korean polity are inevitably glossed over in popular accounts. It is useful to summarize this complex process, at the center of which are debates over the authority of the various provisional Korean leaders who were being backed by the occupying Soviet and American forces, respectively, as well as decisions over deference to neutral international authority for adjudication of elections of provisional Korean leaders. Provisional leaders in southern Korea, where public order was being regulated by the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), deferred to the United Nations, which it recognized as neutral, to monitor national elections intended to select a legislative body that would serve as the foundation for a new Korean state. These

¹⁶ Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-baik, Lew Young-ick, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner. *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), Chapter 18, “Liberation, Division, and War, 1945-1953,” 327-346 (quotations on 336 and 337).

¹⁷Eckert, et al., 337.

¹⁸Cumings (1981), 120, recounts how Colonel Charles Bonesteel and Major Dean Rusk “were given thirty minutes” during the late-night hours of August 10-11, 1945, to complete a proposal for the geographic outlines of the American and Soviet occupation zones in Korea, and they took their cue from a wall-map on which they noted the proximity of the 38th parallel to the capitol city of Seoul. Separately, Cumings (1981, 489, n80) notes that the gist of an early August 1945 high-level Pentagon conversation was that despite protestations of the indivisibility of Korea (“You can’t do that... There is no place to divide it”), the prevailing conclusion was, “We have got to divide Korea and it has to be done by four

elections were held in May 1948. The portion of the peninsula where public order was being regulated by the Soviets (roughly north of the 38th parallel) was dominated by a different set of Korean provisional leaders who, contrastingly, did not wish to defer to the outside intervention of the UN on the matter of the elections. Consequently, the elections of May 1948 were carried out in the southern portion of the peninsula only, and these elections led to the adoption of a Constitution and to the declaration of the Republic of Korea in August 1948. Territorially, then, the ROK – or South Korea - largely corresponds to those areas where UN monitors were permitted access and the election process held. By default, the practical extent of North Korean territory corresponds to those Soviet-administered areas where UN monitors were not permitted to carry out that 1948 election process.

However, North Korea constructs its territorial legitimacy to correspond not to that northern portion of the peninsula alone, but rather to the entire peninsula, according to a circuitous interpretation of the same events of 1948. Of the same May 1948 elections, North Korean historiography calls into question the legitimacy of the UN as a neutral monitoring body of that election process. It also condemns the influence of the USAMGIK upon southern Korean provisional leaders in the period surrounding those elections, declaring instead that the will of the majority of the Korean people was towards the establishment of a leftist, labor-oriented government, and this will was being suppressed by Korean provisional leaders in the south, who were being unduly influenced by USAMGIK. This interpretation also holds that the northern Korean

o'clock this afternoon." Cumings source for this engaging account is John Gunther, *The Riddle of*

provisional leaders were more representative of the will of the *entire* people, not just of the population in the north.¹⁹ Also, allowing the UN to perform the role of arbiter in Korea's internal political process was seen by the north as just a continuation of a decades-long process of Korea's autonomy being undercut by external powers. Thus, the ROK state that resulted from these events of 1948 is still seen as illegitimate by the North, because it was engendered through a process corrupted by foreign intervention. A separate election process was coordinated in August 1948 by northern Korean leaders. No UN monitors were present, but the elections were nevertheless proclaimed as an accurate reflection of the true will of the *entire* Korean people and as providing the foundation for a Korean state whose legitimate territorial reach is the entire peninsula. This claim has two bases: first, the northern authorities claimed that 77.5% of the south Korean electorate secretly participated in this election,²⁰ and second, the election process did not defer to the authority and influence of a foreign monitoring body. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was declared upon the ratification of the Constitution that resulted from these elections.

According to the North Korean interpretation, then, the *entire* Korean peninsula is its rightful territory, consistent with its claim that a majority of the southern electorate

MacArthur (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), p. 178.

¹⁹Mainstream US scholarship supports this view, with Cumings (1981, 382) discussion of the "North wind" around 1946 being a prominent example.

²⁰Kim Young-soo, Lee Jeong-soo, Lee Se-jin, Park Il-sung, and Suh Kuk-sung, eds. 1983. *The Identity of the Korean People: A History of Legitimacy on the Korean Peninsula* (Republic of Korea: National Unification Board), 12.

secretly took part in this August 1948 election process. The North has never recognized the south Korean state as territorially or politically legitimate, but rather it has long seen southern Korea as unfortunately held under the day-to-day control of foreign and foreign-installed influences. But the South Korean government likewise has asserted a subtle territorial claim over the entire peninsula. For its part, it has argued that - although the 1948 UN-monitored elections from which its earliest political institutions emerged did not cover the entire peninsula - because the population centers were located in the south, it reasons that those elections *did* cover a *representative portion* of the Korean people, albeit not the entire people. But the most fundamental factor in shaping and perpetuating this territorial dispute is the difference between the ideological claims that are advanced alongside the rival official accounts of legitimating Korean election processes. The North claims that the will of the Korean people, as reflected in the 1948 elections, was to install a state government under the leadership of a communist Korean Workers' Party. In the South, the state that was established in 1948 was headed by long-standing conservative Korean nationalist Syngman Rhee, who was hand-picked by the United States in no small part because of his staunch anti-Communist credentials. Thus, against the backdrop of the Cold War rivalry that was rapidly escalating, with Soviet-backed regimes multiplying in eastern Europe and the notion of Soviet "containment" (as suggested by George Kennan in his famous "Long Telegram" published under the pseudonym "X" in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947²¹) being

²¹The power and credibility of Kennan's observations was, of course, predicated on his being an eyewitness to the Soviet phenomena that he was interpreting; his authority was even more assured by the fact that he was fluent in Russian and had been a diplomat in the Soviet Union since the early 1930s.

translated into US policy, the United States could hardly remain indifferent to political-territorial outcomes in Korea. Rather, following cues from Kennan's depiction of the Soviet Union as an undifferentiated alien space which defied interpretation, the United States took steps to actively naturalize and reinforce in Korea a familiar geopolitical discourse that could then be "triggered," with an ensuing series of explanatory narratives. Situated in the context of the broader Cold War discourse of "practical geopolitics," then, this becomes almost impregnable to alternate interpretations, as Gerard O'Tuathail and John Agnew point out.²²

Even apart from the fact that the outright imposition by the superpowers of Cold War territorial and security discourses upon Korea caused the peninsula to mimic broader geopolitical characteristics on a smaller scale, the ways in which the two Koreas themselves each integrated territorial discourses that were the outcome of western modernity and western-inspired colonialism coming to Korea deserve some discussion. Similar to territorial discourse in early modern England, and also resembling the essentialized early American and early 20th century American patriotic discourses, a persistent feature of the Korean rivalry over territory has to do with there

This may be an obvious point, but it is a powerful example nonetheless of the logic of direct witness that I have referred to throughout the dissertation as being a key element undergirding the intelligence profession and also instrumental, due to its inherent authority, in the formulation of security discourse. As was seen in Chapter Three (127-129), diplomat Francis Walsingham's eyewitness accounts of Catholic atrocities in Paris were powerful testimony to the dangers faced by England from the Catholic powers of Europe. As I argued, Walsingham's direct eyewitness experience and his powerful articulation of it to his government not only prefigured his personal commitment to England's national security, but also set the tone for what would become the Elizabethan Cold War and its fundamental undercurrent of anti-Catholicism.

²² Gerard O'Tuathail and John Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," *Political Geography* 11 (1992), 190-204.

being (in general) two diametrically opposed conceptions of what kind of a “container” Korean territory should normatively be – that is to say, what sorts of political and cultural ideologies it will contain. The two Koreas have each constructed imagined territories according to distinct interpretations in two areas: first, what should be present in the cultural and political practice of the nation; and second, what should be included in a new national founding narrative of a modern liberated Korea. The essence of each Korea’s interpretation of the appropriate political and cultural practice is fairly obvious. In the North, the practice of “juch’e” (loosely meaning “self-reliance”) style communism, as theorized by Kim Il Sung, strictly within the framework of the cult of personality of Kim and of his family, is the sum total of all political and cultural practice that is permissible.²³ For South Korea, a normatively anti-Communist foundation to all political and cultural practice was enforced with varying degrees of severity until, arguably, well into the 1990s. And South Korean anti-Communism was given the distinct texture of the western form that is most consistently relied upon to counterbalance communism, namely, liberal capitalism with an explicitly Protestant Christian moral foundation.²⁴

²³ An appreciation of the North Korean cult of personality, the utter demand for pervasive adherence to Juch’e, and the apparent absence of a genuine civil society is best gained through direct review of books, magazines, and pamphlets produced in North Korea, which are not normally available to the average reader. However, available sources in English include the volume on North Korea in the US government produced area studies handbook series, Andrea Matles Savada, ed., *North Korea: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1993); and a volume by a former CIA analyst based on declassified CIA reporting, Helen-Louise Hunter, *Kim Il-Song’s North Korea* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999). Additionally, a recent account of Juch’e that analyzes it as a functional religion and provides valuable comprehensive detail is Thomas J. Belke, *Juche: A Christian Study of North Korea’s State Religion* (Bartlesville, OK: Living Sacrifice Book Company, 1999).

²⁴ Analysis of the formative role of conservative Protestant Christianity in the establishment of South Korea’s authoritarian regime under Rhee Syngman is found in Donald N. Clark, *Christianity in Modern*

Secondly, the two Koreas have constructed alternate national narratives, although each has drawn from the same founding events in the process of doing so. The role that interpretation of formative events in a nation's history plays in fixing both national identities and state legitimacy has received abundant attention by scholars. John Gillis notes that "new nations...require ancient pasts,"²⁵ and recent scholarship on the nation has emphasized its ironic nature, being imagined as ancient and enduring, while it is in reality fragile, recent, and highly contingent.²⁶ Relatedly, Agnew has asserted that one of the primary ways in which states achieve the modern ideal of the "nation-state" is by establishing a "civic 'religion' based on a founding myth,"²⁷ by which is meant a particular recounting of past events or beliefs about events that are considered formative to the identity of the nation-state's members. Anthony Smith observes that nationalist discourse is facilitated through deliberate reference to a "golden age," which is framed as the *geohistorical* setting – significant for both its

Korea (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986); and Kang Wi Jo, *Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History of Christianity and Politics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), especially 71-98. By acknowledging that the authoritarian regime utilized Christianity to bolster its legitimacy and its anti-Communist credentials I do not mean to suggest that Christianity has functioned in South Korean political culture in an uncomplicated way. Quite the opposite is true, and the literature on Korean Christianity explores how churches and Christian discourse came to provide discursive space for resistance against the authoritarian regimes in South Korea.

²⁵John R. Gillis, "Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship," in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, edited by John R. Gillis, 3-24 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 9.

²⁶This theme is increasingly emerging in work on nationalism, including Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. One recent expression of this theme that also emphasizes the challenge of nationalism writing onto territory is John Agnew, "Mapping Power beyond State Boundaries: Territory, identity, and Movement in World Politics," *Millennium* 28:3 (Fall 1999), 499-522.

²⁷John Agnew, "Geographies of Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict," in *Political Geography: A Reader*, edited by John Agnew, 317-324 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997), p. 319.

temporality and its spatiality - in which was formed the particular character that would sustain and propel a nation into the future, and to which contemporary promoters of the nation claim ancestral linkage.²⁸ Henry Em's argument that the putatively ancient and homogeneous essence of Korean nationhood, or *minjok*, is in fact a thoroughly modern construct is consistent with this body of critical scholarship on nationalism.²⁹ And Andre Schmid, also writing specifically in the context of the historical underpinnings of contemporary Korean nationalism, alludes to a similar theme that place and time are equally important to a full appreciation of nationalist founding myths when he remarks that territory is so central to nationalist discourse precisely because the crises from which the nation springs are spatial: they occur (or are remembered to occur) in particular places.³⁰

It is possible to see that both Korean states have constructed alternate founding narratives for the modern nation around alternate readings of the recent past. Since the 35-year period of formal Japanese occupation is considered unanimously by both Koreas to have been the most formative episode for modern Korean identity, it follows that the foundational myths for both Korean states would draw from this experience. Not only can one recognize that the two Koreas have each appealed to different interpretations and different emphases within the overall episode of anti-Japanese

²⁸ Anthony Smith, "The 'Golden Age' and National Renewal."

²⁹ Henry Em, *The Nationalist Discourse in Modern Korea: Minjok as a Democratic Imaginary* (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1997).

colonial resistance, but each has also pointed to the other's betrayal of Korean nationhood through their respective approach to recounting and commemorating these events. The South Korean state points to the first concerted peninsula-wide resistance event, the "March First Movement" that was sparked in March 1919 when a group of western-educated Korean nationalist intellectuals (many of whom were Christian converts) signaled their decisive opposition to the Japanese colonial authorities by signing and circulating a "declaration of independence;" and this event is specifically named in South Korea's constitution as providing the seminal authority for a modern sovereign Korean state.³¹ The North Korean regime likewise traces its authority to the struggle against Japanese imperialism in Korea. But instead of identifying with the Korean nationalist movement as it was conceptualized and implemented by upper-class Western-educated elites, the North Korean nationalist discourse offers an interpretation of a more grassroots struggle that was enacted by the peasant class against the tyranny of colonial administrators and their elitist Korean collaborators. Contrary to the South Korea's nationalist narrative centered on the March First Movement, and as an indictment of it, North Korea has constructed an alternate discourse of progressive Korean nationalism that claims that it did not need to look to the West for its idioms.³²

³⁰Schmid, 221. See also Simon Schama (1995), *Landscape and Memory*. Although Schama addresses American nationalist memory, he raises broader points that are applicable to the analysis of the spatiality and landscape of any nationalist founding myth.

³¹In its preamble, the ROK Constitution refers to the "Spirit of the March First Movement;" as is reprinted in Kim et al, eds., *The Identity of the Korean People*, 1.

³²The alternate interpretation of the March First Movement by the two Korean states raises many complex issues that are well beyond the scope of my comments here. Indeed, the historical geography of the March First Movement and of colonial resistance more generally, and the approaches taken by the two Korean states in constructing official memory of the resistance period is a worthy topic in its own right.

Although North Korean literature makes mention of the March First Movement, the tone is one of an opportunity lost because the movement's leaders failed to recognize and act upon the popular yearning to turn the demonstrations into armed resistance against the Japanese then and there; and a North Korean volume says of the resistance movement as begun with the March First Movement, "struggle for national liberation had been under the leadership of dogmatists and flunkeyists."³³ According to this interpretation, it was left to Kim Il-sung to later focus anti-Japanese sentiment into an organized revolution.³⁴ This interpretation is clarified in Kim Il Sung's 1992 multi-volume autobiography, in which he claims that the March First Movement was a definitive turning point in his own young life (he would have been all of seven years old), because he first witnessed blood being spilt in the struggle against foreign occupiers of Korea:

The enemy used swords and guns indiscriminately against the masses, even mobilizing policemen and mounted troops. Many people were killed... This was the first time I saw one man killing another. This was the day when I witnessed Korean blood being spilled for the first time. My young heart burned with indignation... The March First Popular Uprising marked the first time that I

It must be said, too, that the South Korean commemorative accounts of the March First Movement tend not to emphasize the movement's elite origins, but rather its rapid embrace and articulation in the days and weeks following March 1, 1919, by Koreans of all classes, ages, and genders. Indeed, the most memorable "hero" of the March First Movement is a young teenage girl, Yu Kwan-sun, who was apprehended during her participation in demonstrations related to March First, tortured by the Japanese, and soon died in prison.

³³*On the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975), 105.

³⁴In a background chapter titled, "Revolutionary History and Outline History of Constitution," the above mentioned volume *On the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* notes that the March First Movement "could not take a well-organized form...until the anti-Japanese revolutionary organization was established between the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s...under the command of General Kim Il Sung" (104-105).

stood in the ranks of the people and that the true image of our nation was implanted in my mind's eye.³⁵

Kim Il-sung's personal impressions of the March First events notwithstanding, Korean-American scholar Suh Dae-sook states in his acclaimed biography of Kim Il-sung that, "North Koreans no longer celebrate the March First Movement."³⁶ However, although North Korea's approach to the March First Movement may be ambiguous, what is completely *unambiguous* is that the regime in the north regards the crowning achievement of colonial Korea's anti-Japanese struggle to be the period of the 1930's when Kim Il-sung was leading a group of partisan "guerilla" fighters. His activities occurred in a broad area corresponding to remote northeastern China and, allegedly, the region surrounding the nationally symbolic Mt. Paektu, a site straddling the border of between Korea's far north and adjacent Manchuria and steeped in the mythology of

³⁵ Kim Il-sung, *Reminiscences With the Century*, Volume I (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1992), 39 and 47. He discusses the March First Movement throughout Chapter Three, 37-55. Interestingly, though not mentioning by name the famous young girl Yu Kwan-sun, who figures so prominently in South Korean commemoration of March First, Kim offers the following passage to illustrate the sacrifice of civilian people: "When a young girl had her right arm that held the national flag cut off by an enemy sword, she took the flag in her left hand and, when she was unable to move any further having had her left arm cut off, too, she continued to shout 'Long live the independence of Korea!' striking terror into the hearts of the Japanese imperialists and soldiers."

³⁶ Suh, 312. Suh does not provide a citation for this claim, and it is interesting to consider it alongside a statement from a 1964 speech by Kim Il-sung (in which he is alluding to an early political rival, a Soviet-Korean) that, "At one time Pak Chang Ok tried to ban even the commemoration... of the March First Movement," suggesting a contrast between this rival, who rejected commemoration of March First, and himself, who presumably did not. See Kim Il Sung, *On Creating Revolutionary Literature and Art* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House), 9. The North's downplaying of March First as a holiday would stand in contrast to South Korea, where it is widely celebrated. I suspect that one reason it is downplayed in North Korea might derive simply from its placement on the calendar relative to the birthdays of Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung, respectively. Not only are both those birthdays (February 16 and April 15) the major national holidays, the time period between the two has become more or less devoted to continuous celebration of the cult of personality of the two Kims. It would be difficult for the regime to punctuate such a period with a holiday observance of an event that at which one of the Kims was not present (being not yet born) and the other was only a small child and could claim no meaningful participation.

ancient Korea's primordial origins. As part of a background chapter in the volume on its constitution, a North Korean text states in strikingly biblical fashion:

The General said as follows: 'We must build secret bases in the form of semi-guerilla zones by creating a network of secret camps in the large forests on Mt. Paekdu-san for the Korean People's Army to carry on its activities and organizing the people in the surrounding wide areas. Thus we will set up bastions of revolution invisible to the enemy.'³⁷

Table 7.1 summarizes the bases for the two alternate frameworks for territorial discourse that have just been presented, with cultural-political practice and nationalist narrative providing the terrain on which divergence appears most sharply. Bearing these points in mind, I wish to return to the idea that Korean territorial discourse is similar to those addressed in earlier chapters of this dissertation, in that it also presents a binary divide between territories as containers for distinctly different ideologies. It

Rival Korean Territorial Discursive Frameworks		
	Cultural / Political Practice	Nationalist Narrative
North Korea	Juch'e Communism Kim Il Sung Personality Cult	Resistance of Japanese colonialism, guerilla-style, led by Kim Il Sung, based in Manchuria and far north.
South Korea	Anti-Communism Authoritarian / Military Rule Market Capitalism Protestant Christianity	Resistance of Japanese colonialism through March First Movement, led by western-educated upper class.

(Table 7.1)

should be apparent that the dominant regimes in North Korea and in South Korea, respectively, have understood the two territories as spaces in which only certain ideas and practices are present and their opposites are necessarily excluded. This feature is most obvious, of course, with respect to Juch'e communism and the Kim Il-sung personality cult in the North, which are practices hostile to religious expression and to a consumer-driven market economy; and this counterbalances the dominant political and socio-cultural practices in the South – anti-Communist authoritarian dictatorship, extravagant religious expression taking many forms including Christianity, and a consumer-driven “economic miracle.”³⁸ But it is also apparent with respect to the nationalist commemorative practices relative to each Korean state, with each Korea appealing to quite different versions of Japanese colonial resistance and that colonial episode furnishing the overall ingredients of two distinct founding myths.

Background to Korean Security

As the last chapter discussed, one characteristic of the Cold War security discourse involved identifying and naming as security risks those particular elements

³⁷*On the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, 105.

³⁸Neither of the two Korean economies has maintained an even trajectory, of course. North Korea's economy consistently out-performed South Korea's for some two decades beyond the 1953 Armistice, producing what US State Department senior North Korea analyst Dr. John Merrill calls “a socialist success story.” Cumings echoes this point repeatedly in his work; for example, Cumings (1997), 394, when he points to a socialist economist commenting about North Korea's “economic miracle” in the 1960s. As Stephen Haggard and Chung-in Moon suggest, South Korean economic growth was stimulated in part by a determination to bolster the South's political legitimacy that was perceived to be slipping in the face of both North Korea's relative economic success and South Korean domestic unrest. See Stephan Haggard and Chung-in Moon, “The State, Politics, and Economic Power in Postwar South Korea,” in *State and Society in Contemporary Korea*, edited by Hagen Koo, 51-93 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

seen as fundamentally “out of place” within the national territory-as-container. This followed the pattern of the Elizabethan “Cold War,” which presented Catholicism as out of place in England and as the source of security risks to the stability of the state and to the physical person of the monarch. It also followed the pattern of the early American republic, when Puritan-esque clergy declared certain ideologies to be “foreign” and so inappropriate to an American cultural setting as to represent a “present danger” to political and social stability. In both the “red scare” periods of the earlier 20th century, as well as the early Cold War itself, communism was presented as utterly incompatible with American culture. Eventually the intent of communism was rationalized so as to justify its active exclusion based on its very presence within American territory posing a threat to national security. Likewise, with the definitions of the two Koreas’ rival territories so contingent on what they could or could not contain, the threatened presence in either side of those excluded elements formed the primary basis for national security discourse. Of the two, South Korea’s national security discourse probably appears the most transparent in this regard, while the particulars of North Korea’s national security discourse must be understood by inference. In South Korea, for example, the very presence of any social or cultural element that suggested support for Kim Il-sung or for leftist politics, organized labor, or any sort of collective action of the working class or of students was subject to harsh treatment by the state’s security services under the “national security laws,” which continue to be enforced with varying degrees of rigidity. The national security laws set out criminal penalties for the “praising, encouraging, and supporting” of any groups that are “anti-state,” which

includes any group that has “a command structure with the purpose of claiming to govern Korea.”³⁹ Thus, the government of North Korea, under this definition, is an anti-state group under South Korean national security law, and any speech or action expressing positive or even tolerant views about North Korea could be construed as a punishable breach of law.⁴⁰

In North Korea, key elements in national security discourse can be easily inferred by what is *not* observed: consumer products from South Korea, printed books and periodicals from South Korea, radio and television transmission from South Korea, Internet service to the general population, popular culture elements such as music or cinema from South Korea or elsewhere in Asia, religious services (apart from a few that are orchestrated for VIP visitors), and, perhaps most telling, opportunities for unrestricted contacts between South Korean visitors to North Korean tourist sites and local North Korean workers and residents. Indeed, one of the most persistent and puzzling aspects of North Korea has been its dogged determination to prevent the territorial incursion of a spectrum of practices at a time when virtually the entire world has recognized that territorial boundaries are largely powerless to prevent the incursion of nearly anything at all. North Korea’s repeated “unification” proposal for a Korean confederation that would comprise “one state, two systems” is powerful testimony in support of my interpretation of the two Koreas as twin territorial containers; and this

³⁹ “Chief of Spy Agency Backs Changes to Security Law,” *JoongAng Daily*, 23 April 2003.

⁴⁰ The South Korean National Assembly is currently debating proposals to relax the national security laws. It is ironic that the laws have remained largely unchanged long after the end of military dictatorship and throughout the administration of Kim Dae-jung, which was the most conciliatory administration with

proposal would perpetuate the hermetically sealed nature of this “hermit kingdom,” permitting the personality cult and other myriad distinct practices to continue largely unimpeded.

As in the other territorial discourses that I have analyzed, divided Korea also presents a binary of two territories where distinct ideologies prevail, and it is this binary confrontation of ideologies and practices within territorial space that produces what we understand as national security discourse. One additional feature of the Korean situation must be noted, however: namely, that divided Korea is paradoxically both the most territorial and least territorial of global spaces, and I base this claim on three separate and partly contradictory elements. First, the international community recognizes the territorial sovereignty of two Korean states, which confront each other across the most highly fortified boundary in the world; a “line” that is normally depicted cartographically as an unambiguous, uncontested international boundary.⁴¹ Secondly, both Koreas have asserted subtly that no territorial division exists and that only a single territorial sovereign authority exists on the peninsula, which differs according to the particular perspective of each Korean state. And third, the spatiality of Korean national identity is not now, nor has it ever been in modern times, coterminous with the territorial extent of the peninsula. Rather, formative events for Korea’s national evolution have taken place outside of Korea, a circumstance which as Schmid suggests must cause a reassessment of what has historically been regarded as “national space”

respect to the North; and the debate to relax them occurs against the backdrop of North Korea revealing its possession of a nuclear weapon and the willingness to traffic in nuclear materials.

⁴¹*National Geographic Atlas of the World* and *Goode’s World Atlas* are two examples.

and must also implicate the Korean diaspora as a space for national political expression.⁴² These three elements are summarized in Table 7.2 below:

Most Territorial	International recognition of two sovereign states, across unambiguous international boundary that is highly militarized.
And Least Territorial	Each Korea has claimed to be single sovereign authority for all of peninsula, and has subtly denied territorial division.
Of Spaces	Spatiality of Korean <i>national identity</i> coincides with <i>neither</i> the territory of either of the two Korean states, <i>nor</i> with the territory of the Korean peninsula. Rather, it embraces the diaspora.

Table 7.2. Korea's Paradox of Territoriality

Of the first of the three elements above, it should be noted that the international recognition of rival Korean territoriality is almost entirely situated with respect to the broader Cold War binary territorial discourse, which, ironically, itself no longer exists. This will be addressed further as the remaining sections of this chapter unfold. On the second element, it is important to bear in mind that neither Korean has set out to promulgate a contingent national narrative, aimed explicitly at a regional ontology in which not one, but two, Korean states exist. Indeed, to the contrary, and as I alluded to

⁴²The relationship between nationalism and diaspora movements has emerged as a major theme in the literature on nationalism. Agnew (2003) summarizes some of the recent attempts to address "long distance nationalism," and notes the common misinterpretation of persistent diaspora involvement in nationalist causes as evidence that nationalism is "geographically indeterminate."

earlier, each Korea has subtly asserted that the other is illegitimate and that its rightful territory is not its respective half, but rather is the entire peninsula. For South Korea's part, a glossy pictorial book produced by the Korea Overseas Information Service entitled *The Koreans* contains not a single map, but rather a large satellite photo of the entire Korean peninsula.⁴³ An almanac published annually in South Korea likewise contains not a single map, but it notes in a statistical table that the northern extremity of the "national land" is 43 degrees north latitude, which corresponds to the extreme northern point of North Hamgyong Province in present North Korea. Moreover, the same almanac includes a table of "Major Mountains," nearly two thirds of which lie *not* in the South but in North Korea.⁴⁴ Visitors to South Korean diplomatic establishments in the United States see a map of the entire peninsula displayed prominently in public reception area. North Korean practices are similar, and it persistently produces maps and published materials that depict the entire Korean peninsula as its space. A topographical wall map of the Korean peninsula produced in North Korea in the mid 1980s does not depict the Demilitarized Zone (or "DMZ") at all, and it depicts pre-division provincial boundaries.⁴⁵ The notion of territorial unity of North Korean sovereign space is continually reinforced in contemporary North Korean newspapers and state-run radio broadcasts, where claims are occasionally jarring. For example, a

⁴³ John H.T. Harvey, *The Koreans* (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1993), 7.

⁴⁴ Koo Wol Whan, ed., *Korea Annual 1997: 34th Annual Edition* (Republic of Korea: Yonhap News Agency, 1997) 229 and 310-311.

⁴⁵ *The Map of Korea* (Pyongyang: Yang-jin Map Company, 1986).

Pyongyang radio broadcast from the mid 1990s reported that “geographers have recently confirmed in a scientific way” evidence of a single mountain range uniting all of Korea. The broadcast said that Mt. Paektu in the far north of Korea is really the beginning of a mountain chain of common geologic origin, which stretches the length of the peninsula to a mountain in the southernmost portion, Mt. Chiri.⁴⁶ These mountains had been analyzed incorrectly by Japanese geographers during the colonial period, according to the broadcast, and this had led to a misidentification of several separate mountain ranges to the north and to the south of a central “Demarcation Line.” The political intent behind such a broadcast is multi-faceted, not only suggesting that the north-south division of Korea was in part predetermined by a calculated Japanese practice of using topographical interpretation to undermine Korean unity, but also affirming North Korea’s symbolic dominance over a unified peninsula by reference to Mt. Paektu, whose symbolic meaning was mentioned earlier. For North Korean propaganda to name Mt. Paektu as the head of a single peninsular chain of mountains is tantamount to asserting that Korea’s territorial unity literally flows from northern Korea.

On the third of the three elements set forth above - the notion that the spatiality of the construction of Korean nationalist narratives is not coterminous with Korean territory itself - one could even go so far as to say that the modern Korean territorial consciousness has ironically depended upon diaspora and exiled Koreans to recognize

⁴⁶“Korean ‘Grand Paektu Mountain Range’ Defined,” Pyongyang Korea Central News Agency, 0914 GMT, 22 Jan 96.

and articulate it. For a full century, some of the most powerful and productive expressions of nationalism and colonial resistance emanated from Koreans abroad or at least located elsewhere. The effects of some of these – including Korean immigrants’ associations in Hawaii, the western United States, and even Nebraska, which undertook the task of organizing resistance leaders to form quasi governments and armies in exile - are summarized in a recent article by Choe Zihn.⁴⁷ Additionally, the role of exiled nationalists in planning and executing the March First Movement and in setting up the framework for continued organized resistance (such as “cultural nationalism”) from the spaces of exile are recounted by Michael Robinson, as well as Eckert, et al.⁴⁸ Moreover, the first South Korean president, Rhee Syngman, had long been an influential exiled nationalist and had not physically been in Korea for at least 30 years prior to returning as the America-installed head of state. Thus, an image readily emerges of a South Korean state that owes nearly as much to the actions of exiles as it does to domestic nationalists. But the same image can easily be applied to North Korea. The geographic venue of virtually the sum total of the Kim Il-sung-led guerilla resistance that furnishes the raw material for the North Korean founding myth falls outside of Korea, in neighboring Manchuria and, to a lesser extent, Russia. As Cumings

⁴⁷Choe Zihn, “Early Korean Immigrants to America: Their Role in the Establishment of the Republic of Korea,” *East Asian Review* 14:4 (Winter 2002), 43-71. Choe even notes that the American wartime OSS was working with Korean immigrants groups in the western US to organize and train infiltration teams to be composed of Korean-Americans for intelligence and sabotage operations against the Japanese in Korea (63-64).

⁴⁸See Michael Edson Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988); and Eckert, et al (1990), especially their chapter “Nationalism and Social Revolution, 1919-1931,” 276-304.

(1981) points out, “recognition of the Manchurian resistance episode is critical to an appreciation of the specificities of Korean communism;” but he wonders whether a genuine “understanding of the Manchurian gestation of the subsequent North Korean leadership” is possible, given the extent to which the North Korean propaganda machine has obscured events behind Kim Il-sung mythology, as well as the fact that the Manchurian based Chinese-Korean resistance movement was virtually invisible to Western observers, compared to the Chinese guerilla movement led by Mao and based at Yenan, where Western journalists had relatively open access.⁴⁹ A less defeatist approach is taken by Suh Dae-sook, who notes that whatever difficulties arise from piecing together Kim Il-sung’s past are “not because it is non-existent,” and the first three chapters of his biography of Kim explore Kim’s nationalist and resistance activity entirely outside of Korea.⁵⁰ The work of Ch’oe Yong-ho follows the early life of Kim Il-sung and his integration and that of his family within both the Korean Christian community in Manchuria and the Korean communist resistance movement in Manchuria.⁵¹ An exposé-style “authentic biography” of Kim written by a Korean communist émigré to the Soviet Union likewise recounts Manchuria and Russia as the venue for most leftist-inspired Korean resistance activities.⁵² Speaking of an even

⁴⁹ Cumings (1981), 37-38.

⁵⁰ Suh (1988), 13 and 3-54.

⁵¹ Ch’oe Yong-ho, “Reinterpreting Traditional History in North Korea,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 40:3 (May 1981), 503-523; and Ch’oe Yong-ho, “Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song,” *Asian Survey* 26:10 (October 1986), 1082-1091.

⁵² Lim Un, *The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea: An Authentic Biography of Kim Il-sung* (Tokyo: Jiyu-sha, 1982).

earlier period, Michael Robinson notes the role of “the Korean Communist movement in exile” in articulating the “radical critique” of cultural nationalism and offering an alternative discursive framework for colonial resistance.⁵³ And the novelesque account by Kim San and Nym Wales of the almost entirely Chinese venue of young Korean communist activists invites closer analysis of the ways in which the Korean nationalist movement imagined the nation as a *place*, given that the *territory* of the nation was virtually foreign to their experience.⁵⁴

Visuality, Mobility, and Inter-Korean Security

As the previous chapter proposed, Cold War national security discourse tended to identify particular ideas or material phenomena as threats and to suggest that threats can be best countered by controlling the mobility of those ideas and phenomena. This explains why fortified boundaries serving as barriers between the respective territories of the Cold War adversaries came to be so vital to the coherence of that national security discourse; and it logically followed that an act that breached those fortified boundaries represented a profound security threat. The previous chapter also noted the centrality of the emerging intelligence profession to the management of Cold War security discourse. And, as earlier chapters also suggested (Chapters One, Three, and Four), the intelligence profession (like the discipline of geography) rests on an

⁵³ Robinson (1988), 109-114, quotation on 111.

⁵⁴ Kim San and Nym Wales, *Song of Ariran: A Korean Communist in the Chinese Revolution* (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1973)

epistemology that privileges vision and the eyewitness as the best way to arrive at truth. It follows, then, that recognizing the ways in which vision and mobility are both deeply implicated in national security discourse should point to an act such as defection as an inevitable logical outcome. Within a binary conflict in which adversaries face each other across a fortified border, defectors can report on and describe the conditions within territory that would otherwise remain hidden to the other side. Moreover, the defector's actual and implied mobility poses a security threat, insofar as the movement of ideas and information is a security threat. With this brief recapitulation of the themes at hand, I wish now to briefly explore some of the ways that movement and vision are both problematic in the adversarial relationship between the two Koreas and how they enter into the national security discourse of the two Koreas. I will also note the practice in South Korea of using defectors and defector information as visioning tools to illuminate and make legible the concealed North.

Turning first to movement, it is possible that given Korea's long reputation as the "hermit kingdom" – meaning a place hermetically sealed against both intrusion and against outward movement – security paradigms are somehow more "naturalized" in the two Koreas. Perhaps Western discourses of national security were not required to impart to Korea that movement was suspect and somehow fundamentally antithetical to security. In Korea, perhaps the more "foreign" view has been the expectation (that the West seems to take for granted) of not only the freedom to move, but even of the desire to move. One could argue that a disinclination to move is rooted in Korean folklore and tradition in many ways. Primarily, the cultural assumption that one should not move is

connected to the strongly ingrained Korean practice of ancestor-worship, which includes the Confucian-influenced determination to discharge one's filial obligations to one's family and ancestors. This can best be accomplished by continuing to inhabit the area where one's ancestors are buried, so that one can dutifully and regularly tend the ancestral gravesites.⁵⁵ Indeed, one's physical well-being and course of life events are believed to be partly determined by how well one fulfills these duties, even by educated and sophisticated Koreans with no conscious superstitions.⁵⁶ The moral commitment of the living to their dead ancestors continues to be so deeply held by Koreans (Janelli and Janelli state, "no other moral axiom has received greater emphasis throughout the history of Korean society"⁵⁷) that the issue of families divided by war and political division takes on profound urgency and poignancy. Figure 7.1 shows a ceremonial site within the South Korean DMZ security zone that was erected to serve as a remote location for the enactment of ancestor worship rites by South Koreans who originally came from North Korea but who are barred from returning there to perform family rituals directly. This site is also visited by defectors and refugees from North Korea for

⁵⁵Roger L. Janelli and Dawnhee Yim Janelli, *Ancestor Worship and Korean Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).

⁵⁶The assumption that a properly sited and tended ancestral grave affects the living descendants is not indicative of belief in the *supernatural*, but rather it suggests an alternate interpretation of the *natural*. The practice of meticulously siting graves arises from the technique usually called geomancy, which involves the belief in complex physical interconnectedness between the earth and its energies, the bodies of the dead, and the bodies of their living descendants. The need to tend a grave properly is based on the conviction that a carelessly interred corpse will not channel earth's energies efficiently, and thus misfortune could befall living descendants. For background on geomancy see Janelli and Janelli, 71-79; and David Nemeth, "The Yi Dynasty and the Imprint of Neo-Confucian Ideology," in *Architecture of Ideology: Neo-Confucian Imprinting on Cheju Island, Korea* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).

⁵⁷Janelli and Janelli, 50.

ritual purposes. Nearby are other monuments aimed to express the emotional pain of separation from the half of the nation that lies beyond the heavily fortified boundary, such as a simple boulder inscribed with the words “Nation-Love” and one depicting a man and woman reaching out towards one another beneath the words “Song of Homesickness Monument” (Figure 7.2).

Turning secondly, to visibility, the militarized security climate in South Korea – in both a general sense, as well as in the context of the zone of the DMZ itself - does all it can to restrict people from physically glimpsing North Korea – that is, North Korean territory. This would seem to accord with an approach to knowledge that is based upon vision, and it also seems consistent with the long-standing aim of the South Korean government to restrict and control the ability of South Korean citizens to “know” North Korea. With direct visits and exchanges between people extremely rare and subject to monitoring, each Korean government seems to have taken steps to ensure that its people have little besides government-sanctioned materials on which to base their knowledge of and impressions of the other side. In short, it has largely been up to each respective Korean government to “envision” the other and to convey that vision to the population.

Access to the boundary area separating the two Koreas must be rigorously managed, and the reasons for this center upon it being a highly militarized area filled with troops, landmines, and procedures for responding to enemy incursions and other threats that may be associated with unregulated movement of people. But additionally, access to the DMZ must be carefully controlled because it is only along the DMZ that

people are able to more directly envision North Korea.⁵⁸ Other than the Panmunjom “truce village” itself, which to date represents the single location along the DMZ where exchanges have taken place between representatives from the two Koreas, there are two types of sites which I wish to discuss. The first are the “unification observatories,” and the second, which I will only mention briefly, are the “incursion tunnels.”⁵⁹

Called *jeongmangdae*, or literally, “viewing platform,” there are at least four unification observatories aimed at tourist visits. During fieldwork in the summer of 2000, I visited two of these, plus an additional viewing site on a military base on the northern tip of Kangwha Island, located off of South Korea’s far northwest coast and facing North Korea across the Han River estuary (the Han flows through downtown Seoul some 35 miles away). I also visited two incursion tunnels (*ddang gul*, or “earth tunnels”). Of the seven or so incursion tunnels that the South Korean government claims to have discovered over the years, three have been prepared as tourist sites. Figure 7.3 depicts the area where both the observatories and the incursion tunnels (as well as the monuments pictured earlier) visited for this research are located.

Visiting the unification observatories cannot be done spontaneously by individual tourists, but is only possible on pre-approved group tours. Transportation to

⁵⁸I will refer primarily to DMZ-related sites and facilities in South Korea, and the approach taken to managing these sites for visits by non-military personnel. What little information of which I am aware regarding North Korea’s management of similar sites is entirely anecdotal and haphazardly collected.

⁵⁹Analysis of the various underground “symbolic landscapes” of the North Korean regime, including the incursion tunnels, the Pyongyang subway system (touted as the deepest in the world), and alleged widespread existence of underground complexes for production and storage of military materials and even of materials related to banned nuclear weapons would be a worthy project. My interest here is more on the sites along the DMZ that directly enable the envisioning of North Korea; hence my greater concentration upon the observation platforms relative to the incursion tunnels.

the sites is by bus, which stops at several military checkpoints and admits soldiers armed with machine guns, who pass through the bus and check the passports and identity cards of each visitor individually. For the two tourist unification observatories that I visited, it was possible to photograph the outsides of the buildings only (Figure 7.4); photographs inside the building and photographs in viewing areas facing North Korea were prohibited. The two building interiors were similar. Visitors enter a steeply pitched amphitheater-style room with rows of auditorium style seats facing a huge curtained wall. At the base of the wall is a broad table model of the DMZ area, depicting topography and structures on both sides of the DMZ. When visitors are seated a guide in military uniform addresses the group, welcoming them to the unification observatory and reminding them that no photography is permitted from any of the viewing areas of the building or during his presentation. The curtains across the wall open to reveal a huge expanse of glass, through which can be seen a rather nondescript stretch of forested hills, part of the “no-man’s land” buffer within the DMZ. Of course, the view from the two observatories differed in landscape specifics, with the second observatory facing an area of more rugged hills with very little forest cover and practically no structures present at all (Figure 7.5). The first observatory faced a distant collection of buildings in North Korea that have been described by US government observers of North Korea as a “show village,” meaning a setting designed by the regime to give the appearance of a prosperous and materially comfortable “normal” life of rural North Koreans.⁶⁰ The day of my visit was foggy, and the village could not be seen

clearly, apart from a central tower topped by a huge North Korean flag. But the table model showed in detail how the “show village” would appear on a clear day, with clean and well-maintained multi-storied buildings clustered amid farm fields. The uniformed guide inside the observation room gave a short lecture, using a long pointer to gesture to the landscape beyond the glass and then refer to the table model. The experience at the second observatory was very similar, except that there was no “show village” to serve as a landscape focal point and the building was designed with several outdoor viewing balconies in addition to the interior amphitheater-style room.

In both the immediate and general vicinities of the unification observatories are related features that serve to remind visitors that the division of Korea is both tragic and “unnatural,” and that North Korea is a hostile and insidious enemy lurking nearby. Just beyond the parking lot of one of the observatories it was possible to glimpse over the treetops one of the large neon-lit signs that face North Korea bearing South Korean political statements (Figure 7.6). And outside the entrance to one of the observatories was a drinking fountain from which water poured directly out of large boulders inscribed with the words “nostalgia water” (or “homesickness water,” Figure 7.7). A nearby sign claimed that the water came from an underground source that lay under North Korea, and this seemed intended as a reminder both of the “natural” unity of the two Koreas and of the physical closeness of a part of Korea from which visitors were tragically and unnaturally barred. Finally, the visitor experience at the incursion tunnels (which were impossible to photograph), which were separate destinations in the same general area of the unification observatories, but not directly co-located with them,

seemed likewise designed to emphasize the physical closeness and insidious danger of North Korea. Visitors don hard-hats and enter the tunnels through an outdoor hillside entrance in one case and through a building constructed over the entrance in another case. Both tunnels I visited had about a half-mile stretch open to visitors, at the end of which was placed a heavy iron door across the tunnel, on which was displayed a North Korean flag, and a heavily armed South Korean soldier on guard. Again, the threatening proximity of the enemy, imagined as forcefully suppressed just beyond the door, was emphasized. All through the tunnels were placed a variety of displays, including a streaming basin of “north water” with drinking cups (similar to the above-ground fountain display), signs pointing to chisel marks and evidence of dynamite placement and describing “proof” of the direction from which the tunnel was constructed (evidently an attempt to counter skeptics who suggest that the South Korean government constructed the tunnels as a propaganda ploy to play up the North Korean threat), and glass cases containing items allegedly found in the tunnels, including bits of clothing and empty cigarette cartons all of North Korean manufacture.

In addition to the two “tourist” observatories, I also participated in a group visit to an observation site within a South Korean military installation on the northern edge of Kangwha Island.⁶¹ Like the “tourist” observatories, the approach to this even more restricted observation site went through several military checkpoints, and soldiers

⁶¹This visit was in conjunction with a Summer 2000 International Geographical Union political geography specialty group, which met for a weakling conference on Kangwha Island in August 2000. The visit to the observation area of the Kangwha Island military installation had been arranged by the conference hosts from the Department of Geography at Seoul National University.

boarded the vans to accompany the group to the site. They told us that no photographs would be allowed at the site and that we would not even be allowed to carry cameras on our persons, although Figure 7.8 was hastily shot through the window of the van, showing a more distant view of the stretch of North Korea that we would soon be seeing from the site. Upon arriving at the site, the vans parked below the crest of a bare grassy hill that had a bunker-type structure that seemed to be built entirely of sandbags stretching up the hill. We entered the structure and walked up the hill through a labyrinth of sandbag-walled passages, over which was hung a “roof” of rope mesh. At the top of the hill the passage opened out into a small room with a wooden roof over the sandbag walls, containing a row of folding metal chairs, and a single broad window opening facing a stretch of river estuary with land beyond. We were told by the soldiers accompanying us that we were now seeing North Korea and that we were welcome to take our time looking at the view and could use binoculars if we had them. The “view” that we saw was an expanse of countryside perhaps a mile or so wide, backed with rugged hills, with farm fields, a few clumps of trees, and a collection of buildings that appeared to be an inhabited village off to one side. The riverbank on that side was blocked off by what appeared to be a continuous line of barbed-wire barricades. With binoculars it was possible to pick out a number of people scattered around the area, both singly and in groups. I watched a lone person riding a bicycle between farm fields and another pair of people who appeared to be leading a cow.

These experiences strongly evoked Kenneth Olwig’s (1996) analysis connecting the idea of “landscape” to that of the commanding gaze of a framed view from a

particular vantage point.⁶² However, while Olwig's analysis leads one easily to apprehend the power relationship that is it is possible to exert over an envisioned landscape (a relationship that transforms landscape into territory), in this instance the "vantage point" is occupied by the adversary as a scripted means of gaining power advantage by intimidation. (Relatedly, it cannot go unnoticed that a South Korean state-supported journalistic organ, Naewoe Press, which reports almost solely on North Korea and which has played a significant role in maintaining the public's threat perspective of North Korea, calls its monthly newsletter *Vantage Point*.) And among the most remarkable aspects of these "observatories" was the theatrical quality of the experience there.⁶³ The sites were obviously designed to present a literal "window" into North Korea, with the landscape of North Korea appearing as on a stage or a screen in a theater, revealed to the eager audience as the curtains parted. Clearly, too, there was an element of voyeurism, particularly at the most restricted observatory, the site on Kanghwa Island, where we could peer into the North Korean landscape through

⁶²See Olwig (1996), "Recovering the Substantive Nature of Landscape."

⁶³ Although I have not included it in my discussion, Panmunjom, by all accounts, is a profoundly stilted and stiffly scripted setting, and it would make an interesting focus of analysis as a semi-theatrical "stage" on which Cold War hostilities are played out. To my knowledge, no such study exists, although media accounts of Panmunjom frequently refer to its tense, yet artificial, atmosphere. Hans Greimel, "Neutral 'Village' in DMZ a Diplomatic Portal and Cold War Tourist Attraction," Associated Press, Thursday, January 9, 2003, quotes an American soldier in the DMZ saying, "It looks like Disneyland but it's not... It's Disneyland with armed guards." Other theater-type metaphors include describing Panmunjom as "a deadly ballet" or as "a theatre of perceptions," and accounts suggest the need for visitors to conform to scripted actions, such as one article that states, "Profanity is out of the question. So is a miniskirt or blue denim. And, please, wipe that smile off your face." See "North Korea Faces South, US on Last Cold War Front," *Financial Times Information*, Global News Wire, Business Recorder, March 31, 2002; "Twin Spectres of a Deadly Ballet," *The Statesman (India)*, *Financial Times Information*, Global News Wire, January 5, 2003; Charles Yoo, "Touring the DMZ: On the Edge of Danger," *The Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, Sunday Home Edition, March 9, 2003; and Robert Marquand, "Korean DMZ—A Bizarre Cold War Relic," *Deseret News*, (Salt Lake City, Utah), March 11, 2003.

binoculars and watch people going about their lives, who, although surely aware of proximity of South Korean territory opposite their location, did not realize at any given instant that our distant eyes were trained on them watching their movements.

It is intriguing, and perhaps oddly consistent with the theatricality of the scripted visual display of North Korean landscape, to note that one of the recurring metaphors present in scholarly writing about North Korea is the idea of a theater set or a setting for pageantry. Studies of built environments as stages where a variety of social forces are acted out are increasingly common in the cultural geography literature, and these offer a wealth, largely untapped as yet, of theoretical tools for analysis of the North Korean cultural landscape.⁶⁴ In one of the few applications of “new cultural geography” theory to North Korea, Peter Atkins refers to Pyongyang’s built landscape as “stage props” and “props on a theatrical set,” although he does not explore the metaphor further.⁶⁵ And indeed, the tendency to refer to the grandiose urbanscape of Pyongyang - as well as other North Korean sites for touring “VIPs” that are grand in scale yet strangely vacant of seemingly normal habitation - as similar to stage sets, either empty and waiting for the action to begin or inhabited only by actors, is virtually ubiquitous in visitors’

⁶⁴See J. B. Jackson, *The Necessity for Ruins and Other Topics* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), “Landscape and Theatre,” 67-75; Stephen Daniels and Denis Cosgrove, “Spectacle and Text: Landscape Metaphors in Cultural Geography,” in *Place/Culture/Representation*, edited by James Duncan and David Ley, 57-77 (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); Kenneth Olwig, *Landscape, Nature and the Body Politic: From Britain's Renaissance to America's New World* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002a), especially 84-85, 96-98, and 210-212; and Olwig (2002b), “Landscape, Place, and the State of Progress,” 42-44.

⁶⁵Peter Atkins, “A Seance With the Living: The Intelligibility of the North Korean Landscape,” in *North Korea and the New World Order*, edited by Hazel Smith, Chris Rhodes, Diana Pritchard, and Kevin Magill, 196-211 (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1996), 209-210, n40 and n41 respectively.

descriptions of North Korea. Adding to this sense of the inherent theatricality of North Korea, no doubt, is the contradiction that visitors must sense in being prohibited the chance to mingle freely with North Korean citizens on the one hand (visitors remain largely sequestered and strangely alone with regime-assigned guides in chauffeured vehicles), but on the other hand being taken to view spectacle performances of mass gymnastics, “card section” displays,⁶⁶ or similar pageantry with relentlessly political messages, in which literally tens of thousands of North Korean locals are simultaneously performing. The intent of the regime seems to be to consign visitors perpetually to the role of audience, separated from and in a position to objectify a distantiated North Korean polity; or if that is *not* the regime’s intent, at least it is the unintended consequence of the regime’s policy towards visitors. This distantiated polity is often kept hidden and invisible, but if it *is* visible it is kept secluded from the audience by the isolating framework of pageantry, so it is ultimately unknowable.

Bruce Cumings refers to North Korea as the realm of “the Sun King,” a veiled reference to the reign of France’s Louis XIV, surely one of Europe’s most theatrical and ritual-oriented monarchies.⁶⁷ Cumings is also well known for his analysis of the North

⁶⁶ By “card section” I refer to the practice, in stadium settings of ceremonial public events, of a large section of seated people in a stadium collectively forming displays of scenes and slogans by holding up colored cards en masse and transitioning seamlessly from one scene to another by changing cards. Although “card section” is practiced in a number of national settings (including South Korea, as recounted to me by a friend who attended grade school in South Korea and described participating in card section displays at school events) and there has surely never been a cross-national comparative study of “card section” as a collective public performance practice, I would suspect based on videos and magazine photo accounts that the card section performances in North Korea are unrivaled, both in terms of sheer numbers of people simultaneously participating (as much as one-third of a 100,000 person capacity stadium) and of the impressive intricacy and beauty of the designs depicted.

⁶⁷ Cumings (1997), Chapter Eight, “Nation of the Sun King: North Korea, 1953-1996,” 394-433. I call this a “veiled reference” because Cumings makes no direct mention of Louis XIV being most commonly

Korean regime as “corporatist,” by which he means the tendency of the polity to identify with the physical person of the political leader, as well as the leader’s physical body symbolically representing the institution of the state.⁶⁸ In describing North Korean corporatism, Cumings (who seems to avoid the term “personality cult” that is most commonly used to convey many of the same aspects of unremitting glorification of the individual person of Kim Il-sung) notes the similarities to the reign of Henry VIII, who, to reiterate his authority over both church and state in the face of England’s split from Catholic Europe, deliberately took advantage of Christian “body of Christ” type metaphors.

While agreeing with Cumings analysis on this point, I would go even farther with a comparison to early modern England. One could make a very strong case that North Korean corporatism is aptly symbolized by the famous frontespiece image in Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*,⁶⁹ in which the “leviathan” of state power takes the form of a man (whose body is literally composed of the bodies of people) looming above a

referred to as the “Sun King,” but he does note that calling North Korean hagiography labeling Kim Il Sung the “Sun of the Nation” is consistent with pre-modern Korea’s tributes comparing the Chinese Ming emperor to the sun in terms of pervasiveness and life-giving power.

⁶⁸Bruce Cumings, “The Corporate State in North Korea,” in *State and Society in Contemporary Korea*, edited by Hagen Koo, 197-230 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Cumings also contributes an essay to the US-government produced volume edited by Savada, *North Korea: A Country Study*, “Historical Setting,” (1-44) in which he addresses “Corporatism and the Church’s Idea” (41-44).

⁶⁹This is a familiar image to most scholars in the social sciences and humanities, and it has recurred in many texts since its use in Hobbes 1651 edition. I used Richard E. Flathman and David Johnston, *Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan: Authoritative Text, Backgrounds, Interpretations* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997). Interestingly the Leviathan frontespiece image also appears as the cover illustration for Olwig’s (2002a), *Landscape, Nature and the Body Politic*, a work which, as I have already suggested, explores connections between state power, pageantry, and bodily performance on the landscape.

landscape over which he extends his penetrating gaze. Indeed, the idea that modern state power is thrown into sharp relief by the state's unchallenged surveillance ability not only is consistent with corporatism but also is profoundly consistent with the most potent features of a police state such as North Korea. Thus the idea of "vision" takes on yet another facet in the Korean context; and evidence for this is seen in a recent memoir by a North Korean defector, in which the author uses an aquarium as a metaphor for the transparency of "private" life to the state.⁷⁰ Continuing to follow the comparison with early modern England, it is to the "cult" of Elizabeth that North Korea's Kim Il-sung obsession bears the stronger resemblance, both in terms of the endless symbolic, rhetorical, and iconographic representations present in both instances,⁷¹ as well as with respect to one theme of this dissertation – the production of state territoriality. As I argued in Chapter Three, drawing from the work of Kenneth Olwig, one way in which the regime of Elizabeth transformed England's "landscape-as-countryside" into political territory that was separate and distinct from the Catholic-inhabited political territory of continental Europe was by the physical ceremonial circuit of the person of Elizabeth through that landscape-as-countryside in her regular practice of going "on progress."

⁷⁰Kang Chol-hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, *The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag* (New York: Basic Books, 2000). It is ironic that the author notes that as a child he maintained a fish aquarium as a hobby. My own study of North Korean pictorial magazines, which routinely feature ideal domestic life, reveals that the only "pet" animal ever depicted in a North Korean home setting is a fish in a fishbowl or aquarium.

⁷¹Chapter Three discussed some of the common metaphors for different aspects of Elizabeth and her reign (the beehive, the pelican, the Tudor rose, eyes and ears, etc.) and noted that these appeared commonly in period art, iconography, and crafted objects. Likewise, upon studying the Kim Il-sung phenomenon, a procession of metaphors quickly present themselves, including the constellation Big Dipper, the North Star, the sun over the East Sea, the outline of Mt. Paektu, a pine tree, and the red hybrid begonia called "Kim Il-sungia." Further discussion of how these various symbols function in North Korean cultural expression is a worthy topic, but beyond the scope of this dissertation.

This combination of pageantry with the physical embodiment of the state in the person of the monarch was essential to the process of constituting England as a national territory. In the North Korean case, surely one of the most commonly observed practices of Kim Il-sung during his lifetime were his “on-the-spot-guidance” tours, by which he traveled throughout the country to personally visit collective farms, factories, and other sites of economic production.⁷² North Korean pictorial magazines are filled with images of Kim interacting with working-class North Koreans on these visits, and the images convey powerfully and palpably the intent of the “on-the-spot-guidance” practice to embody state power and state authority. Through the visits, the state was transformed from a distant impersonal dictatorial authority to a parental figure, whose authority is often distant but just as often interceding into daily life. The national territory then becomes a father’s household “writ large,” and the “Great Leader” is the father passing throughout the household giving benevolent instruction, inspecting conditions and suggesting corrections, and reaching out to physically touch and embrace the members of the nation (Figure 7.9).⁷³

⁷²Although a systematic geographic analysis of “on-the-spot-guidance” visits would be impossible, given the scanty research materials available, my review of some five dozen issues of the North Korean pictorial magazine *Korea* spanning the years 1974–1996, as well as access to a haphazard selection of other North Korean publications and close monitoring of media accounts for the years 1987–1993, all suggests to me that Kim Il-sung concentrated a significant number of his tours to the far northeastern province of Hamgyong. Part of this strategy might be that for the world outside North Korea, Hamgyong Province is far too remote to permit independent verification of any of these reported activities. Part of the strategy, too, could have been simply an effort to produce a sense of national identity and loyalty even in remote areas, thereby discouraging the growth of dissident movements that might threaten Kim’s authority.

⁷³Much more could of course be said about the personality cult in general and the “on-the-spot-guidance” visits in particular. One could read them as appealing to some combination of the various authority relationships (such as ruler-subject, father-son, teacher-student) familiar to most Koreans from the long-standing tradition of Confucian morality. However, many Koreans in the north had converted to

It is precisely because North Korea seems to be so thoroughly and incessantly artificial and theatrical, in addition to its outright political isolation and the illegibility and inscrutability of its political and social processes, that the adversaries which confront North Korea across the fortified territorial boundary – South Korea and to a less direct extent the United States – are so intent upon getting a glimpse “behind the curtain,” as it were, of the “real” North Korea. Indeed, this has long been the obsession of US intelligence. Being able to penetrate beyond the facade to detect the “reality” of North Korea’s conditions, its policies, and its near-term outcomes has long been the impossible aspiration for US government “North Korea watchers.”⁷⁴ One can easily trace a succession of dominant concerns from the days of the mid to late 1980s when the health of Kim Il-sung and the adjustment to the fall of the Soviet Union were the central issues of interest to analysts, to the very early 1990s with the alarm over the alleged existence of a North Korean nuclear program and the intent behind it, to the later 1990s when the questions focused on the stability of a post-Kim Il-sung North Korea and the true severity of the floods and the consequent famine, to the present day when the questions of a nuclear North Korea and the intent of the mysterious and elusive Kim Jong-il have returned. In theory, the processes of professional intelligence are supposed to allow states to achieve this glimpse behind the curtain – whether the

Christianity during the colonial period, so the “on-the-spot-guidance” phenomenon may have been crafted with attention to Christian metaphors as well.

⁷⁴That North Korea specialists in the US government informally use that term to refer to themselves collectively is highly ironic, since their ability to “watch” North Korea is strained at best. Having had some direct experience in this area, my own opinion is that the “watching” of North Korea by US intelligence has only ever been “through a glass darkly.”

curtain is the inscrutability of the pageantry of a “theatre state”⁷⁵ or the “iron curtain” barrier of a fortified military boundary – to visually apprehend the real.⁷⁶ And with their singular experience of having themselves been members of the group that is sealed off behind this quasi-theatrical “iron curtain,” defectors are particularly valuable for their latent ability to reveal and interpret the things that would otherwise remain hidden and mysterious.

Defection and Provocation in the Inter-Korean Context

In this final section I wish to present some general information on the practice of defection between the two Koreas and appeal to some specific scenarios to illuminate how the elements of national security discourse that I have been analyzing – visibility and movement in particular – are implicated in the instances of inter-Korean defection. Additionally, I will attempt to locate in inter-Korean defection accounts the three main features of defection that first presented early in the dissertation – first, its salience in a paradigm of binary conflict; second, defectors’ capacity to “undo” an adversary; and third, assumptions of defectors’ “defectiveness” or deviance.

The very term “defector” has become progressively more controversial, as the number of people to whom it might apply in the Korean context mounts higher every

⁷⁵See Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali*, which I cited in Chapter Three, along with Olwig and others in my discussion of the symbolic pageantry of the Elizabethan progresses.

⁷⁶In the case of US government intelligence policy toward North Korea (in my opinion), analysts’ assumptions that a theatrical façade masks some alternate reality causes them to too readily put aside and virtually ignore the information and images that present on the surface and to rationalize this by noting that such information is “only propaganda” and therefore not worthy of close examination.

year and the South Korean government's resources are further strained at the demands of resettling them. To begin with, there are several words that are used in the Korean language to refer to defectors, and each Korean state tends to favor slightly different words for defector (which itself is not surprising, as many differences have crept into the Korean language over the years of division).⁷⁷ There is no equivalent word in the Korean language that conveys the same ambiguity of meaning (*defect / defect*) stemming from etymology, although one of the words commonly used in South Korea for the act of exile or defection – *mahng-myong* (망명) – is composed using a Chinese character that connotes death; the same character also appears in the words *mahng-in* (망인) and *mahng-nyong* (망령), which roughly mean dead people and ghosts, respectively. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that Korean and English both share the commonality of the words for defection carrying a double meaning, whether that meaning is passing beyond the point of possible return (in the Korean case), or being fundamentally flawed (in the English case). Other words used to refer to defectors stress the idea of a defector as a betrayer of loyalty (*bae-bahn* - 배반, *bae shin ja* - 배신자), and a group that stress the idea of defection as a desertion or secession from the nation (*t'al dahng* - 탈당, *ee-t'al ju-min* - 이탈 주민). The North Korean media used *bae-bahn*, or traitor, to refer to Hwang Chang-yop, the high-ranking juch'e ideologue who defected to South Korea over the period February to April 1997; and in general the

⁷⁷Underscoring the highly contentious nature of the various Korean terms used to denote defection is the fact that, during my research, virtually each Korean-speaking friend or colleague with whom I discussed the nuances of meaning among these terms was quick to discount the impressions I was forming from the views of others and from my own study of the linguistic relationships among the terms, insisting that I

North Korean media has favored the use of *bae shin ja* to refer to people who defect from North Korea.⁷⁸ However, several researchers have pointed out that the terms that connect defectors with deserters or seceders from a nation are increasingly seen as provocative and contradictory to the possibility of inter-Korean reconciliation, because they imply the existence of not one, but two nations. These researchers note that many voices in South Korea increasingly favor the rather generic *t'al buk-ja* (literally “exiting northern people”), usually rendered in English as “escapees,” for all people who exit North Korea, no matter what the reason for their departure; but interestingly, “defectors” continues to be the overwhelming term of choice in media writing and scholarly writing alike.⁷⁹

Over the past decade there has been a dramatic shift in the numbers and socio-economic types of defectors leaving North Korea. Throughout decades of the ‘60s, ‘70s, and ‘80s, the few defectors tended to be military personnel and government employees, apparently all male; and the numbers were small, ranging from 102 over the second half of the 1960s to only 11 for the first half of the 1970s. However, since the early 1990s, the number of people leaving North Korea and seeking asylum has been accelerating annually. From 1992, when five people defected, the numbers rose to

needed to be corrected. Thus, the input I received from Korean-speaking colleagues was usually contradictory and even polemical.

⁷⁸ Personal interview with Professor Chae-jin Lee, Claremont-McKenna University, November 2001. In his autobiography, Hwang Chang-yop uses *mahng-myong* to denote his own defection.

⁷⁹ Yoo Young-ock (1997), “Problems and Policies Regarding Escapees from North Korea,” Son Chu-whan, “The Status of North Korean Escapees: In Search of Solutions,” *East Asian Review* 11:4 (Winter 1999), 49-68; Suh Jae-jean, “North Korean Defectors: Their Adaptation and Resettlement,” *East Asian Review* 14:3 (Autumn 2002), 67-86.

around 50 annually in the mid 1990s. From the late 1990s to the present time, the numbers have continued to climb sharply each year; with 71, 148, 312, 583, and 1141 respectively for the years from 1998 to 2002.⁸⁰ Since North Korea suffered severe flooding in agricultural areas in the mid 1990s which brought about a famine that has been the focus of international attention,⁸¹ more and more “defectors” are motivated by economic need and have been exiting North Korea through its northern border with China. However, defections of high profile regime officials also appear to have increased since about 1997, with not only Hwang Chang-yop but also North Korean diplomats and their families being counted among defectors; and this led many analysts in South Korea and the United States to speculate that the regime was becoming unstable following the July 1994 death of Kim Il-sung.⁸²

A review of some of the issues surrounding the defection of Hwang Chang-yop brings into focus many aspects of defection in the inter-Korean context overall. Hwang was about 74 years old at the time of his defection in February 1997, he had long been a

⁸⁰ Oh Jung-hwa, “S.Korea Prepares for Influx of Escapees from North (Reuters News Service, 6/17/02); “North Korean Defectors Total 488 to Date” (*Chosun Ilbo*, Seoul, 6/17/02); “270 North Koreans Defected to South Korea in Past Three Months” (*The Associated Press*, 4/3/03).

⁸¹ A summary account that addresses the international response to the famine and the problems associated with ascertaining the true conditions and humanitarian needs in a state that is chronically reluctant to reveal its weaknesses to the outside world is Andrew S. Natsios, *The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001).

⁸² “The Stronger the Grip, the More Torrential the Leakage: Members of Elite Seeking Asylum,” *Vantage Point* 19:2 (February 1996), 1-8; “Interview with Cho Myong-chol: Many Privileged North Koreans Have a Desire for Defection,” *Vantage Point* 19:2 (February 1996), 9-11; “Evident Are Disputes Between Pyongyang Policymakers,” *Vantage Point* 20:3 (March 1997), 1-3; Kim Yong-ho, “Hwang Chang-yop: His Defection and Its Impact on North Korea,” *Korea Focus On Current Topics* 5:2 (March-April 1997), 37-49; James P. Rubin, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC, Wednesday, August 27, 1997.

prominent figure in the North Korean regime (having interacted closely with the two Kims since the late 1950s, having reportedly mentored the younger Kim during his university attendance, from his position as President of Kim Il-sung University, and having worked with the two Kims to perfect the ideological stance of the regime, in his capacity of “architect” of North Korea’s trademark *juch’e* ideology), and he had been named by Western scholars as among the top 30 political figures in North Korea in the mid 1990s shortly before his defection.⁸³ Reportedly, Hwang grew increasingly disillusioned with the manipulations of *juch’e* ideology by Kim Il-sung’s son and successor Kim Jong-il and had difficulty reconciling the official demands to pay lip service to “self-reliance” while a famine was claiming hundreds of thousands of lives and the regime was unwilling to allow unrestricted access to humanitarian aid. But additionally there were indications that Hwang, who, in his capacity as a trusted regime spokesperson, traveled outside of North Korea often, had struck up a relationship with South Korean intelligence agents, was providing written reports to South Korean intelligence, and was planning his defection months before it actually took place.⁸⁴ In their account of Hwang’s defection, Chae-jin Lee and Stephanie Hsieh suggest that Hwang suspected that he had fallen out of favor from Kim Jong-il and may soon face a

⁸³Suh Dae-sook and Chae-jin Lee, eds., *North Korea After Kim Il Sung* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 248. For a general account of Hwang’s background and defection see Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 399-406; Kim Yong-ho; Cho Tac-hoon, “Juche Ideology: The Power and Blight of Its False Image – Why Did Hwang Chang-yop Defect to South Korea?” *East Asian Review* 9:3 (Autumn 1997), 43-56; (in Korean) Hwang Chang-yop, *I Saw the Truth of History* (Seoul: Hanul Publishing, 1998); and Chae-jin Lee and Stephanie Hsieh, “China’s Two-Korean Policy at Trial: The Hwang Chang Yop Crisis,” *Pacific Affairs* (Fall 2001), 321-341.

⁸⁴Oberdorfer’s account (403-405) names a South Korean intelligence operative and former Korean War commando who worked with Hwang to orchestrate his defection.

demotion or worse.⁸⁵ In any case, during a trip back to North Korea from Japan, while he was staying briefly at the North Korean embassy in Beijing prior to flying back to Pyongyang, Hwang arrived by taxi at the South Korean embassy in Beijing and announced his intention to defect. The conditions of “dual recognition” between China and both Koreas (while China long had diplomatic ties only to North Korea, it has practiced “dual recognition” since 1993) created a tense and complicated diplomatic situation (best analyzed by Lee and Hsieh) and a standoff of approximately a month’s time, during which Hwang remained secluded in the South Korean embassy, where fears for his safety from assassination attempts by North Korean agents or foreign nationals friendly to North Korea led to him even being kept away from glass windows. Finally, a solution was reached whereby China would “expel” Hwang to a third country, thus underscoring the illegality of his presence there, but without adjudicating between South Korea’s claim that he had defected and North Korea’s claim that he had been kidnapped. Hwang was conveyed (along with a second defector Kim Duk Hong, a North Korean resident of Beijing who operated an import-export business and had helped arrange Hwang’s defection to accompany his own) via a Chinese plane to the Philippines, where he remained in isolation at a remote Filipino military facility. Finally, in late April, more than two months after his defection, he was taken to Seoul.

Hwang’s handling by South Korean intelligence organizations raised many questions. Initially South Korean intelligence flatly refused to give American intelligence officials access to Hwang to debrief him, and later only grudgingly allowed

⁸⁵ Lee and Hsieh, 325-326.

very carefully orchestrated American access to Hwang. Rumors began to circulate that “witch-hunts” would soon be in the offing in South Korean government and business circles for individuals with ties to North Korea, whose names had been provided by Hwang in a list of North Korean intelligence operatives in the South. South Korean media soon began releasing reports of various aspects of Hwang’s intelligence debriefings, and Hwang’s reports painted a dire and threatening picture of a bellicose North Korea determined to wage war. Much of what Hwang said seemed to run counter to the public climate in South Korea, where voices calling for a more conciliatory attitude and a less hostile posture towards the North had been growing stronger. The extent to which Hwang’s statements seemed to accord perfectly with the more conservative opposition to this reconciliation movement was a bit too convenient to be entirely believable. At the same time that analysts pointed to Hwang’s revelations of a North Korea that was more militarily robust than ever, they also deduced eagerly that Hwang’s defection was an indication of a North Korean regime in chaos. Thus, Hwang’s defection was an “unmaking” of North Korea in two respects: first, the departure of someone of his stature was a signal to South Korean analysts that fissures were developing in the regime; and second, his revelation of purported military intentions helped “un-do” any threat that those intentions might have posed. And North Korea’s ultimate reaction to Hwang’s defection indicated its awareness that Hwang’s defection could amount to an “un-doing;” Kim Jong-il chose to “cut his losses quickly” by declaring Hwang a coward and a renegade who had long outlived his usefulness to

the regime and had little of value to offer.⁸⁶ Oddly, the United States and North Korea ended up voicing similar views about Hwang's usefulness and access, or lack thereof. Probably because many in US intelligence circles resented the South Korean intelligence coup in achieving Hwang's defection and controlling his debriefings, the US response seemed to be one of calculated nonchalance and skepticism over Hwang and whether he really possessed access to any "crown jewels" of the enigmatic North Korean regime.⁸⁷

One consequence of the Hwang defection seemed to be a marked increase in China as a venue for the transitioning of defectors. Although partly the importance of China is simply a function of geography, in addition to starving North Korean refugees seeking asylum in the far northeast,⁸⁸ the diplomatic neighborhoods of Beijing and the northeastern city of Shenyang have emerged as sites for numerous defections both of individuals and of large family groups. Such activity seemed to peak during 2002, with numerous well-publicized incidents of groups of North Korean refugees "storming"

⁸⁶Lee and Hsieh, 331.

⁸⁷Dr. John Merrill and Prof. Chae-jin Lee each expressed this view during my interviews with them. Additionally, this view was reinforced by Mr. Rinn-sup Shin, Research Analyst, Foreign Resource Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, December 1999. My research yielded many subtle suggestions of competition between South Korean and US intelligence organizations and their respective programs relating to inducing of North Korean defections and managing the defectors that come their way. Control and possession of North Korean defectors represents valuable intelligence collateral.

⁸⁸ Because China's diplomatic recognition of South Korea has eased the freedom of travel enjoyed by South Koreans in China, numerous South Korean humanitarian and missionary organizations have established facilities and relief networks in the China-North Korea border region to help provide a "safety net" for North Korean "escapees."

foreign embassies and consulates in these cities.⁸⁹ As recently as April 2003, international efforts to choreograph the defection and transiting out of China of some 20 high-level North Korean officials, including scientists with purported knowledge of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and ambitions, have focused on the sovereign island nation of Nauru and have reportedly included negotiations over the establishment of additional foreign embassies there that would serve as neutral gateways for defectors.⁹⁰

Accompanying the numerical shift in defection trends and the tendency towards defectors representing nearly opposite poles of North Korean domestic social status⁹¹ is an intriguing shift in South Korean public opinion regarding defectors, which a number of scholars have recently remarked upon. Kelly Koh and Glenn Baek state it thus: "No longer feted as national heroes, defectors are these days more often perceived as

⁸⁹An excellent source for media accounts of North Korean defectors and refugees is the website of the Nautilus Institute, which provides a link to the Northeast Asian Peace and Security Network, a service coordinating daily media reports on security issues affecting the region. Examples of media coverage of the 2002 North Korean defector "crisis" include: Lee Young-jong, "China Said to Step Up Defector Watch" (*Joongang Ilbo*, Seoul, 04/11/02); Oh Young-hwan, "Pyongyang, Beijing Mum On Defectors" (*Joongang Ilbo*, Seoul, 04/28/02); "Government To Accept NK Defectors at Diplomatic Mission Abroad" (*Joongang Ilbo*, Seoul, 5/24/02); "Ex-North Korean Army Officer Seeks Asylum in South Korean Consulate in China" (Agence France-Presse, 5/29/02); "Another North Korean Enters Seoul's China Consulate" (Reuters, Beijing, 6/6/02); Oh Young-hwan, Yoo Kwang-jong, "Defectors in Mission Still Wait" (*Joongang Ilbo*, Seoul, 6/7/02); Tamora Vidaillet, "More North Koreans Seek Refuge in China Embassies" (Reuters, Beijing, 6/10/02); "Three More N. Korean Asylum-Seekers Enter S. Korean Diplomatic Compound" (Agence France-Presse, 6/10/02).

⁹⁰Doug Struck, "Korean Scientists Defect in China: Report Says Top Nuclear Officials from North Korea Helped by US, Others" (*Washington Post*, 4/21/03); Barbara Demick, "A Plan to Assist North Korea Defectors is Alleged" (*Los Angeles Times*, 4/27/03).

⁹¹Alongside the published memoirs by Hwang and other high level defectors of life in the stratosphere of the North Korean inner circle elite are the equally sensationalistic memoirs of "defectors" who fled horrific conditions of starvation and concentration camps, such as Kang and Rigoulot's *Aquariums of Pyongyang*.

parasites.”⁹² Suh Dong-man argues that the continued hemorrhage of North Korean food refugees into China and then into South Korea where they are processed according to the same long-standing system for handling defectors is so overburdening government resources that dramatic policy change should be considered, including sending these hapless people back to North Korea.⁹³ He suggests that the South Korean government focus should be upon negotiating with the North Korean regime to ensure the human rights of its population, rather than offering to integrate into South Korea a category of people who are ultimately of no value, simply on the basis of their material need. Indeed, Suh’s rather shocking position illustrates the polarized extremes of attitude toward defection that exist in South Korean discourse, from seeing them as national heroes to worthless beggars who will do nothing but drain the national coffers. And it also reinforces one facet of the analysis of defectors that I presented in Chapter Two, namely, that defectors’ “value” is a function of the information they can offer, by which they can participate in a system’s undoing, either literally or through helping erode the system’s prestige. The desperately poor are unlikely to either possess singular knowledge or to participate in the prestige of the state from which they are defecting; they would be no great loss to the system they leave (in the case of famine victims, North Korea could readily blame their plight on natural causes, compounded by the US

⁹² Kelly Koh and Glenn Back, “Handling With Care: South Korean Government Policy and North Korean Defectors Living in South Korea,” *Korea Observer* 30:3 (Autumn 1999), 467-486, p. 468.

⁹³ Suh Dong-man, “North Korean Defectors and Inter-Korean Reconciliation and Cooperation,” (Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network ‘Special Report,’ 5/7/02), <http://www.nautilus.org/pub/fip/napsnet/special%3Freports/dprkrefugees.txt>.

embargo, thus preventing loss of prestige), but neither are they a gain to the system they seek to enter. Thus, their very status is invalidated.

Compounding the growing view in South Korea that the government can ill afford to care for defectors is a related view that defectors by their very presence could obstruct inter-Korean reconciliation. Koh and Baek report that over two-thirds of South Koreans polled thought that defectors pose an impediment to reunification and more than one in five people thought that defectors shouldn't be admitted to South Korea at all.⁹⁴ Underlying this position seems to be a mixture of impressions about the term "defector" (meaning most of the Korean terms discussed earlier such as *mahng-myong* and *ee-t'al chu-min*) prolonging the outmoded fixation on the Cold War division of Korea and discomfiture with the tendency of defectors to speak negatively about North Korea (along a range of issues, from military threat to political corruption) and thus undermine prevailing attempts to foster a more positive public impression of North Korea. This suggests a strange reversal of the role of visibility in the logic of defection; and in this case the defectors' potential abilities to reveal the "hidden truth" of a place actually presents a possible drawback and a potential interference to South Korean official spokespersons' abilities to construct a North Korean reality at will, in order to best suit a particular political climate.

Defectors themselves seem to be no more contented at their plight than the South Korean public is at the challenges their presence entails. The host of difficulties faced by defectors is truly dizzying, and their forced initial detention in an intelligence

⁹⁴Koh and Baek, 468-469.

facility for at least a month's interrogation followed by up to a year of confinement along with other defectors of all backgrounds whom they may or may not know at the barbed-wire fenced "Hanawon" (Unity Wish or One Wish) facility - where they receive intense "orientation" into various aspects of South Korean life - strikes one as offering a disorienting start to a maladjusted future.⁹⁵ Among the myriad grievances voiced by defectors is their resentment over the South Korean system that determines defector compensation. Yoo Young-ok discusses the laws that have been enacted to set various levels of defector compensation, ranging from the 1962 "Special Assistance Act for Persons of Merit and North Korean Defectors" to the more recent iterations of "Law for the Protection of North Korea Defectors" (1993) and "Law Related to the Protection and the Settlement Assistance for North Korean Defectors" (1996), with responsibility for the laws' administration shifting from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the National Unification Board.⁹⁶ The evolution of these laws reportedly reflects some attempt to move away from the Cold War position of equating merit simply with the act of departure.⁹⁷ But some observers have pointed out that rewarding defectors based on the singularity of their "insider" knowledge risks replicating among the defectors the

⁹⁵In a recent article, Michael Paterniti, "The Flight of the Fluttering Swallows" (*New York Times Magazine* online version, 4/27/03), discusses the awkward adjustments of a group of teenage North Korean refugees. See also Roy Richard Grinker, *Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), especially Chapter Nine, "The Defectors," 225-255. Grinker notes that despite interviewing numerous defectors for his research, he learned little or nothing of what specifically happens to them during this initial period of confinement. He suggests that they feel intimidated by their government "watchers," who continue to monitor their lives even after their initial orientation period is complete.

⁹⁶ Yoo Young-ok, 46.

⁹⁷ Je Song-ho, "Problems and Reform Measures Related to the Protection and Management of North Korean Defectors," *Studies for Criminal Policies* 7:1 (Winter 1996), 65-66.

same class structure under which they lived in North Korea, and that it is not surprising that lower-status defectors are resentful of the relatively opulent compensation of, for example, a former high ranking political official who “also created and directed the policies we had to follow” (no doubt a reference to Hwang Chang-yop).⁹⁸ Suh Jae-jean points out that the system of compensating defectors as “meritorious” national heroes was an early Cold War strategy aimed at encouraging North Koreans to defect, dangling before them the promise of both money *and* high social status in the South.⁹⁹

Besides the defectors resenting their unequal compensation packages, researchers have indicated that they also suffer a loss of self-identity, since their previous social and professional roles either have no counterpart in South Korea or they hold professional credentials not recognized in South Korea so they are not able to gain similar employment. Moreover, young male defectors (who have constituted the majority, although a greater variety of ages and genders is increasingly represented since family groups have begun to defect more often) are practically assured that their marriage prospects will be nil, as the finding spouses for oneself or one’s children is a serious business in Korea, in which social status and background are paramount. And this issue of slim marriage prospects interrelates with the broadest concern among defectors, which is their acute awareness of a complex range of South Korean prejudices against North Koreans. Besides being marked often with visible or otherwise apparent differences – accent, speech patterns, physical signs of past

⁹⁸ Koh and Back, 478.

⁹⁹ Suh Jae-jean, 76.

malnutrition or poor dental care – defectors also suffer a range of bigotry and stereotypes, from assumptions that they are simple-minded and childlike to the somewhat contradictory assumption that they are not to be trusted. Anthropologist Roy Grinker tells us:

When a defector commits a crime in south Korea, the press generally makes much of the fact that the criminal is also a defector, and this sort of publicity lowers morale among all the defectors and reaffirms their suspicions that southerners expect them to behave aberrantly.¹⁰⁰

The expectation that defectors are likely to exhibit “deviant” behavior is probably what accounts in part for the fact that defectors’ lives continue to be closely monitored by government officials. As Yoo Young-ok explains, the various aspects of defectors’ resettlement and daily lives are under surveillance by several different (and overlapping) layers of government watchdogs, from the National Intelligence Service to the National Unification Board, to regional and local police forces.¹⁰¹ Indeed, the South Korean regime seems determined to control defectors’ movements and lives. Much of this can be explained away as merely benign and paternalistic, such as the provision to defectors of subsidized housing and services to locate employment. But measures to restrict defectors to particular housing developments and to require that they join at least one of a number of government approved “voluntary” social organizations for defectors can also be construed as an effort to corral defectors within the watchful surveilling gaze of the new regime to which they have defected. Grinker alludes, too, to

¹⁰⁰ Grinker, 252.

¹⁰¹ Yoo Young-ok, 49.

this approach being motivated by an official South Korean position that the defectors are indeed defective:

(D)efectors are never entirely free of the government's suspicion, for they were born and raised in a completely different ideological system, and, from the government perspective, if they violated one law in crossing the border to the south, they may violate another law once they have defected. In other words, the defectors are forever tainted and, by the very act of defection, they will perhaps be forever observed.¹⁰²

However, as I suggested earlier, defectors can also in theory facilitate the observations of others, with their innate ability to offer an "insider" view. In the literature on North Korean defectors appear abundant visual metaphors for what defectors offer. Of Hwang Chang-yop, Cho Tae-hoon states that "Hwang painted a dark picture of the land he had left..."; and Choe Ju-hwal, a former North Korean colonel, writes in a South Korean journal that his analysis represents "An Insider Perspective."¹⁰³ And defectors have been called upon to give eyewitness testimony by which the international community has tried to ascertain the truth of some of North Korea's most mysterious recent episodes, such as the famine. Defectors testified at a 2002 human rights convention that North Korean officials were grossly manipulating humanitarian aid workers and famine relief supplies. Said one defector, a former bodyguard to Kim Jong-il, "I know about this because I worked in the security network...it's all a farce."¹⁰⁴ But in perhaps the most striking example, Grinker reveals clearly that defectors from North Korea have been regarded quite literally as windows

¹⁰² Grinker, 242.

¹⁰³ Cho Tae-hoon, 44; Choe Ju-hwal, "An Inside Perspective: North Korea's Unalterable Stance," *East Asian Review* 11:4 (Winter 1999), 87-102.

into North Korea.¹⁰⁵ Grinker's work examines South Korean discourses on "unification," a national aspiration that is variously defined and pursued but which Grinker identifies as "a metaphor for the return home, an ideal that always awaits" (221). He presents the array of explanatory models present in South Korean unification discourse for understanding North Korean people, ranging from the pejorative view of North Koreans as indoctrinated and pseudo-mechanical or as unenlightened and uncivilized, to the more positive view of North Koreans as "the prelapsarian or primordial Korean before the fall," meaning the fall of part of Korea into Western modernity with all its attendant temptations (49). Of course, any of these discursive approaches to identifying the essence of North Korean people depends upon their being concealed from "view," that is, from analytical consideration.¹⁰⁶ Grinker reveals how the complexities of South Korean impressions of North Korean people were exposed through a public exhibition of some 2000 everyday objects and recreated model settings of North Korean domestic life presented at Seoul's Midopa department store in the summer of 1993 and later moved to a permanent display site. The exhibition's content, much of which was designed directly by defectors or based on defectors' descriptions,

¹⁰⁴Joji Sakurai, "N. Korea Defectors Claim Aid Sham" (Associated Press, Tokyo, 2/8/02).

¹⁰⁵Grinker, Chapter Three, "North Korean Everyday Life on Display," 49-72. Grinker, 255, also remarks that by the late 1990s "escapees" was being used more and more, although he unfailingly uses "defector," and does not analyze why the choice of term for the act of defection is in itself problematic and provocative.

¹⁰⁶In a brief section titled, "The Invisible North" (53-56), Grinker describes the ways in which South Korean discourse on North Korea produces a condition in which real North Koreans are so inaccessible to South Koreans that South Korean individuals experience overwhelming and complex emotions even during very minor and momentary contacts with North Korean people, including both direct oral contacts and indirect contacts through literature.

was reviewed and pre-approved by the South Korean government's central intelligence branch, the Agency for National Security Planning. Grinker notes that the defectors' direct involvement "led reviewers to praise the exhibition as providing... a sense of the real or actual" (55), and this was accentuated by the presence of "some North Korean defectors to give guided tours and answer questions" (56).¹⁰⁷

Discussions of defection in the Korean context normally presume that all defectors move in one direction only, from north to south. But North Korea has been the destination not only of some "defectors," but also of a variety of individuals who apparently were forced to fulfill a visual-type need for the North Korean regime - and for the North Korean intelligence apparatus, in particular: illuminating the popular culture of the world outside of Kim Il-sung's "hermit kingdom." Allegedly, the ways in which North Korean intelligence and terrorist operatives have functioned in some very unexpected places in the world to carry on North Korea's "cold war" rivalry with the South have rested in part upon a foundation of information gleaned (forcibly) from "abductees," kidnapped usually in Japan and forced to participate in teaching North Korean spies and terrorists the various mannerisms needed to allow them to pass as nationals from Japan or South Korea. For example, the female North Korean terrorist who, along with her male partner (who committed suicide when the pair was caught) planted the bomb that brought down a South Korean airliner in 1987 killing all aboard,

¹⁰⁷Grinker also explores how viewers' reactions to the items on display - which were invariably remarked upon for being simple, primitive, out-dated, and even toy-like relative to similar items available to South Koreans - tended to reinforce pre-existing impressions of North Koreans themselves as primitive, pre-modern, and even outside of time altogether. See 56-65.

has described how she was trained in language and mannerisms by an abducted Japanese woman.¹⁰⁸ The issue of the Japanese “abductees,” who were mostly taken while very young women, has gotten renewed media attention recently when North Korean officials admitted to their security services having committed the abductions, as had long been alleged by Japanese families and interest groups.¹⁰⁹ And another group of defectors to North Korea – US enlisted servicemen who defected to North Korea in the early 1960s while serving along the Korean DMZ – have served an especially bizarre function in allowing North Korea to better “envision” the outside world: they have allegedly appeared as actors in North Korean movies. The movies in which they have appeared include both spy genre movies set in Cold War Europe and war movies from the Korean War era. The American GI defectors, who are now in their 60s, are reported to portray stock “bad guy” characters that, according to plot demands, must be black or Caucasian.¹¹⁰

Conclusion

If it were possible to construct a “word-equation” to convey the relationship between territoriality, national security, and defection, one could do so and then easily

¹⁰⁸Kim Hyun-hee, *The Tears of My Soul* (New York: William Morrow, 1993).

¹⁰⁹Gavin McCormack, “North Korea in the Vice,” *New Left Review* 18 (November-December 2002), 5-27.

¹¹⁰“US Defectors in North Korea,” www.kimssoft.com/korea/usdefect.htm. Additionally, McCormack mentions that one of the Japanese female abductees married one of the American GI defectors and raised two daughters with him in North Korea. Additionally, a North Korean military defector reported in 1989 that American GI defectors were working as language teachers at a military training school.

apply such a calculus to various geohistorical settings, and in particular to settings of sharp and thorough binary conflict. What I have aspired to do in this chapter is to apply to the setting of the Korean peninsula, pervaded as it is by the binary conflict that is in part a relic of the Cold War, some of the theoretical discussions of territoriality, national security, and defection that I have been attempting to develop throughout this dissertation. In the case of the two rival Koreas, official memory of formative events in Korean history during the first half of the 20th century has affected the territorial imaginations of the two Koreas in the second half of the 20th century and beyond. This has impacted their discourses of modern nationality and of national security, and it is even apparent to the discerning observer that traditional practices such as “ancestor worship” continue to inform both territoriality and national security in the two Koreas.

As the two Koreas (claim to) attempt to move beyond a Cold War construct of territorial conflict and of overlapping claims to territory, the “one state, two systems” idea that has been perennially promoted by North Korea for at least a decade itself ironically suggests the perpetuation of twin territories in Korea, each operating as a container of a particular set of political ideologies. And the tainting of those respective territorial containers by adulterating or “defective” elements represents a security problem. Indeed, a theme running through dissertation is that of defectors as making a hidden place more legible – revealing it to new eyes. But the inter-Korean border, the DMZ, is already crowded with sites whose meaning and poignancy rest on visual assumptions. Such sites include the “unification observatories,” which are ironically named in light of their apparent intent *not* of fostering conciliation towards the North,

but instead of accentuating the threat and suspicion of the North so as to perpetuate division. And visually significant sites also include the monuments for homesickness and for ancestor worship rituals, although the meaning of these sites hinges not upon the vision of North Korea, but upon that vision being occluded.

Using the recent history and contemporary geopolitical relationship between the two Koreas to interpret a set of Western and Western-imposed discourses, on the one hand might run the risk of continuing to subjugate Korea, through the imposition of pseudo-imperialist narratives. However, on the other hand, the exercise is analytically instructive in that allows one to arrive at a powerful critique of those very narratives. Defection holds a distinctive place in the Western discourse of professional intelligence, which in turn is itself a logical extension of national security discourses, which themselves rest upon assumptions of territoriality - of what belongs in a given territory, what does not belong, and what threatens that territory. Throughout this dissertation I have tried to analyze the theoretical progression among this group of concepts. Defection presumes two territories in diametric conflict, which are "secured" by the physical and ideological barriers that separate them, barriers that must be breached by the defector. Additionally, the security function of these dividing barriers rests partly on the notion that they conceal from the penetrating and scrutinizing gaze of the adversary the essence of whatever it is that the territory contains. Intelligence discourse arises, then, to effect a penetration of the adversary's barrier and to visually discern the adversary and his essence. And defection is among the tools of the intelligence trade, insofar as defectors represent "windows" into the hidden spaces of the adversary.

Moreover, defectors themselves – as formerly part of the adversary - can contain elements of an adversary’s essence, and the theoretical assumption that they leave the adversary weaker by their act of departure is one source of their “value” in national security discourse. Narrating the recent evolution of the inter-Korean rivalry with its prominent US role, then, should illustrate to a tee how rival discourses of territoriality integrated with rival discourses of national security produce an almost obsessive – if not paranoid – extension of the US practice of defection. In this case, it is extended to a socio-cultural setting where putative racial and cultural homogeneity mean that the typical markers for interpreting “difference” do not exist.

Of the conditions for North Korean defectors in South Korea, Roy Grinker comments insightfully that “(t)he difference between defectors and south Koreans is curious amidst the ideology of homogeneity.”¹¹¹ I began this chapter with a discussion of the unified territoriality of Korea being essentially an ideology of modern manufacture, which must necessarily be critiqued if we are to find more satisfactory explanations of why Korean division could continue well over a decade beyond the end of the Cold War that supposedly produced it in the first place. Grinker’s observation, along with the insights forthcoming from the growing literature on defectors and their resettlement challenges in the South, should underscore emphatically that the myth of Korean unity, which ostensibly motivates dissidents on both sides of the DMZ, does not hold up to the everyday experiences of North Korean people attempting to integrate into South Korean urban life. Clearly North Korean defectors are far from a homogeneous

¹¹¹Grinker, 250.

group. But South Korean analysts writing in 2002 with public policy propositions for the handling of defectors had little better to offer than the suggestions that defectors should lower their expectations of their new life in South Korea and turn to religion for solace, and that South Koreans should simply forget their prejudices and call defectors by a different name.¹¹² This signals that there is much that remains to be done to smooth the ways in which defectors are both passively viewed and actively manipulated and implicated in the inter-Korean security climate. Although lack of reliable research materials prohibited a more nuanced discussion of defectors to North Korea, one can detect that the ways in which defectors and abductees have functioned for the North Korean security services is theoretically similar to the functioning of defectors in other settings.

In the final chapter, I will turn back to the more traditional Cold War setting of US-Soviet rivalry, and examine how the handling, experiences, and public attitudes with respect to defectors has been both similar to and sharply different from the Korean cases. This will involve reviewing the process by which Cold War defectors have been resettled and professionally reoriented in the United States and the negotiation of their citizenship concerns.

¹¹² Suh Jae-Jean, 84.





Figure 7.1. Ancestor-worship site on South Korean side of the DMZ, intended for use by families whose ancestors are buried in the North, beyond their reach for the discharging of filial duties. (Photo by author.)



Figure 7.2. “Song of Homesickness” Monument, in South Korean security zone at the DMZ. (Photo by author.)



———— Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)

Figure 7.3. Map depicting locations along the DMZ in South Korea of the unification observatories and infiltration tunnels visited for this research.



Figure 7.4. Entrance to a unification observatory, “Point of Country Division #1, Unification Area.” (Photo by author.)



Figure 7.5. Roadway along DMZ outside of a second unification observatory. Distant hills are in North Korea. (Photo by author.)




Figure 7.6. Huge neon-lit signs depicting political slogans face North Korea near a unification observatory on the South Korean side of the DMZ, and are visible above the treetops. (Photo by author.)




Figure 7.7. Drinking fountain outside of unification observatory offers “nostalgia water.” (Photo by author.)




Figure 7.8. Hills and ridges across the Han River in the distance are in North Korea and are near the guarded “observation” site on Kangwha Island.



Figure 7.9 Images from North Korean pictorial propaganda magazine *Korea* depict typical scenes of Kim Il-sung during “on-the-spot-guidance” visits in rural areas.

Chapter Eight

Confronting Defection in the Cold War Period

Throughout this dissertation I have attempted to construct a theoretical foundation through which the act of defection can be understood, both on its own and as part and parcel of intelligence discourse more broadly. In so doing, I have also attempted to construct a theoretical pathway that will better enable the recognition of analytical interrelationships among the basic (though hardly unproblematic) geographical tenet of territoriality, the largely modern Western discourse of national security, and the Western enlightenment-informed discourse of the intelligence profession. This has involved highlighting the assumptions that are at work in intelligence discourse; namely, that intelligence processes and methods can be put to work to better detect and understand and counter threats to national security that may be promulgated by a nation's rival that inhabits a neighboring territory and is working from across a fortified boundary. Defectors are one tool available within intelligence discourse. A defector's value lies in his ability to reveal information about territories that are hidden behind the discursive boundaries of national security. Not only is defectors' value "place-specific," they also hold the potential of helping to undermine the very place-specific system from which they have defected. This happens in two ways: first, their departure weakens the system; and second, their revelation's of the system's "secrets" makes the system more vulnerable to assault (literally and figuratively) by the adversary.

In this chapter I wish to return to the Cold War setting of the US-Soviet and Soviet Bloc rivalry and examine how various issues surrounding defectors and acts of defection were managed in that polarized national security climate. In particular I will concentrate upon the activities of the Jamestown Foundation, a non-governmental and non-profit organization founded to coordinate attention to some of the resettlement and reorientation needs of Soviet and Soviet Bloc defectors to the United States. The Jamestown Foundation was launched in 1984 by William Geimer, a Washington, DC, attorney and former State Department official. Geimer had become the *pro bono* attorney in 1978 of Arkady Schevchenko, an Under-Secretary General at the United Nations when he defected, making him the highest-ranking Soviet defector to the United States. Geimer established the Jamestown Foundation out of recognition that multiple aspects of the defection experience were being ignored or short-shrifted by the US Intelligence Community professionals who “handled” defectors.

In 1999 and 2000 I had the opportunity to spend time at the Jamestown Foundation offices and archives, as well as the chance to interview its president, the late William Geimer. Relatedly, I was later able to interview former US intelligence community personnel who also were involved in defector handling and defector resettlement, as well as, conversely, a former Soviet KGB officer who was responsible for handling American defectors to the Soviet Union. By reviewing the documentary evidence of the Foundation’s goals and how it discharged its perceived responsibilities to defectors, many interesting themes emerged that are consistent with the theoretical framework that I have attempted to construct surrounding defection. It was clear that,

fundamentally, the Jamestown Foundation has understood defectors through a visual epistemology: defectors allow us to *see* things that would otherwise remain hidden. This is immediately apparent upon reviewing the Foundation's mission statement, as currently reflected on its website:

Launched in 1984 after Jamestown's late president and founder William Geimer's work with Arkady Shevchenko, the highest-ranking Soviet official ever to defect when he left his position as undersecretary general of the United Nations, the Jamestown Foundation rapidly became the leading source of information about the inner workings of closed totalitarian societies.¹

Through a review and analysis of material from the Jamestown Foundation files and archives, of older archival collections of defector information and defector-based reports, as well as material gained from former American and Soviet intelligence professionals and from defectors themselves, this chapter will reveal some of the specific ways in which the theoretical connections between territory, national security, and defection have been manifested in the US-Soviet Cold War rivalry. It will also provide further illustration of the various elements that, according to the arguments I have presented earlier in the dissertation, are at work in the logic of defection: its necessary connection to a binary conflict; defectors' capacity to "undo" the systems from which they defect; and, defectors as "defective."

Defector Writing and the Logic of the Eyewitness

Although defectors have attracted the attention of popular writers since early in the Cold War, the ways in which defectors have been written about has focused much

¹See <http://www.jamestown.org/about.htm>.

less on their potential to “shed light” on the concealed social and political system from which they have defected so as to make that system more legible and thus impact the binary conflict, and much more on the clandestine activities of defectors who functioned as espionage operatives and the sensational events in which they were implicated.² Of course, such accounts are difficult to separate from more general descriptive accounts of Cold War spycraft and espionage, a literature that is staggering in size but largely sensationalistic and unremarkable from the standpoint of being useful to support scholarly analysis. A broad segment of this literature concerns “traitors” to the West, and includes analyzing the motives of traitors against the backdrop of the exciting and lurid operations they were involved in, and it is in such works that material on defectors is more likely to be found.³ Additionally, some of the autobiographical works of prominent Soviet defectors - such as those by Arkady Schevchenko, who defected from his position as a UN diplomat, and Stanislav Levchenko, who was a high-ranking KGB officer at the time of his defection - have attained status in the intelligence studies field as tantamount to serious scholarly works, under basically the same rationale that has led first-person accounts by former CIA personnel to be regarded,

²Accounts of Soviet defectors that appear to set the standard within the spy nonfiction genre of popular writing include Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Storm Petrels: The First Soviet Defectors, 1928-1938* (London: Weidenfeld, 1977); and Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Storm Birds: Soviet Postwar Defectors* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989).

³This sort of literature has literally spanned the Cold War, from Rebecca West, *The Meaning of Treason* (New York: Viking, 1946); to Rebecca West, *The New Meaning of Treason* (New York: Viking, 1964); to Chapman Pincher, *Traitors: The Labyrinths of Treason* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1987); to the fairly recent Stan A. Taylor and Daniel Snow, “Cold War Spies: Why They Spied and How They Got Caught,” *Intelligence and National Security* 12:2 (April 1997) 101-125.

without question, as authoritative, as I suggested in Chapter Six.⁴ In fact, it is not uncommon to see the same publishers handling defectors' memoirs as handling intelligence studies work more generally. Moreover, defectors' memoirs are among the mainstays within the array of resources used by the Washington, DC based Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, which designs academic curricula and contracts with government agencies and academia alike to offer classroom instruction in the intelligence studies field.⁵

It should be clear, then, that the dominant approach to the study of defectors is unquestionably to treat it as a function of the intelligence profession and the practice of espionage. The pedagogical potential of defectors' experiences is overwhelmingly presumed to be synchronous with the defectors' professional experiences as intelligence and political operatives. The Soviet defectors who came from professional backgrounds other than intelligence - such as athletes and dancers, musicians, wives of diplomats, scientists, etc. - are practically invisible, unless they write their own autobiographical

⁴Arkady N. Shevchenko, *Breaking With Moscow* (New York: Knopf, 1985); and Stanislav Levchenko, *On the Wrong Side: My Life in the KGB* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988). Although not written by a defector, Oleg Kalugin, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), is a work which falls in the same category. Kalugin, a KGB colonel, abruptly began working towards political reform in Russia in 1990, and he emigrated to the United States after retiring with a pension from the KGB.

⁵Founded and staffed by former FBI and CIA officers, the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies also counts three former KGB officers among its "professors," including Kalugin. The Centre staff also includes a University of Virginia history professor, a retired intelligence officer from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and former British Parliamentarian Rupert Allason, who under the pen name "Nigel West" is a prolific writer of popular military and intelligence history. According to its co-founder and vice-president David Major, the Centre is currently negotiating with University of Maryland to design and teach the curriculum for an MA degree in intelligence and security studies. See the group's website at <http://www.cicentre.com>.

accounts, of which an unknown number exists.⁶ Yet analyzing the theoretical aspects of defection must address the commonalities among the experiences of *all* defectors, to ascertain patterns that would point to the various elements present in the logic of defection as I have laid it out. And such an approach would also give attention to the aspects of defectors' past lives, access, and bodies of knowledge that would have been of interest to the US intelligence system that managed their defections.

Indeed, defectors' reports about conditions in the Soviet Union were routinely and methodically solicited and compiled, largely through the processes by which defectors were debriefed by US intelligence officers and foreign policy specialists in the first several months after their defection. A collection of reports from Soviet and Soviet Bloc defector interviews conducted by the US Department of State dating from the late 1950s through early 1960s exists in the archives of the Hoover Institute, and these consist primarily of descriptive accounts organized around the particular lifestyle and professional and social background of the defector. For example, one report begins:

A young Russian seaman describes living and working conditions aboard a freighter serving Western European and Soviet subarctic trade routes. Topics discussed include the training and functions of crew members, pay, rations, use of foreign exchange, rules of conduct aboard and disciplinary methods, black market speculation and pilferage of cargo, Party and trade-union organization, and formal and informal devices for political control. The incidents related bring out the relationship of the political officer to the crew, the peculiar advantages enjoyed by Russian seamen by comparison with the Russian people as a whole, the rigid regulations governing shore leave in foreign ports, the

⁶One of these is Alexandra Costa, *Stepping Down From the Star: A Soviet Defector's Story* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1986). Costa was the wife of a diplomat when she defected with her two very young children in 1978. Her book concentrates on her life in diplomatic circles and how she developed the acquaintance in US intelligence circles through whom she arranged her defection.

prohibition of unauthorized reading matter, the use of informants among the crew, and the Party's domination of the ship's trade union organization.⁷

The tone of this introductory passage strongly suggests that the defector has been the source for information about a setting that would otherwise remain concealed and ill understood. Indeed, this is a common theme throughout this particular collection of defector reports, and the revelations pertain to a wide range of sectors in Soviet and Soviet Bloc life. From the following passage one can infer that a defector could even reveal the interior of a shabby Moscow university dormitory:

Her first acquaintance in Moscow was with lice in the dormitory... Her first impression was of mess, dirt, disorganization, crowding and poverty... She shared a room adequate for two or three with five other girls. The furnishings were minimal in quantity and quality—poor cots, chairs, a small table and bad light. The dormitory was dirty, parts of it evil smelling; the Russian students were obviously poor.⁸

Some of the reports suggest specific insights into issues in which scholars in the West were particularly likely to be interested, such as the plight of Soviet Jews, as the following passage reflects:

Agriculture and rural life in the Ukraine, Tadjikistan, and western Byelorussia are described in this report. A young Ukrainian tractor driver and farm machinery mechanic discusses his training... The final part of the report discusses village life in western Byelorussia as seen by one of the few Jewish survivors of the prewar population. He describes his stratagem for avoiding enlistment into the kolkhoz, the apolitical and apathetic life of the villagers, and the undertone of anti-semitism. The prewar synagogue of the village is now a storage shed for grain.⁹

⁷ "The Soviet Bloc: As Reported by Former Nationals, Interview Reports No. 20 – No. 26." Washington, DC: Department of State, Division of External Research and Publications, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, 1962. Accessed at Hoover Institute library. Quotation from Interview Report No. 25, "Aboard a Soviet Freighter" (August 1960).

⁸ Interview Report No. 21, "A Foreign Student at Leningrad University" (March 1959).

⁹ Interview Report No. 24, "Aspects of Soviet Agriculture" (December 1959).

And another topic likely to attract the attention of Western specialists was the Soviet public attitude to the Communist Party leadership, as the following report alludes to:

Kruschev is not taken seriously as a leader of any stature. He is rather the object of disrespect and ridicule. He is occasionally referred to as a "fool" (durak), off-color jokes are passed... students turn off their radios when he is being broadcast, the usual ridicule - composed of punning on his corn program - prevails at the university and several times his appearance in newsreels was met by open laughter from movie theater audiences.... While Stalin had a certain mystical authority, Kruschev is more of a joke.¹⁰

Many of the reports suggest exaggeration to the point of hyperbole when it comes to presenting social and economic conditions in negative terms, causing one to suspect that defectors' descriptions were colored by their own disaffection for the place they had left, as well as by a desire to please debriefers who probably expected to hear (and indeed wished to hear) the reviled Soviet Union described as a grim place. The above passage about the dormitory suggests exaggeration, as does the following:

She had vivid illustrations of class distinction. She saw government spies posing as students. She knew that the crime rate in Leningrad made the entire city, except on the main thoroughfares, unsafe for anyone, especially a girl, after dark. Criminals hung about unafraid in a park near the university. A friend of hers stumbled home one night, her face badly gashed by criminals' knives.¹¹

Although the defectors and debriefers seemed to share an obvious impulse to present the defector's eyewitness descriptions as indicative of a regime in dire straits, the reports also indicate that neither the defectors nor the debriefers wish to give the impression that the regime is seriously threatened by dissent from within, in other

¹⁰Interview Report No. 21.

¹¹Interview Report No. 21.

words, that it is anything but an omnipotent political power that represented the gravest possible threat to the United States. The following passage reflects an attempt to strike a balance between the two impressions:

The anti-regime conversations and activities of Russian students described below... may very well give an exaggerated impression of student hostility and unrest. These occurrences, Marija warned, should be viewed as unique aberrations in an overwhelming pattern of what appears to be uncritical acceptance, loyal patriotism, national pride, and support for the regime.¹²

However, some of the reports remain relatively dispassionate even on topics on which the West delighted in demonstrating Soviet rigidity, such as the elimination of religious expression, as this passage on religion from a report by a Bulgarian defector shows:

Alexander was not aware of any recent drive of the regime against religion. On the contrary, he commented on the regime's growing opportunistic reconciliation with the church. He heard a rumor that the regime "was giving money to the church." He was not himself a churchgoer... His mother who regularly attended church told him that attendance was usually large with a good representation of younger groups.¹³

An additional element that is noteworthy in these defector reports are passages that characterize the defectors reliability and suggest why their testimony should be taken as reliable and credible. For example, the female student who was the source of several of the passages above was presented as all the more reliable for being "a straight 'A' student." And the following passage is representative:

Popular attitudes, labor conditions, and criminal organizations in Soviet Armenia are described in this report. It is based on interviews with three Armenians... All three are young men in their twenties who display a considerable degree of native shrewdness which compensates for their meager

¹² Interview Report No. 21.

¹³ Interview Report No. 23, "Bulgarian Economic and Political Conditions" (October 1959).

education. They appear to be fairly representative of the younger urban workers of Soviet Armenia. Although they may exaggerate the extent of open crime in Yerevan and the impotence or connivance of the militia, their testimony is in conformity with reports from other sources.”¹⁴

The intended purpose of these defector reports contained in the Hoover Institute archive is plainly stated on the cover of each individual report as, “to make available to students of Soviet affairs basic data for their research from sources not readily accessible.” However, it would be virtually impossible to determine to what extent the reports in the collection were cited and used by scholars studying various aspects of life in the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc. One indication that this collection was perhaps only rarely used may be inferred from the premise of a study of defectors produced by 1962 defector Vladislav Krasnov in 1986. Krasnov’s work approaches defectors simply from the standpoint of sorting and categorizing them, according to a range of criteria. He also suggests general explanations for defection, noting how defectors’ motivations shift according to the various social, political, and professional backgrounds in which they fall.¹⁵ The incentive for his approach, and indeed for the project itself, was apparently Krasnov’s surprise to find that so little analysis had been undertaken on defectors as a group.¹⁶ An important source of material for Krasnov was the Hoover

¹⁴Interview Report No. 22, “Social Conditions in Soviet Armenia,” August 1959.

¹⁵Vladislav Krasnov, *Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986). Among the book’s many interesting observations, Krasnov remarks that the phenomenon of defection is an inherent feature of the Soviet totalitarian system and its prevalence is indicative of a system that is “defective.” Thus, he attempts to link the two forms of the word “defect,” although he does so in an approach that is different from my own analysis.

¹⁶David Floyd, “Soviet Defectors – The KGB Wanted List, by Vladislav Krasnov” (Review Essay), *Russia Review* 46:3 (July 1987), 338-339.

Institute archival collection of defector reports, and one might conclude from Krasnov's surprise over the dearth of scholarship on defectors that these had not been very frequently accessed for scholarly research.

Thus, there is no obvious indication that the defector reports that are housed in the Hoover archive, reports that are fascinating in their breadth, variety, and singularity, were ever utilized extensively in the production of scholarly analyses of the Soviet Union. In my research I was able to locate one work that appears to garner a range of defector information to support a broad and informative analysis of the Soviet Union in a way for which defectors - according to the analysis I have presented throughout this dissertation of defectors' value lying in their ability to be eyewitness to things otherwise invisible or incomprehensible - are almost ideally suited. That work is a compilation of notes and analysis on the Soviet Union produced by the Munich based "Radio Liberty" organization, which in the first decades of the Cold War sought to penetrate the Soviet Union with radio broadcasts from the "free world." The work is self-described as "an attempt to find a common denominator for opinions, viewpoints, and beliefs expressed by Soviet citizens, defectors, repatriates, and by knowledgeable Russian-speaking Western travelers to the USSR."¹⁷ The modest quality of this publication - mimeographed pages stapled together along the spine - suggests that its circulation was limited and it remained obscure. However, it conforms very closely to my abstract descriptions earlier in the dissertation of writing based on defector accounts being

¹⁷"Notes on Soviet Attitudes, 1959-1960," Compiled by the Audience Research and Evaluation Department of Radio Liberty (Munich: Radio Liberty, undated).

epistemologically analogous to travel writing, and to geographic writing. In this case, the information in the report is categorized so that the work reads like a succinct cultural and social geography.¹⁸

Ambiguity of Defector Utilization – “Non-intelligence Knowledge”

One of the most ordinary uses for defector information is also one of the most invisible. Since Cold War defectors to the United States were defined within the context of the US Intelligence Community (USIC) and processed by USIC personnel from the very first stages of their transition,¹⁹ it follows that the USIC had “a system to identify and select intelligence information and to address other intelligence concerns with respect to these persons” that was “comprehensive, very active and highly successful.”²⁰ Then CIA Director William Webster testified in 1987 Senate hearings on the *Federal Government’s Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors* that the CIA engaged in a process, which he would only allude to in the most general terms, of narrowing the pool of defectors to a “small fraction... who are of intelligence interest to

¹⁸Sections of the “Notes on Soviet Attitudes” include the following: Standard of Living, Youth, Literature and Art, Press and Radio, Non-Russian Nationalities, Religion, and Émigrés. There is also a brief section titled, “Virgin Lands,” which describes a not very popular program aimed at attracting young people out to populate distant peripheral areas of the Soviet landmass.

¹⁹See “Exhibit No. 21: Statement of Mark Wyatt,” in *Federal Government’s Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 100th Congress, First Session, October 8, 9, 21, 1987 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), 925-939. Wyatt had been a CIA officer assigned to US Embassies overseas, and his testimony in part discussed the initial contacts of defectors with US Embassy and CIA personnel.

²⁰“Testimony of William H. Webster, Director, Central Intelligence Agency,” *Federal Government’s Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 16.

the United States government.” Although the details of how defector information is gathered used remain classified, it is possible to infer through unclassified sources that defector information is systematically solicited according to various dimensions of national security threats that are perceived at any given time. For example, testimony at the same 1987 Senate hearings by Senate Subcommittee Deputy Chief Counsel John Sopko described the USIC’s solicitation of defector information as follows:

The agencies involved in original defector debriefings, by the nature of their work, are preoccupied with the search for ‘tactical’ information. Their needs to prove the bona fides of the defector as well as to obtain time sensitive information are...the highest priorities. They focus on the names and locations of adversary agents, the modus operandi of hostile networks as well as other specific and lethal threats to our national security. As one senior analyst put it, ‘we don’t have the luxury of long-term sociological or politico-economic analysis, we’re always faced with short-term crises.’²¹

More recently produced material demonstrates that defector information continues to be brought to bear on issues of national security, as a 1994 report by the Department of Defense and CIA “Joint Security Commission” shows. This report proffered recommendations on the process of reassessing national security threats and updating proposed responses, and it alluded to the role of defector information:

A critical element necessary to make smart security decisions is reliable, usable, intelligence data defining the threat. Currently, there are efforts underway in the Defense and Intelligence Communities to incorporate threat assessments when developing security policies... Defector information and espionage lessons learned are taken into account...²²

²¹ “Staff Statement by John F. Sopko,” *Federal Government’s Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 161-246, p. 190.

²² *Redefining Security: A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence*. Washington, DC: Joint Security Commission, February 28, 1994. Posted on the website of the Federation of American Scientists, <http://fas.org/sgp/library/isc/>.

During the same Senate hearings at which CIA Director Webster seemed to portray the most limited use of defectors by the USIC, in an apparent effort to defend the CIA's obvious lack of interest in defectors who seemed - to the senators present in the hearings, at least - to be highly unusual people with singular knowledge of obscure events and systems, the overall tone was one of celebrating the great potential value of defectors represented by the information to which they were privy and the insights they possessed by virtue of their singular life experiences. And though no specific references were made of the existing archival repositories of defector reports and whether or not these were being utilized by scholars studying the Soviet Union, the common and emphatic refrain - namely, that defector information was not being incorporated into the overall corpus of American knowledge of the Soviet Union - suggests that those archival collections were remaining virtually untouched. At the same time, there was an undercurrent of an awareness of defectors as a whole being divided into two categories, according to the perceived applicability of their knowledge and experience to a narrowly-conceived set of USIC concerns, as the following passage - a senator's question posed to Deputy Chief Counsel Sopko, whose testimony was quoted above - indicates:

But you also mentioned that the narrow slot of intelligence defectors are generally given more attention and care than the broader group of defectors who don't fit that slot but who may very well also be important officials, former officials in totalitarian regimes. Do you have any recommendations... as to how we go about, as a government, dealing with those individuals that fall into that slot?²³

²³“Opening Statement of Senator Roth,” *Federal Government's Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 12-15, p. 13.

Indeed, it is apparent in these hearings that members of the USIC were acknowledging that “intelligence value” where defectors were concerned was perhaps being too narrowly defined, as this passage from the testimony of General William Odom, Director of the National Security Agency, suggests:

...there is a large ambiguous category which is very close to having something that is worth the intelligence community’s attention but being outside the range of what we might have resources or intense interest in going after, and yet, could benefit enormously both general and open intelligence activities—I say open; that is unclassified knowledge and materials and resources about the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact area—that is not fully or even marginally exploited.²⁴

Against this setting of recognizing distinctions in the degree of tactical intelligence value of defectors, the consensus theme was one of profound dismay that so late in the Cold War such overwhelming evidence and testimony should be collected indicating that defectors as a whole were grossly under-utilized²⁵ and that, insofar as this was a problem with direct national security implications, immediate corrective measures should be taken both by the government and by private organizations with government blessing. Senators and individuals presenting testimony alike rhetorically glorified defectors in terms startlingly consistent with the analysis I have presented in this dissertation of defectors holding the potential to “undo” a regime and being a visual tool by which an invisible place could be penetrated and defectors. Testimony from

²⁴ “Testimony of Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, Director, National Security Agency,” *Federal Government’s Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 28-45, p. 39.

²⁵ John Sopko stated, “The negative effects of the current state of our defector program are numerous. We do not get their insights in a timely and systematic manner,” *Federal Government’s Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 167.

former CIA officer Mark Wyatt called defectors the “Achilles Heel” of the Soviet regime,²⁶ and testimony from former defector Vladislav Krasnov (whose book on defection was mentioned above) deduces that the Soviet response to defection signals the capacity of defectors to inflict profound damage:

Soviet leaders view the problem of defection with utmost alarm. They are always anxious to silence, to downplay, and to distort the true nature of every case of defection as well as to conceal from their adversaries that the problem worries them.²⁷

And as for defectors being a potential window into a closed society, the following passage is highly typical:

It is important to note that the defector offers our country a rare insight into the Soviet Union... Unlike other countries, the communist bloc guards even some of the most innocuous facts and figures behind an all-encompassing veil of its state security apparatus. Defectors offer us a tool to pierce that veil.”²⁸

However, clearly these hearings were struggling with a deep ambiguity. If the US government personnel involved in proposing changes to defector handling were in agreement that the system from which the defectors came – the very system that posed the greatest imaginable set of threats to US national security - concealed even “the most innocuous facts,” this suggests that *any* knowledge of that system was of strategic value to US managers of national security policy. Seemingly to avoid reproaching intelligence officials who acknowledged that they really only cared about debriefing a

²⁶“Exhibit No. 21: Statement of Mark Wyatt,” *Federal Government’s Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 933.

²⁷“Exhibit No. 10: Statement of Vladislav Krasnov,” *Federal Government’s Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 668-684, p. 668.

²⁸“Opening Statement of Senator Nunn,” *Federal Government’s Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 2-4, p. 3.

very limited number of defectors, then, the senators were forced into coining awkward, nearly oxymoronic, phrases about “non-intelligence knowledge,” as the following passage (from the same opening address by Senator Nunn as quoted above) shows:

It is a case of ‘lost opportunities.’ Unfortunately the West, and particularly the United States, has not shown enough interest in much of the non-intelligence knowledge concerning the Soviet system which these individuals offer us... I believe the testimony will show that the defectors’ knowledge of Soviet and East European foreign and domestic policy, political-military doctrine and strategy, as well as their instinctive anticipation of future communist behavior, have been, to a large extent, ignored.

Restoring “Lost Opportunities” - The Jamestown Foundation

By the time the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs met in 1987 to consider the various shortcomings in how Soviet and East Bloc defectors were being handled and whether potentially valuable information was remaining unexploited, unpleasant aspects of defectors’ treatment by their CIA handlers was increasingly being given public exposure. The CIA’s stunningly brutal treatment meted out to the mid 1960s defector Yuri Nosenko, who had been the KGB intelligence officer in charge of monitoring Lee Harvey Oswald during his sojourn in the Soviet Union, were exposed in a popular spy-genre account in 1980.²⁹ And in the fall of 1985 another KGB defector, Vitaly Yurchenko, who had been approached for recruitment by the CIA earlier in the 1980s and had been sequestered and intensively debriefed in a Washington area

²⁹David Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors: Intrigue, Deception, and the Secrets that Destroyed Two of the Cold War’s Most Important Agents* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980). Because Nosenko was suspected of being a false defector, the CIA kept him imprisoned in a spartan detention cell in a secluded rural compound near Washington, DC for three years while officers interrogated him. The story was adapted to a 1986 movie produced by HBO.

safehouse for three months, shocked his CIA handlers by “redefecting.” After supposedly slipping out of a Washington, DC restaurant where he was dining with a CIA officer, Yurchenko apparently made his way to the Soviet Embassy, where he held a press conference a few days later proclaiming his “escape” from the CIA, which he alleged had drugged him overseas and brought him to the United States against his will. Not all defectors were mishandled on such a truly spectacular scale as Nosenko and Yurchenko, but the mishandlings nonetheless were noticed. Arkady Shevchenko, who was a UN Under-Secretary General when he defected in 1978, was working on his autobiography in the early 1980s when he revealed that his CIA handlers had refused his requests to introduce him to women and instead “gave him a telephone book and recommended that the highest-level Soviet official ever to defect call an escort service.”³⁰ He ended up having an affair with a woman who later wrote an embarrassing expose (allegedly, a volume called *Defector's Mistress*), detailing how Shevchenko paid for their liaisons with CIA funds.

It was Arkady Shevchenko's attorney, Bill Geimer, a former State Department official during the Ford Administration, who proposed forming an organization that would be dedicated to improving the ways in which defector information was solicited and utilized and promoting a more satisfactory approach to the myriad practical aspects of defector resettlement – including their employment, citizenship concerns, social networking, finances, and facilitating any publishing projects they wished to

³⁰Thomas Ferraro, “Life After Defecting from the USSR” (United Press International, May 10, 1988).

undertake.³¹ In working with Arkady Shevchenko beginning in 1978 and into the early 1980s, Geimer became dismayed at the limited nature of the CIA's interest in his client, and he was convinced that a defector of Shevchenko's caliber could potentially offer profound insights based on his decades of experience in Soviet foreign policy that might substantially impact the impressions of American scholars and government analysts alike with regard to the conduct of Soviet foreign affairs. Through his years of working with Shevchenko and advising him on everything from finding a wife to obtaining US citizenship to writing his memoirs, Geimer gradually became aware of other Soviet defectors whose handling by the CIA was similarly cursory, as well as disrespectful. Detecting a pattern of the CIA's short-lived and hastily discharged interest in most defectors, Geimer began to conclude that defectors' CIA handlers were overwhelmingly focused on defectors' short-term tactical knowledge of intelligence operations and personnel, especially intelligence penetrations of the United States. Since, only defectors who had themselves been intelligence professionals were likely to have such knowledge, and these individuals were few in number, that left the bulk of defectors – including such high-level political figures as Shevchenko, as well as elite scientists, engineers, and academics – to contend with a rapid-fire debrief by the CIA followed by an abrupt “release” into private life.

The Jamestown Foundation was operating by January 1984, and its defector clientele numbered nine in its first year. By 1986 the organization was working with

³¹ Background on the Jamestown Foundation was shared by Bill Geimer during my research visit to the organization's offices in December 2000, and my summary here consists both of interview material as well as raw notes and office memoranda contained in the files to which Geimer gave me access.

twenty-four defectors, and by the time of Geimer's testimony to the Senate Committee in October 1987 he reported that the Foundation was working with thirty defectors. This included a mixture of defectors who began to work with the Jamestown Foundation within a few months to a year of their defection, along with defectors who had left the Soviet Union as much as twenty or more years previously. The defector client with the most years in the United States was Vladimir Krasnov, who had defected in 1962 from his position as a broadcaster and political writer with Radio Moscow. Krasnov, who like Geimer was appalled at not only the haphazard approach by the US government to extracting and utilizing defector information, but also at simply the absence of discerning written works analyzing defectors and the defection process. He began working with Jamestown during its first year; and the theme of his book *Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List* (discussed earlier in this chapter) - namely, to clarify the range of backgrounds, professions, and motivations represented among defectors so that they might be viewed with less intrigue and sensationalism and they (and the knowledge they offered) might be more productively discerned and incorporated into American life - was wholly consistent with Jamestown's vision for its outreach to defectors.

The more recent defectors had a clear incentive to use the staff at Jamestown to assist them with a range of orientation issues; and even more "settled" defectors quickly recognized that the personnel at the Foundation could help them coordinate publishing or public speaking outlets through which they could share their insights with a broader audience. And indeed, many of the more "settled" defectors in fact appealed to the

Jamestown Foundation precisely because the ways in which they were making a living were so incongruous with their previous professions.³² The “services” provided by Jamestown to the defectors included the following, according to an information summary sheet prepared by Jamestown for public release:

Jamestown staff and volunteers provide the support and services defectors need for their message to reach a wide audience. These services include language training, career counseling, help with resettlement, supplemental income, exposure to the academic and political communities, public relations strategy, and research and editorial assistance.³³

According to Geimer, the Jamestown Foundation and its staff were quickly confronted with more defectors than they could reasonably handle. They also were besieged with requests from legal Russian émigrés who hoped for assistance finding employment or locating interested publishers for their memoirs; however, the Foundation determined that it would only work with individuals whose departure from the Soviet Union had been an illegal one, according to the Soviet legal system for processing emigrants. This was a key distinction that Jamestown made in defining defection. Geimer noted that the variety of defectors that appealed to them for assistance included everyone from Soviet sailors who jumped ship to Russian Jews seeking asylum to ballet dancers and athletes to doctors, engineers, and political figures. Additionally, many legal Soviet émigrés contacted the offices inquiring about assistance. Geimer resolved that Jamestown would have to find some way of

³²Geimer was readily able to relate stories of defectors who had been engineers in Soviet research facilities before their defection working as street vendors selling ice-cream, or of former diplomatic defectors driving taxis.

categorizing defectors, hoping that in the process they could develop a coherent policy to govern what defector clients they would and would not accept. In his 1987 Senate testimony, Geimer described Jamestown policy to differentiate defectors among four categories.³⁴ The first included laborers and enlisted soldiers, such as stowaways on merchant ships or deserters from the Soviet war in Afghanistan. He stated flatly that the Jamestown Foundation would not work with such people, and he described these types of defectors as having little relevance and drawing little public interest beyond simply a one-day media event. In the second category he placed “people from ordinary occupations with transferable skills” and included scientists, ballet dancers, musicians, and athletes in this category. Like the first category, Jamestown declines working with such defectors except in a few instances. Geimer indicated that Jamestown regards such defectors as people simply wishing to practice their profession in a less restricted environment, and he suggested that he personally believed such defectors to be more adaptable and in less need of resettlement help. Thirdly, Geimer noted the defector category of intelligence officers. He described these defectors as living “quietly” under new identities given them by their government handlers. He noted that Jamestown works with only a few such defectors, because they prefer to keep a lower profile with regard to associating with groups through which their identity as defectors would be readily noticed. Many such defectors fear reprisals from the Soviets, which could

³³This was excerpted from “Jamestown Foundation: Background Information,” contained in the Foundation archives, Washington, DC.

³⁴Testimony of William W. Geimer, President, Jamestown Foundation,” *Federal Government’s Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 100-115, pp. 101-102.

include physical harm. The fourth category of defectors includes a mixture of people whom Jamestown judged to be of continuing value and potential interest to the American public and American policymakers alike. In this category were political officers, government bureaucrats, and diplomats, as well as university professors, journalists, attorneys, and advanced graduate students. It was towards such professional defectors, who were situated in backgrounds outside of traditional intelligence but with political, public policy, and foreign policy relevance nonetheless, that the Jamestown Foundation aimed its services.

It is interesting to see Geimer's allowance of the moniker of "defectors" for prestigious athletes, dancers, and scientists. This accords with my analysis of defection in Chapter Two as an "un-doing," and my deduction that a defector can be any person who by their exit would damage the regime they are leaving behind, whether that damage is potential material damage from the loss of technology taken by the defector or restricted information conveyed by the defector, or rhetorical damage to the regime's prestige by the loss of a celebrated member of a professional or artistic community in which the regime takes particular international pride. However, his refusal for Jamestown to work with such defectors is really mystifying, as it disallows any possible value that knowledge of the inner workings of these sectors of Soviet culture or science might have held for the American public. Indeed, bearing in mind he is referring to a group that included such figures as Mikhail Barishnikov, it is astounding that Geimer could toss off such a group as simply "ordinary" with "transferable skills."

Having determined to only work with a particular set of defectors, Jamestown personnel compiled a form for the systematic assembling of defector backgrounds. Appendix A shows a copy of a blank form, and Jamestown files contained completed forms for all the defector clients. As the form suggests, the Jamestown staff sought to organize not only defectors' backgrounds and needs, but also their future aspirations and what projects they hoped to undertake in terms of writing, consulting, or public speaking. Also indicated on the form is a place to denote security concerns of the defectors. Because of the personal security concerns of some of the defectors, who feared that the Soviets might send KGB assassins to murder them, Geimer established a relationship with several FBI agents, including David Major, whose duties in the 1980s pertained to the oversight of at least one defector, KGB intelligence officer Stanislav Levchenko, whom the Jamestown Foundation began to work with in 1986, three years after his initial defection. Levchenko was one of the few defectors from the intelligence officer category discussed above that the Foundation agreed to work with.

Although a private organization, the Jamestown Foundation was from the outset conceived of as complementary to US government programs for defector management. In part this was necessary because many Jamestown defector clients simultaneously continued a separate relationship with government personnel, including FBI and CIA officers. Moreover, Jamestown's assistance to high-profile defectors, such as Shevchenko, was instrumental in those defectors receiving heightened media exposure, which in turn sparked greater government interest in ensuring that defector handling be better managed to minimize scandals and embarrassments. As Appendix B – an

undated "Fact Sheet" on its "Defector Resettlement" program - suggests, the Jamestown Foundation was consulted extensively by Congress to "submit recommended changes to existing laws and policies," and the embarrassing redefection in 1985 of Yuri Nosenko was one stimulus for this outreach. Jamestown records that I reviewed included extensive correspondence during 1986 between Geimer and Senate Deputy Chief Counsel John Sopko on the range of issues that should be explored by a Congressional committee appointed to reviewing the matter. Among other things, Geimer was advocating that exceptions to citizenship laws be implemented to facilitate defectors attaining US citizenship. Geimer was adamant in condemning the irony that some of the most sought-after defectors were individuals whose elite status in the Soviet Union included Communist Party membership, but these individuals' quest for US citizenship was actually impeded by that fact, since US immigration law doubled the waiting period from five years to ten years for individuals with confirmed membership in an overseas Communist Party.³⁵ In his extensive consultations with Sopko and other Congressional personnel, Geimer also recommended that a "defector's bill of rights" be written and adopted as a matter of US policy. The success of Jamestown's efforts to at least significantly raise the awareness of the government's defector mishandling and to bring about steps to improve it is indicated by the congratulatory letter that Geimer and his staff received from President Reagan in March 1986, which appears as Appendix C.

³⁵The defectors whom the Jamestown Foundation worked with were all processed for citizenship under Public Law 110 (PL 110), which also applied to other émigrés from the Soviet Bloc.

Geimer was one of a number of voices who expressed the view that one problem with the US government's resettlement of defectors lay in the fact that fundamentally many of the resettlement personnel were highly dubious about the quality of the defectors' characters. In short, the defectors were consciously or subconsciously regarded as "defective" people. In his 1987 Senate testimony, former CIA officer Mark Wyatt stated that handlers' "misgivings stem from the unfortunate word defector—literally a person who abandons loyalty, duty, and principle."³⁶ And Geimer believed that the CIA's crass handling of Arkady Shevchenko's request for social companionship stemmed from a basic lack of respect of him as a person who would betray his country, despite his professional accomplishments as a diplomat and his professed willingness to aid the United States.³⁷ But ironically, it was not only the government personnel who seemed to regard defectors with a jaundiced eye. Geimer also testified that the Jamestown Foundation's difficulties in finding academic employment for some of its defector clients who were highly accomplished scholars stemmed from an impression held by most of the academic departments with which Jamestown conferred that, even with their qualifications that were impressive in several cases, the defectors were not desirable faculty members. As Geimer explained:

³⁶"Exhibit No. 21: Statement of Mark Wyatt," in *Federal Government's Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 930.

³⁷Geimer contrasted the CIA's enabling of Shevchenko to retain the services of prostitutes with his own "matchmaking" on behalf of Shevchenko that resulted in his marriage.

But there is also a bias. There is a feeling that a defector is not an objective seeker of the truth. He is vengeful. He wants to strike back at his former masters, therefore, what he says is unreliable from an academic standpoint.³⁸

Indeed, not only did Geimer face resistance from academic departments with which he consulted in his efforts to find meaningful professional affiliations for his defector clients, contrastingly he faced requests from private sector firms specializing in various kinds of scientific research to refer defector experts from various scientific fields. Geimer summed up his difficulties “selling” defectors to academia as follows:

I think there is a feeling in some individuals, the resident Sovietologists whose knowledge of the Soviet Union is based on a few trips there and a lot of books, and they are not that anxious to see someone come on the faculty whose views are rooted in his own experiences.³⁹

Moreover, Geimer noted that a number of academic departments stated flatly that affiliating with defectors would place in jeopardy any existing cooperative agreements between their universities and East Bloc universities. With private sector companies seeking scientific research, however, the problem was rather different:

I have been confronted by representatives of industry saying, if you come across these people, we would like to know about it. We would like to find out how our adversaries go about engineering. Their universities are different. Their skills in titanium surprised us. How do they produce airplanes? What are they doing in space?⁴⁰

Geimer summed up both issues, both that of promoting the professional qualities of defectors to a sector that saw them as unsuitable and that of handling requests for

³⁸“Testimony of William W. Geimer, President, Jamestown Foundation,” *Federal Government's Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 106.

³⁹“Testimony of William W. Geimer,” 106.

⁴⁰“Testimony of William W. Geimer,” 110.

defector expertise in professional fields outside of those represented among the defector clients that Jamestown represented, as issues of “marketing.” He was unwavering in his assertion that US government agencies and private groups alike, which held a stake in seeing defectors utilized in a way most beneficial to overall US national security, were falling short in their efforts to exploit defectors in a positive way. He stated: “...our marketing...of those people is very poor. Not just Jamestown Foundation, but the United States society doesn’t know who is available.”

Conclusion:

During much of the Cold War, Soviet and East Bloc defectors to the United States appeared to garner more attention for their abilities to tell sensationalistic stories than for the full range of information they could potentially offer to the US intelligence community to use in managing the US-Soviet rivalry. Granted, some agencies recognized the potential to formally collect and compile defector information that extended beyond simply tactical intelligence information, and the archival collections such as the one at Hoover Institute are a manifestation of a good-faith attempt to bridge the gap between defectors and American scholarship on the Soviet Union.

It was not until fairly late in the Cold War that key aspects of the mishandling of the defector experience began to emerge. First, it was evident that instead of being incorporated into serious scholarship or applied to the various vexing dimensions of managing the national security concerns vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, defector “knowledge” (apart from that confined to the classified realm of use by the intelligence

community) was mostly brought to bear in the production of popular spy genre books. Instead of presenting defectors as individuals with singular access and insights to a closed and ill-understood system, these accounts concentrated on the sensational aspects of defectors being embroiled in espionage activity. And secondly, several notorious embarrassments involving defectors - ranging from a disastrous redefection to a defector paying prostitutes with CIA funds to a defector being imprisoned for three years as a gross infringement of his human rights – worked to convince public officials and private figures alike that changes in defector handling were not only desirable but also imperative.

In part, the Jamestown Foundation was clearly aimed at fulfilling a niche created by the CIA's rigid fixation on what amounted to "intelligence." "Intelligence" can simply be construed as knowledge collected for and put to a strategic use. One would expect that a conflict as overarching and systemic as the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union would be managed by intelligence professionals who would recognize that countering a massive and multi-faceted threat might best be achieved by soliciting a wide range of information from every possible potential source. Instead, the intelligence officials' statements I examined indicated that they saw the collection of wide-ranging information from defectors a luxury that they frankly did not have the time or interest to bother with. It is no wonder that the US Intelligence Community continues to rack up one gross failure after another, with that kind of shortsightedness. It is also little wonder that a private group such as the Jamestown Foundation emerged to fill a vacuum left by an intelligence community to whom defectors were only so

many "lost opportunities." However, the Jamestown Foundation appeared to be more successful in the logistics of defector management and in garnering defectors' short-term speaking and publishing opportunities than in fostering on a sustained level serious scholarship about a full spectrum of issues relating to Soviet politics, culture, and society. The fact that Jamestown determined early on to eliminate from its clientele a wide swathe of defectors with singular backgrounds in the Soviet artistic, athletic, and scientific communities indicates that it, too, defined a set of parameters for judging defector value, albeit seemingly broader parameters than the CIA. Indeed it the elimination of these defectors from consideration to include in its clientele is somewhat counterintuitive, based upon my review of Jamestown information that strongly stressed in a general sense the need to recognize that valuable information could come from unexpected sources where defectors were concerned.

The Jamestown Foundation files contained several reports consisting of insightful analysis on defectors, which never received wider circulation beyond simply government circles. These, and much of the other evidence within the Jamestown body of analysis on defectors, accorded with many features of my own analysis on defectors. Particularly notable was the notion confirmed by Jamestown that defectors could be the source of the Soviet Union's "undoing." Quoting a defector, one-time Jamestown Foundation Research Director Etienne Huygens' report titled "The Notion of Defector: Attempt to Define and Compare," stated: "For the Soviet regime, a defection is like a hemorrhage to a hemophiliac. For the United States, on the other hand, it is like an injection of antibiotics that provide it with greater resistance, if not total immunity to

Soviet propaganda.”⁴¹ And another defector quoted in Huygens report invoked the “Achilles heel” metaphor, also seen earlier in this chapter, to describe defectors: “One of the not-well-known organic weaknesses of communist regimes is their rulers’ almost paranoid fear that their subjects will somehow escape or ‘defect.’ The fear of defection is the Achilles heel of the communist rulers.”

In many different respects, my research showed that the Jamestown Foundation’s “definition” of defectors was consistent with the theoretical approach to defining defection that I have adopted in this dissertation. For example, as I just recapitulated, it recognized that defectors represented a vulnerability of the Soviet system, a means to bring about its “undoing;” and following that, it included among defectors such cultural figures such as elite dancers and athletes (although it declined to work with them). It recognized the tendency for Americans to consciously or unconsciously treat defectors as “defective” people. It vigorously promoted the idea that defector information, insofar as it was oriented to a *place* that itself posed a sweeping national security threat, was not being sought or utilized effectively enough by Americans purporting to design the US response to that threat. And Jamestown asserted that it would not work with legal émigrés, since the illegality of a defector’s passage out of the Soviet Union was key to that person being a defector. This accords to my analysis of one territorial aspect of defection, namely, that it presumes to breach a border that is normatively unbreachable.

⁴¹“The Notion of Defector: Attempt to Define and Compare,” an unpublished Jamestown Foundation report prepared by Etienne Huygens. This report is contained as “Exhibit No. 9” in *Federal Government’s Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 605-667; quotation on 609.

However, the Jamestown Foundation's working understanding of defection during its heyday of managing defector clientele seems also to have differed in at least two important respects from what I presented theoretically. First, it was clear to me that Geimer himself regarded defection as an act that could occur in one direction only – from “East to West,” and he connected this assumption to the idea of defection being an illegal emigration. He noted that since there was never any “Iron Curtain” preventing people from leaving the United States to go to the Soviet Union or Eastern Bloc, it would be inappropriate to name any Western people defectors; he preferred to simply call them traitors or cowards. Of course, the main difference between his approach to and my own would lie in the notion of what constitutes a breach of a normative boundary. Secondly, the Jamestown Foundation, as indicated in a written report by its one-time research director Etienne Huygens, seemed to concur with one of its defector clients, author Vladislav Krasnov, that “defection is a uniquely 20th century phenomenon, characteristic of totalitarian communistic regimes.”⁴²

It is this second difference that suggests the most profound implications for this dissertation. Surely even a superficial and cursory review suggests that defection is a concept whose interconnections with other complex ideas such as treason and loyalty give it a historical scope far beyond simply the 20th century Cold War. And relatedly, even declaring with confidence what they believed the definition and scope of defection to be is indicative of these specialists' substantial efforts towards trying to analyze

⁴²Quotation from Krasnov, 12; also quoted in “The Notion of Defector: Attempt to Define and Compare,” an unpublished Jamestown Foundation report prepared by Etienne Huygens. This report is contained as “Exhibit No. 9” in *Federal Government's Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors*, 605-667.

defection and situate it relative to some of the most influential discourses of the 20th century. Yet, apart from the materials I have drawn from in this chapter, defection has remained remarkably unexamined, in terms of its abstract nature, and some of the best efforts to meticulously examine it remain buried in files, archives, and the Congressional record. Even with the recognition that defection is deeply embedded in both intelligence and national security discourse – fields which themselves have a long history and conceptual evolution, as I have tried to show - an attitude towards defection has prevailed that renders it resistant to systematic attempts to theorize it.

NAME	EMPLOYMENT
STATUS	FAMILY
LANGUAGES	EDUCATION
RESIDENCE	SECURITY CONCERNS
FINANCIAL STATUS	DATE OF BIRTH

JAMESTOWN INVOLVEMENT

DATE OF INITIAL CONTACT:

REFERENCE:

RESETTLEMENT:

RELOCATION

EMPLOYMENT

EDUCATION

INSURANCE

PERSONAL

HOUSING

FINANCIAL AID

CITIZENSHIP

PROJECTS:

PUBLIC SPEAKING

MEDIA APPEARANCES

DEBRIEFING

GOVERNMENT BRIEFINGS

PUBLICATIONS

BOOKS

Appendix A: Jamestown Foundation client information sheet to gather and organize information on individual defector clients.

FACT SHEET

DEFECTOR RESETTLEMENT

- * Resettlement of a significant number of defectors from the USSR and Eastern Europe has been undertaken by the Jamestown Foundation, a tax exempt organization.
- * The principle objective of the Jamestown Foundation is to improve Western understanding of the Soviet Union. The method used to achieve this goal is to make available to the public the knowledge provided by high level defectors.
- * Jamestown staff and volunteers provide the support services defectors need for their message to reach a wide audience. These services include language training, career counseling, help with resettlement, supplemental income, exposure to the academic and political communities, public relations strategy and research and editorial assistance.
- * Jamestown was founded in 1984 by William Geimer, a Washington, D.C. attorney who represented former Soviet diplomat Arkady Shevchenko for six years after his defection in 1978. Shevchenko was Undersecretary General of the United Nations and a personal advisor to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. After a long, difficult adjustment, he has emerged as the free world's foremost authority of Soviet affairs. His bestselling book, Breaking With Moscow, was excerpted in Time magazine and was the subject of a feature on "Sixty Minutes." Its publication has caused more public relations damage to the Kremlin than anything since the Korean airliner shootdown.
- * We are now assisting 20 Soviet bloc defectors, 12 of whom are writing books, opeds, and magazine articles. If funding becomes available, we will begin a Jamestown publication which would feature their writing. We have launched a project to encourage defectors to focus on the international debates over the critical issues of SDI and Central America. When the funds are available, we plan to launch an in-house speaker's bureau to increase the number of their public appearances. The Jamestown Foundation also conducts research on the subject of defection, to include a listing of those who have defected.
- * Following the Yurchenko affair in November 1985, the Foundation was asked by Congress to submit recommended changes to existing laws and policies. Coupled with an expansion of activity, this also led to a significant increase in media exposure.
- * Present plan call for an increase in public appearances across the US as well as additional media coverage in this country and abroad.
- * Security for this highly vulnerable, but very valuable, group of clients has become a concern. The Jamestown Foundation has met with representatives of the FBI to discuss the likelihood of targetting by hostile intelligence of the Foundation or individuals associated with it.
- * There is evidence that the activities of the Foundation and perhaps the identity of some of its American supporters are known to the Soviet Union.

Appendix B: Jamestown Foundation "Fact Sheet: Defector Resettlement"

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 26, 1986

I am delighted to express my appreciation to all the officers and sponsors of the Jamestown Foundation, especially William Geimer, its founder and president. Mr. Geimer understands that key Soviet-bloc officials who renounce the comforts and privileges of their rank and seek asylum and a life of freedom in the United States often need special help, guidance, and friendship. He also understands that their first-hand knowledge and special insights are an invaluable resource for the entire Free World.

Arkady Shevchenko, Zdzislaw Rurarz, and Vladimir Sakharov are only three of the more well-known recruits to the cause of freedom who have benefitted from the work of the Jamestown Foundation. Mr. Shevchenko was a highly placed Soviet diplomat working in the United Nations Secretariat; Dr. Rurarz was a Polish diplomat and economist working in the Far East, and Mr. Sakharov was a Soviet diplomat and KGB general working in the Middle East. Like many others, they were fortunate indeed that the Jamestown Foundation was there to help after they had made the difficult and dangerous decision to break with a system in which they had lost faith and throw in their lot with the forces of freedom.

It is worth noting that the services the Jamestown Foundation provides are of a kind only the private sector can offer effectively. It not only helps these very special emigres to adjust to life in a free society, it encourages and assists them to put their knowledge and talents to work in advancing the cause of freedom.

To this great and noble cause the Jamestown Foundation and its supporters continue to make an indispensable contribution. For that you have my warm commendation and my good wishes. All Americans, indeed all who love freedom, have reason to be grateful for what you have accomplished and will accomplish in the years ahead. God bless you all.

Ronald Reagan

Appendix C: Congratulatory letter from President Ronald Reagan to the Jamestown Foundation.

Conclusion

It should not be surprising that political geographers in the last ten or fifteen years have given attention to the relationship between national security discourse and some of the main themes of political geography – boundaries, boundary construction, and geopolitics. This is evident in recent work by David Campbell, Neil Smith, John Agnew, Gerard O’Tuathail, and Simon Dalby.¹ Perhaps this has been a consequence of the erosion of Cold War discourse and the removal of one of the most formal and familiar feature of the Cold War, its rigidly guarded boundaries between and among political territories. It is almost impossible to reflect upon or theorize security, however, without thinking about boundaries. We secure ourselves from something outside or beyond, and this begins fundamentally with our physical selves isolated by (as stated in the poem that appears in the dissertation’s Preface) a “hide” from the forces in the world that would threaten our bodily security. Indeed, it is possible to understand from that poem that boundaries, at all scales from that our physical bodies to that of the nation-state, are both barriers and membranes. They are barriers insofar as they shield what is within from rampant penetration or unwanted exposure; but they are membranes insofar as they present a structure for passage according to particular formalized processes. But although scholarly interest in integrating key aspects of geographic

¹ In addition to Campbell, *Writing Security*; Smith, *American Empire*; Agnew, “Mapping Power Beyond State Boundaries;” and O’Tuathail and Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse;” Simon Dalby, “American Security Discourse: The Persistence of Geopolitics,” *Political Geography Quarterly* 9:2 (April 1990), 171-188, notes that US foreign policy perceives and articulates threats to national security in terms of how it perceives political power to be organized and diffused geographically across the globe, vis-à-vis US territory and US interests in territory.

discourse with the definition and articulation of national security – both conceptually in public discourse and procedurally in political practices – seems to be on the increase, the move to seriously examine how intelligence discourse is also implicated in this relationship between geography and security seems not to have yet occurred. It is this “niche” that I hope this work has begun to address.

At the outset of this dissertation, I indicated that my central research problem consists of “how to integrate separate literatures, and indeed whole separate discourses that have long been regarded as quite unrelated, for the purpose of identifying and expressing new insights about each.” These three separate discourses are territoriality, national security, and the intelligence discourse that produces the concept of defection. In Western culture, all three of these discourses are deeply enmeshed in the emergence of the modern state. Thus, I have chosen to present my analysis of the interrelationships among them by considering the historical trajectory of the three in Anglo-American thought, entering that continuum at a selection of key geohistorical junctures at which the three themes were the most strongly intertwined and problematized.

The first of those junctures was the time of the Protestant Reformation, a time that saw the modern state begin to emerge alongside three crucial shifts. First among these is the rise of political territoriality, the notion that political power and political identity could be “contained” within a set of stable territorial confines presided over by a single authority. During the Reformation, as Protestant England’s conflict with Catholic Europe (primarily Spain) broadened and sharpened to a pervasive, all-inclusive meta-narrative of moral clash between good and evil, the embodiment of England’s

Queen Elizabeth in the terrain of the English countryside-as-landscape, through various practices of iconography and pageantry, was instrumental to transforming that cultural terrain into a political landscape. This was in stark contrast with earlier conceptions of power, as primarily vested in the physical person of a monarch, whose geographical expanse of authority fluctuated and was more tenuous. The second shift at the time of the Reformation was the surge in geographical exploration of the globe, and the development of the idea that the enterprise of global exploration might be a stage on which a competitive discourse of geopolitics among Europe's political power rivals might be played out. Out of the enterprise of geographical exploration flowed a set of powerful narratives about defining and systematizing distant places, making them visible and legible by imposing upon them the rational practices of observation and description. Third, the period saw the shift in the practices of espionage; where before they were oriented toward the protection of individual persons of authority and carried out in a setting of court intrigue, they now were more integrated into the fabric of a state and concerned with the security of state territory alongside and in addition to the personal safety of a monarch.

I have argued that the coincidence of these three themes in the geohistorical setting of early modern Europe points compellingly to the possibility of unexplored interrelationships among them. In particular, it seems fairly obvious that both geographic exploration and intelligence practice rest on the same epistemology of vision and visual tools for establishing "truth." This observation not only suggests that the contemporary intelligence profession has looked to the wrong sources in attempting

to explicate its own history and theory, but it also indicates how a notion such as defection, which is most strongly situated within intelligence parlance, can and should be approached as a *geographic* concept dependent upon sets of assumptions about territories divided by normatively fortified boundaries.

The second geohistorical juncture that I considered was early colonial America, which experienced a transference of a range of English cultural ideas and practices to the perceived *tabula rasa* of the North American wilderness. The ways in which Puritans conceived of and articulated threats accorded with the language of a strictly binary and pervasive moral conflict between good and evil. The physical landscape itself was the source of threats to colonial security – vast space, unmanageable distance, and “nature” with its host of imperiling beasts, diseases, and wild men – and these evils were expressed metaphorically in the Puritan jeremiads.

I extend my observations about the Puritan articulation of threat and the relationship of threat and physical terrain to the third geohistorical juncture, the first generation following the American Revolution. This was a period in which the continental terrain began to be transformed into American territory, through a variety of devices from exploration and mapping to literary device, iconography, and geographically scalar political representation. With nature itself continuing to threaten American security, by virtue of the sheer domination of an expanse that was sketchily known and difficult to interpret, the idea that individuals more closely allied to nature – that is, native Americans – could cross over and assist the American territorial enterprise strongly suggests a practice that we would recognize today as defection.

Against this backdrop of territorial consolidation, moreover, this same period also saw the resurgence of strident political rhetoric delineating the normative moral character of American political identity and the nature of threats to that identity and to American political security itself. Not only was this rhetoric expressly patterned after the Puritan jeremiads of an earlier time, it also eerily presaged the expression of threats to national security that were to follow in the 20th century.

My fourth geohistorical juncture is the period of the early 20th century, an era that saw America, made territorially complete by the closure of the frontier, moving from a position of geopolitical isolation to one of geopolitical centrality. Although American territory appeared, cartographically, to be complete, changes that were underway in technology, social practice, immigration, and urbanization meant that the construction of American territorial identity was just beginning. One conservative women's group, the Daughters of the American Revolution, was influential in fostering American identity through a range of projects. These included promoting the construction of roadways both as heritage objects and as tools to ensure national defense, promoting the roadside landscape as a setting for commemorative iconography that would inscribe particular narratives about the early American republic, aggressively educating non-Anglo immigrants in how to assimilate to Anglo-American citizenship norms, and condemning the incursion into American culture of foreign ideologies, which the DAR argued included pacifism, "internationalism," and communism. Through some of its commemorative projects, the DAR was able to powerfully define and convey a set of qualities that ennobled Americans and native Americans, and these

qualities pertained in many cases to the shifting of loyalty to the American enterprise of transforming terrain into territory. Thus, without perhaps consciously aiming to, the DAR helped to prepare early 20th century Americans to understand a concept that would shortly loom very large in American political discourse – defection.

As my argument reaches the period of the Cold War, the importance of visual epistemology to national security and state territoriality becomes even more apparent. Considering the security cultures and practices that began to emerge in this period allows one to appreciate more fully the thorny, if not paradoxical, relationship between visual transparency and the state: territorial sovereignty demands it, while national security resists it. At the same time, such a consideration helps clarify some important resonances with past geohistorical junctures. The Cold War as an all-inclusive global meta-narrative with glaringly articulated moral overtones strikingly parallels the Elizabethan “Cold War.” And the ways in which US commentators articulated the communist threat as both insidious and looming utilized both the rhetorical cadences and metaphors of Puritan preachers and their successors in the early American republic, such as Jedidiah Morse.

I shift my argument to the Cold War binary division and sharp adversarial relationship between North and South Korea. Chronically manipulated as it has been by the rival superpowers and by imperial powers during its modern period, divided Korea is an ideal platform on which the Western discourses of territoriality, security, and intelligence/defection can be both examined and critiqued. Here, considering the DMZ between the two Koreas itself as a contested space of tourism and voyeuristic

surveillance, as well as of “cold war,” emphasizes the relationship of visual practice and of movement to professional intelligence discourse, of which defection is a key component.

Finally, my argument shifts back to the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and I end by examining the practice of defection and how it both helps and hinders the intelligence process. There I attempt to address the disjuncture between, on the one hand, the abstract recognition on the part of the US government and intelligence community that defectors are a valuable source of information, and, on the other hand, the tendency in practice to utilize only a small number of defectors in very specific and tactical ways to help address various short-term operational predicaments. Although defectors were widely hailed during the Cold War both as sources of essential and wide-ranging information pertaining to the “enemy” and as strategic instruments for the long-term management of the rivalry, the ways in which defectors were processed and debriefed fell far short of rhetorical aspirations.

People who have worked most closely with defectors in the US security community and are most genuinely concerned about defectors seem much closer to a theoretical awareness of defection and its potential implications for national security. However, efforts to more satisfactorily define and analyze defection have been hampered by these individuals’ analytical tendency to work backwards from the actual defectors with whom they work with, since within the dominant intelligence discourse

all of them have already been defined as defectors. Not surprisingly, this led to the conclusion that defection is a “uniquely 20th century phenomenon.”

The course of my argument in this dissertation has progressed rather differently. Rather than begin my analysis with the contemporary manifestation of defection, I have begun by scrutinizing the etymology of the concept and interrogating the possible linkages between the ways in which the family of terms of which defection is a part have functioned in Anglo-American parlance. This not only begins to reveal functional defectors at geohistorical junctures far afield from the 20th century Cold War (to which many believe defection to be restricted), but it also enriches and historicizes our understanding of the 20th century Cold War intelligence discourse in which defectors are most commonly situated, by revealing that discourse to be both a consequence *of* and deeply embedded *in* related discourses of territoriality and national security. These discourses, as I have shown, have long and complex histories. If one accepts, then, that defection is deeply enmeshed in these two bodies of thought that have unfolded over the course of centuries of Anglo-American geographic thought and cultural and social history, suggesting that defection is a uniquely 20th century phenomenon becomes nothing short of preposterous.

“For...we have twelve that sail into foreign countries under the names of other nations (for our own we conceal), who bring us the books and abstracts, and patterns of experiments of all other parts. These we call merchants of light.”

Francis Bacon, *New Atlantis*

“A free nation with accurate knowledge of the world around it, particularly of hostile and secretive closed societies, is more likely to survive and prosper than one that relies on wishful thinking.”

Ray Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA*

The two passages above span some 350 years. Yet it is clear that the normative ideal of state practice suggested in the first quotation, a description proffered by a state official from Francis Bacon's mythic Bensalem summarizing the means used by the state to maintain its strategic advantage, remains essentially unchanged in the second quotation. It seems apparent that the contemporary intelligence profession owes considerable debt to the early modern and Enlightenment discourses of visual reconnaissance, surveillance, and rational evaluation and reporting. These themes all continue to undergird the contemporary discourses of intelligence and national security, just as they have fortified Western geographic discourse since the early modern period.

The existing literature on the origins of the U.S. intelligence community makes practically no reference to the discourses that give it much of its theoretical foundation. Moreover, it pays insufficient attention to the extent to which its existence is a product of the modern nation-state system. This suggests that “intelligence studies,” as a field, is sealed somewhat precariously in a vacuum. Substituting history or tactics for theory, the field of “intelligence studies” takes only two tacks. It promotes debates and reviews of case-specific operational tactics and methods or it meticulously recounts the chains of causality through which the monumental events of the mid 20th century produced a threat climate in which the only plausible response entailed the emergence of twin

massive sets of powerful intelligence organizations, confronting each other across the Cold War rhetorical and territorial divide.

I have tried to go beyond simply demonstrating the intellectual and theoretical legacy from geographic discourse upon national security discourse and the intelligence discourse that produces defection. When perceptions of threat are elucidated from within territorial political narratives, where multiple themes of identity and difference are present, the result tends to be the production of a security and threat discourse that depends upon binary opposition for its coherence. This binary construct then becomes a convenient device in an adversarial relationship, a means for inscribing difference, but at the same time one that each adversarial party can use to project the identity of the other.

“By all tradition, the war between the sacred and the profane accents the absolute, unbridgeable difference between the two. They confront each other not as greater and lesser antagonists, but as diametrically opposite ways of perception.”

Sacvan Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad*

“Yet enemies who occupy the same posts and are sworn to the same tasks often mirror one another.”

Michael Burns, *The Debatable Land*

This metaphor of the mirror still carries great power (Figure 9.1). The notion that intelligence adversaries share more similarities with one another than either does with his respective broader social group is a common one in intelligence literature, and indeed it has even been applied to intelligence practitioners of. Though it resonates with the present, in the passage above Michael Burns was describing Frances

Walsingham and his Spanish nemesis Cardinal Mendoza. Indeed, the title of Burns' book, *The Debatable Land*, came from a local name for a "lost domain" in the border regions between England and Scotland that came to be a "refuge of men from broken clans who no longer had a chieftain."² Burns uses the term as symbolic of spies themselves, and of the "psychological regions they inhabit." Spies and defectors alike, in one territorial setting or another, continue to inhabit the same "psychological region." It is for this reason that the end of the binary discourse of Cold War adversariality could so quickly transform once bitterly adversarial relationships to warm and congenial ones (Figure 9.2). Defectors, then, seem to inhabit space at different scales. At the broader geographic scale, they will never "fit" when they cross to the opposing side – they will always remain "defective." But at another scale, defectors perhaps remain forever in the same place.

²Burns, 44.




Figure 9.1. “Spy Meets Spy” conveys the mirror-like opposition between Anglo-American intelligence operatives on one side and Soviet intelligence on the other, which pervaded Cold War intelligence discourse. (Image courtesy of Keith Melton, Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies. Used by permission.)



Figure 9.2. Retired FBI counterintelligence official David Major (wearing glasses) with retired KGB Colonel Oleg Kalugin, conducting tourists on a bus tour of espionage-related sites in the Washington, DC area. (Photo courtesy of Cindy Kwitchoff, Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies. Used by permission.)

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